Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), light carriers CVL als basis ipv LHD

Gestart door Harald, 13/02/2017 | 14:49 uur

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 23/10/2017 | 10:39 uur
Nou ja, gezien onze samenwerking met de Britten op het gebied van Mariniers en het recente beleid van de Britse marine denk ik dat er daar wel ruimte voor is ontstaan. We gaan tenslotte zelf ook geen strand invasie  meer ondernemen?

Dezelfde reden als waarom de Doorman een dek heeft lijkt me genoeg reden om hier 2 dedicated CVL's voor te bemannen, tegelijkertijd hiermee de Dman afstoten, evenals de Rotterdam. Beide CVL's hoeven niet te worden uitgerust met bijvoorbeeld F-35B's. Dit hoeft maar 1 pool te zijn, die samen met een helicopter pool afwisselt naargelang missie/inzet.

De taak lijkt me vrij simpel, wij begeven ons overal op zee, een clubje vliegtuigen bij de hand lijkt me een goed idee.
Dit is allemaal in het verlengde van mijn visie waarin het aantal buitenlandse safari's wordt gereduceerd tot 0 en we met de Marine en Luchtmacht ons internationaal kunnen laten gelden. Landmacht is bedoelt voor Europa en Nederland.

Dus de CVL's worden dan net als de HMS Ocean nu hoofdzakelijk als Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) gebruikt, eventueel ASW/ASuW helikopters en misschien cross decking met F-35B's.
A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Harald

Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 23/10/2017 | 09:37 uur
Op het moment zitten we met een boot welke eigelijk niets meer kan en ons vleugellam maakt, de Dman is een ramp voor de marine, want ze 'hebben' hem nu, maar 'hebben' er vrij weinig aan aangezien hij wel zoveel taken heeft dat de hele bevoorrading niet meer als topprioriteit bestaat.

Gedeeltelijk mee-eens, ik vind dat je juist met de KD meer taken uitoefenen dan dat ze hem nu (willen of kunnen) gebruiken, namelijk als ASW carrier en of AirAssault Heli carrier.
De KD heeft een grote hangaar en ook een 40tons grote lift naar het benedendek. Het benedendek is prima geschikt om als hangaar/opslag ruimte te dienen. Dit is al vaker besproken, hier op DF. Maar NL kan in binnen de NAVO/EU een goede bijdrage leveren.
Zeker gezien er een steeds grotere dreiging komt van onderzeeboten. 

Een NL Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime) met als middelpunt de KD als "heli carrier", net als dat het vliegdekschip KD het was in de jaren 50 en 60. Maar man niet met vastvleugel toestellen, maar alleen helicopters, zoals de NH90 (puur ASW), Cougars (of vervanger) voor transporttaken en het liefst nog een toevoeging zoals een "attack" helicopter in de vorm van kleine heli (bijvoorbeeld MH-6I / MH-530G ) of AH-1Z Viper. Voor maritiem gebruik vind ik de Apache niet geschikt.
Eventueel zou je de Cougars kunnen bewapenen, net zoals de H225M Caracal met raketten e.d.   

Het zal een investering vragen maar een airborne early warning (AEW) heli zou een goede toevoeging zijn, evenals een groter transport helicopter. Nee, geen Chinook, maritiem niet geschikt. 

Huzaar1

Citaat van: Sparkplug op 23/10/2017 | 09:54 uur
En waaruit wil je de Air Group/Air Wing laten bestaan en met welke welke taak?

Nou ja, gezien onze samenwerking met de Britten op het gebied van Mariniers en het recente beleid van de Britse marine denk ik dat er daar wel ruimte voor is ontstaan. We gaan tenslotte zelf ook geen strand invasie  meer ondernemen?

Dezelfde reden als waarom de Doorman een dek heeft lijkt me genoeg reden om hier 2 dedicated CVL's voor te bemannen, tegelijkertijd hiermee de Dman afstoten, evenals de Rotterdam. Beide CVL's hoeven niet te worden uitgerust met bijvoorbeeld F-35B's. Dit hoeft maar 1 pool te zijn, die samen met een helicopter pool afwisselt naargelang missie/inzet.

De taak lijkt me vrij simpel, wij begeven ons overal op zee, een clubje vliegtuigen bij de hand lijkt me een goed idee.
Dit is allemaal in het verlengde van mijn visie waarin het aantal buitenlandse safari's wordt gereduceerd tot 0 en we met de Marine en Luchtmacht ons internationaal kunnen laten gelden. Landmacht is bedoelt voor Europa en Nederland.
"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 23/10/2017 | 09:37 uur
Op het moment zitten we met een boot welke eigelijk niets meer kan en ons vleugellam maakt, de Dman is een ramp voor de marine, want ze 'hebben' hem nu, maar 'hebben' er vrij weinig aan aangezien hij wel zoveel taken heeft dat de hele bevoorrading niet meer als topprioriteit bestaat.

Verpats dat ding, bouw gewone bevoorraders, verpats de Rdam en schaf 2 x CVL aan.

En waaruit wil je de Air Group/Air Wing laten bestaan en met welke welke taak?
A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Huzaar1

Het lijkt me voor Nederland, in een aantal jaar als de organisatie weer loopt en er mensen te vinden zijn die er willen werken, een heel goed idee voor Nederland hierin te investeren.
Op het moment zitten we met een boot welke eigelijk niets meer kan en ons vleugellam maakt, de Dman is een ramp voor de marine, want ze 'hebben' hem nu, maar 'hebben' er vrij weinig aan aangezien hij wel zoveel taken heeft dat de hele bevoorrading niet meer als topprioriteit bestaat.

Verpats dat ding, bouw gewone bevoorraders, verpats de Rdam en schaf 2 x CVL aan.

"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

Harald

For Future Navy Carriers, Big Is Still Beautiful: Rand Study

After soaring costs and years of delays with the Navy's new Ford class of supercarrier, Congress wants the service to pursue lower-cost carrier options for the future fleet.

But a new Rand Corp. report commissioned by the service and published this month concludes the Navy cannot build cheaper, more modest carriers without significantly limiting capability or overhauling its current air acquisition plan.

The study, which was provided to the Navy in a classified version last July and made publicly available Oct. 6, assesses four potential future styles of carrier, taking into account key capability factors such as aircraft sortie generation rates, as well as comparative costs for acquisition and midlife refueling.

The first option, CVN 8X, is by and large similar to the new Ford class of carrier that saw the first of its class, the Gerald R. Ford, commissioned in July.

Like the Ford and the two follow-on carriers in the class, this variant would be 100,000 tons and keep the same dimensions.

But the CVN 8X, as envisioned by Rand, would incorporate a few improvements that lean heavily on emerging technology, including a 40-year life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor that would eliminate the need for a midlife refueling period, and three catapults in its Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) instead of four.

The second option, CVN LX, would be a carrier in the style of the Forrestal-class, built in the 1950s for the Navy as the first class of supercarriers. It would be 70,000 tons and feature an improved flight deck and a hybrid integrated propulsion plant with nuclear power.

The third, CV LX, would be a carrier akin to the new America class of amphibious assault ship.

At 43,000 tons, it would not incorporate the catapult launch system at the center of modern carrier operations, but would support short takeoff and vertical landing, or STOVL aircraft, including the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter.

Rand envisions the Navy requiring two of these smaller carriers for every legacy carrier it needs to replace.

The final option, CV EX, is a 20,000-ton miniature carrier akin to escort carriers used by some international navies.

This option, which would run on conventional power and could accommodate STOVL fighters, is undoubtedly the cheapest of the bunch. But its capabilities would be so limited, and require such a dramatic departure from current Navy operations, that analysts spend little time considering its merits.

The Forrestal-style carrier, or CVN LX, has several major advantages, according to the study. Though it would have a more modest footprint, a slightly reduced sortie generation rate would not significantly decrease its ability to meet the Navy's needs underway, analysts find.

However, the requirements of redesigning an older style of ship to meet contemporary needs, they found, would result in a still-expensive ship: $9.4 billion to build, compared with the Ford's $12.9 billion.

"The CVN LX [Forrestal carrier] concept would allow considerable savings across the ship's service life and appears to be a viable alternative to consider for current concept exploration," study authors Bradley Martin and Michael E. McMahon write. " ... However, CVN LX would be a new design that would require a significant investment in non-recurring engineering in the near-term to allow timely delivery in the 2030s."

There are other downsides that might give the Navy pause, including reduced survivability compared with today's supercarriers.

With the CV LX [USS America-style carrier], essentially a helicopter carrier that can accommodate the Marine Corps version of the new Joint Strike Fighter, analysts envision the Navy needing 22 ships in lieu of today's 11 carriers.

Even at a two-to-one replacement rate, the Navy would realize significant savings, spending an estimated $4.2 billion on each ship.

However, the fact that this carrier could not accommodate the Navy's brand-new F-35C aircraft, which are designed for catapult launch and tailhook recovery, means this option is at best an incomplete solution, and would require either a complete reimagining of future Navy aviation, or significant investment in other, complementary platforms.

"The concept variant CV LX [America carrier] ... might be a low-risk, alternative pathway for the Navy to reduce carrier costs if such a variant were procured in greater numbers than the current carrier shipbuilding plan," the analysts write.

"Over the long term, however, as the current carrier force is retired, the CV LX would not be a viable option for the eventual carrier force unless displaced capabilities were reassigned to new aircraft or platforms in the joint force, which would be costly," they add.

A practical option, the study suggests, might be investing in future carriers like the Ford, but slightly cheaper to produce.

By equipping a future carrier with a 40-year life-of-the-ship reactor (a technology, the study notes, which does not yet exist) and cutting back from four EMALS catapults to three, which assumes the emerging technology will be proven reliable, analysts estimate the Navy could shave off $920 million in recurring ship costs.

However, the study concludes that evolving operational needs and acquisition decisions could easily alter the calculus.

"It is worth noting that the timeline for these arriving in service is still decades away, and it is very likely that threats and capabilities will evolve during that time," the analysts write. "Any of these paths could be feasible assuming changes in air wing or escort mix."

https://www.dodbuzz.com/2017/10/13/future-navy-carriers-big-still-beautiful-rand-study/

Harald


RAND proposes 4 alternative carrier designs

U.S. think tank RAND has published a report last week for alternative aircraft carrier designs for the U.S. Navy.

The sailing branch sent copies of the report to Congress along with a warning letter that says the four designs proposed won't meet current operational requirements and might require new concept of operations.

Two of those designs are based on current Ford-class and America-class carriers while the other two are fresh ideas that will require engineering development.

Lees meer via http://alert5.com/2017/10/23/rand-proposes-4-alternative-carrier-designs/#YRimcLvcj3YstPIE.99


Future Aircraft Carrier Options

Although the integrated carrier air wing is the actual component of sea-based tactical aviation delivering warfighting capability for power projection, the individual air wings require aviation support for launch and recovery at tactical distances, fuel and flight crew replenishment, maintenance, and other sustainment. The aircraft carrier and embarked crew provide this support.

Some are concerned that continuing the current carrier program imposes high acquisition cost and might unduly affect the whole of the Navy shipbuilding budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee noted that alternatives could be developed for less cost and potentially with sufficient capability. This led to a request for the Navy to examine lower-cost alternatives.

This report is a shorter version of a classified, restricted-distribution report provided to the Navy in July 2016. Neither report is of a formal analysis of alternatives or detailed engineering study, nor is either a requirement document. It is an exploration of possible alternatives for further consideration to potentially replace the legacy force as it begins reaching expected service life in decades to come. The variants analyzed are possible alternatives and do not represent recommendations for a specific future course of action.

Key Findings

Each Variant Affects Force Sortie Generation
•A CVN 8X, a descoped Ford-class carrier, offers similar warfighting capability to that of the Ford-class carrier.
•A CVN LX offers an integrated, current air wing with capabilities near current levels but with less organic mission endurance for weapons and aviation fuel.
•The CV LX, which is a version of the LHA 6 platforms, might be a low-risk, alternative pathway for the Navy to reduce carrier costs if such a variant were procured in greater numbers than the current carrier shipbuilding plan.
•The smallest concept variant reviewed, the CV EX, does not provide either a significant capacity or an integrated air wing.

Each Variant Affects Cost
•A CVN 8X might generate fewer sorties than the Ford class and might only incrementally reduce overall platform cost.
•A CVN LX concept would allow considerable savings across the ship's service life.
•A CV LX could potentially reduce overall construction costs if it allowed for reduced carrier numbers were reduced.
•A CV EX is not practical at all without considerable revision of Navy warfighting concept of operations.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2006.html


Harald

New Navy Amphib Tests Changing Strategy   (een zij-stapje, maar binnen de ARG )

The Navy is building a new, multi-mission amphibious assault ship designed to function in a modern threat environment, conduct a wider range of missions than the ship it is...

As a new Amphibious Transport Dock completes Builders Trials and moves closer to operational service in 2018, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to adapt planning, technological focus and concepts of operation for amphibious combat and Amphibious Ready Groups in the future. 

By Kris Osborn

The USS Portland (LPD 27) has completed a series of at-sea tests including full power runs, self-defense detect-to-engage exercises, evaluations of key combat and communications systems, rapid ballast/de-ballast operations, steering checks, and anchor handling demonstrations.

The USS Portland is part of a broader Navy and Marine Corps strategy to adjusts amphibs for the future. The Navy is building a new, multi-mission amphibious assault ship designed to function in a modern threat environment, conduct a wider range of missions than the ship it is replacing, and help the service increase the lagging number of amphibs in the force, senior officials said.

While LPD 27 is the eleventh LPD 17 San Antonio Amphibious Transport Dock to join the fleet, the service seeks to multiply capability by engineering a new ship called the LX(R) - loosely based on an LPD 17 hull -  with expanded technologies.

The Navy plans to build at least 11 new LX(R) ships, with the first one slated to deliver by 2026, service developers said.

In September of last year, Huntington Ingalls Industries secured a $19.1 million contract modification to accelerate design work on the US Navy's LX(R) amphibious ship replacement program.

The Navy hopes to add much greater numbers of amphibious assault ships to the fleet while simultaneously adjusting to a modern threat landscape which will require more dis-aggregated operations - and require single Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) to perform a much wider range of missions. Modern near peer adversaries increasingly posses long range sensors and precision-guided munitions, a phenomenon which will require much more operational diversity from ARGs.

New Navy LXR - Future Amphib Strategy

The Navy plans new LX(R) amphibs to replace its current fleet of Dock Landing Ships, or LSD 41s, which have functioned for years as a support ship in an  ARG. This strategic move to replace Dock Landing Ships with an LPD 17-like hull  seems to speak to a Navy effort to expand amphibious capability to adjust to new threats and help compensate for a continued Navy amphibious assault ship deficit.

The Navy used to be able to deploy up to five ARGs at one time, however the fleet is no longer the size it used to be in the 1980s and the service is working on a strategy to get by with fewer ARGs and  as fewer amphibs overall.  As a result, the Navy needs more ships that have the technological ability to operate independently of an ARG if need be.

The modern threat environment contains a wider range of contingencies to include counterterrorism operations, counter-piracy, humanitarian missions, disaster response and, of course, full-scale amphibious combat operations against near-peer adversaries. This requires that the three ships in an ARG have an ability to disperse when necessary and operate independently. The Navy and Marine Corps increasingly explains that modern missions require more split or dis-aggregated operations.

A lead Amphibious Assault Ship, a Dock Landing Ship, or LSD, and the San Antonio-class LPD 17 amphibious transport dock are both integral to an Amphibious Ready Group, which typically draws upon a handful of platforms to ensure expeditionary warfighting technology.  The ARG is tasked with transporting at least 2,200 Marines and their equipment, including what's called a Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU.

The 684-foot long LPD 17s can hit speeds of 22 knots and carry four CH-46 Sea Knights or two MV-22 Osprey aircraft. The LSD, or Dock Landing Ship, also travels around 20 knots however it is only 609-feet long and not equipped to house aircraft. 

Both the LPD 17 and the LSDs have well-decks for amphibious operations along with the ability to launch Landing Craft Air Cushions, or LCACs. However, the LPD17 weighs close to 25,000 tons and the LSD is only 16,000 tons.

The 1980's-era LSD dock landing ships consist of eight Whidbey Island-class 609-foot long ships. The 15,000-ton ships, configured largely to house and transport four LCACs, are nearing the end of their service life.

While the mission of the existing Dock Landing Ship (LSD) is primarily, among other things, to support an ability to launch Landing Craft Air Cushions, or LCACs, for amphibious operations, the new LX(R) ship will have an expanded mission to include more independent missions. LCACs are ship to shore connector vehicles able to transport Marines and equipment from ship-to-shore beyond the horizon. LCACs can even carry M1 Abrams tanks over the ocean.

An Amphibious Transport Dock, or LPD, is designed to operate with greater autonomy from an ARG and potentially conduct independent operations as needed. An LSD is able to operate four LCACs and the more autonomous LPD 17 can launch two LCACs.

Developers explain that the LX(R) ship will have a much wider mission set than the fleet of LSD ships it is replacing.

As a result of this wider mission requirement for the LX(R), the ship is being engineered with greater aviation and command and control technologies that the LSD 41 ships it is replacing.

Additional command and control capabilities, such as communications technologies, will allow the ship to reach back to the joint force headquarters they are working for, stay in with the parent ship and control the landing force, Navy and Marine Corps developers added.

Having more amphibs engineered and constructed for independent operations is seen as a strategic advantage in light of the Pacific rebalance and the geographical expanse of the region. The widely dispersed territories in the region may require a greater degree of independent amphibious operations where single amphibs operate separately from a larger ARG.

Corps officials explain that the greater use of amphibious assault ships is likely as the Marine Corps continues to shift toward more sea-based operations from its land-based focus during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the same time, Navy and Marine Corps leaders are quick to acknowledge that there is a massive shortfall of Amphibious Assault Ships across the two services. In recent years, senior service leaders have said that if each requirement or request for amphibs from Combatant Commanders worldwide were met, the Navy would need 50 amphibs.

The Navy currently operates only roughly 30 amphibs and plans to reach 38 by the late 2020s.

https://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/Navy-Tests-New-Amphib-Amid-Broader-Moves-to-Change-Future-Strate-101452563

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Harald op 06/07/2017 | 14:25 uur
Are Light Carriers Poised to Make a Comeback?

Congress is funding a study that would add slimmed-down flat tops to the fleet.

.../...

For decades, the U.S. Navy has maintained that supercarriers—nuclear-powered aircraft carriers displacing more than 90,000 tons—are the ideal platform for maintaining naval dominance and power projection. The Navy's reasoning is the bigger the carrier. The larger the carrier, the more aircraft, munitions, and fuel it can carry, and the more sorties it can fly in combat. While the U.S. Navy maintained light carriers up until the end of the Cold War, these were actually just normal aircraft carriers built during World War II that were of typical size at the time they were built, but were later dwarfed by the debut of the supercarrier. The "light" carriers USS Midway and USS Coral Sea were retired between 1990 and 1992 but never replaced.

.../...

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a27172/light-carriers-comeback-us-navy/

En dan noemen ze de Midway-klasse light carriers, terwijl tot in 1976 de nog kleinere Essex-klasse in dienst was  :(

A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Parera

USMC denkt ook aan andere opties o.a. een STOVL FARP barge met ski ramps.





De concept studie waar deze ideen uit komen ''EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCE BASE OPERATIONS''

Harald

Are Light Carriers Poised to Make a Comeback?

Congress is funding a study that would add slimmed-down flat tops to the fleet.

The U.S. Navy could find itself sailing smaller, lighter aircraft carriers in the near future if Congress has its way. The upper half of the legislative branch added funding to the 2018 defense budget to study the possibility of building so-called light aircraft carriers, complementing the service's gigantic 100,000-ton nuclear-powered supercarriers. The ships would be used in situations that don't warrant a full-sized carrier, or supplement a supercarrier's firepower in wartime.

The U.S. Senate's 2018 defense bill, according to U.S. Naval Institute News, includes $30 million for "a preliminary design effort to create a light carrier for the service." The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, senator and former naval aviator John McCain, released his own white paper on defense spending in January of this year that called for the U.S. Navy to adopt light aircraft carriers. McCain's paper said:

The Navy should also pursue a new "high/low mix" in its aircraft carrier fleet. Traditional nuclear-powered supercarriers remain necessary to deter and defeat near-peer competitors, but other day-to-day missions, such as power projection, sea lane control, close air support, or counterterrorism, can be achieved with a smaller, lower cost, conventionally powered aircraft carrier. Over the next five years, the Navy should begin transitioning from large deck amphibious ships into smaller aircraft carriers with the goal of delivering the first such ship in the mid-2030s.

For decades, the U.S. Navy has maintained that supercarriers—nuclear-powered aircraft carriers displacing more than 90,000 tons—are the ideal platform for maintaining naval dominance and power projection. The Navy's reasoning is the bigger the carrier. The larger the carrier, the more aircraft, munitions, and fuel it can carry, and the more sorties it can fly in combat. While the U.S. Navy maintained light carriers up until the end of the Cold War, these were actually just normal aircraft carriers built during World War II that were of typical size at the time they were built, but were later dwarfed by the debut of the supercarrier. The "light" carriers USS Midway and USS Coral Sea were retired between 1990 and 1992 but never replaced.

The problem is that supercarriers are growing unaffordable. The only supercarrier built in the last decade, USS Gerald R. Ford, is two years behind schedule, cost nearly $13 billion, was 22 percent over budget, and incurred $4.7 billion in research and development costs. While the next carrier, John F. Kennedy won't incur as much in R&D costs, the Navy's own estimate pegs it at $11.4 billion with the General Accounting Office saying that number will likely be exceeded.

Light carriers would certainly be useful. A light carrier is an ideal alternative to a full-size supercarrier for places such as Libya, Somalia, or the Philippines, less dangerous conflict zones that still require airpower. A light carrier could also escort convoys during wartime, or augment a regular carrier's firepower in a conflict against another big power such as China or Russia.

What could a modern day light carrier look like? There are two likely possibilities. The first and cheapest is an adaptation of the Marine Corps' "lightning carrier" concept. The concept involves loading up a $3 billion America-class amphibious transport, which normally carries up to six F-35B Lightning II fighter bombers and an assortment of helicopters, with approximately 20 F-35Bs.

The plan has both upsides and downsides. On one hand, America-class ships would be cheaper to buy and involve little to no research and development. The Navy would simply buy the vertical takeoff and landing version of the F-35, and fly them off the ship. In fact, placing orders for more America-class ships would likely drive the per-unit ship price down. The ships could even be used as amphibious transports again in a pinch. A force of 20 F-35Bs would constitute half of the offensive firepower of a Ford-class supercarrier, on paper anyway, for a quarter the cost of the ship.

But the vertical-launch F-35B has a shorter range than the carrier-borne version, the F-35C. Shorter than a Ford supercarrier and lacking aircraft catapults, an America-class light carrier couldn't carry E-2D Hawkeye airborne early warning and control planes and their networking capability that allows them to share targeting data with F-35s and Aegis destroyers. Instead the America-class carrier would need to rely on a radar-equipped Osprey tiltrotor aircraft—which doesn't even exist yet—to provide early warning and control for the F-35s as well as helicopters for anti-submarine warfare. All of these tiltrotors and helicopters need hangar and deck space, so you can begin to understand why the Navy is fond of big-deck supercarriers.

Another alternative is a more heavily modified America-class ship designed to operate a wider variety of aircraft. Installing an angled flight deck, bigger, more powerful aircraft elevators and catapults and arresting gear ("traps") would allow the carrier to operate Super Hornet strike fighters, the carrier takeoff and landing version of the F-35, the F-35C, E-2D Hawkeyes, and other carrier aircraft. It would operate almost exactly the same as a Ford-class supercarrier.

Adding more capability would also add complexity and cost. Modifying the amphibious ship's hull by adding an angled deck, new elevators, and so-called "cats and traps" would cost money. Exactly how much this would cost is the focus of the study the Senate wants to fund. If costs spiral, which seems likely given the history of U.S. naval shipbuilding, the light carrier will no longer be cost-effective at a certain point. A smaller carrier, although operating the same as a Ford-class supercarrier, would carry fewer planes and generate fewer combat missions per day in wartime.

Does the Navy need light carriers? Probably not, but they would sure be nice to have. Should it buy them? That depends—Trump's shipbuilding budget disappointed many, as it came nowhere near funding the 350 ship navy he promised during the 2016 presidential campaign. If funding increases become available that allow the Navy to fund the light carrier concept without cannibalizing other programs, the choice to proceed comes with less downsides. If the Navy would find it necessary to shortchange another program—or is unable to address the already problematic fighter shortfall, the project could have costs that are measured in more than mere dollars. In the meantime, $30 million is a not unreasonable sum for a concept that could revolutionize U.S. naval aviation.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a27172/light-carriers-comeback-us-navy/

Harald

The Navy's New Mini-Carriers Balance Air Power and Beach Assaults

Specialized flattops are designed to compensate for each other

The U.S. Navy is acquiring early materials, working on systems engineering and starting detailed design work for a new America-class amphibious assault ship which re-introduces a "well deck" to prepare the service for future amphibious warfare.

Construction of the ship, Bougainville, is scheduled to commence in late 2018 with delivery planned to occur in 2024, Colleen O'Rourke, spokeswoman for Naval Sea Systems Command, told Scout Warrior in a written statement.

"Over the past year, efforts have focused on advanced system engineering and production planning," O'Rourke said.

Unlike the first two of 11-planned America-class amphibs built with an aviation focus without a well deck, Bougainville will be built to accommodate both air and surface amphibious assault missions.

A statement from ship-builder Huntington Ingalls Industries said the well deck will give the U.S. Marine Corps the ability to house and launch two landing craft air cushion hovercraft or one landing craft utility as needed during maritime missions. These connectors, which the Navy is now upgrading, enable amphibious forces to move Marines, weapons, assault vehicles and other combat assets from ship to shore.

HII was recently awarded a $3 billion contract for the detail design and construction of the ship, Navy and HII developers said. This follows an original long-lead material contract awarded to HII for Bougainville last year.

Integration of a well deck into a new, high-tech class of amphibs represents key elements of a multi-year conceptual trajectory informing Navy thinking about amphibious warfare strategy in a modern threat environment.

As the Marine Corps more fully returns to its amphibious roots, and pivots from a decade and a half of ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many planners see the need to strengthen and solidify a high-tech, modern amphibious assault concept well suited to engage in major power, near-peer type warfare against technologically advanced adversaries.

While the tactical, strategic and operational factors are now quite different than they were decades ago when Marines launched their historic attack on Iwo Jima, amphibious assault operations are expected to figure prominently in war planning for decades to come.

They naturally provide combatant commanders with additional offensive operations and, in some scenarios, might be required to attack an entrenched coastal force less reachable by air power.

Potential adversaries now have longer-range weapons, better sensors, targeting technologies and computers with faster processing speeds, resulting in scenarios where amphibious forces approaching the shore may need to disperse to make it harder for enemy forces to target them.

Such disaggregated operations, wherein attacking forces spread farther apart while simultaneously connecting to one another through new radio, Satcom and digital networking technology, can enable lower-risk coordinated assaults. The Navy is also progressing quickly with algorithms able to facilitate broad-based navigation and coordination of unmanned surface vehicles able to both lower risk and augment amphibious assaults.

The Navy's emerging "ghost fleet" concept, for instance, is advancing technology enabling groups of unmanned surface vessels to coordinate intelligence, counter-mine or even offensive attack operations.

Speed and maneuverability are also recognized as fundamental to offensive operations, which is one reason the Marine Corps is exploring the technical feasibility of a super high-water speed amphibious assault vehicle able to attack rapidly from beyond the horizon, leaving ships at a safer distance from enemy fire.

Essentially, if advanced precision weaponry precludes amphibious assault ships from operating closer to the shore, the Navy and Marine Corps will still need to hold potential adversaries at risk of amphibious attack.

Accordingly, overcoming this "tyranny of distance" and emerging long-range enemy threats, is part of the rationale for the Navy's plan to build the first two America-class amphibious assault ships with a distinct aviation focus—and without a well deck.

Larger deck space for aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey and F-35B, combined with a larger hanger for aircraft storage, were designed to enable air platforms to launch attacks at ranges far greater than traditional amphibious assaults.

Leveraging the advanced technology of the V-22 Osprey and F-35B is a large part of the reasoning for the aviation focus of the first two America amphibs. The speed and range of the Osprey, along with the sensors, weapons and ISR technologies of the F-35B promise to greatly change the nature of amphibious war.

The concept behind the aviation-focus of the first two is described, at least in part, in terms of what Navy and Marine Corps officials refer to as "vertical maneuver"—an ability to move well-supplied amphibious assets, gear, Marines, weapons and equipment inland using aircraft such as the Osprey. The idea is to air-drop forces behind a potential adversaries' fortifications or front-line defenses.

The ships can transport up to 3,000 sailors and Marines, including elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU, designed for amphibious warfare.  Amphibious technology on board the ship can include up to 60 Humvees, Light Armored Vehicles, mortars, artillery and smaller Internally Transportable Vehicles, or ITVs, configured to drive into the back of an Osprey, Navy and Marine Corps officials described.

In total, America-class amphibs can house as many as 31 aircraft including 12 MV-22 Ospreys and the CH-53 Super Stallion, AH-1Z Super Cobra, UH-1Y Huey, F-35B Joint Strike Fighter and MH-60 Sea Hawk helicopter, Navy officials explained.

America-class ships are outfitted with defensive weapons including RIM-116 Mk 49 missile launchers, two 20-millimeter Phalanx CIWS mounts and seven twin .50-caliber machine guns.

The F-35B can conduct a wide range of missions to include support for amphibious ship-to-shore operations, ground operations, close-air support and what's called "suppression of enemy air defenses."

At the same time, the advanced sensor suite and computers on the Joint Strike Fighter will allow for a greater range of missions compared to traditional fighter jets. Sensors, combat systems, radars and weaponry on board amphibs are also being upgraded to better integrate with the F-35.

The second America-class amphib, USS Tripoli, launched in May 2017. The ship incorporates a high-tech Navy ship-based computing network called Consolidated Afloat Network and Enterprise Services, or CANES, developers said.

The USS Tripoli is 844 feet long and 106 feet wide with a weight of more than 44,000 tons. A fuel-efficient gas turbine propulsion system brings the ship's speed up to more than 20 knots.

https://warisboring.com/the-navys-new-mini-carriers-balance-air-power-with-beach-assaults/

Ace1


Ronald Elzenga

Citaat van: Sparkplug op 25/04/2017 | 15:09 uur
De manoeuvres die je beschrijft, zijn vooral van toepassing bij korte afstand (Within Visual Range) gevechten.

De AV-8B Harrier II Plus (met APG-65 radar) kan net als de Sea Harrier FRS.2 de AIM-120 AMRAAM voor de middellange afstand gebruiken.
Inderdaad...en Beyond Visual Range kan de F-35B zijn voordelen uitbuiten.

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Ronald Elzenga op 25/04/2017 | 14:29 uur
Op praktijkervaringen van de piloten die daarover schreven indertijd en ik het nodige van gelezen heb. Een Harrier kon/kan zijn STOVL capaciteiten inzetten tijdens luchtgevechten en daardoor manoeuvres uitvoeren die een conventioneel toestel verrassen en vaak niet kan volgen. Zoals veel nauwere bochten draaien, plots afremmen en omhoog schieten. Er zijn natuurlijk ook tekortkomingen, zoals max snelheid en vlieghoogte. Maar zoals ik schrijf zijn radarcapaciteiten en de luchtdoelrakketen die men meevoert ook belangrijk en waren in het verleden ook veelal bepalend voor afloop gevecht. Naast en vooral de kwaliteit van de piloten. De F-35B is superieur aan de Harrier, maar ik dacht dat die niet zijn STOVL capaciteiten kan inzetten tijdens luchtgevechten. Maar hoor graag als dat wel zo is.

De manoeuvres die je beschrijft, zijn vooral van toepassing bij korte afstand (Within Visual Range) gevechten.

De AV-8B Harrier II Plus (met APG-65 radar) kan net als de Sea Harrier FRS.2 de AIM-120 AMRAAM voor de middellange afstand gebruiken.

A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.