Spanning(en) rond Iran

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

An impasse with Iran

Published 06/23/2012 12:00 AM

Negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program are close to an impasse - an outcome that should surprise no one. At a meeting in Moscow on Monday and Tuesday, Iranian envoys continued to resist a proposal for an interim deal that would stop the most dangerous parts of the program in exchange for modest economic concessions from a coalition composed of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and Germany. Iran countered with maximalist demands for the lifting of sanctions and recognition of its right to enrich uranium.

"It remains clear that there are significant gaps," said a sober statement by the European Union's Catherine Ashton.

If there is a positive aspect to this outcome, it is that the United States and its partners appear to be sticking to their position on what Iran must do to open the door to a diplomatic solution - and are prepared to let the process lapse. No further negotiations have been scheduled - only an experts' session early next month to go over technical details, followed by contacts between the deputies and chiefs of the delegations.

Western officials say further meetings will depend on whether Iran shows itself ready to carry out the package of steps originally proposed last month, including a freeze of its most advanced form of uranium enrichment, the export of its existing stockpile of that enriched uranium, and the closure of an underground processing facility known as Fordow.

"The choice is Iran's," said Ms. Ashton's statement.

Before Tehran makes that choice, some of the sanctions it has been trying to head off will go into effect, including an EU oil embargo and a block on insurance for ships carrying Iranian oil. Already Iranian oil exports, and the country's economy at large, appear to have been significantly damaged in recent months. Since the collapse of negotiations could also prompt Israel to move toward the military action it has been threatening, it's still conceivable that Iranian leader Ali Khamenei will decide to accept the interim package - which would leave most of Iran's enrichment infrastructure in place - rather than risk economic ruin and war.

The Obama administration must nevertheless be prepared to take an Iranian "no" for an answer. It should resist any effort by Russia or other members of the international coalition to weaken the steps that Iran must take, or to grant Tehran major sanctions relief for partial concessions. It should continue to reject recognition of an Iranian "right" to enrich uranium.

The United States and its allies also should have a strategy for quickly and significantly increasing the pressure on the Khamenei regime if the negotiations break down. Israel may press for military action; if that option is to be resisted, there must be a credible and robust alternative.

http://www.theday.com/article/20120623/OP01/306239977

[dudge]

Dat zie ik er niet in terug...

Ah, ik zat scheef te kijken, was 1 post eerder.

Maar dan nog, het artikel van Hammelburg gaat eigenlijk niet echt over Iran, maar voornamelijk over wat andere landen van Iran denken.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran kan binnen enkele maanden een atoombom bouwen

donderdag 21 juni 2012 om 01u13

"Het is duidelijk dat Iran zeer snel een kernwapen zou kunnen bouwen als het dat zou beslissen", zei Stephen  Rademaker van het Bipartisan Policy Center, een thinktank in Washington, tijdens een hoorzitting in het Amerikaanse Congres.

Volgens de experts bezit Iran voldoende uranium dat tot 3,5 procent verrijkt werd, om twee atoombommen te maken. Om in een atoombom gebruikt te worden, moet uranium verrijkt zijn tot bijna 90 procent.

Splijtbaar materiaal

Teheran heeft al 3.345 kilogram tot 3,5 procent verrijkt uranium geproduceerd, luidde het nog. In de fabrieken van Natanz en Fordo produceren de meer dan 9.000 centrifuges elke maand 158 kilogram van dergelijk uranium.

Met die voorrad kunnen de Iraniëers binnen 25 tot 106 dagen genoeg splijtbaar matriaal maken voor een bom, zei Rademaker. (Belga/TV)

http://www.knack.be/nieuws/buitenland/iran-kan-binnen-enkele-maanden-een-atoombom-bouwen/article-4000119871954.htm

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran nuclear negotiations: The dawn of the zombie talks

After Moscow, there is no discernible life left in this diplomatic process but it has to be kept going in the hope of a miracle and because the alternative is so grim.

The diplomatic process to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis was always a very frail patient, bustled from one clinic to another around the world, from Istanbul in April to Baghdad in May in the hope of imbuing it with vigour. Yesterday in Moscow, by any reasonable assessment, it stopped showing signs of life.

However, because this was a fiercely proud Russian-run hospital, and because the global implications of declaring diplomacy dead are so grave, it is being made to look like it is staggering on. If it is to officially keel over, the Russians made clear, let it be somewhere else, like Istanbul.

So it is that a technical working group is to assemble in the Turkish city on July 3 to pore over the papers presented in Moscow ostensibly lest some detail of nuclear science had been overlooked by the diplomats. This is of course a nonsense. There were plenty of experts on hand in Moscow and these issues have been studied by both sides in depth for years. Everyone involved is well aware of the science. They just don't agree.

But it is a worthwhile nonsense. It is an excuse to keep contacts alive and the door open to a change of mind which could be dressed up as a working group breakthrough. And as long as there is some diplomatic engagement it makes it that small bit harder for Israel to mount military action. As former IDF brigadier general, Michael Herzog, put it, talks represent a "complication" in Israeli decision-making on a strike.

Iran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, hailed the working group wheeze as a diplomatic triumph last night, welcoming "the fact that the other side has come to agree with us although it took them [so] long."

In fact Jalili wanted at least three working groups, with others dealing with politics and legal issues. Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief acting on behalf of the six powers at the talks, argued that the legal issues had been looked at exhaustively, and the political decisions, by their nature, had to be taken at a senior level, which is what Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow were supposed to be about.

There seems little doubt that the Iranian side are enamoured of working groups because they use up time. The hawks in Israel, the US and elsewhere, see this as proof that Tehran is stalling while it makes a bomb, but there is little evidence that a concerted effort to make weapons is underway.

However, as time goes by, Iran's centrifuges are spinning and more fissile facts on the ground are being created in the form of low-enriched and 20%-enriched uranium. Stalling is also useful for a regime that is incapable of making a strategic decision because it is weak and paranoid.

In many ways what went on in Moscow, and in Baghdad last month, was an illusion of negotiations. To give an example, a member of the Iranian delegation came through the lobby of the talks venue, a Moscow hotel, and lightened the tedium of the journalists slumped on the sofas by suggesting that the Russians had brought new ideas to the table which could close the gap between the sides. It turned out the 'ideas' were an article by Vladimir Putin written during the presidential campaign in February in which he suggested Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium. In the negotiating room, the Russians quickly dismissed the article presented by the Iranians, saying that could be the end-point of negotiations not an opening gambit.

In another example, in Jalili's PowerPoint presentation on Monday, he had a slide on confidence-building measures which referred to the international community providing fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor which makes medical isotopes. This was a hopeful sign as the six powers had offered the fuel as part of a deal for suspension of 20% uranium production. However, when the negotiators finally got hold of the paper version of the presentation yesterday, it appeared that Jalili was presenting the international community's opportunity to participate in the reactor's operation as an Iranian concession, for which Tehran wanted payment in sanctions relief.

Much of the rest of the two-day talks were taken up by lengthy screeds on history delivered by Jalili. He had been asked to clarify Iran's negotiating position in Moscow and in a sense he did, going into intricate detail. It was like a history buff who, on being politely told his monograph could be a little sharper, had read out the entire university thesis on which it was based. It did not get any clearer; there was just much more of it.

The interminable lecturing is likely to be symptom of a lack of trust. On one level, the Tehran regime seems to suspect that if it got involved in bargaining any offer it makes would be pocketed by the other side with nothing in return, and to a certain extent the mistrust here is mutual. But there is also deep lack of trust inside Tehran, where no one wants to be seen as giving any part of the great national nuclear achievement away for fear of being knifed in the back for it at some later date. That is what happened to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was pilloried - even by the 'reformists' - for tentatively agreeing to a uranium swap deal in 2009.

The deal on the table in Baghdad and Moscow is considerably more advantageous for Iran. Under the Ahmadinejad version, Iran would give up some of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in return for fuel plates for the Tehran reactor. In the new deal, it keeps all its LEU and just gives up its 150 kg or so of 20%-enriched fuel. As well as fuel plates it gets nuclear safety help and much needed spare parts for planes.

That said, the six powers may have missed an opportunity by not offering some sanctions relief as part of the deal. The EU oil embargo, due to take effect on July 1, is being imposed largely in response to an IAEA report last November spelling out evidence of past weapons activity, which all six nations had known about for years anyway. Both the Arms Control Association, and National Iranian American Council in Washington are both arguing today for the sanctions to be be on the table.

The Europeans are now reluctant to make such an offer in part because it would be seen as rewarding intransigence, and because they believe the pressure is working. The head of NIAC, Trita Parsi disagrees. he says:

If a compromise is not vigorously pursued, war will become far more likely. As Western countries escalate economic warfare against Iran, Iran is likely to escalate in kind, exacerbating the already perilous spiral towards conflict. This begs an important question: Are we willing to risk war for the sake of never lifting any sanctions?

The former IAEA chief inspector, Olli Heinonen also thinks the Iranian response will be to up the stakes "to pepper the talks to come":

I bet that it will be more enriched uranium, and perhaps more 20% uranium together with more 'good news on further nuclear achievements. This may come with some harder statements like the Iranian plans of using uranium for nuclear submarines. That sends two messages: uranium enrichment continues, and that future submarines are not only for the Hormuz. You do not need nuclear submarines to defend home waters; they are to be used faraway from home.

Asked if he was frustrated, a senior western diplomat at the Moscow talks said he did not use the word. Sitting though such negotiations is all part of he is paid to do, he said. It is what diplomacy is all about. It often seems absurd, time-consuming and futile, and it costs a lot of time and resources. But to paraphase something often said about education and ignorance, if you think diplomacy is costly, try war.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/jun/20/iran-nuclear-moscow

[Jah]

Maar dat is toch precies wat er in dat artikel staat?

Dat zie ik er niet in terug...

[dudge]

Iran calculeert haar acties voortdurend en heeft aangetoond nauwe afwegingen te maken wanneer ze zich op het internationale toneel begeven.

Maar dat is toch precies wat er in dat artikel staat?

[Jah]

Iran calculeert haar acties voortdurend en heeft aangetoond nauwe afwegingen te maken wanneer ze zich op het internationale toneel begeven.

[Sandgroper]

Leg uit,  want ik en waarschijnlijk velen op dit forum hebben niet zo'n uitgebreid inzicht in de psyche van de Iraanse regering.

[Jah]

Bernard Hammelburg schijnt niet te (willen) begrijpen dat Iran redelijk rationeel handelt m.b.t. dit soort geo-politieke vraagstukken.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Column Bernard Hammelburg | Heimwee naar de Koude Oorlog

Door Bernard Hammelburg

2012-06-20 06:48:29.0 | bnr.nl

Tijdens de Koude Oorlog stonden de Amerikanen en Russen 46 jaar lang tegenover elkaar met zoveel atoombommen dat ze elkaar twee keer konden vernietigen.

Tijdens de Koude Oorlog stonden de Amerikanen en Russen 46 jaar lang tegenover elkaar met zoveel atoombommen dat ze elkaar twee keer konden vernietigen. Door die enorme slagkracht weerhielden zij elkaar van die ene druk op de knop. In het jargon heette dat 'deterrence' – afschrikking. Het werkte omdat de leiders van beide blokken net iets meer van hun eigen volkeren hielden dan ze elkaar haatten. Wat het conflict met Iran en de burgeroorlog in Syrië zo griezelig maken is dat het daar net andersom is. Daar winnen haat en koppigheid het van elke vorm van logica.

Iran speelt letterlijk met vuur. De kans dat het land echt de atoombom bouwt die Israël, Saoedi-Arabië, de Europese Unie en Amerika zo vrezen is nog altijd klein. Maar het land saboteert consequent alle onderhandelingen, en de handreikingen die het westen biedt. In Israël is de oplopende spanning voelbaar. De militaire inlichtingendiensten twijfelen of de bom er echt komt, maar Israël is als de dood om het risico te nemen en af te wachten. Al drie jaar wordt de aanval op Iran tot in de kleinste details voorbereid, met grootscheepse oefeningen door de luchtmacht en de inrichting van een basis in Azerbeidzjan, vlak bij de grens met Iran. Doodgriezelig dat er een oorlog dreigt om een atoombom die er waarschijnlijk niet is.

Even griezelig zijn de ontwikkelingen in Syrië. Het gaat niet alleen meer om de barbarij van Assad, en de evenredig groeiende wraakacties van de oppositie, maar om wat er in de marge gebeurt. Assad beschikt over grote hoeveelheden biologische en chemische wapens. Westerse inlichtingendiensten zijn als de dood dat die wapens in handen vallen van de grootste oppositiegroep, de Soennieten.  Minstens zo groot is de angst voor de groeiende contacten tussen het Vrije Syrische Leger van de oppositie en Al Qaeda.

Zoals de Israëliërs zich voorbereiden op oorlog met Iran, zo bereiden de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten een aanval voor op Syrië. Het kan gaan om steun aan buurlanden, een no-fly zone, of gerichte aanvallen met onbemande vliegtuigen en Special Forces op specifieke doelen in Syrië.

Het zijn allemaal noodscenario's, en je moet hopen dat het daarbij blijft, net als tijdens die 46-jarige Koude Oorlog. Je krijgt bijna heimwee naar de mannen die elkaar toen voor verdorven communisten en schunnige imperialisten uitmaakten. In elk geval waren ze verstandiger dan de krankzinnige machtswellustelingen die het in Iran en Syrië voor het zeggen hebben.

Bernard Hammelburg

[Jah]

The Failure in Moscow

Moscow Talks between Iran and the six major powers ended in failure today. The two sides, after seven rounds of talks in the past four years, could not even work out a minor technical agreement, even though the host Russia was desperate to show some progress. At the end, they decided to hold a low-level meeting in Istanbul on 3 July to "focus purely on technical details rather than the broader political issues," as EU's Catherine Ashton said

The Iranian delegation came to Moscow determined not to give an inch on enrichment issue. The Iranian thinking behind such determination can be summarized as follow:

•The U.S. has lost its war in Iraq and is losing in Afghanistan. It is in no shape to start another conflict with Iran.
•Israel is unable to attack Iran without active support from the Americans.
•The EU is in the midst of a financial crisis and cannot afford to worsen or prolong the crisis through a conflict in the Persian Gulf.
•The West cannot afford to keep the Iranian crude out of the market for long and will have to ease or scrap the oil embargo sooner than later.
•Russia and China would veto any action against Iran at the UN and the latter will keep purchasing the Iranian crude.
•Then why compromise now, the thinking goes. If Iran stands firm on its demand of continuing to enrich uranium even at 20-percent purity, the West will have no choice but to give in by this summer, the height of the US presidential campaign, and ease or lift the sanctions, at least the upcoming oil embargo.
•The West will be unable to stop Iran's nuclear program even if it wanted to and did make the bomb.

The problem with such thinking is not the accuracy or lack of any of these points. The danger inherent in such thinking, however, is for the Iranian leaders to overplay their hands, a tendency they have demonstrated over the years, like in the hostage crisis, the last years of war with Iraq and now going nuclear.

What if the world could survive without the Iranian crude, what if taking hard line against Iran could help both candidates during the US presidential campaign, what if Israel really sees a nuclear Iran as an 'existential' threat, what if the US would have more firepower available after the end of the Iraq war and the drawdown in Afghanistan... The Iranian leadership cannot afford to construct the best-case scenario and starts believing it in its entirety. There are not-so-well scenarios as well where Iran could suffer economic disaster or gets involved in a prolonged conflict, with all the uncertainties they would create for the country and its leadership.

The more prudent course of action is to compromise on some part of the enrichment program, like the 20-percent variety. After all, it was originally Ahmadinejad's own proposal to forego the 20-percent enrichment through a uranium fuel swap agreement with the West, a proposal that didn't go well with the hardliners in the West and especially in Iran.

For the West, there is also the danger of overplaying its own hands. In the current political atmosphere in Iran, the acceptance by the senior leadership of the halt to 20-percent enrichment, closure of Fordo plant and signing the IAEA additional protocol without lifting of all sanctions would be simply a political suicide. The settlement of the decade-old dispute would require the end of all sanctions.

By Nader Uskowi

http://www.uskowioniran.com/2012/06/...in-moscow.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Top Iran en wereldmachten mislukt

AFP Toegevoegd: woensdag 20 jun 2012, 01:42

Een tweedaagse top over het nucleaire programma van Iran heeft geen resultaat opgeleverd. In Moskou spraken vertegenwoordigers van de internationale gemeenschap met onderhandelaars uit Iran.

EU- buitenlandcoördinator Ashton leidde de gesprekken en constateerde na afloop dat er nog altijd "significante verschillen" zijn. Volgens haar is het nu aan Iran om te bepalen of het land concrete stappen wil zetten om het vertrouwen van de wereldmachten terug te winnen. Begin juli wordt verder gesproken.

Boycot
De Franse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Laurent Fabius, zei na afloop van de ontmoeting dat Frankrijk de sancties tegen Iran wil aanscherpen. Hij wees onder meer op de Europese boycot van olie uit Iran die op 1 juli van kracht wordt.

Iran zegt dat het nucleaire programma alleen is bedoeld voor vreedzame doeleinden, maar de internationale gemeenschap vermoedt dat Iran kernwapens ontwikkelt.

Bron: NOS

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

U.S. braces for action in Persian Gulf

The U.S. Navy has sent four additional mine countermeasures ships to the region to oppose an Iranian threat to close the vital oil artery.

Published: June 11, 2012 at 12:41 PM

MANAMA, Bahrain, June 11 (UPI) -- Amid dimming expectations that next week's talks in Moscow will defuse the U.S.-Iranian confrontation in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy has sent four additional mine countermeasures ships to the region to oppose an Iranian threat to close the vital oil artery.

The deployment doubles the number of mine-hunting warships the U.S. 5th Fleet, which has headquarters in Bahrain, will have operating in the region, through which one-fifth of the world's oil supplies pass.

The U.S. Navy has identified the mine-hunters as the Avenger class USS Sentry, USS Devastator, USS Pioneer and USS Warrior out of San Diego.

These slow-moving 1,379-ton ships, all transported to the gulf aboard heavy-lift vessels, will join their forward-deployed sister ships USS Scout, USS Gladiator, USS Ardent and USS Dextrous.

The British navy also has four mine countermeasures vessels in the gulf.

The Americans plan to deploy at least four mine-sweeping MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters to the gulf as well.

The Iranians have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, the only way in and out of the gulf, if its vital oil exports are cut off or if it is attacked.

They are reputed to have in excess of 5,000 mines, many of them advanced Russian-built variants that are hard to detect and disarm. They also have batteries of Chinese-designed cruise missiles along the waterway's eastern shore.

Iran's air force has strike aircraft, although these are largely outdated U.S.-built F-14 Tomcats bought during the days of the shah. They have some Russian-made MiG-29s as well.

If a shooting war does break out, the U.S. Central Command believes it's capable of destroying or seriously degrading Iran's forces within three weeks, U.S military sources say.

This would be achieved largely through air and sea strikes using aircraft and missiles, the sources say.

The Americans have two navy carrier battle groups in the region.

In April, the Pentagon deployed an unspecified number of Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor strike jets, the most advanced operational fighter in the world, to Al-Dhafra airbase near Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates.

Al Dhafra is being used by U.S. Air Force KC-10 aerial tankers along with U.S. surveillance aircraft, including the venerable U-2 and the unmanned Global Hawk.

At about the same time, the Air Force deployed 20 upgraded F-15C Eagles of the 104th Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard to an undisclosed base in the Central Command area of operations.

Military sources say the Boeing F-15s are either at Al Dhafra or the large U.S. air base at Al Udaid in the Gulf emirate of Qatar. Al Udaid also houses Central Command's forward headquarters.

The F-22s and the 104th's F-15s are believed to have been training to operate together in the air-to-air fighting role, tasked with eliminating the Iranian air force's fighter squadrons.

"The Raptor-Eagle team has been honing special tactics for clearing the skies of Iranian fighters in the event of war," reported David Axe of Wired.com, which specializes in military weapons systems.

Axe noted that the "U.S. dogfighting armada" assembling in the Arab monarchies on the gulf's western shore that face Iran would likely operate in small groups, using silent electronic exchanges of data to "wipe out the antiquated but determined Iranian air force" with state-of-the-art missiles systems.

The U.S. air assets would provide a "significant dogfighting presence" in the gulf, Axe noted.

The F-22 has been deployed to the Pacific theater several times but has yet to make its combat debut since it was declared operational in 2005. But for all its vaunted combat capabilities, the aircraft's been plagued a serious flaw in its oxygen generating system that has caused some pilots to lose consciousness.

U.S. forces also have a heavy air component aboard the carrier battle groups headed by the USS Enterprise and the USS Abraham Lincoln in the region. Between them they can muster more than 100 combat F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike aircraft.

But former CIA officer Philip Giraldi has warned that U.S. Internal Look war games conducted in March indicated that the Navy "would have considerable problems dealing with Iranian offensive operations" in the narrow waters of the strait.

The games "revealed that there is a high probability that Americans vessels will be sunk, with considerable loss of life," Giraldi observed.

Read more: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/06/11/US-braces-for-action-in-Persian-Gulf/UPI-93431339432907/#ixzz1xg6gAi7J

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran Plans to Build Nuclear-Fueled Submarines

TEHRAN (FNA)- A senior Iranian Navy commander stressed Iran's high capabilities in designing and manufacturing different types of submarines, and announced the country's move towards manufacturing nuclear-powered submarines.
 
Speaking to FNA on Tuesday, Lieutenant Commander of the Navy for Technical Affairs Rear Admiral Abbas Zamini pointed to the navy's plan to manufacture super heavy nuclear-powered submarines, and stated, "Right now, we are at the initial phases of manufacturing atomic submarines."

He noted Iran's astonishing progress in developing and acquiring civilian nuclear technology for various power-generation, agricultural and medical purposes, and said such advancements allow Iran to think of manufacturing nuclear-fueled submarines.

He further reminded that using nuclear power to fuel submarines is among the civilian uses of the nuclear technology and all countries are, thus, entitled to the right to make such a use.

On May 29, Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari lauded Iranian experts' success in repairing heavy submarines, saying their outstanding capabilities and mastery of the hi-tech used in naval vessels display the failure of enemy sanctions and pressures.

Addressing a ceremony to launch a heavy submarine after the subsurface vessel was overhauled by Iranian experts, Sayyari said that Iran is among the very few world countries with the ability to carry out full or partial repairs for submarines.

He said the submarine, called 'Tareq', is now fully ready to be dispatched to the high seas.

Last year, the Iranian Navy's Tareq-class submarine, 'Younus', managed to set a new record in sailing the international waters and high seas for 68 days.

Iran's Younus submarine, sailing alongside warships of the 14th fleet of the Iranian Navy, returned home in early June 2011 following an over two-month-long mission in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The deployment of the Iranian submarine in the Red Sea was the first such operation by the country's Navy in far-off waters.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9103081864

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran speelt spelletje met atoomagentschap

Geplaatst door Nick Ottens op 10 juni, 2012 - 13:59

Nog maar twee weken geleden leek er vooruitgang te zitten in de onderhandelingen tussen Iran en het IAEA. Het hoofd van de organisatie zei er vertrouwen in te hebben dat hij tot een akkoord kon komen met Iran. Wat blijkt? Iran hield hem voor de gek.

Het Internationaal Atoomenergieagentschap wil weer toegang tot alle kerncentrales van het islamitische land. Het gaat de waakhond vooral om het complex bij Parchin in het noorden van Iran. Daar zouden tests met explosieven hebben plaatsgehad die wijzen op de intentie een atoomwapen te bouwen. Uit satellietbeelden bleek recentelijk dat Iran die locatie aan het opschonen is. Verdacht dus.

IAEA-chef Yukiya Amano sprak er hoogstpersoonlijk met de Iraniërs over en die verzekerden hem een paar weken geleden dat zij bereid tot een deal. Vrijdag moest Yukiya toegeven dat het niet tot een afspraak was gekomen.

De Iraniërs lijken het spel geleerd te hebben van de Noord-Koreanen: dreigende taal uitslaan, een aantal raketten afvuren en vervolgens zo veel mogelijk concessies winnen van Westerse landen zonder zelf in te binden.

Iran gaat volgende week weer met de vijf permanente leden van de VN-Veiligheidsraad plus Duitsland om de tafel in Moskou. Het is in de aanloop naar die onderhandelingen dat het land het IAEA voor schut zet. Immers, waarom inspecteurs toelaten als je er niets voor terugkrijgt? Het is voor Iran gunstiger inspecties onderdeel te maken van de onderhandelingen met de P5+1, die willen namelijk geen van allen dat Iran ook een kernmacht wordt.

De Iraniërs onderschatten echter de bereidwilligheid van Westerse landen om militair in te grijpen. Des te langer de onderhandelingen voortduren, des te meer tijd krijgt Iran om een kernwapencapaciteit te ontwikkelen (nog geen daadwerkelijk wapen, dat duurt langer) en des te ongeruster wordt Israël. Hoe lang is Jerusalem nog bereid dit spel aan te zien?

http://www.dagelijksestandaard.nl/2012/06/iran-speelt-spelletje-met-atoomagentschap