'Fransen dood door einde Taliban-betalingen'

Gestart door Elzenga, 15/10/2009 | 13:47 uur

hdevreij

Citaat van: hdevreij op 17/10/2009 | 03:52 uur
Citaat van: Ros op 15/10/2009 | 22:20 uur
De praktijken van de Italianen is, naar genoeg, voor de Fransen verkeerd uitgepakt. Aan de andere kant is het Afghanistan avontuur doorspekt met berichten hoe er met geld word gesmeten om gunsten en diensten te bewerkstelligen. Geld word zelfs genoemd als onderdeel van de strategie;

Leden van de Taliban losweken door ze geld te geven........
De Afghaanse politie meer te betalen dan de Taliban zou doen......

Ik heb ook sterk het vermoeden dat de Afghanen die met de ISAF en andere organisaties samenwerken dat puur doen voor de dollars en dat de opbouw en verandering van hun land hen geen drol kan schelen.

Om in een corrupt land te overleven moet je zelf ook corrupt zijn.

Is ook een kwestie van vraag en aanbod. Was van de week bij een shura (bijeenkomst van stamhoofden en dorpsoudsten) in het Dorafshan-gebied ten noorden van Tarin Kowt. In de buurt hebben de Australiërs een fraaie brug gebouwd. Moet wel beschermd worden. Maar daarvoor zijn er te weinig politieagenten in de provincie en ISAF gaat er zeker geen permanente bewakingspost neerzetten. Plaatselijke stamleider biedt 20 man aan uit zijn eigen militie, á raison van 200 dollar de man per maand. Da's 2x meer dan een officiële agent verdient. Wat te doen? De stamleider ziet uiteraard dollartekens voor zijn ogen; ISAF heeft er belang bij dat de dure en voor de lokale bevolking belangrijke brug niet opgeblazen wordt....

PS: het antwoord was dat de overheid van Uruzgan zelf dient te zorgen voor de beveiliging van vitale objecten zoals deze brug.

hdevreij

Citaat van: Ros op 15/10/2009 | 22:20 uur
De praktijken van de Italianen is, naar genoeg, voor de Fransen verkeerd uitgepakt. Aan de andere kant is het Afghanistan avontuur doorspekt met berichten hoe er met geld word gesmeten om gunsten en diensten te bewerkstelligen. Geld word zelfs genoemd als onderdeel van de strategie;

Leden van de Taliban losweken door ze geld te geven........
De Afghaanse politie meer te betalen dan de Taliban zou doen......

Ik heb ook sterk het vermoeden dat de Afghanen die met de ISAF en andere organisaties samenwerken dat puur doen voor de dollars en dat de opbouw en verandering van hun land hen geen drol kan schelen.

Om in een corrupt land te overleven moet je zelf ook corrupt zijn.

Is ook een kwestie van vraag en aanbod. Was van de week bij een shura (bijeenkomst van stamhoofden en dorpsoudsten) in het Dorafshan-gebied ten noorden van Tarin Kowt. In de buurt hebben de Australiërs een fraaie brug gebouwd. Moet wel beschermd worden. Maar daarvoor zijn er te weinig politieagenten in de provincie en ISAF gaat er zeker geen permanente bewakingspost neerzetten. Plaatselijke stamleider biedt 20 man aan uit zijn eigen militie, á raison van 200 dollar de man per maand. Da's 2x meer dan een officiële agent verdient. Wat te doen? De stamleider ziet uiteraard dollartekens voor zijn ogen; ISAF heeft er belang bij dat de dure en voor de lokale bevolking belangrijke brug niet opgeblazen wordt....

Elzenga

Citaat van: Ros op 15/10/2009 | 22:20 uur
Ik heb ook sterk het vermoeden dat de Afghanen die met de ISAF en andere organisaties samenwerken dat puur doen voor de dollars en dat de opbouw en verandering van hun land hen geen drol kan schelen.
Dat vind ik te sterk uitgedrukt...maar er zal zeker niet altijd in termen als "natie" en "nationaal" worden gedacht...maar door jaren oorlog en de etnische verdeling vaker in stammen- of eigenbelang. Buiten een groep idealisten die Afghanistan wel tot 1 land willen omsmeden. Betwijfeld kan worden of dit ooit zonder Westerse directe steun, zowel financieel als met mensen, zal worden gerealiseerd. Krijgt het zo meer trekjes van een neo-koloniaal project dan van een land dat door eigen ontwikkeling verder komt. Zoals je in andere delen van Azië wel ziet gebeuren.   

Ros

De praktijken van de Italianen is, naar genoeg, voor de Fransen verkeerd uitgepakt. Aan de andere kant is het Afghanistan avontuur doorspekt met berichten hoe er met geld word gesmeten om gunsten en diensten te bewerkstelligen. Geld word zelfs genoemd als onderdeel van de strategie;

Leden van de Taliban losweken door ze geld te geven........
De Afghaanse politie meer te betalen dan de Taliban zou doen......

Ik heb ook sterk het vermoeden dat de Afghanen die met de ISAF en andere organisaties samenwerken dat puur doen voor de dollars en dat de opbouw en verandering van hun land hen geen drol kan schelen.

Om in een corrupt land te overleven moet je zelf ook corrupt zijn.

IPA NG

Gaan ze de Taliban geld geven om niet te vechten terwijl het hun doel is het land in heroveren en te regeren.
En dat noemt zich dan leiders...
Militaire strategie is van groot belang voor een land. Het is de oorzaak van leven of dood; het is de weg naar overleven of vernietiging en moet worden onderzocht. --Sun Tzu

Elzenga

Doet je wel afvragen of alleen de Italianen dit doen.... :(

Enforcer


Elzenga

Citaat van: Mourning op 15/10/2009 | 14:53 uur
Wat is die pastapipo van een Berlusconi toch een enorme RAT  :mad:. F*cking unbelievable.
Dat is ie zeker...maar in dit geval zou het best eens kunnen dat het inderdaad "beleid" was van de Regering Prodi...die voorstander was van blijvende aanwezigheid van Italiaanse troepen in Afghanistan (zeer omstreden bij de Italiaanse bevolking) en dus geen doden en gewonden kon hebben zo tijdens de verkiezingen.


Mourning

Wat is die pastapipo van een Berlusconi toch een enorme RAT  :mad:. F*cking unbelievable.
"The only thing necessary for Evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing"- Edmund Burke
"War is the continuation of politics by all other means", Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege/On War (1830).

Elzenga

#4
Silvio Berlusconi attempts to duck Afghanistan bribe scandal
Tom Coghlan and Nico Hines

Silvio Berlusconi today sought to duck the blame for a series of secret Italian payments to Taleban fighters that left French soldiers exposed in Afghanistan.

The Italian Prime Minister denied any knowledge of money paid to Afghan warlords in an apparent attempt to divert attention over the clandestine deals to his predecessor's administration.

The Times has learnt that when French soldiers arrived to assume control of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, in mid-2008, they were not informed that the departing Italians had kept the region relatively peaceful by paying local Taleban fighters to remain inactive.

Western officials say that because the French knew nothing of the payments they made a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment.

Within a month, ten French soldiers had been killed in an ambush by the insurgents. It was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan. The French public was horrified to learn that the soldiers had been mutilated and photographs were later published showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims' flak jackets and weapons.

In a statement this morning, the office of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said The Times report had made "totally baseless accusations".

"The Berlusconi government has never authorised any kind of money payment to members of the Taleban insurrection in Afghanistan and has no knowledge of initiatives of this type by the previous government," said the statement.

"It should be highlighted that in the first half of 2008, Italian contingents in Afghanistan came under attack numerous times, including one in the Sarobi district, on February 13, 2008, which cost the life of Lieutenant Francesco Pezzulo."

Mr Berlusconi, defeated Romano Prodi at elections in April 2008 and had been in power for around three months when the handover of Sarobi was completed.

.......................
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6875923.ece?token=null&offset=12&page=2

Elzenga

Relatives of dead French troops criticise army officers for 'errors'
Adam Sage and Marie Tourres

Relatives of the French soldiers killed in the Sarobi ambush demanded an investigation yesterday into the circumstances of France's worst military fiasco for 25 years.

"We have always thought the army has failed to tell the full truth about what happened, that it has been hiding things from us," said Jean-François Buil, whose son Damien, 31, was among the dead.

Others denounced a series of errors committed by the French commanders, which they said left troops exposed. Joel Le Pahun, father of Corporal Julien Le Pahun, 20, told The Times of the lead-up to the disaster: "Two days earlier, I had my son on the telephone and he said they had been out on patrol half way up the mountain over the Uzbin Valley when they met some Afghans who told them to be careful, and that something was being prepared," he said.

"At a debriefing a commanding officer said, 'It's a good job there were no Taleban there, otherwise we'd all be dead'. Despite this they went out again on patrol. That should never have happened.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6875426.ece

"Given all the information they had, the commanding officers should have cancelled that patrol. I think there was an excess of confidence.

"I lost my son and I cannot accept the way it happened. It's intolerable."

He said he had not heard of Italian payments to local insurgents but added: "We had heard that the Italians who were in the region before the French did strictly nothing in terms of military activity and that the region was nevertheless calm. If they were paying the Taleban, that would explain why."

Mr Buil, the dead sergeant's father, said French intelligence officers had failed to appreciate the full extent of the dangers. "They did not come up to scratch and I think the commanding officers also took the risks lightly," he said. "Those French soldiers were left to face 150 Taleban and I have huge doubts about the preparation for that mission.

"When my son left for Afghanistan we knew it would be dangerous — but not that dangerous. We thought he would basically be training the Afghan army or something like that. Then the day before the ambush he phoned to say, 'Tomorrow we're going out to catch the Taleban'. That was when we realised the full extent of the dangers."

Elzenga

French troops were killed after Italy hushed up 'bribes' to Taleban


Taleban insurgents involved in the ambush that killed ten French soldiers in 2008 show off some of the weapons and uniforms that were stripped from mutilated bodies
Tom Coghlan

When ten French soldiers were killed last year in an ambush by Afghan insurgents in what had seemed a relatively peaceful area, the French public were horrified.

Their revulsion increased with the news that many of the dead soldiers had been mutilated — and with the publication of photographs showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims' flak jackets and weapons. The French had been in charge of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, for only a month, taking over from the Italians; it was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan.

What the grieving nation did not know was that in the months before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008, the Italian secret service had been paying tens of thousands of dollars to Taleban commanders and local warlords to keep the area quiet, The Times has learnt. The clandestine payments, whose existence was hidden from the incoming French forces, were disclosed by Western military officials.

US intelligence officials were flabbergasted when they found out through intercepted telephone conversations that the Italians had also been buying off militants, notably in Herat province in the far west. In June 2008, several weeks before the ambush, the US Ambassador in Rome made a démarche, or diplomatic protest, to the Berlusconi Government over allegations concerning the tactic.

However, a number of high-ranking officers in Nato have told The Times that payments were subsequently discovered to have been made in the Sarobi area as well.

Western officials say that because the French knew nothing of the payments they made a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment.

"One cannot be too doctrinaire about these things," a senior Nato officer in Kabul said. "It might well make sense to buy off local groups and use non-violence to keep violence down. But it is madness to do so and not inform your allies."

On August 18, a month after the Italian force departed, a lightly armed French patrol moved into the mountains north of Sarobi town, in the district of the same name, 65km (40 miles) east of Kabul. They had little reason to suspect that they were walking into the costliest battle for the French in a quarter of a century.

Operating in an arc of territory north and east of the Afghan capital, the French apparently believed that they were serving in a relatively benign district. The Italians they had replaced in July had suffered only one combat death in the previous year. For months the Nato headquarters in Kabul had praised Italian reconstruction projects under way around Sarobi. When an estimated 170 insurgents ambushed the force in the Uzbin Valley the upshot was a disaster. "They took us by surprise," one French troop commander said after the attack.

A Nato post-operations assessment would sharply criticise the French force for its lack of preparation. "They went in with two platoons [approximately 60 men]," said one senior Nato officer. "They had no heavy weapons, no pre-arranged air support, no artillery support and not enough radios."

Had it not been for the chance presence of some US special forces in the area who were able to call in air support for them, they would have been in an even worse situation. "The French were carrying just two medium machine guns and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. They were asking for trouble and the insurgents managed to get among them."

A force from the 8th Marine Parachute Regiment took an hour and a half to reach the French over the mountains. "We couldn't see the enemy and we didn't know how many of them there were," said another French officer. "After 20 minutes we started coming under fire from the rear. We were surrounded."

The force was trapped until airstrikes forced the insurgents to retreat the next morning. By then ten French soldiers were dead and 21 injured.

The French public were appalled when it emerged that many of the dead had been mutilated by the insurgents— a mixed force including Taleban members and fighters from Hizb e-Islami.

A few weeks later French journalists photographed insurgents carrying French assault rifles and wearing French army flak jackets, helmets and, in one case, a dead soldier's watch.

Two Western military officials in Kabul confirmed that intelligence briefings after the ambush said that the French troops had believed they were moving through a benign area — one which the Italian military had been keen to show off to the media as a successful example of a "hearts and minds" operation.

Another Nato source confirmed the allegations of Italian money going to insurgents. "The Italian intelligence service made the payments, it wasn't the Italian Army," he said. "It was payments of tens of thousands of dollars regularly to individual insurgent commanders. It was to stop Italian casualties that would cause political difficulties at home."

When six Italian troops were killed in a bombing in Kabul last month it resulted in a national outpouring of grief and demands for troops to be withdrawn. The Nato source added that US intelligence became aware of the payments. "The Italians never acknowledged it, even though there was intercepted telephone traffic on the subject," said the source. "The démarche was the result. It was not publicised because it would have caused a diplomatic nightmare. We found out about the Sarobi payments later."

In Kabul a high-ranking Western intelligence source was scathing. "It's an utter disgrace," he said. "Nato in Afghanistan is a fragile enough construct without this lot working behind our backs. The Italians have a hell of a lot to answer for."

Haji Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder from Sarobi, recalled how a benign environment became hostile overnight. "There were no attacks against the Italians. People said the Italians and Taleban had good relations between them.

"When the country [nationality of the forces] changed and the French came there was a big attack on them. We knew the Taleban came to the city and we knew that they didn't carry out attacks on the Italian troops but we didn't know why."

The Italian Defence Ministry referred inquiries to the Prime Minister's Office. A spokesman said: "The American Ambassador in Rome did not make any formal complaint. He merely asked for information, first from the previous Government and then from the current Government. The allegations were denied and they are totally unfounded."

Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister, defeated Romano Prodi at elections in April 2008.

The claims are not without precedent. In October 2007 two Italian agents were kidnapped in western Afghanistan; one was killed in a rescue by British special forces. It was later alleged in the Italian press that they had been kidnapped while making payments to the Taleban.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6875376.ece

Elzenga

'Fransen dood door einde Taliban-betalingen'
Uitgegeven:    15 oktober 2009 06:54
Laatst gewijzigd:    15 oktober 2009 06:54
LONDEN - Tien Franse militairen die vorig jaar in Afghanistan zijn gedood, hadden de risico's in het gebied niet goed ingeschat omdat de Italianen de Taliban heimelijk hadden betaald om af te zien van geweld. Dat schrijft de Britse krant The Times donderdag.
© ANP

De Italiaanse geheime dienst betaalde tienduizenden euro's aan Talibanleiders en lokale stamhoofden om het Sarobi-gebied bij de hoofdstad Kabul rustig te houden in de maanden voor de komst van de Franse troepen.

De Franse troepen vervingen de Italiaanse in juli vorig jaar in het gebied dat relatief veilig leek. Het Italiaanse leger had in het voorafgaande jaar slechts een dode te betreuren gehad, wat ze presenteerden als een succesvol voorbeeld van de 'hearts and minds'-operatie.

De Fransen hadden het slechts een maand voor het zeggen in het gebied, toen tien van hun militairen in een hinderlaag werden gedood, tot grote schrik van de Fransen. Het was een van de grootste NAVO-verliezen in een enkele gebeurtenis in Afghanistan.

Catastrofale inschattingsfout

Westerse legerfunctionarissen onthulden tegenover The Times het bestaan van de betalingen, die destijds voor de Fransen werden verzwegen. De Fransen maakten daardoor een ''catastrofale inschattingsfout van de veiligheidssituatie''.

Dit verklaart ook waarom de Fransen relatief lichtbewapend waren. ''Als er bij de hinderlaag van 170 zwaarbewapende opstandelingen niet toevallig een paar Amerikaanse speciale eenheden aanwezig waren geweest, die luchtsteun konden inroepen, was het nog veel slechter afgelopen.'' Veel doden waren verminkt door de gemengde groep strijders van de Taliban en Hezb-i-Islam.

Een hooggeplaatste Navo-functionaris in Kabul zei tegen de krant: ''Het kan handig zijn om lokale groepen af te kopen om het geweld te beperken. Maar het is gekkenwerk om je bondgenoten daarover niet te informeren.''
© ANP