Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

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Aardige opschaling van Brits defensiebudget. Aankoop F35B lijkt met dit bericht iets dichterbij.

MOD Reveals £160 Billion Plan to Equip Armed Forces

The Ministry of Defence has today published details of how it will equip the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force over the next 10 years and how this will be funded.
For the first time, the government has set out a fully-funded Defence Equipment Plan totalling almost £160 billion.
The affordability of this plan has been scrutinised by the National Audit Office (NAO) and their independent analysis is also published today.
The NAO makes clear that the MOD has:
substantially revised the way it compiles and manages the equipment plan and is now approaching the task on a more prudent basis;
taken difficult decisions to address what was estimated to be a £74 billion gap between its forecast funding and costs;
taken significant positive steps designed to deal with the accumulated affordability gap and lay the foundations for stability going forward.
And concludes that if it continues along this path:
the department will be able to demonstrate it has really turned a corner.
The publication of the equipment plan follows the Defence Secretary's announcement last year that the Defence Budget has been balanced for the first time in more than a decade and that the MOD is taking a new approach to financial planning.
Within the equipment and equipment support budget of around £160 billion over the next ten years, Philip Hammond has introduced for the first time a contingency of £4.8 billion to manage cost variation and protect existing projects.
In addition, within the £160 billion, £8 billion is currently unallocated. This will be allocated as new equipment priorities emerge over the decade and only once the MOD is confident that they are affordable and therefore deliverable.
Priorities will be decided by the Armed Forces Committee, chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff.
Structuring the Defence Equipment Plan and the budget that supports it in this way will enable the MOD to deliver Future Force 2020.
The equipment plan includes the following major investments in state-of-the-art military capabilities and their support over the next ten years:
£35.8 billion on submarines and the deterrent, including a total of seven Astute Class attack submarines and developing a replacement for Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarines;
£18.5 billion on combat air, including Lightning II and Typhoon fast jets and unmanned aerial vehicles;
£17.4 billion on ships, including Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, six new Type 45 destroyers and the development of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship;
£13.9 billion on aircraft for air-to-air refuelling, passenger and heavy lift, such as Voyager and A400M;
£12.3 billion on armoured fighting vehicles, including Warrior, Scout and other land equipment;
£12.1 billion on helicopters, including Chinook, Apache, Puma and Wildcat; and
£11.4 billion on weapons, for example, missiles, torpedoes and precision guided bombs.
The Defence Equipment Plan gives the defence industry more information than ever before about the MOD's priorities to enable them to invest in the capabilities the military will require.
Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said:
"It is essential that our forces are fully equipped to respond to the range of threats we face in this uncertain world. This £160 billion equipment plan will ensure the UK's Armed Forces remain among the most capable and best equipped in the world, providing the military with the confidence that the equipment they need is fully funded.
"For the first time in a generation the Armed Forces will have a sustainable equipment plan.
"Step by step, we are clearing up the culture of over-promising and under-delivering that created a multi-billion pound black hole in the Defence Budget. Today's NAO report confirms that we were right to take the difficult decisions to cut unaffordable expenditure and balance the books."
Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, said:
"Successful operations rely on a proper equipment programme based on sustained funding into the future. Through the Armed Forces Committee to the Defence Board, all 3 Services now have greater input and more certainty than ever before about what equipment they will have and when.
"The clarity provided by the equipment plan builds on the confidence in the budget and shows that Future Force 2020 is affordable and achievable. Our Armed Forces will have the capabilities to respond to global threats and provide the nation's defence."

http://www.defencetalk.com/mod-reveals-160-billion-plan-to-equip-armed-forces-46610/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

European nations cannot afford separate defence programmes

by Clara Marina O'Donnell
01 February 2013

European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive military programmes prior to the economic crisis and they definitely cannot afford it now - says think-tank, calling for more EU defence cooperation

Europe's military spending is in free fall. European Union member states combined have reduced defence spending from €200bn to €170bn since the start of the economic crisis in 2008. In response, governments have signed up to a variety of new bilateral and multilateral initiatives. These are designed to limit the impact of budget cuts on their armed forces. But so far, the savings incurred pale in comparison. Estimates put them at €200m to €300m. Many sensitivities relating to national security make it hard for governments to implement collaborative defence efforts. But at a time when Europe's neighbourhood is replete with instability and the United States is scaling back its own armed forces, Europeans need to do more to stem the damage to their militaries.

Notwithstanding their budget cuts, taken together EU states are still the second largest defence spenders in the world. And not all European countries are reducing the level of funding to their armed forces. According to a 2011 study for the European Parliament, Finland and Denmark have maintained military spending steady in recent years. Poland and Sweden have increased it. But even prior to the economic crisis, most European countries spent less than 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence – even though North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members are in theory committed to devoting at least that much to their militaries.

And, according to the European Parliament study, most middle-sized European countries have cut their defence spending by 10 to 15 per cent since 2009. Some of the smaller states, including Latvia and Lithuania, have cut spending by more than 20 per cent. Britain is reducing its military budget by 7.5 per cent over four years. And according to Andrew Dorman from Chatham House, the actual reduction is nearly 25 per cent because the Ministry of Defence has many unfunded liabilities and has to unexpectedly pay for the replacement of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. France is expected to scale back its military once it announces its new defence priorities this year. As a result, American officials warn that Europeans will soon be incapable of deploying a mission like the one they sent to Libya in 2011.

European governments have acknowledged that closer cooperation between their armed forces could offset – at least partly – the impact of such large spending cuts. They have introduced some welcome measures. For example, last year, 14 countries agreed to buy surveillance drones for a joint NATO-run squadron. Some 18 states now take part in the EU network to facilitate maritime surveillance through information exchanges. Last April, Belgium and the Netherlands decided to cooperate in helicopter maintenance. In September, Bulgaria and Romania agreed terms to make it easier to police each other's airspace. Britain and France are training together to develop a new joint expeditionary force. And the UK and other Europeans are providing logistical support to France's deployment in Mali.

But governments remain wary of pooling military capabilities. They still fear that their partners may block their access to shared equipment if they disapprove of a particular operation. States also disagree on the best way to develop new military technologies. For example, Britain wants to acquire defence equipment with France bilaterally. But since French President François Hollande has been in office, France has become increasingly keen to allow other European countries to take part in Franco-British procurement projects. Many countries are averse to committing to ambitious initiatives because they know that these can be costly in the short term.

Last year, Britain notably abandoned its plans to adapt its aircraft carrier so that French planes could land on it, after realising how expensive the adjustments would be. Several states are loath to integrate their defence companies with those of other countries, as Germany illustrated when it refused to support the merger between BAE and EADS. Finally, governments do not want their defence firms to lose out on contracts. Many in France worry that several of the cost-saving projects proposed by NATO, including missile defence and the joint purchases of surveillance drones, favour US defence companies.

Europeans need to overcome some of these continued aversions to cooperation. Even though governments would prefer to avoid using military force, they might not have a choice. Several conflicts risk undermining stability in Europe's southern periphery over the next few years – not least the partial take-over of Mali by Islamist militants, where French forces have already felt compelled to intervene, the civil war in Syria and a possible standoff with Iran. And Washington, struggling with its own budgetary constraints, wants its allies across the world to take more responsibility for their regional security.

President Hollande's government can allay some of the French concerns about the lack of European industrial participation within NATO cost-saving initiatives. To do so, Paris could suggest projects to the alliance which involve equipment made in Europe. Berlin, London, Paris or Rome could sell some of their old fighter jets to countries in Central Europe which want to strengthen their arsenals cheaply. Europeans should buy cutting edge military capabilities only when it is necessary. Over the last few decades, the cost of defence equipment has grown exponentially. Even when their economies are stronger, governments will increasingly struggle to arm their militaries. In some cases, national security will require governments to continue acquiring the most technologically sophisticated capabilities. But for less sensitive tasks, governments should explore cheaper equipment options and a greater use of civilian suppliers, for example in communications.

Finally, European governments must ensure that they do not duplicate their efforts to build the next generation of drones. European governments have long argued that it has been very inefficient for Europe to have three manned fighter jets programmes - Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen. The duplication has prevented the various programmes from benefiting from economies of scale, it has curtailed interoperability amongst European armed forces and it has led Europeans to compete against each other in export markets.

Over the next few years, Europeans will decide how to develop unmanned combat aircraft and other sophisticated drones. It is still unclear how governments will proceed. France and Britain have announced plans to develop next generation drones bilaterally. Lately, EADS and Finmeccanica -Italy's largest defence company - have floated intentions to do the same. And France has agreed to work on unmanned aircraft with Germany, too. Under current spending trends, there is insufficient demand in Europe to support several competitive next generation large unmanned aircraft programmes. So Europeans must avoid several uncoordinated efforts taking place simultaneously. European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive aerospace programmes prior to the economic crisis. They definitely cannot afford it now.

Read more: http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/3033/european-nations-cannot-afford-separate-defence-programmes#ixzz2Jea0Ei8P

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Nato chief: EU must spend more on military

31.01.13

BRUSSELS - Nato chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen has urged EU countries to spend more on defence despite the economic crisis or risk losing US solidarity.

He said in a foreword to the alliance's report on 2012, out on Thursday (31 January), that: "If current defence spending trends were to continue, that would limit the practical ability of Nato's European nations to work together with their North American allies. But it would also risk weakening the political support for our alliance in the United States."

He added Nato is still "the most important military power in the world."

But he warned: "The security challenges of the 21st century - terrorism, proliferation, piracy, cyber warfare, unstable states - will not go away as we focus on fixing our economies."

He also said "the rise of emerging powers could create a growing gap between their capacity to act and exert influence on the international stage and our ability to do so."

The Nato report says the US accounted for 72 percent of Nato countries' defence spending in 2012 compared to 68 percent in 2007. France, Germany, Italy and the UK made up the bulk of the rest, but the French contribution fell steeply.

"This has the potential to undermine alliance solidarity and puts at risk the ability of the European allies to act without the involvement of the United States," the report notes.

It adds that Nato spending as a proportion of world military expenditure fell to 60 percent in 2011 from 69 percent in 2003 and is to hit 56 percent in 2014.

'EU like Vatican'

The angst over EU defence capabilities is not new.

Former US defence chief Robert Gates in a speech in Brussels in 2011 also voiced alarm.

"The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress - and in the American body politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence," he said at the time.

Gates and Fogh Rasmussen's anxiety is not confined to Nato.

Speaking in Brussels also on Thursday on the margins of an EU foreign ministers' meeting, Poland's Radek Sikorski said the Union needs a real defence force of its own.

"I think the Mali crisis shows this is necessary because the next crisis could unfold even more quickly and we need to be able to react instantly," he told press.

"Let's recall that events in Mali unfolded very fast. The terrorists crossed the line of contact and France reacted from one day to the next. But we know that in the EU, as in the Vatican, the wheels of state turn very slowly," he added.

EU arms licences

The latest EU figures appear to show that some of the worst crisis-hit EU countries are still ploughing money into new weapons despite Nato's concerns.

The report says that fellow EU countries in 2011 granted significant amounts of export licences to Greece (€783mn), Portugal (€397mn) and Spain (€1.6bn).

The numbers do not tell the whole story, however.

France, which makes up most of the Greek figure, granted licences to negotiate future arms sales rather than export licences as such.

A large chunk of the Spanish number relates to cross-border movements of spare parts in defence projects, such as Eurofighter or Typhoon, managed by the European defence consortium Eads.

Most of the Portuguese figure relates to deliveries from a 2005 deal to buy armoured vehicles from Austrian firm Steyr.

Lisbon cancelled the contract last November because Steyr delivered just 166 out of 260 units, invoking a €55 million penalty against the supplier.

"Portugal, in the last two years, reduced its budget for the purchase of military equipment by over 60 percent ... Also for budgetary reasons, though not only for that, Portugal, in 2011, decided to withdraw from several military programs, such as NH90 helicopters," its ministry of defence told EUobserver.

http://euobserver.com/defence/118914

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

UK unveils £159 billion defence equipment plan, but doubts remain

By Mohammed Abbas

LONDON | Thu Jan 31, 2013 1:46am GMT

(Reuters) - Britain published on Thursday a 159-billion-pound long-term defence equipment spending plan, a move aimed at reversing decades of mismanagement but which drew only qualified praise from experts.

The plan covers spending from 2012 to 2022, the first time the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has outlined defence equipment spending over such a long period, reflecting the gestation time of major military projects.

Equipment covered in the plan contained no surprises, having been outlined in the MoD's last major planning exercise, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which charted a course for British security needs by 2020.

British arms firm BAE Systems, Europe's largest defence contractor, is behind most of the large projects outlined in the plan, including submarines, ships, aircraft carriers and the Typhoon fighter jet.

The MoD has for years been criticised by spending watchdogs for over-optimistic cost and time forecasts for equipment projects, a matter that has grown in importance as Britain slashes spending to fix a budget deficit.

The spending plan includes a 4.8 billion pound contingency allowance to manage unexpected cost increases, as well as an unallocated 8 billion pounds for future equipment needs.

"Step by step, we are clearing up years of mismanagement under the last government by ending the culture of over-promising and under-delivering," Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, a Conservative, said in a statement, referring to the opposition Labour party.

Labour labelled Hammond "hubristic" and said his claims to have balanced the defence budget were "wild".

The MoD said the spending plan addresses what had been estimated to have been a 74 billion pound equipment funding gap, and that it had received the backing of the National Audit Office (NAO), parliament's spending watchdog.

OVER-OPTIMISM

However, the NAO said in a report reviewing the MoD's spending plan that while the ministry was approaching defence spending on a "more prudent basis" and had "taken significant positive steps", uncertainty remained.

"There is systemic over-optimism inherent in the department's assumptions around the costing of risk and uncertainty .... which may not be sufficiently mitigated by the contingency provision," the NAO said.

It stressed that its assessment of the spending forecast only took into account equipment procurement and not equipment support costs, which at 86 billion pounds makes up more than half of the spending plan.

The NAO also said the plan was "unlikely to be realistic" without a comprehensive analysis of risks and uncertainties.

John Louth, director for defence, industries and society at the Royal United Services Institute defence thinktank in London, said the MoD's plan lacked detail and was vulnerable to shocks.

"Whilst they should be applauded for publishing a 10-year plan, the information we have is very thin. It doesn't really talk about any accounting assumptions or anything that gives an understanding of how the numbers were generated," he said.

"If you have a 10-year forecast, you're making an awful lot of assumptions over how the world will be over that 10-year period .... We haven't been able to forecast any of the operations we've been involved with," he added.

An MoD spokesman said future "wider economic conditions" could have an impact on the plan, as well as another SDSR planned for 2015.

PROJECTS COVERED

The major defence equipment projects covered in the MoD spending plan are:

* 35.8 billion pounds on seven BAE-built Astute-class submarines and developing a replacement for the four Vanguard-class submarines used for Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent.

* 18.5 billion pounds on fighter jets, and UAVs, or drones, including the Joint Strike Fighter built by U.S. firm Lockheed Martin Corp, of which Britain has so far committed to buy 48, and the Typhoon, built by a consortium of BAE, Italy's Finmeccanica and European aerospace group EADS, of which Britain has ordered 160.

* 17.4 billion pounds on two aircraft carriers, six new Type 45 destroyers and the development of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, all built by BAE.

* 13.9 billion pounds on air-to-air refuelling, passenger and heavy lift capability by leasing Airbus aircraft through the EADS-led AirTanker consortium.

* 12.3 billion pounds on armoured fighting vehicles, including the Scout - built by General Dynamics - and the Warrior, built by GKN.

* 12.1 billion pounds on helicopters, including the Boeing-built Chinook and Apache, and the AgustaWestland-built Wildcat.

* 11.4 billion pounds on assorted missiles, torpedoes and bombs.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/uk-britain-defence-spending-idUKBRE90U00J20130131

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Lessons From Mali

By Robert Farley / January 31, 2013

The French-led intervention in Mali appears to be accomplishing some of its short-term objectives.  However, just as with Libya, the inability of France to conduct a medium-sized operation in a nearby country without U.S. assistance is raising eyebrows . France is experiencing shortfalls in several areas, but most notably in air logistics, including in-flight refueling and air transport.  The Obama administration has thus far lent measured assistance, recently backing away from a requirement that the French pay the Pentagon for services rendered. As Michael O'Hanlon has argued, the key to U.S. military supremacy lies in its system of global logistics, rather than in its most sophisticated weaponry .

To be sure, France's problems may be temporary.  The long awaited arrival of the A400M should resolve many of these logistical difficulties, and the aerial refueling situation may also improve. Nevertheless, the French experience has some important lessons for Asia-Pacific players. Military capabilities mean little without the ability to transport forces across distance, and a major logistical commitment requires sealift, airlift, and aerial refueling.

The development of the Y-20, assuming it goes into full production, demonstrates that the PLA is beginning to take airlift seriously. The Y-20 is expected to replace older Russian aircraft, and give the PLAAF a capability similar to that of the C-17 Globemaster. Indeed, the Y-20 may someday capture some of the emerging ASEAN market for large, advanced transport aircraft.

The transport fleets of most ASEAN states are dominated by C-130s and a variety of lighter aircraft, such as the An-26 and the C-212 Aviocar.  Japan and South Korea have similar, if somewhat more modern, transport squadrons. With increasingly dense littoral populations living in a disaster-prone region, the ability of ASEAN militaries to conduct airlift may become their critical operational capability. Of all Indo-Pac states, India has made the most serious investment with an order of 10 C-17s.

"Air diplomacy" may have a role to play. The pre-eminence of the United States in air transport continues to give it an advantage in crisis situations, as the U.S. military can deliver people and material faster and in greater quantities than any regional player. A Y-20 equipped PLAAF may someday be able to cut into this advantage. In the medium term, we could perhaps imagine an Asian alternative to the Heavy Airlift Wing, a organization serving the airlift needs of a consortium of European states.  The HAW owns 3 C-17 Globemasters (operating with Hungarian markings), giving member states a limited heavy airlift capacity.  Of course, any kind of multilateral military organization requires substantial agreement across parties, a requirement that does not necessarily hold even in ASEAN, much less across the panoply of East Asia states. Nevertheless, some sort of shared airlift capacity might make sense in context of the operations-other-than-war that so often occupy Asian military organizations.

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/01/31/lessons-from-mali/

[dudge]

Why France Can't Fight

Years of shortchanging defense are showing up in its Africa campaign.

The French armed forces field some of the world's most sophisticated fighter jets, nuclear submarines, attack helicopters and armored vehicles. The country spent $52 billion last year on defense, which puts it in the world's top league in total military spending. That's more than twice what such robust middle powers as South Korea, Turkey and Israel spend.

Inderdaad een heel interessante vraag, en een absolute waarschuwing voor heel Europa. Frankrijk is op dit moment, waarschijnlijk, de meest capabele krijgsmacht van Europa.

Yet in its commendable efforts to fight terrorists in Mali, Paris is all but begging for logistical and military support from its NATO allies and has come up short on everything from refuelling to surveillance to heavy transport. Independently deploying a brigade-sized force to a country a mere five hours flight-time away is proving a bridge too far. How did that happen?

Die brigade krijgen ze er wel. Alleen tijd was in deze een belangrijke factor. Een waardoor zeetransport te langzaam was, en de Fransen een stevige air assault moesten opzetten.

The question is worth asking because it tells us something about the nature of present-day European militaries—and perhaps the future of the U.S. military, too.

Consider personnel costs. In the U.S., military planners fret that the Pentagon spends $107 billion of its $600 billion budget on salaries, another $53 billion or so on health care, and another $50 billion on retirement costs. In France, the Defense Ministry spends an astounding 50% of its total budget on personnel costs.

Some of that is the result of moving to an all-volunteer force, as France did in 1996, which has made the military smaller but more professional. But the bulk of the problem is that the Defense Ministry spends €7.6 billion ($10.2 billion) on retirees—roughly 20% of its budget, euros that are effectively taken away from war-fighting needs.

Die redenen inderdaad, maar naast dat 20% uitgegeven wordt aan pensioenen (in NL ook meer dan 1 miljard/>15%), gaat er ook nog een deel naar de Gendarmerie (wederom 7,7 miljard, 20%), net als de NL Kmar. In landen als de VS staat dat, meen ik, vaak los van het defensiebudget (secret service, Border control enz). Ongeacht of je de KMAR nu nuttig vindt of niet, of dat nu bij Defensie hoort of niet, een echte warfighting capability leveren ze niet. Is dus al 40% die niet naar de Marine, Lucht- of Landmacht gaan.
 

The result is an increasingly hollow military. On paper France has 230,000 men and women in uniform, but only 30,000 are estimated to be deployable on six months notice.

wij hadden de grootste moeite om in 2008 zo'n 2500-3000 man op uitzending te hebben, van de 70.000(?). verhoudingsgewijs nog een heel stuk slechter (3,5% vs 13%). Ook bij de Britten liggen de verhoudingen waarschijnlijk slecht. Onder meer een probleem door de versplintering in de Europese krijgsmachten denk ik. Een goed argument voor specialisatie. Ook is het interessant om te weten hoeveel burgers de krijgsmachten in dienst hebben. Waar burgers enerzijds vaak goedkoper kunnen zijn dan militairen, en de gemiddelde uitzendbaarheid misschien omhoog kunnen brengen, hebben zij als nadeel dat zij zelf niet uitzendbaar zijn, en dus ten koste gaan van het doorzettingsvermogen.

France does spend money on modern weaponry: Since 2009, one of the few pieces of equipment that saw an upward revision in planned inventory through 2014 is Dassault's twin-engine Rafale fighter jet, of which France already has more than 70, with plans for nearly 160 more.

But militaries need the not-so-sexy stuff, too, and here Paris has been shortchanging its soldiers for years. French infantrymen must now deploy with barely half the number of logistical transport vehicles the military had planned four years ago. French diplomats spent the first week of the Malian intervention haggling with the U.S., Canada and Britain for American-made C-17s to transport soldiers and gear to Mali.

Nieuwe projecten zijn risicovol. Helaas worden deze vaak te laat opgestart, en is er te weinig rekening gehouden met eventuele risico's. Dit als gevolg van politieke beslissingen.

France has no C-17s, though for nearly a decade it has had an order in for 50 A400-M cargo planes. The A400-M (aka the Airbus "Atlas") is a joint project of several European governments, whose inability to pay for it has delayed the program repeatedly. The A400-M can handle only about half the payload of a C-17.

De payload van een A400M was ruim afdoende geweest voor Mali. Bij de eerste berichten dacht ik er zelfs aan, dat een uitlevering van de A400M de Franse afhankelijkheid van externe transporttoestellen aanzienlijk beperkt zou hebben.

France is also still hunting for more air-refueling tankers to back up its small fleet of aging KC-135s, which are the only way its Rafales can carry out attacks throughout northern Mali. The U.S. hasn't agreed to help on that one. Again, Paris has an order in for 14 new Airbus 330s to replace its tankers, but this purchase was postponed in 2010.

Refueling capacity is one of the many areas covered in France's 2010 "Defense and Cooperation Treaty" with the U.K., through which the allies were meant to make up the growing holes in each other's military capabilities should the need arise. But now that the need is there in Africa, British defense officials say they have no tankers to spare. Theirs are either busy in Afghanistan or on standby in case they need to get to the Falklands.

Een afspraak is leuk. Maar dan moet je moet dan wel borgen dat deze ook voor capaciteiten zorgt. Dat gebeurt, maar er is nog veel op te winnen. Daarbij gaat nationaal gebruik voor, de restjes worden gedeeld. Dat is efficiënt, maar in bepaalde gebieden zijn er nu eenmaal weinig restjes. En A2A-Refuelling is daar 1 van. 

Given the Obama Administration's unfortunate unwillingness to provide more than minimal help in Mali, policy makers across Europe must now reconsider their future defense-to-GDP ratios with some urgency. Meantime, France needs help to secure the Sahel from Islamist insurgents. Paris's misguided spending priorities have compromised its ability to win on its own in Mali. But neither France nor its allies can afford to see it lose.

Niet alleen de defense-to-GDP ratio, maar de gehele defensiestrategie!

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

January 28, 2013

Russia poised to achieve nuclear superiority over U.S.

By Toby Westerman

In his second term as Russian president, Vladimir Putin has made the rebuilding of Russian military forces, including its nuclear striking capabilities, a top priority. Advanced missiles, bombers, and submarines are either on the drawing board or coming into operational service, just as the United States is on the verge of drastic cuts in its armed forces.

Of the three legs of Russia's nuclear triad (air, land, sea forces), attack submarines carrying newly designed intercontinental ballistic missiles are receiving special attention. Moscow is seeking first to equal and then overtake the United States in nuclear weaponry, according to a now retired military weapons and terrorism analyst.

"Over the long haul, Russia is on the right track to achieve "parity," and ultimately surpass the U.S." in nuclear capability, particularly if threatened budget cuts slash the military budget of the United States, said Rick Norris, a veteran of the U.S. Army, Defense Intelligence Agency, and a recognized expert in weapons and counterterrorism.

Norris' made these remarks after this writer contacted him about the effectiveness of Russia's newest ballistic missile submarine, the Yuri Dolgorukiy, which has just entered service in the Russian navy.

The Yuri Dolgorukiy, named after an early Russian military hero, is the first of the Borei class of attack submarines to enter into service, and is scheduled to be joined "in the near future" by the Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh, according to a recent RIA Novosti report [http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130110/917607431.html] . In all eight ships of this class are to be completed.

On board the Yuri Dolgorukiy is Russia's most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, the Bulava ("Mace"), which is described as "low flying," "hypersonic," weapon with multiple warheads.

The "low flying" aspect of the Bulava is especially dangerous. During the Cold War, U.S. military experts believed that the Soviet Union was capable of launching a "low flying" missile attack which could destroy, with very little warning, the national leadership of the United States, according to Norris. Specific measures were developed that would ensure the survival of at least part of the American leadership, including the practice of at least one person in the presidential succession always out of the Washington, D.C. area, Norris said.

The Bulava is meant to be an improvement on earlier Soviet capabilities. Each of the ten warheads has its own guidance system and is capable of changing altitude and course to evade anti-missile defenses. The Borei class submarines will be able to eventually carry as many as 20 Bulava missiles, Norris stated.

Moscow plans to use the Borei class submarines in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Already Moscow has reintroduced regular submarine patrols of the U.S. coast, which "should be cause of some concern," said Norris.

Russia is also working to improve the strike capabilities of other aspects of its nuclear "triad." In addition to modernizing its current bomber fleet, Moscow is developing a next generation long range strategic, possibly stealthy, bomber, referred to as PAK DA. Along with its submarine patrols, Russian bombers are again prowling along U.S. borders.

Another, and somewhat ambitious, revival of Cold War weaponry is the planned return of the missile train. In the Soviet era, certain trains would carry ballistic missile launching facilities along with passenger, mail, and freight cars. The missile trains were difficult to detect except that three locomotives were required to pull the extra load.

Russian scientists and technicians are now working on a nuclear-powered locomotive which remove the necessity of using three engines as well as refueling requirements. A prototype of a gas turbine locomotive, which could also pull a missile train, has already been built and successfully tested.

Moscow is serious in its intension to regain its place as a nuclear power. The political impulse influencing Russia's rearmament may be detected in a Tweet sent out by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and attracted Norris' attention. Rogozin made the Tweet after the acceptance into the Northern Fleet of the Yuri Dolgorukiy. Its message: "Tremble, bourgeoisie! You're done with."

© Toby Westerman

http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/westerman/130128

[HermanB]

Ach in Europa slapen we gewoon door hoor.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Why France Can't Fight

Years of shortchanging defense are showing up in its Africa campaign..

The French armed forces field some of the world's most sophisticated fighter jets, nuclear submarines, attack helicopters and armored vehicles. The country spent $52 billion last year on defense, which puts it in the world's top league in total military spending. That's more than twice what such robust middle powers as South Korea, Turkey and Israel spend.

Yet in its commendable efforts to fight terrorists in Mali, Paris is all but begging for logistical and military support from its NATO allies and has come up short on everything from refuelling to surveillance to heavy transport. Independently deploying a brigade-sized force to a country a mere five hours flight-time away is proving a bridge too far. How did that happen?

The question is worth asking because it tells us something about the nature of present-day European militaries—and perhaps the future of the U.S. military, too.

Consider personnel costs. In the U.S., military planners fret that the Pentagon spends $107 billion of its $600 billion budget on salaries, another $53 billion or so on health care, and another $50 billion on retirement costs. In France, the Defense Ministry spends an astounding 50% of its total budget on personnel costs.

Some of that is the result of moving to an all-volunteer force, as France did in 1996, which has made the military smaller but more professional. But the bulk of the problem is that the Defense Ministry spends €7.6 billion ($10.2 billion) on retirees—roughly 20% of its budget, euros that are effectively taken away from war-fighting needs.

The result is an increasingly hollow military. On paper France has 230,000 men and women in uniform, but only 30,000 are estimated to be deployable on six months notice.

France does spend money on modern weaponry: Since 2009, one of the few pieces of equipment that saw an upward revision in planned inventory through 2014 is Dassault's twin-engine Rafale fighter jet, of which France already has more than 70, with plans for nearly 160 more.

But militaries need the not-so-sexy stuff, too, and here Paris has been shortchanging its soldiers for years. French infantrymen must now deploy with barely half the number of logistical transport vehicles the military had planned four years ago. French diplomats spent the first week of the Malian intervention haggling with the U.S., Canada and Britain for American-made C-17s to transport soldiers and gear to Mali.

France has no C-17s, though for nearly a decade it has had an order in for 50 A400-M cargo planes. The A400-M (aka the Airbus "Atlas") is a joint project of several European governments, whose inability to pay for it has delayed the program repeatedly. The A400-M can handle only about half the payload of a C-17.

France is also still hunting for more air-refueling tankers to back up its small fleet of aging KC-135s, which are the only way its Rafales can carry out attacks throughout northern Mali. The U.S. hasn't agreed to help on that one. Again, Paris has an order in for 14 new Airbus 330s to replace its tankers, but this purchase was postponed in 2010.

Refueling capacity is one of the many areas covered in France's 2010 "Defense and Cooperation Treaty" with the U.K., through which the allies were meant to make up the growing holes in each other's military capabilities should the need arise. But now that the need is there in Africa, British defense officials say they have no tankers to spare. Theirs are either busy in Afghanistan or on standby in case they need to get to the Falklands.

Given the Obama Administration's unfortunate unwillingness to provide more than minimal help in Mali, policy makers across Europe must now reconsider their future defense-to-GDP ratios with some urgency. Meantime, France needs help to secure the Sahel from Islamist insurgents. Paris's misguided spending priorities have compromised its ability to win on its own in Mali. But neither France nor its allies can afford to see it lose.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324624404578257672194671036.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

[Lex]

Pentagon schrapt tienduizenden banen

WASHINGTON - Het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie gaat fors schrappen in het personeelsbestand om te kunnen bezuinigen. 

Het Pentagon zegt 46.000 tijdelijke werknemers en contractanten de wacht aan, zo meldde het departement vrijdag.

Het ministerie neemt daarmee een voorschot op enorme verwachte bezuinigingen op het defensiebudget. Het Pentagon zal in februari het Amerikaanse congres inlichten over de plannen.

ANP
25 januari 2013 18:24

[IPA NG]

En de Duitse krijgsmacht stelde al zeer weinig voor...

Nog een reden voor ons om te investeren.

[Lex]

Miljardenbezuiniging op Duitse defensie

MUNCHEN - De Duitse regering plant voor 2014 bezuinigingen op de begroting van in totaal 6 miljard euro. Defensie krijgt daarbij de zwaarste klappen. Bijna een derde van het totaalbedrag moet uit de portemonnee van minister Thomas de Mazière komen. Zijn departement zal 32 procent van de bezuinigingen moeten dragen. Verkeer levert 24 procent van de benodigde miljarden in.

Omdat het totaalbedrag vermoedelijk niet door vrijwillige bijdragen van de afzonderlijke ministeries bijeengebracht zal worden, treedt een vooraf vastgestelde verdeelsleutel in werking, aldus de krantSüddeutscheZeitung van vrijdag. Volgens de krant worden daarmee ook Onderzoek en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking het kind van de rekening. Deze departementen moeten respectievelijk 11 en 6 procent van de 6 miljard ophoesten.

Telegraaf,
vr 25 jan 2013, 11:44

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Dan zal Dassault omlaag moeten gaan met de prijzen want de VAE gaan voor de Eurofighter Typhoon.

Oman is voor 12 EF's gegaan, in de VAE zijn de besprekingen nog gaande. Als India defintief tekent (en er is zelfs spraken van 60 kisten boven op de eerder genoemde 126) dan heeft dat Dassault de ruimte om iets aan de prijs te doen.

Daarnaast is Mali voor het die regio (wederom) een aardige "show case" voor de Rafale. Kortom: afwachten.

[Ace1]

Laat ik een s voorzichtige gok doen. Libië koop de occasions van de VAE (Mirage2000/9) en de VAE kopen de Rafale.

Dan zal Dassault omlaag moeten gaan met de prijzen want de VAE gaan voor de Eurofighter Typhoon.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Doorverkoop naar Libie zou heel goed kunnen deze heeft al Mirages F1 in gebruik of gehad?

Laat ik een s voorzichtige gok doen. Libië koop de occasions van de VAE (Mirage2000/9) en de VAE kopen de Rafale.