Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

Gestart door Lex, 10/07/2006 | 21:54 uur

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Inside the geriatric unit: US Air Force struggles to keep aging aircraft flying

Published November 04, 2012

TOKYO –  For decades, the U.S. Air Force has grown accustomed to such superlatives as unrivaled and unbeatable. These days, some of its key combat aircraft are being described with terms like geriatric, or decrepit.

The aging of the U.S. Air Force, a long-simmering topic in defense circles, made a brief appearance in the presidential debates when Republican nominee Mitt Romney cited it as evidence of the decline of U.S. military readiness. His contention that the Navy is the smallest it's been since 1917 got more attention, thanks to President Barack Obama's quip that the Navy also has fewer "horses and bayonets."

But analysts say the Air Force has a real problem, and it will almost certainly get worse no matter who wins Tuesday's election. It was created in part by a lack of urgency in the post-Cold War era, and by design glitches and cost overruns that have delayed attempts to build next-generation aircraft.

Looming budget cuts limit the force's ability to correct itself, they argue, as China's rise as a world power heightens its need to improve. And though the world's most formidable air force never had much use for bayonets, it's got more than its share of warhorses.

IKE'S LEGACY — THE KC-135 STRATOTANKER

The U.S. probably couldn't have fought the air wars over Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya without the KC-135 Stratotanker, the Air Force's main aerial refueler, which allows fighter jets to remain airborne on long flights.

America has President Dwight Eisenhower to thank for that.

The KC-135 came into service during Eisenhower's watch in 1956. The newest of the roughly 400 Stratotankers in service started flying nearly half a century ago, in 1964.

"We are in unknown territory," said Lt. Col. Brian Zoellner, who has been flying the KC-135 for 15 years and is head of operations for 909th Air Refueling Squadron at Kadena Air Base on Japan's southwestern island of Okinawa. "The unknown is at what point does the KC-135 become unusable."

The KC-46A refueling tanker is being developed as a replacement, but probably won't start delivery for another five years. If Congress has its way, some Stratotankers could still be taking off well into the 2040s.

THAT '70s SHOW — THE F-15, F-16 AND A-10

The F-15, America's workhorse warplane since the Vietnam War, was designed to have a service life of about 5,000 flight hours. The Air Force has more than tripled that, to 18,000 hours.

The F-16, another key fighter, has been in use since 1979. The Air Force began retiring the oldest ones two years ago.

Another '70s-era fighter is the A-10 Thunderbolt, which provides close air support for ground troops. It's now being rewinged because its old ones were riddled with cracks. The General Accounting Office estimates the cost of upgrading and refurbishing the aircraft will be $2.25 billion through 2013.

The Air Force is revamping its fighter fleet with the stealthy F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but production of the F-22 was cut short after its price tag swelled to nearly half a billion dollars a pop. Delays and escalating costs have also dogged the F-35, which is now the most expensive Department of Defense procurement program ever.

SPY PLANES FROM THE '50s — THE U-2

The fabled U-2 "Dragon Lady" spy plane is still being used to keep watch over North Korea and other hot spots. The first U-2 flew in 1955, and the legendary Skunk Works aircraft became a household name for its role in the Cuban missile crisis, not to mention the propaganda bonanza the Soviet Union got by shooting one down in 1960 and capturing its CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers.

Many analysts argue the unmanned Global Hawk could do the job more effectively, but Congress has nixed that idea for now. More than $1.7 billion has been invested in upgrading the U-2.

MAJOR KONG'S FAVORITE BOMBER — THE B-52

Iconic, yes. State-of-the-art, no. The venerable B-52, remembered by movie fans for its starring role in the 1964 Cold War comedy "Dr. Strangelove," remains the backbone of the Air Force's strategic bomber force. It dates back to 1954 and was already losing its edge by the end of the Vietnam War, but nearly 100 B-52s remain in service.

The Air Force developed the B-1 in the 1970s as the B-52's replacement. President Jimmy Carter killed it, President Ronald Reagan brought it back, and none have been delivered since 1988.

Next up was the stealth B-2 Spirit, which first flew in 1989. Because only 21 were built, they ended up costing a prohibitive $2 billion each. The Air Force is now hoping to upgrade with what it calls the Long Range Strike Bomber, but it's not clear when it will be ready.

To be sure, all of these aircraft have undergone massive overhauls and updates, and most experts agree the U.S. Air Force remains the best-equipped in the world. Its aircraft aren't likely to soon start falling out of the sky, either, thanks to intensive, and expensive, maintenance.

Zoellner, the KC-135 pilot, bristled at the idea his Stratotankers aren't safe. He said they "fly like a champ."

But Loren Thompson, of the Lexington Institute, a conservative think tank, said the graying Air Force is evidence of how Washington has failed to keep its eye on the ball.

"The reason the fleet is so decrepit is because for the first 10 years after the Cold War ended, policymakers thought the United States was in an era of extended peace," he said. "Then it spent the next 10 years fighting an enemy with no air force and no air defenses. So air power was neglected for 20 years, and today the Air Force reflects that fact."

Former Air Force Col. Robert Haffa, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, added that although ground forces were the primary concern in Iraq and Afghanistan, air power will be a key to future security requirements as the United States turns its attention to the Pacific and a strengthening China.

Unlike America's more recent adversaries, China has a credible air force that could conceivably strike U.S. bases in the region, requiring a deterrent force that is based farther away, out of range. America's bases in Japan — and possibly Guam — also are within striking distance of a North Korean missile attack.

"As the nation looks to increased focus in the Pacific, these long-range strike platforms will be especially important," Haffa said. "Planes like the B-52 simply cannot survive."

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/04/inside-geriatric-unit-us-air-force-struggles-to-keep-aging-aircraft-flying/#ixzz2BFUlqKDD

Elzenga

Wijze woorden van de Zweedse generaal. Zou graag zien dat Nederland zich daar bij aansluit...ook qua materiaal. Dus na de CV90s en misschien wat Zweedse Leopards staat wat mij betreft ook de Gripen NG op het programma. En dan samen met de Zweden werken aan nieuwe projecten voor de toekomst (UCAV, opvolger jager).

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Military chief: EU becoming 'marginal' in Asia-centric world

1 november 2012

BRUSSELS - EU countries must share military resources or become "marginal" powers on the world stage, a Swedish general has said.

Hakan Syren issued the warning after chairing a regular meeting of EU military commanders in Brussels on Wednesday (31 October).

"We have shrinking budgets and we have changing responsibilities. It was shown in the Libya conflict ... I would say there's a new world out there," he told press.

"The centre of gravity is moving from our continent to the Far East and we must come up with a long-term response to make sure we are not marginalised," he added.

Syren's remarks echo US President Barack Obama's statement last year that the end of the Cold War and the rise of China mark the beginning of a "Pacific century," referring to the Pacific Ocean between the two powers.

They also come after former US defence chief Robert Gates last year said EU countries could not have toppled Libya's Muammar Gaddafi - "a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country" - without American help.

For his part, Syren said "pooling and sharing" - an EU agreement on military resources - has to be "taken to the next level" in 2013 as a response.

He noted the pooling pact has spawned 15 projects over the past two and half years.

But he added: "There are several, over 12, manufacturers of armoured vehicles [in the EU]. Do we need that? We are buying four different types of combat aircraft right now. Do we need that? Do we have the money for that?"

He identified joint EU war schools, joint equipment maintenance and military manoeuvres as future areas for co-operation.

He also referred to joint EU operations in Somalia and Uganda as a "success."

But he noted that a new operation in Mali will have to be tailor-made rather than using Somalia as a model.

EU officials earlier this week told Reuters that member states are planning to send 200-or-so military experts to Mali and another 200 soldiers to keep them safe.

The EU force will try to get Mali's own army in shape to attack Tuareg tribes in the north of the country.

The EU fears that the Tuareg-controlled territory of Azawad is becoming a base for Islamist extremists on the model of Afghanistan

http://euobserver.com/defence/118070

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Europe's Defence in Times of Austerity: Spending Cuts as a One-Way Street?

29 October 2012

The Eurozone's prolonged financial crisis and resultant austerity measures have had a deep impact on defense spending. Marko Savković warns that without careful defense planning, the cuts will almost certainly undermine the credibility of Europe's armed forces.

By Marko Savković for Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)

Since the beginning of the global economic crisis NATO and EU countries have been called to reassess (and significantly cut down) their defence spending. With the public debt and Eurozone crisis, and economic growth projected to stagnate, pressure on decision makers has increased. So far, their first course of action has been to consider layoffs and termination of contracts, programmes and operations, risking credibility of their forces. In this analysis we consider some of the measures implemented so far, and think of possible alternatives.

An uneven global spending record

Between 2009 and 2011, European states discharged 160,000 soldiers, understanding cuts as necessary to maintain effective armed forces in times of economic austerity. By a rule, they are implemented within broader government spending reductions. Many of the measures proposed are drastic and would have been hard to imagine only a decade ago. Spain, for instance, is vacating air bases and introducing more unmanned drones to its air force. Close to 20,000 soldiers will leave the British Army, in what Defence Secretary Philip Hammond has described as "the biggest shake-up in 100 years". Last October, German Minister of Defence Thomas de Maiziere announced how, out of 328 Bundeswehr bases, 31 will be shut and 90 sized down.

Cuts went even deeper in some of smaller EU members, especially in Central and Eastern Europe where impact of the crisis has been felt most. Lacking the resources and ability to sustain large budget deficits, many have been cutting back their military spending. Lithuania set the absolute record by cutting 36% of its defence budget in 2010 following an 11% decrease observed in 2009: meaning that in a span of just two years one EU member state literally halved its defence budget. Governments may present their plans as "rightsizing" or "streamlining" of forces – the trend remains, as one reporter had noted, "clear", as more of the same seems to follow.

Worldwide, we observe a different picture. The most developed countries have attempted to fight recession by increasing public spending (state investment). To this end, they have created (usually large, because you can't have it any other way) stimulus packages. Part of the money gets invested in defence. This "Military Keynesianism" or "warfare state" – a pun on the well-known concept of "welfare state" – has become acceptable even in the United States, since "it creates jobs". We also note an increase of military spending in rising powers, foremost the BRICs – that "appears to represent a strategic choice in their long-term quest for global and regional influence, even in hard economic times". For them, the way things are, sizing down is not an option. They rather contemplate acquiring new hardware. In 2011, Russia, for instance, spent nearly 72 billion dollars on arms, overtaking the UK (62.7bn) and France (62.5bn); its draft budgets show a further 53% rise in real terms up to 2014.

In any country, military spending will increase with the addition of new policy objectives. Threat perception, standing alliances and rivalries can also influence decision-makers, pushing them to invest in long-term armament programmes. Significant funds are spent on contribution to peacekeeping operations. And finally, high prices of minerals and fossil fuels have a two-pronged effect: financing defence becomes more expensive; while countries producing oil and natural gas become able to spend more on their armed forces.

Principal risk associated with spending cuts: Europe failing to "pull its weight"

Spending cuts have brought an old issue to the fore: the (alleged) failure of European countries to "pull their weight" in military affairs, best manifested in protracted efforts to promote greater European military cooperation. Since 2008, the EU has launched only one new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission. No EU Battle Group has ever been deployed. As it was demonstrated during the operations in Libya, European countries' military forces remain dependent on American capabilities. And all this comes as the US is "strategically re-orienting itself towards the Asia-Pacific region to build partner capacities". Europe's problems with building defence capacities are not new; actually, from the decision-makers perspective, "the new age of austerity is simply deepening of a long-standing crisis". Just before recession hit, many nations were enjoying high economic growth or far easier access to credit. Nevertheless, defence and foreign ministers in Europe "lacked the political will to go beyond declarations" and initiate real change.

At the core of the issue, Scott Harris sees three "broad strategic dilemmas" that European defence establishments face today. First, there are too many people employed in Europe's defence sectors. Europe spends more on personnel than the US, which leaves less money for operations, as well as R&D. Second, although outdated, much of Europe's defence infrastructure that was made for Cold War purposes remains in place. Finally, and back to the R&D issue, since investment amounts are not fixed, they are often used to balance military budgets. With the known fragmentation of Europe's defence market, national funding is insufficient to maintain a robust industrial base.

For two decades now, the idea was to transform large immobile defensive militaries into deployable units which can be sustained in distant theatres. Even before the crisis, many have been slow to introduce all the necessary changes, buy the equipment required or commit to joint armament programmes. Christian Mölling believes how one result of spending cuts will be growing pressure on the larger countries – France, Germany and the UK – to compensate for smaller countries' shortcomings. He concludes how such trend risks further eroding the concept of NATO solidarity. This fear was also voiced by Ivo Daalder, US Ambassador to NATO and James Stavridis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who have argued that "if defence spending continues to decline, NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another decade". Such outcome, where some allies are willing to contribute while others are simply riding along US Defence Secretary Gates, speaking in 2011 called a "two-tiered alliance".

And even for the European "heavyweights" it is doubtful whether they can deliver. Take Germany: out of its 250,000 soldiers, only 6,700 are deployed abroad. The Bundeswehr requires 35 uniformed and 15 civil personnel to support each soldier in combat duty: a hard-to-believe 50 to 1 ratio.

How and where are the cuts and savings being made?

First, soldiers and civilians are being laid off. Of many similar, most ambitious programme to date is the British "Army 2020". UK Defence Department plans to cut its civilian workforce by 29,000 and its armed forces by 25,000. In Defence Secretary's view, "overstretch" in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also "woeful budget indiscipline" caused by 2a combination of politician, bureaucrat and military all working in this spirit of optimism rather than realism" have all made today's cuts necessary. To this end, the MoD has started a redundancy programme and a "Voluntary Early Release Scheme".

As we have mentioned before, some acquisition programmes will be reconsidered. This implies either their full cancellation; or, more likely, renegotiating the order as well as payment dynamics. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom envisaged scaling back such procurement and modernization programs, as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, the A400M military transport plane, NH90 multirole helicopters and Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets. Bulgaria attempted to renegotiate contracts signed with Eurocopter (Puma helicopters), Daimler (land vehicles), Alenia Aeronautica (the Spartan transport aircraft) and Armaris (naval corvettes).

Some countries will try to sell their assets to others. Sweden, Hungary and Croatia seem to be involved in a complex scheme to equip Croatian Air Force with 8 Swedish built Gripen multirole fighter jets, with Sweden agreeing to buy one of Croatia's shipyards in return and Hungary providing training. Rationalization will also entail getting rid of some equipment completely. For example, the Netherlands and Denmark are eliminating their main battle tanks (MBTs), opting to use infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) instead.

4 Countries may decide to "pool and share" their resources. For instance, Belgium and the Netherlands are combining their navies, while Romania and Bulgaria are discussing joint air policing, given that both countries will equip themselves with the same multi-role aircraft.

Finally, major defence industry players – incited by their respective Governments within a wider context of European defence cooperation – will consider merging. Despite most recent failure of EADS (Germany and France) merge with BAE Systems (UK), caused by concern for job losses in Germany and, in the UK, losing of BAE share of the American market, similar initiatives are bound to follow.

Many of proposed measures have proven to be difficult to implement. In response to "Army 2020", UK's National Audit Office (NAO) has published a report arguing how, in order to "continue with its current level of activity", given that it will have fewer staff, the MoD will have to change the way it works. One major risk NAO has identified is worsening of the current skill gap; since military "tends to bring in younger people, the Department will struggle to maintain skills levels". Since cancelling of programs would result in large financial penalties, many of cost-saving decisions made by governments had to be reversed. Finally, governments are rarely good in doing business. Their attempts to fund building equipment and then export it rather than cut jobs within their industrial base too often end up in budget deficits.

Is there a less painful alternative?

As Mart Laar has noted, "spending less but more smartly still entails spending less". And, "less money means fewer ships, aeroplanes and computers – in short, less capability". Increased, but efficient cooperation may represent one way out of the crisis. One such idea is advocated by a team of experts from the Visegrad region (V4), who, within the DAV4 project have proposed a radical "pooling and sharing" initiative.

This initiative will rest on several "operating principles". First, similar to EU's enhanced cooperation, is the one of "variable geometry": "while all projects should be open to all interested V4 parties, countries should be free not to join, and allow a smaller cluster to proceed without them". Second, in their cooperation, partner countries should be "cautious, yet ambitious"; starting from activities which would "raise fewer sensitivities", followed by more ambitious projects. Thirdly, all possible overlaps of facilities and capacities should be explored, with countries prepared to give up on those that are not being used to their full potential. For their defence industries, they propose long-term treaty cooperation, one which would guarantee that, despite some orders going entirely to another country's producer, "over lifetime of cooperation, each country would receive a proportionally fair share of orders". Experts finally warn how "defence collaboration is much about mind-set" as it is about specific projects. And in this, changed mind-set, decision makers must "learn from others" while, at the same time, they remain focused on NATO and EU initiatives, as "vehicles of deployment of V4 armed forces".

"Pooling and sharing" will not, however, exclude laying people off, or sending them to early retirement. After years of plenty, decision makers must come to grips with the crisis. Increased cooperation may well be one way to go; however, it depends on a change of mind-set, something defence establishments are not really known for.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?id=154133

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Flyguy op 27/10/2012 | 08:58 uur
Zo kan het ook, de politiek wil 'meer' tanks maar de US army hoeft ze niet. Omgekeerde wereld.  :crazy:

"The military says it can save $3b by not upgrading a fleet of tanks, but Congress won't listen. Drew Griffin reports."
http://edition.cnn.com/video/?/video/bestoftv/2012/10/09/exp-erin-government-waste-m1-abrams-tanks-drew-griffin.cnn

Het gaat gelukkig ook maar om een "handje vol"  :cute-smile:

Flyguy

Zo kan het ook, de politiek wil 'meer' tanks maar de US army hoeft ze niet. Omgekeerde wereld.  :crazy:

"The military says it can save $3b by not upgrading a fleet of tanks, but Congress won't listen. Drew Griffin reports."
http://edition.cnn.com/video/?/video/bestoftv/2012/10/09/exp-erin-government-waste-m1-abrams-tanks-drew-griffin.cnn

Elzenga

Citaat van: BNR op 17/10/2012 | 09:37 uurEuropa heeft de afgelopen eeuw als het gaat om defensie altijd zwaar op de Amerikanen geleund.  Maar de Amerikanen moeten ook bezuinigen. "Je ziet nu al dat de Verenigde Staten voor een stukje de handen aftrekt van de Europese veiligheid", zegt Frank Bekkers van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.
Ik denk niet dat dit helemaal de juiste weergave is......De Amerikanen hebben ons ook bewust zo afhankelijk gemaakt....dat heet "verdeel-en-heers"beleid. Wat een Amerikaans strategisch belang is.

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Bezuinigingen zetten Defensie onder druk

Door Anne-Greet Haars

2012-10-17 08:43:36.0 | bnr.nl

Als het nú misgaat in het Midden-Oosten, bijvoorbeeld rond Syrië en Iran, dan is Europa niet in staat om de eigen stabiliteit te waarborgen. Door bezuinigingen staat de Europese militaire macht onder druk.

Bijdrage | BNR's Pieter van der Werff in gesprek met Dick Zandee van Clingendael en Frank Bekkers van HCSS

Europa heeft de afgelopen eeuw als het gaat om defensie altijd zwaar op de Amerikanen geleund.  Maar de Amerikanen moeten ook bezuinigen. "Je ziet nu al dat de Verenigde Staten voor een stukje de handen aftrekt van de Europese veiligheid", zegt Frank Bekkers van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies.

Hij constateert dat Europa absoluut niet klaar is voor een escalatie in het Midden-Oosten. "Dan zijn er hele vervelende scenario's denkbaar. Je krijgt natuurlijk veel migratiestromen die op gang komen en allerlei verwikkelingen met Arabische of Noord Afrikaanse bevolkingen die in Europa leven. Dat kon wel eens hele grote problemen geven en ik denk dat Europa slecht voorbereid is om dat echt aan te pakken."

Bezuinigingsgolf
Ook Dick Zandee, onderzoeker bij Clingendael en gespecialiseerd in Defensie maakt zich zorgen over de gevolgen van de Europese bezuinigingen. "Het is overduidelijk: de bezuinigingsgolf die overal in Europa plaatsvindt, heeft de defensieapparaten en krijgsmachten heel hard getroffen."

Zandee zet zomaar even wat bezuinigingen op een rij: "Kijk naar het Verenigd Koninkrijk; daar zijn hele onderdelen van de krijgsmacht verdwenen. In Nederland hebben we de tankbataljons moeten opheffen en ook de Fransen en Duitsers verminderen ook hun eenheden. Dat heeft zeer nadelige invloed op de slagkracht van de krijgsmacht."

Samenwerking
En juist die slagkracht moet op bepaalde momenten onze stabiliteit waarborgen en ondersteunt onze economische en diplomatieke macht, al is het maar om toegang tot energie te behouden. En dus moet er wat gebeuren. "Er is een noodzaak om meer in Europa samen te doen in plaats van alles op je eigen nationale post doen. De druk is enorm toegenomen dat er eigenlijk geen andere keus meer is."

Maar dat proces gaat met vallen en opstaan. "Er zijn best goede successen geboekt in het verleden. Nederland heeft daar een vrij positieve rol bij gespeeld. Ik noem de geïntegreerde marines die we in feite kennen tussen België en Nederland: dezelfde schepen, dezelfde mijnenjagers en één school voor opleidingen."

Materieel
En dat zou een voorbeeld moeten zijn, want ook NAVO-topman Rasmussen roept op tot samenwerking juist om specialistische onderdelen te behouden. Maar samenwerking is lang niet altijd eenvoudig. Met veel projecten loopt het stroef, met name rond het materieel.

Veel van die projecten duurde veel te lang en werden veel te duur. Maar juist dat materieel is cruciaal want daar gaat het vaak mis, aldus Zandee: "Dat de communicatiesystemen niet in elkaar geplugd kunnen worden, dat de munitie niet uitgewisseld worden omdat men verschillende kanonnen heeft en dat andere reserveonderdelen niet uitgewisseld kunnen worden omdat voertuigen van verschillende makelij zijn: daar zitten de problemen."

Geld
En dat zou ongelofelijk veel geld schelen. Kijk maar eens naar Afghanistan: "Elk land dat een Afghanistan zit, heeft zijn eigen logistieke lijn. Dat is vreselijk kostbaar, vereist veel personeel, maar is allemaal het gevolg van het feit dat men in Europa verschillend materieel heeft."

Maar dat oplossen duurt nog wel even, want Europa is verdeeld. Een Europees leger zal er nog niet snel van komen, maar in kleiner verband zullen we – noodgedwongen -  steeds meer intensieve samenwerking zien tussen verschillende landen.

http://www.bnr.nl/meernieuws/916432-1210/bezuinigingen-zetten-defensie-onder-druk

Elzenga

Citaat van: jurrien visser op 10/10/2012 | 23:18 uur
Ik begrijp dat jij neutraliteit nastreeft.
Nee hoor, want ik denk dat Zweden steeds meer EU lid wordt en zijn verantwoordelijkheden daarbinnen neemt. Waar ik wel voor ben is om binnen de EU een defensieve organisatie op te bouwen naar het oude model van de NAVO, de EDO. Zij het moderner ingevuld. Ik denk dat de Zweden dan zeker belangstelling hebben omdat dit past binnen hun visie. Missies out of area worden dan uitgevoerd onder VN vlag of door een coalition of the willing. Of indien het ook Amerika en Canada betreft vanuit de Noord-Atlantische Raad (wat van de NAVO overblijft dan).

IPA NG

Citaat van: Mourning op 11/10/2012 | 12:15 uur
Dat "redelijk" is dan wel heel relatief te noemen...

Tsja, je moet dan wel net als Zweden (of althans zoals ze altijd deden :'() het concept van de gewapende neutraliteit handhaven.
Dan kun je wel heerlijk handel drijven met jan en alleman en je opstellen als belastingparadijs zonder dat je echt rekening moet houden met de zeurende partijen binnen jou blok zoals nu met de EU die onze handelspolitiek bepaalt en de USA die ons buitenlands beleid vormgeeft.

Klink zo slecht nog niet :devil:.

Militaire strategie is van groot belang voor een land. Het is de oorzaak van leven of dood; het is de weg naar overleven of vernietiging en moet worden onderzocht. --Sun Tzu

Flyguy

Hoe veel scheelde het en er stonden Duitsers of Britten op  Nederlandse boden in 1914-1918?  Niet veel ;)

Mourning

Dat "redelijk" is dan wel heel relatief te noemen...
"The only thing necessary for Evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing"- Edmund Burke
"War is the continuation of politics by all other means", Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege/On War (1830).

IPA NG

Citaat van: jurrien visser op 10/10/2012 | 23:18 uur
Ik begrijp dat jij neutraliteit nastreeft.

En waarom niet? Ging ons altijd redelijk goed af.

Maar dan begrijp ik zijn VSE obsessie niet zo goed...
Militaire strategie is van groot belang voor een land. Het is de oorzaak van leven of dood; het is de weg naar overleven of vernietiging en moet worden onderzocht. --Sun Tzu

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Elzenga op 10/10/2012 | 22:54 uur
Dan vind ik de Zweedse aanpak, zowel op buitenlands gebied, defensiegebied en ook economisch, toch een stuk verstandiger en meer de moeite van het (na)volgen waard.   

Ik begrijp dat jij neutraliteit nastreeft.

Elzenga

Citaat van: Mourning op 10/10/2012 | 22:47 uur
Ja, alleen wel jammer dat het gewicht wat Zweden in de (internationale veiligheids)schaal legt verwaarloosbaar is en dat van de VS als (nog) enige supermacht het tegenovergestelde. Geloof me ik ben ook voor meer EU-samenwerking, standardisatie en gezamenlijke ontwikkeling, maar dat is iets wat niet van de een op de andere dag gebeurt.
Waarbij ik dan wel even wil aantekenen dat diezelfde VS aan de basis stond van de hypotheek en bankencrisis...en dat mede weer werd veroorzaakt door het starten van twee illegale invasies van landen, Afghanistan en Irak....op basis van een mijns inziens krankzinnige doctrine...die tegenwoordig als de Bush-doctrine door het leven gaat.....al wil ik Bush enigszins vrijwaren...want hij hielp deze doctrine gedurende zijn tweede termijn ook persoonlijk om zeep (en schopte de intellectuelen die hem bedacht hadden, behalve vice president Cheney, uit zijn regering). Dan vind ik de Zweedse aanpak, zowel op buitenlands gebied, defensiegebied en ook economisch, toch een stuk verstandiger en meer de moeite van het (na)volgen waard.