Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

[Marc66]

Het land heeft ook iets meer water rondom zich liggen en enkele landen waarbij enige oplettendheid noodzakelijk is.

[andré herc]

Na gem. 30 - 35 jaar van dienst mag dat ook wel  

En, tja, als je de euro bedonderd als land dan moet je wel bezuinigen  

Ja en maar 8 nieuwe marine schepen daar kunnen we hier in Nederland alleen maar van dromen  

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Na gem. 30 - 35 jaar van dienst mag dat ook wel 

En, tja, als je de euro bedonderd als land dan moet je wel bezuinigen 

Het is alleen vervelend dat vrijwel elk Europees land hierdoor getroffen wordt... nog een paar jaar en we hebben een (Europese) defensie vergelijkbaar met de Zwitserse garde.

[Marc66]

Na gem. 30 - 35 jaar van dienst mag dat ook wel 

En, tja, als je de euro bedonderd als land dan moet je wel bezuinigen 

[andré herc]

Italian navy to loose 26 ships in the next 5 years

Bad times for the italian navy, in the next 5 years are going to be retired 26 ships (6 only in 2012).

-4 Maestrale class frigates
-3 Soldati class light frigates
-3 Lerici class mine hunters
-6 Minerva corvettes
-4 small training ships for cadets
-1 Stromboli class AOR
-1 Submarine rescue ship
-4 tugboats

In the same timeframe (more or less) only 8 new vessels will join the fleet

-6 FREMM frigates
-1 new submarine rescue ship
-1 AOR


http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?211417-Italian-navy-to-loose-26-ships-in-the-next-5-years
http://www.difesa.it/Sala_Stampa/ras...012&pdfIndex=8

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

België geeft minste budget uit aan vernieuwing militair materieel

vrijdag 13 april 2012, 15u35

Van alle NAVO-lidstaten met een actief leger geeft België - na Bulgarije - het kleinste deel van zijn Defensiebudget uit aan de hernieuwing van militair materieel, namelijk 6,4 procent. Dat blijkt uit cijfers die de NAVO vrijdag heeft vrijgegeven.

Volgens het Westerse bondgenootschap gaat het leeuwendeel van het Belgische Defensiebudget op aan personeelskosten. In 2011 ging het om 75,6 procent, wat nog iets meer was dan het historische maximum van 75,5 procent uit 2010.

Algemeen ging het Belgische budget vorig jaar lichtjes omhoog, van 3,960 miljard in 2010 tot 3,986 miljard in 2011. Uitgedrukt in percentage van het bbp, staat het Defensiebudget vorig jaar garant voor 1,1 procent. Aan het einde van de Koude Oorlog was dat nog 2,7 procent.

De NAVO blijft intussen aandringen dat elk van haar leden minstens 2 procent van hun bbp voor defensie zouden reserveren.

http://www.standaard.be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=DMF20120413_141

[Lex]

Polish Navy To Acquire Vessels, Submarines

WARSAW — Poland's Ministry of Defense has released a document outlining a Navy modernization program for the years 2012 to 2030 under which the country would spend about 900 million zloty ($290 million) per year to upgrade the fleet.

"Without the acquisitions of new gear and arms, the Polish Navy could lose its combat capacity after 2030," the document said.

By 2030, .....

Defensenews,
Apr. 11, 2012 - 04:35PM   

Vanwege copyright slechts een gedeelte.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

IN FOCUS: Why the UK's carriers will not be 'airfields at sea'

By:   Peter Collins 

Stick or twist? That is the choice facing UK defence secretary Philip Hammond, who is poised to announce a decision on the future of the nation's carrier strike ambitions and choice of embarked combat aircraft.

The main issue to be decided is whether to keep faith with a decision made in late 2010 to switch allegiance from Lockheed's short take-off and vertical landing F-35B to the manufacturer's C-model carrier variant. Attributed at the time to a desire to acquire the stealthy aircraft in its "more capable, less expensive and longer-range" version, the act has had massive cost implications for the Royal Navy's future aircraft carrier programme at a time of severe budget-tightening.

Studies continue to determine the likely price of adapting one or both of the UK's future carriers to accommodate an electromagnetic launch system and arresting gear to support operations with the F-35C, but the possibility of Hammond soon approving a switch back to the STOVL aircraft appears a real one, given his determination to balance the Ministry of Defence's finances.

By the time of the first vessel's introduction, the RN will have lacked an operational "large-deck" carrier for more than 40 years since decommissioning the Audacious-class HMS Ark Royal, and the service by no means underestimates the challenge faced in regaining such a capability.

Flight International test pilot Peter Collins had a rare chance to witness fixed-wing operations at close hand in late February, when he spent seven days on board the US Navy's Nimitz-class aircraft carrier the USS John C Stennis (CVN 74). He joined the vessel as Carrier Strike Group 3 made its way home across the Pacific at the end of a seven-month tour of duty in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, from where it had provided air support to coalition forces in Afganistan and Iraq.

EXPERT OPINION

Collins - a former military fast jet pilot and test pilot with past experience on the Harrier GR3, Sea Harrier FRS1 (on HMS Illustrious) and the UK's experimental VAAC Harrier, built to aid the development of the F-35B's flight control laws - used the opportunity to assess whether a flat-deck aircraft carrier could be considered an "airfield at sea", and in any way compare to the operations of a land-based, air force wing.

His visit was also intended to highlight some of the challenges that the RN and Fleet Air Arm will face as they prepare to introduce future carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, particularly if the F-35C is retained.

Collins's hosts were the USN's VFA-14 "Top Hatters" squadron, which flies the single-seat Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornet and is commanded by Cdr Kevin McLaughlin. Other elements of Carrier Air Group (CAG) 9 were a squadron of two-seat F/A-18Fs and two squadrons of F/A-18C Hornets, which together made a force of more than 40 attack aircraft. Also on board were individual squadrons of Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare, Northrop E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control and C-2A Greyhound cargo delivery aircraft, plus Sikorksy MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine warfare and MH-60S plane guard helicopters. In all, the air group totalled in excess of 70 aircraft and operated as a self-contained expeditionary air wing.

With a total crew of over 5,000, the Stennis is nuclear powered and displaces over 100,000t, making it much larger than the UK's 65,000t Queen Elizabeth-class ships. It has four side lifts rising from the hangar to the flight deck, an angled deck at the port waist and four steam-powered catapults: two at the bow and two at the angled deck.

LANDING SPACE

But for all its total size, the carrier's angled deck, with four arrestor wires, only measures 786ft (240m) in length and 114ft in width between the painted side "foul lines". From the stern "round down" to the first arrestor wire is 170ft. The arrestor wires are spaced about 40ft apart, with the number three wire being the target that any pilot will aim to catch. A typical approach speed for a mid-weight F/A-18E/F is 140kt (259km/h) indicated air speed, flown at an 8.1˚ angle of attack (AoA).

Aircraft, ground equipment and deck personnel are parked/positioned on both sides of the angled deck landing area and just outside the foul lines. The proximity of landing aircraft to potential obstructions is swiftly apparent, with a Hawkeye's wingtip only 4ft inside the foul line when landed precisely on the deck centreline.

The mechanics of arresting a high-speed fast jet on a deck landing area that is typically less than one-tenth the length of a conventional runway also impresses, particularly as it requires a pilot to catch a wire accurately from a precisely flown approach onto a pitching, heaving and rolling deck. A landing aircraft must also be cleared beyond the foul line and the deck prepared to accept the next arrival within just 55sec.

With aircraft being positioned after landing, others being readied for the next launch and more being armed or moved between deck and hangar, the organisation of the air group around the carrier requires an extraordinary level of co-ordination and control. The hangar space, although large and unobstructed along its length, appears akin to a labyrinth full of aircraft with overlapping wings, tailplanes, rotor blades and propellers, and with maintenance crews working within very confined spaces.

The choreography of air group support on the vessel's deck sees personnel work within "coloured vest" specialisations to direct aircraft to taxi within inches of each other and the deck edges. They also operate quickly and smoothly across a flight deck surface live with jet intakes and exhausts, turning propellers, extending and retracting arrestor cables, operating catapults, open armament and aircraft lifts and many other potential dangers. Their ability to do so is the product of hard-earned experience, strict adherence to procedures and the currency of unbroken operations. This normal deck tempo was maintained during a 12h uninterrupted shift over a six-day week, for up to two months at a time without a break.

The carrier, meanwhile, must co-ordinate its launch and recovery operations with escorting vessels to negate surface, sub-surface and above-surface threats, maintain navigational integrity with regard to obstacles or territorial borders and avoid weather that could compromise flight operations. These factors add layers of operational complexity not encountered by an air force base or station headquarters.

MANUAL LANDINGS

Landing guidance in poor weather or at night can be provided by the advanced carrier landing system, which datalinks information from the ship, or the older antenna-based instrument carrier landing system, and with aircraft using the options of autopilot or auto throttle coupling, if so equipped. But since these auto-systems do not have the same levels of multiple redundancy found in civilian commercial aircraft, they cannot be relied on operationally and cannot always compensate for deck movement. As a result, the great majority of landings are still made fully manually, placing critical importance on the ship's Landing Signals Officers (LSOs), known colloquially as "Paddles".

Each LSO team of around four to six personnel works as a fully integrated unit. Some of these look exclusively at the aircraft, while others view the deck to ensure that it is not fouled. They are backed up by a system of deck lights and radio calls from the Flying Commander, or "Air Boss", to "gate" the landing aircraft at the 100ft and 10ft "wave off" heights. Airspeed, angle of attack and pitch attitude of an aircraft, along with its height on crossing the round down point, are all critical to the landing hook accurately engaging the number three wire.

Using this system, the LSO team will see approach problems developing externally before the pilot recognises them, and give instant correction instructions to improve landing accuracy, safety and pilot confidence.

For the pilot, meeting a landing slot and matching fuel planning requires ongoing calculation throughout the flight, and especially during extended strike sorties, unlike when making a direct recovery to a land base as a singleton or as part of a small battle formation.

Aircraft are recovered into a vertical "stack" above the ship as per standard operating procedures, which place the F/A-18C lowest and E-2C highest. An individual Super Hornet is normally stationed above the stack to act as a tanker, but its fuel offload is limited and could not hope to cover a strike package numbering over 20 aircraft, or if the air group was in the mid-Atlantic with no diversion airfields available.

KNOWLEDGE RETENTION

The "push down" of aircraft within the stack as others descend or break over the ship and turn to land is decided and conducted by the pilots themselves, without radio transmissions or direction from any shipboard air traffic control.

Tactics, latest intelligence on threat systems and weapon employment recommendations across the squadrons are standardised across the navy's carrier air groups through the service's Fighter Weapons School (still nicknamed "Top Gun") via monthly updates. The USN's squadron structure also ensures that corporate knowledge of aircraft and tactics is properly interwoven and self-sustaining.

Both represent vital functions that the re-configured Fleet Air Arm will need to build, into its future fixed-wing strike fleet organisation.

Establishing a large deck carrier capability with US-style complexity cannot be 'worked up' by using helicopters as an initial option. This means that a decision to keep with the F-35C and converting at least one of the RN's Queen Elizabeth-class ships could be ably supported by using an interim fixed-wing type, most probably leased.

Such a requirement could come down to a straight choice between the F/A-18E/F or Dassault's Rafale M, with the latter considered due to the UK's strengthened military co-operation with France. Both are affordable and capable multi-role aircraft which are available and flying operationally from carrier decks today, and could fill any gap in capability should the F-35C be delayed further. A first Fleet Air Arm pilot has already gained combat experience in flying the single-seat Super Hornet from the Stennis. Others will also take similar exchange posts with the USN, while more are due to fly the Rafale under a recent agreement.

A decision to revert to the STOVL F-35B would pose more of a challenge, with the UK having already retired its Harrier GR7/9 fleet and sold the surplus aircraft to provide spares for the US Marine Corps.

The recruitment and training of all of the specialist carrier air group trades will be a massive future undertaking for the RN, but also the key to allowing its carriers to function effectively, safely and at the correct operational tempo.

It is vital that the UK does not try to reinvent the wheel in reintroducing its languished carrier strike mission from around 2020; it should instead use the template that the USN provides and read this experience across almost directly.

Even in peacetime the expeditionary ethos of the USN's carrier air group is almost totally different to that of a land-based air wing, and also far removed from the RN's previous small and STOVL-optimised carriers, the last of which, HMS Illustrious, will remain in use as a helicopter assault ship through 2014.

Regardless of the aircraft that will be flown from their decks while in service, the UK's future large carriers will bear almost no similarity to a base on land, and any attempt to label them as "airfields at sea" would be mistaken.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-why-the-uks-carriers-will-not-be-airfields-at-sea-370186/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

The SDSR is a slash-and-burn campaign plan - and it's time the Government admitted it

By William Forbes

PUBLISHED: 10:13 GMT, 9 April 2012 | UPDATED: 10:14 GMT, 9 April 2012

Four days ago I wrote, in respect of the Falkland Islands but with relevance to all British interests in the wider sense:
'The most effective deterrent of all, the true guardian of the Islands' security, is British clarity of vision, rational national defence policies, and consistently unambiguous and fudge-free ministerial communication. Those are issues this blog will examine during the next few months.'
Our theme for this, Rational Defence First, is linked to Effects-Based Financing (EBF) and to unwavering insistence on Integrity as the principal virtue of our national leaders. That integrity must include the willingness to admit incapacity, to acknowledge failure, and to surrender office to others better qualified in knowledge, experience and skill.
HMS Dauntless, the navy's most powerful warship, was sent to the Falkland Islands as a show of force. Alongside this, the MoD should remember that rational defence policies are a deterrent in themselves.

So where, amid what defence analysts recognise as a truly appalling political, economic and military situation, should we begin? If we are to concentrate on what has happened and will happen under the present coalition government (treating the dreadful years of Mr Brown's stewardship, about which we can do little now, as merely the platform for future disasters we can still avert), then the obvious place to begin is this government's Strategic Defence and Security Review, the SDSR (or, as it is known among defence analysts, the Suicidal Disarmament and Surrender Retreat).     
Fair-minded readers may ask whether the selection of such a defenceless target can be justifed? Perhaps it seems like bullying, but effectively the target has been chosen for us by the government's own insistence that the SDSR will not be amended (even while ministers surreptitiously seek to do just that as the true horror of their position, and of the nation's military weakness, sinks into the government's addled corporate brain). 

Despite its condemnation by a host of defence experts, highly qualified by experience, especially by members of the United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA), whose criticisms are countered solely by personal smears (but while the MoD employs a battalion of PR spin doctors they may as well be used, no?), and despite the mounting evidence of the SDSR's irrelevance, the government refuses to budge from its obtuse stance.
Again it may be asked if such criticism is not rather too harsh, for were the authors of the SDSR themselves not highly qualified experts who knew exactly what they were doing? Well, yes, they did know, but they were not composing the rational strategic review expected from their deliberations and they did not produce one. They were responding to what the Treasury dictated, not to strategic requirements, and the result was a slash-and-burn campaign plan that is incrementally destroying the UK's ability to protect its sovereign interests.
As independent analysts everywhere accused the government of fantasy, a serious charge when the nation's defences are in question, again we must ask if the charge is too harsh. To this the analysts reply that the hub of the SDSR's thinking is the acquisition at some time in the future of two aircraft carriers equipped, at some further time in the future, with squadrons of the F-35B or F-35C Joint Strike Fighters. Future issues of this blog will deal extensively with the practicality of this plan, especially in respect of its cost (which is already, we are told, out of control, and far beyond our ability to pay), but for today I shall restrict the criticisms to those in a formal paper I have had on file for a year.
Key component: Analysts have placed the acquisition of F-35 super jets at the heart of the SDSR 

The basis of the paper's argument was 'the conflict between the SDSR's representation of the F-35 JSF as "the world's most advanced multi-role combat jet" and (when paired with the Typhoon) "two of the world's most capable combat aircraft", a claim for which the MoD can produce no valid evidence ...' and the paper charged: 'The SDSR claim was untrue and destroyed its credibility.'
The paragraph of the SDSR relevant to this stated:
"Our fast jet fleet will be made up of two modern and highly capable multi-role combat aircraft, the Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter. This combination will provide the flexibility and strike power to deal with a variety of new and existing threats, while also radically improving cost-effectiveness and efficiency."
The Typhoon was described two decades ago by a very senior RAF officer as "the aircraft that will bankrupt the Air Force," and it has been reported that when quoted to an American audience it drew a snort of derision: "We have an airplane that will bankrupt the whole ******* country."  The full JSF programme began life modestly, so when it was predicted that its cost would rise to near one trillion dollars there were questions to answer. First there was denial, and then admission that this might possibly be correct, then that it was but it might be higher, then that it would be $1.3 trillion, then $1.45 trillion, and now there are rumours it will be $1.5 trillion (or $1,500 billion, or $1,500,000,000,000 if that is easier for the MoD, which has problems with figures, to comprehend).
The paper continues with a reference to a recent letter from the MoD pleading that 'the JSF programme is in the early development stage' and thus implicitly accepting the validity of the original criticism of the SDSR's promotion of the JSF as a superior aircraft in its category, and also of the MoD's subsequent claims that it is most 'cost-effective'.
Such claims may easily mislead the public. No aircraft in the inchoate development stage of the JSF – nine years behind schedule and with three million lines of code yet to be written (another six years at the current rate of progress) – can be portrayed as one of the world's best, nor may it be validly described as 'cost-effective' when neither its costs nor its effectiveness are known or are capable of calculation.
We shall have much to discuss on this fantasy in future issues of the blog, principally on the grounds that, first, the carriers, if they are ever ready to put to sea ten years or more from now, will be too vulnerable to risk in war, and second, that the JSF design is not what the UK wants or can afford.
So the SDSR should be scrapped immediately, plans for any more cuts should be stopped immediately, and a new review commissioned for production within a realistic timescale. The SDSR, as the government must understand, has no credibility and has been shown, in its distortion of the truth about the immense financial commitments the MoD is making on our behalf, that it lacks the integrity essential for government communications in a democracy.
Having started with the SDSR, several of the coming posts must be used to provide the information the MoD has forgotten to give the public. None of it is secret. All will be taken from material in the public domain, much of it in America. Owing to the crucial role of the carriers-JSF programme in the SDSR's plans, most of it will be concentrated on these two immensely expensive items - whose real costs, the MoD has admitted, have been grossly underestimated by the department's 'conspiracy of optimism' and hidden by processes described in Parliament as 'dysfunctional and incompetent'.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2127183/The-SDSR-slash-burn-campaign-plan--time-Government-admitted-it.html#ixzz1rZIHaFhE

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Russian Commander Explains Air Force Acquisition Plan

AIN Defense Perspective » March 30, 2012

by Vladimir Karnozov

Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin said the service plans to acquire aircraft from Sukhoi and Yakovlev, among others, under the country's Weapons Program 2011-2020. (Photo: Vladimir Karnozov)

March 30, 2012, 11:22 AM

Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin has elaborated further about aircraft acquisition plans under the country's Weapons Program 2011-2020. His comments addressed the Sukhoi series of combat aircraft, as well as airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, airlifters and the Yak-130 jet trainer.

Zelin said that the air force will acquire about 60 Sukhoi PAKFA (T-50) fifth-generation fighters by 2020. "The T-50 is intended for air-superiority missions...and will be flown by first-class pilots only," he said.

Zelin also said that the grand total of Sukhoi Su-30SM two-seat and Su-35 single-seat fighters to be acquired would be about 100. On March 22, Russian defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Irkut president Alexey Fedorov signed a contact for 30 Sukhoi Su-30SMs for delivery in 2013-2015. This is the domestic version of the Su-30MK already exported to Algeria, India and Malaysia. State acceptance trials are slated for next year. As for the Su-35, a total of 48 have been ordered so far.

Zelin said that the Russian air force will acquire a total of 140 Su-34s. To date, 124 have been placed under contract. The Su-34s will allow for a substantial increase in the national nuclear deterrent force, and also be used for launching long-range missiles at maritime, land and aerial targets, he added.

The commander also called for additional Yakovlev Yak-130 advanced jet trainers to be used for preparation of Su-34 and Su-35 fighter pilots. The airplane was also selected as a platform for development of a light strike aircraft.

The A-100 AWACS aircraft that was announced last year will include additional functions such as maritime target identification and the control of UAVs, Zelin said.

The Russian air force wants "not less than 300 airlifters in different payload capabilities," Zelin said. The restart of Ruslan heavylifter production is still being pursued, specifically the more advanced An-124-300 version. In parallel, the air force will be getting the re-engined Il-76MD-90A, which will also be used for special missions and aerial refueling.

Regarding the long-delayed Antonov An-70 joint project with Ukraine, Zelin said, "We have eliminated the discrepancies taking place before." Antonov will deliver to the Russian air force for evaluation an improved prototype now being assembled. If ever approved for production, Russian An-70s will be assembled in Voronezh, from kits produced at the Antonov plants in Kiev and Kharkov.

Zelin said the service has selected the An-140-100 as a temporary solution for a light tactical transport. The commander also confirmed plans to acquire 100 Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTAs), being jointly developed by Russia and India.

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-03-30/russian-commander-explains-air-force-acquisition-plan

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

DCNS delivered the fourth Skjold FPB to Norwegian Navy

2012/03/30

On March 29th 2012, DCNS delivered the fourth-of-class fast patrol boat (FPB) P964-Glimt to the Royal Norwegian Navy. The six-boat Skjold program is led by a consortium comprising DCNS and two Norwegian contractors with DCNS acting as the combat system design authority and co-supplier.

The Norwegian authorities entrusted the Skjold program to a consortium of three contractors with DCNS as the combat system design authority and co-supplier. DCNS is working with Norwegian contractors Umoe Mandal and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, through the Skjold Prime Consortium.

Skjold FPBs are designed specifically for maritime security and safety missions in Norway's littoral waters. The combat system is tailored to demanding environments and reduced crewing. The communications and sensor suites are fully compatible with active participation in international and NATO-led operations. The vessels communication capabilities will be further enhanced as they will be upgraded with a state-of-the-art satellite communications system. The contract for this new capability has just been awarded by NDLO (Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation) to the Skjold Prime Consortium.

With a length of around 50 meters, Skjold-class FPBs are heavily armed for their size. The combat system features eight anti-ship missiles and a 76-mm gun that can engage several targets at once at ranges exceeding 12 kilometers.

First-of-class P961-Storm was handed over on 9 September 2010, second-of-class P962-Skudd on 28 October 2010 and third-of-class P963-Steil on 30 June 2011.

The success of the Skjold program is the fruit of a long-term partnership between DCNS and its Norwegian partners. Between 1997 and 2004, DCNS demonstrated its expertise in combat system design and development as prime contractor for the modernization of 14 Hauk-class FPBs for the Royal Norwegian Navy.

http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2012/03/30/dcns-delivered-the-fourth-skjold-fpb-to-norwegian-navy/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Chilean Air Force accepts Stratotanker at Boeing's San Antonio facility

SAN ANTONIO, March 28, 2012 -- Boeing [NYSE: BA] delivered the last of the Chilean Air Force's three KC-135E Stratotankers on March 9 after all the aircraft completed Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) in San Antonio.

The final aircraft arrived at Boeing's San Antonio facility in June for the maintenance work, which included a variety of depot-level inspections, repairs, maintenance, modification and repainting. The KC-135E was flown to Santiago, Chile, by a crew from the U.S. Defense Contract Management Agency's 313th Flight Test Squadron.

"Boeing worked with the Chilean Air Force to incorporate lessons learned on the first and second aircraft to deliver the final KC-135 and return it to doing what it does best," said Mike Wright, Boeing KC-135 program director. "This highly dependable aircraft is a critical resource to Chile for refueling missions and humanitarian assistance."

KC-135 aircraft receive PDM after five years of service or 20,000 hours of flight time. Boeing has been performing PDM for the U.S. Air Force and other international customers at its San Antonio facility since 1998.

"Boeing continues to make significant investments in Lean processes that dramatically accelerate turnaround time, decrease cost and improve quality to better serve our customer," said Wright.

The first Chilean Air Force KC-135 to go through PDM was delivered on Feb. 18, 2010, a week before an 8.8-magnitude earthquake hit Chile. The aircraft was immediately put into use to conduct humanitarian missions. Delivery of the second aircraft took place on Aug. 30, 2011, one day before the KC-135 marked its 55th anniversary of first flight.

The Chilean government purchased three KC-135 E-model aircraft on July 8, 2009, through the U.S. Air Force Foreign Military Sales Office at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla.

http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2189

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

8e C-17 Globemaster III voor de RAF

LONG BEACH, Calif., March 28, 2012 – Boeing [NYSE: BA] today announced that the UK Ministry of Defence has signed an agreement for the acquisition of one C-17 Globemaster III, bringing the Royal Air Force (RAF) fleet of the world's most advanced airlifters to a total of eight. Boeing is scheduled to deliver the eighth C-17 later this year.

"The tremendous teamwork of Boeing and U.S. Government officials has made it possible to announce this acquisition so quickly after we determined the need for this additional C-17," said UK Ministry of Defence Head of Commercial for Air Support Robin Philip. "This C-17 will be a welcome addition to the RAF fleet."

RAF C-17s had surpassed 50,000 flight hours in December 2009, when the UK announced its intent to purchase a seventh aircraft. By the time the seventh C-17 was delivered in November 2010, the fleet had logged more than 60,000 flight hours. The fleet has now surpassed 74,000 flight hours – a rate 15 percent above planned use.

"We have watched with great pride over the past decade as the RAF, our first international C-17 customer, has supported global peacekeeping missions and responded to the needs of millions affected by natural disasters around the world," said Bob Ciesla, Boeing vice president and C-17 program manager.

"We understand the need to move quickly to bring this contract to completion," said Liz Pace, Boeing C-17 UK program manager. "This additional order is a testament to our strong relationship with the UK as well as to the aircraft's advanced capability, flexibility and reliability."

The RAF C-17s are operated by 99Squadron at RAF Brize Norton. C-17s are used to support Operation Herrick, the transport of large equipment and troops to Afghanistan. RAF C-17s also delivered relief supplies following devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and provided humanitarian relief following floods in Pakistan.

As a member of the worldwide C-17 "virtual fleet," RAF C-17s are supported through the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program, a Performance-Based Logistics agreement. The GISP arrangement provides the highest airlift mission capable rate at one of the lowest costs per flying hour.

Boeing has delivered 241 C-17s worldwide, including 216 to the U.S. Air Force active duty, Guard and Reserve units. A total of 25 C-17s have been delivered to Australia, Canada, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. India has 10 C-17s on order for delivery in 2013 and 2014.

A unit of The Boeing Company, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is one of the world's largest defense, space and security businesses specializing in innovative and capabilities-driven customer solutions, and the world's largest and most versatile manufacturer of military aircraft. Headquartered in St. Louis, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is a $32 billion business with 62,000 employees

http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2191

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Mwa, te ver....daar heb ik zo mijn twijfels over. Het zal wellicht wat kosten ja. Misschien dat als ze nu een definitieve tekening hebben dat het bouwen van een 3e carrier wel goedkoper is. Maar als je ziet hoe bepaalde schepen in het verleden zijn omgebouwd, gerefit en geupgrade, geloof ik niet dat de eerste carrier hopeloos verloren is. Kost wellicht tijd en geld, maar laat het desnoods in Roemenië doen ofzo. Voorlopig hebben ze het geld niet, maar technisch is 'alles' mogelijk. Vraag me af voor hoeveel de britten het eerste schip van de hand zouden durven doen .

Voor geld is natuurlijk alles mogelijk.

Wellicht een prima idee voor een zekere H. Hillen om een aan de overzijde van het kanaal van gedachten te wisselen om te onderzoeken of een Brits "overtollig" product zou kunnen passen in een geherstructureerde NL Krijgsmacht  

Kunnen de Britten hun nootleidende industrie weer dolgelukkig maken met de aanbesteding van een derde...  

En wij... dit onderwerp doorschuiven naar de krijgsmachtvisie voor 2020/30

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Dat lijkt me op termijn wel een te overwegen optie. De toestellen maken immers grotendeels gebruik van dezelfde technieken en onderdelen ( :crazy:).

Ik mag hopen dat ze voorlopig bij hun 'cat & trap' versie blijven. Wat er dan ooit gebeurt met die tweede carrier moet nog maar bezien worden. Die misschien ook maar ombouwen?

Lijkt mij ook de meest zinvolle oplossing.

Volgens diverse artiekelen is de eerste, in aanbouw zijnde carrier, al in een tever gevorderd stadium om deze realistisch gezien nog om te bouwen.

Slim, in mijn optiek, is de JSF order 50/50 te verdelen over de B en de C variant.