Spanning(en) rond Iran

[KapiteinRob]

Netherlands: 1 Walrusklasse..... ??

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran's Submarine Force: The Undersea World Of Ali Khamenei – Analysis

Welke andere Subs zijn in de Golf dan ? .... als counter-force

- Amerikaanse nuc. fast attack subs, aantal ? .... 1 a 2 per carrier, ik denk 4 stuks ?
- Israel, Dolphin-klasse aantal : 1
- .......

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/137760

Geen idee. Dit soort info is bij niet ingewijden vrees ik niet bekend.

Ergens in de regio zou ook zo maar een "Flipper" aanwezig kunnen zijn.

[Harald]

Iran's Submarine Force: The Undersea World Of Ali Khamenei – Analysis

Welke andere Subs zijn in de Golf dan ? .... als counter-force

- Amerikaanse nuc. fast attack subs, aantal ? .... 1 a 2 per carrier, ik denk 4 stuks ?
- Israel, Dolphin-klasse aantal : 1
- .......

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/137760

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran's Submarine Force: The Undersea World Of Ali Khamenei – Analysis

April 10, 2012

By Scott Charney

In the middle of all the discussion of the possibility of attacks on Iran and a war in the Persian Gulf region, one factor in particular has been largely overlooked. The Iranians have evidently fallen in love with submarines. Brief news stories about the launch of new submarines have appeared repeatedly in the past few years, and yet this phenomenon receives only a passing mention in most articles and reports. No other country in the area (unless one counts Pakistan) operates any submarines. By contrast, the Iranians now could potentially have more than 20.

Obviously the Iranian naval establishment thinks it's on to something, and that their near-term future lies beneath the waves. What do they have in mind?

What They Have

An Iranian Kilo class submarine, the Yunes

Accurate information about Iran's submarine force is difficult to acquire. The announcements of new submarines often emanate from semi-governmental Iranian sources, which are known to boast about the capabilities of their indigenous weapons systems.For their part, international journalists often vary widely in their estimates of the size of Iran's submarine force, with no consistent pattern emerging..

In the 1990s and shortly thereafter, the Iranians purchased three Kilo class submarines from Russia.  These submarines are diesel-electric attack subs, well-known for being quiet. The Iranians subsequently began constructing their own midget submarines, with one craft of the Nahang class and many more of the Ghadirclass. The Iranians may also have acquired a few midget submarines from North Korea, though details are hazy, and these craft may no longer be operational. All of these midget subs can carry two torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, lay mines, and transport commando teams.

More recently, the Iranians seem to be seeking to bridge the gap between the midget subs and the Kilos by constructing what they call "semi-heavy" submarines of the Qaaem and/or Fateh class, with more possibly to come. Such submarines, if successful, could complement the Kilos at first and eventually supplant them when the larger submarines reach the end of their service lives. The upshot of all of this is that, even by the most conservative estimates, the Iranians have a sizable submarine force, are seeking to make it larger, and have a substantial head start over any of the other states bordering the Persian Gulf.

Why They Want Them

The reason for this submarine construction binge is very similar to the reason for Iran's missile program:  it circumvents their aerial deficiencies and, in so doing, creates a deterrent to attack. The Persian Gulf is mostly shallow and is littered with shipwrecks from centuries of traffic. Antisubmarine warfare is complicated in such an environment, and smaller submarines have particular advantages. All of the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf have small navies, and suffering losses to Iranian submarines would leave these kings, sheiks, and emirs able to protect neither their exports of oil nor their imports of vast quantities of consumer goods. The Saudis have the most powerful navy in the region by far, but they are cursed by geography. Some of their most powerful ships are based at a port on the Red Sea, and transferring these elements to the Persian Gulf would necessitate sailing through the Straits of Hormuz. This would likely be a suicide mission in the face of Iran's mines, submarines, shore-launched missiles, warships, air strikes, and so on.

The Arab air forces would surely attempt to eliminate Iran's naval bases. But the Iranians have likely constructed missiles with that in mind. The multi-billion dollar air forces and navies of the Gulf states are concentrated at very few bases such that even an inaccurate missile is likely to land on something valuable.

In the case of a conflict with the United States, the Iranians could not win per se, but this is where deterrence comes into play. Before being overwhelmed and destroyed, Iranian submarines could conceivably sink one or more American ships and/or submarines, resulting in unacceptable casualties for the United States. This strategy is behind most of Iran's recent military moves, and is common around the world. For this reason, among others, many current and retired American senior military officers oppose any attack on Iran. The military situation for the Israelis is similar. They would love to add the firepower of their own submarines' cruise missiles to any strike on Iran, but risking the subs would be very foolish at a time of terrible relations with Turkey, upheaval in Syria, and an uncertain future with Egypt.

The Iranians would not have acquired so many submarines if they did not think they would come in handy. Thanks in part to these undersea craft, the regime in Tehran may have developed the ability to dominate its neighbors and ward off attack from faraway powers even as most of the foreign policy community has been chasing the specter of nuclear weapons.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/10042012-irans-submarine-force-the-undersea-world-of-ali-khamenei-analysis/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

U.S. Navy deploys second aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf amid rising tensions with Iran

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates— The Associated Press

Published Monday, Apr. 09, 2012 7:20AM EDT

The U.S. Navy says it has deployed a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf amid rising tensions with Iran over its nuclear program.

Cmdr. Amy Derrick-Frost of the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet said on Monday that the deployment of the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise along the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group marks only the fourth time in the past decade that the Navy has had two aircraft carriers operating at the same time in the region.

The two carriers will support the American military operations in Afghanistan and anti-piracy efforts off Somalia's coast and in the Gulf of Aden.

The warships also patrol the Gulf's strategic oil routes that Iran has threatened to shut down in retaliation for economic sanctions.

The deployment of the second aircraft carrier is "routine and not specific to any threat," Cmdr. Derrick-Frost added. She did say how long the Navy will keep the increased military presence in region.

It was in June 2010 that the U.S. had two carriers operating in the region. Before then, the carriers were deployed in March 2003 during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and in February 2007 in support of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Enterprise is based in Norfolk, Va. It is the Navy's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that is now on its last mission.

The Enterprise was commissioned in November 1961. The carrier is scheduled to be deactivated this fall.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-navy-deploys-second-aircraft-carrier-to-persian-gulf-amid-rising-tensions-with-iran/article2395730/?utm_medium=Feeds%3A%20RSS%2FAtom&utm_source=World&utm_content=2395730

[Jah]

Iraanse commando's arresteren piraten die een Chinees schip in de Indische Oceaan hadden gegijzeld:

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

'Iran in staat kernbom te maken'

07-04-2012

TEHERAN - Iran heeft de kennis en wetenschappelijke bekwaamheid in huis om atoomwapens te vervaardigen, maar zal daartoe nooit overgaan. Dat heeft het vooraanstaande parlementslid Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghadam vrijdagavond gezegd.

Het is voor het eerst dat een prominent politicus in Iran openlijk claimt dat zijn land in staat is een kernbom te maken. Iran kan met gemak het voor atoomwapens vereiste hoogverrijkte uranium produceren, beweerde Moghadam op de website van het Iraanse parlement, maar dat zou niet stroken met het beleid van de regering in Teheran.

De Verenigde Staten en hun bondgenoten betichten Teheran ervan onder het mom van civiele toepassingen van atoomenergie te werken aan een kernarsenaal. Iran spreekt die beschuldigingen tegen.

http://www.nd.nl/artikelen/2012/april/07/-iran-in-staat-kernbom-te-maken

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

'Hezbollah has 300 operatives in NYC'

US officials debate virulence of Hezbollah's threat on US soil as NYPD says Hezbollah's infrastructure in the Big Apple substantial

Yitzhak Benhorin, Reuters Published:  04.06.12, 08:36 / Israel News 
 
WASHINGTON – A recent report by the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security states that there are hundreds, perhaps even thousands, people he described as "Iranian and Hezbollah terrorists" in the United States.

An alarming part of the officials' assessments focuses on the apparent surveillance missions that Iranian diplomats and possible Hezbollah operatives have been seen conducting at sensitive targets such as New York City's subways and bridges, and at nuclear power plants and tunnels elsewhere in the United States in the past 10 years.

At the same time, US officials caution that Hezbollah, a Shiite militia based in Lebanon, has largely avoided attacking US targets since it carried out mass-casualty bombings in the 1980s against the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. One reason may be that it does not want to endanger its lucrative North American fund-raising operations.

The renewed focus on Hezbollah – which US counter-terrorism officials regard as the most potent and disciplined of Islamic militant groups, even more so than al-Qaeda – comes amid a growing confrontation over Iran's nuclear program.

An Israeli or US strike on Iran's nuclear sites could prompt Hezbollah to change strategy, moving from surveillance and fund-raising in North America to launching retaliatory attacks on either country, several US officials said.

Israel, while acknowledging the likelihood of retaliation by Iran or its agents, has sometimes downplayed the risk of a broader conflict.

Iranian-inspired surveillance missions in the United States have been scattered over a period of years. But, when combined with a handful of recent attacks or plots around the world, they have contributed to an assessment within the US government that considerable violence directed against US targets – at overseas installations or businesses, or at American soil – could follow any strike on Iran's nuclear program.

US intelligence and law enforcement officials, along with private experts, say there is little doubt Hezbollah has an extensive network of supporters, fund-raisers and potential operatives in the United States.

'Thousands of sympathizers'
A law enforcement official said that the New York Police Department, whose monitoring of Muslim communities has prompted political controversy, believes that between 200 and 300 Hezbollah sympathizers live in New York City. Between 10 and 20 of those are relatives of Hezbollah leaders or fighters who were killed in action, said the official.

The NYPD's knowledge of Hezbollah's infrastructure is sufficiently detailed that it has identified three Lebanese towns, Bint Jbeil, Yanoun and Yatar, to which suspected sympathizers of the group have ties. At least a handful of people in New York connected with Hezbollah have also undergone military training in Lebanon, the official said.

A preliminary Homeland Security report said that pinpointing the number of Hezbollah operatives inside the United States was difficult because of the group's operational security. The report nonetheless cited the estimates of "some officials" that the group "likely" has "several thousand sympathetic donors" in the United States as well as "hundreds" of operatives.

But other officials said there was a big difference between a Hezbollah "supporter" and someone who would be willing to engage in violent activity. The officials said such distinctions have been blurred in public discussions about the domestic threat the group allegedly poses.

Over the years, US federal authorities have brought numerous criminal cases against alleged Hezbollah operatives, most of them related to fund-raising or other support activity rather than plotting against US targets.

The access to potential funding sources is one reason why Hezbollah has avoided targeting the United States or its interests, experts say.

Because the United States is such a critical source for funds and equipment, Hezbollah might be reluctant to embark on attacks inside the United States – even if prodded to do so by patrons in Iran. Attacks against US targets overseas might be more likely, the report said.

Some of the officials said that anxieties about possible Hezbollah – or Iranian-related attacks were increased in the wake of an alleged plot by Iranian agents to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington and other alleged Iranian plots uncovered recently in Thailand, India, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4213306,00.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Israël verwacht laag dodenaantal bij oorlog met Iran

Door: redactie
3/04/12 - 16u21  Bron: belga.be © reuters.

De wereld kijkt met bezorgdheid naar een mogelijk conflict tussen Israël en Iran. De hele regio kan getroffen worden als Israëlische gevechtsvliegtuigen het land van de mollahs aanvallen.

Volgens Israël zijn de gevolgen te overzien, tenminste in eigen land. Militaire deskundigen rekenen nu in geval van oorlog met Iran op hoogstens 300 dodelijke slachtoffers in Israël. Er kunnen volgens het leger wel heel wat gewonden vallen en er kan aanzienlijke schade aan privé-eigendommen en infrastructuur aangericht worden. Dat stellen de Israëlische media vandaag op basis van een rapport van het leger voor het kabinet van premier Benjamin Netanyahu. Defensieminister Ehud Barak had in november al gezegd dat er bij een oorlog "niet eens 500 slachtoffers" zouden te betreuren zijn.

Schuilkelders
Maar er wordt gewaarschuwd dat de Israëlische civiele verdediging niet voldoende voorbereid is op raketaanvallen door Iran en zijn bondgenoten in Zuid-Libanon, Syrië en de Gazastrook. Zo zijn er voor een kwart van de Israëlische bevolking geen schuilkelders voorzien.

Israël waarschuwt al langer dat het Iraans atoomprogramma in geval van nood ook alleen militair zal stoppen of minstens vertragen. Net zoals vele andere landen beschuldigt Israël de regering in Teheran ervan het atoomprogramma niet enkel voor vreedzame kernenergie aan te wenden, maar ook om kernwapens te ontwikkelen.

Sancties
De Verenigde Staten en Europa dringen er bij Israël op aan in elk geval nu nog niet toe te slaan. De steeds harder wordende sancties tegen het land moeten tijd krijgen.

Volgens een peiling eind maart beschouwt 65 procent van de Israëli's de gevolgen van een nucleair bewapend Iran als erger dan de consequenties van een spoedige militaire aanval op de atoominstallaties. Bijna 60 procent achten een militaire oplossing van het probleem uiteindelijk als onvermijdelijk.

http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/960/Wereld/article/detail/1418304/2012/04/03/Israel-verwacht-laag-dodenaantal-bij-oorlog-met-Iran.dhtml?show=react

[Lex]

Het grootste en oudste marineschip van de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten is begonnen aan zijn laatste missie. De USS Enterprise verliet vandaag zijn thuishaven Norfolk in de staat Virginia, op weg naar het Midden-Oosten.

Na een tussenstop bij Ibiza en een Passex met SNMG1 brengt het schip nu een bezoek aan Piraeus.

[Jah]

'Azerbaijan granted Israel access to air bases on Iran border'

Foreign Policy quotes U.S. diplomats as saying that 'Israel is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan' and says intelligence officials worried that Israel's military involvement in Azerbaijan would complicate efforts to reduce Israeli-Iranian tensions.

Israel has been granted access to air bases in Azerbaijan on Iran's northern border, Foreign Policy reported Wednesday, quoting senior U.S. diplomats and military intelligence officials.

"The Israelis have bought an airfield," a senior U.S. administration official told Foreign Policy's Mark Perry, "and the airfield is called Azerbaijan."

According to the report, U.S. intelligence officials are worried that Israel's military involvement in Azerbaijan would make it more difficult for the U.S. to reduce Israeli-Iranian tensions. Apparently now, military planners must prepare for a war scenario that would also involve the Caucasus.

"We're watching what Iran does closely," said a U.S. intelligence officer involved in assessing the consequences of a potential Israeli strike on Iran. "But we're now watching what Israel is doing in Azerbaijan. And we're not happy about it."

In February, Israel signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Azerbaijan, committing to sell drones and anti-aircraft missile defense systems to Baku. According to a retired U.S. diplomat, the deal left Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan "sputtering in rage," since Israel had previously canceled a contract to develop drones with the Turkish military.

The report said that the Azeri military has four abandoned, Soviet-era airfields that could be available to Israel and four air bases for their own aircraft, quoting the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 2011.

U.S. officials told Foreign Policy that they believe Israel has been granted access to these air bases through a "series of quiet political and military understandings."

"I doubt that there's actually anything in writing," said a former U.S. diplomat who spent his career in the region. "But I don't think there's any doubt - if Israeli jets want to land in Azerbaijan after an attack, they'd probably be allowed to do so. Israel is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan, and has been for the last two decades."

The report states that Israel's embassy in Washington, the IDF, the Mossad, and the Shin Bet were all asked to comment on the story but failed to respond. Also, the Azeri embassy to the U.S. did not respond when asked about Azerbaijan's security agreements with Israel.

Earlier this month, Azerbaijan authorities arrested 22 people suspected of plotting to attack the Israeli and American embassies in the capital Baku. Iran's Revolutionary Guards was reportedly behind the plan to attack Israeli and U.S. targets in the country, according to Azerbaijan's national security ministry.

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/azerbaijan-granted-israel-access-to-air-bases-on-iran-border-1.421428

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Intelligence community hobbles plans to strike Iran

By LINDA HEARD

American and Israeli intelligence agencies are openly deviating from the political script on Iran's nuclear program. While Washington and Tel Aviv are bent on ratcheting up the ante with assertions that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons and threats of military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, intelligence chiefs are singing from an entirely different hymn sheet.

It seems they've wizened-up after the Iraq War intelligence debacle when intelligence was sculptured around the Bush administration's regime change goal, purposefully exaggerated -- and, in some cases, fabricated.

When no WMD turned up in Iraq politicians conveniently threw up their hands in faux astonishment and re-directed the heat toward their intelligence bureaus. What's clear is that the 2003 US/UK propaganda scam that oiled the road to war has exceeded its shelf life. This time, the saber-rattlers need a genuine smoking gun but, unfortunately for them, thus far, there isn't even a whiff of proof that Tehran is actively building a nuclear bomb.

Predictions by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and others that Iran will succeed in developing nukes in two years, five years, ten years etc., seem to be random timelines they've drawn from a hat if you believe US National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) compiled by 16 different agencies suggesting Iran halted its efforts to build a nuclear warhead in 2003.

Earlier this month, the New York Times reported that the Mossad agrees with the assessment of US spy agencies. Former Mossad spymaster Meir Dagan told CBS News of his opposition to Israel striking Iran warning of potentially devastating repercussions including the ignition of regional war. Moreover, "There's no military attack that can halt the Iranian nuclear project. It could only delay it", Dagan claimed.

So, in that case, those politicians champing at the bit to launch missiles in Iran's direction have no solid ground to stand on.

An article published in the Los Angeles Times and headed "US does not believe Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb" quotes US officials as saying they've seen no "evidence that has caused them to significantly revise that judgment" -- and, according to those officials, Israel doesn't "dispute the basic intelligence or analysis" but, nevertheless regards Iran as a threat to its existence.

In other words, Israel wants to bring Tehran under its heel just in case the ayatollahs decide to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program at some future point. This is a scenario straight out of Steven Spielberg's futuristic movie "Minority Report" wherein a specialized police department called "PreCrime" arrests "criminals" before they commit a crime based on psychic foreknowledge.

It's mind-boggling to think a country could come under attack simply because some pundits believe it might one day decide to develop a nuclear arsenal with which to threaten its enemies; foes that are themselves nuclear powers with vast stockpiles of nukes.

It's worth recalling that the only nation to have used at atom bomb in warfare is the US while, unlike Iran, Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To this day, with Washington's collusion, Israel retains the policy of nuclear ambiguity and ruffles its feathers when any UN Security Council member state inadvertently refers to its activities in the Negev, exposed by former nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu in the mid-1980s.



Indeed, the moral platforms of both joined-at-the-hip allies on this issue are far shakier than that of Iran which hasn't breached NPT rules and does allow monitoring of its nuclear facilities by the international nuclear watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By its failure to issue Iraq with a clean bill of health under heavy US pressure, the IAEA virtually rubber-stamped the invasion of Iraq. According to former senior IAEA officials, including weapons inspector Robert Kelley and former IAEA director Hans Blix, the IAEA may be on the point of making the same mistake with Iran. They accuse IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano of pro-Western bias and over-reliance on unsubstantiated intelligence.

Amano has been portraying the Iranians as uncooperative but after Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA spoke before the IAEA board of governors laying out the facts, Amano admitted that talks between the Agency and Iran "took place in a constructive spirit", adding, "Differences between Iran and the Agency appeared to have narrowed."

A recent op-ed by author Mark H. Gaffney supports my contention that the nuclear issue is being deliberately hyped. Urging the American people not to fall for this "phony crisis", Gaffney says "Despite public perceptions, and all the rhetoric about nukes, the present crisis has nothing to do with Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. In my opinion, that is just a cover story. The real issue is the fact that Iran has upgraded its medium-range conventionally-armed missiles with GPS technology making its missiles much more accurate. This means Iran can now target Israel's own nuclear, bio and chemical weapons stockpiles, located inside Israel, as well as the Dimona nuclear reactor."

I largely agree with Gaffney on this latter point but believe the real aim of the US and Israel is regime change -- an illegal casus belli under the UN Charter and International law -- although for different reasons. The stronger Iran becomes the more Israel feels vulnerable; the US seeks total domination of the oil-rich Gulf region and its waterways.

Many of Iran's neighbors bless regime change too, concerned that Tehran is whipping up Shiite passions against governments, using its oil wealth to lure some Arab states into its sphere of influence, arming non-state actors and making territorial claims on Arab lands. A free and democratic Iran, as it was briefly in the early 1950s before Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was ousted by Britain's scheming, would be in just about everyone's interest including that of the Iranian people themselves. But as long as the West tries to indoctrinate them with WMD fairytales, kills off their nuclear scientists and threatens missile attacks, the ayatollahs are there to stay.

© Arab News 2012

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Israelis prefer preemptive strike to nuclearised Iran
Confidence in military action

JERUSALEM, March 26, (Agencies): Nearly two-thirds of Israeli Jews believe that the consequences for the Jewish state of a nuclear-armed Iran would be worse than those of an Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic, a poll showed on Monday.
The poll, published in Haaretz newspaper, found that 65 percent of Jewish Israelis agreed with the statement that "the price Israel would have to pay for living with the threat of an Iranian bomb would be greater than the price it would pay for attacking Iran's nuclear facilities."
Commissioned by the right-leaning Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, the survey found 26 percent disagreed with the statement, while nine percent said they were unsure.
It also found that six out of 10 respondents — 60 percent — agreed that only military action could halt Iran's nuclear programme, which Tehran claims is for peaceful civilian purposes but Israel and much of the international community believes masks a weapons drive.
But another 37 percent disagreed with the claim that only military action could halt Iran's nuclear programme, which has prompted the international community to impose tough sanctions on Tehran's exports and financial sector.
A majority of respondents, 64 percent, said they were confident that Israel's military forces could "significantly" damage Iran's nuclear programme, compared to 29 percent who disagreed.
And 63 percent said they believed Israel would suffer the same consequences whether an attack against Iran was carried out by the Jewish state or the United States.
The poll surveyed 505 Jewish Israelis, religious and secular, Haaretz said, without specifying a margin of error.
Israel has said frequently it is keeping all options open for responding to Iran's nuclear programme, which it says poses an existential threat to the Jewish state.
But the United States and other countries have called for time to allow biting sanctions to take effect.
Earlier this month, a poll published by Haaretz showed that 58 percent of Israelis opposed a strike on Iran without US backing.
The same poll, conducted by among 497 Israelis, also found that over half of the respondents trusted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak to deal with the Iran issue.
Iran and six world powers have agreed to meet on April 13 for new talks about Tehran's nuclear program, but the failure of previous meetings and disputes over what should be discussed are keeping them from choosing a venue, diplomats told The Associated Press on Monday.
No formal announcement about a date and venue for the talks has been made, and Michael Mann, a spokesman for EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, insisted in Brussels that even the date is not yet fixed.
But three diplomats from Western nations accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency said the starting date is set and they expect the dispute over the venue to be resolved in time.
The bickering between Iran and the world powers over the location after days of talks appeared to reflect the deep differences that have doomed previous meetings during which Iran has refused to even discuss international demands that it curb nuclear activities that could be used as part of a weapons program.
The main stumbling block remains uranium enrichment.
Iran says the expansion of its enrichment program is meant only to provide nuclear fuel, denies any interest in developing the atomic bomb, and says the right of countries to enrich nuclear power is enshrined in the Nonproliferation Treaty.
But the US and others say Iran's nuclear record is causing concern. Tehran started enriching in secret, has refused offers of nuclear fuel shipments from abroad, and last year began enriching to higher levels that bring it closer to point where it could turn its program into producing fissile warhead material at an underground bunker that could be impervious to attack from the air.
The IAEA also has warned of growing suspicions, based on intelligence from the United States, Israel and elsewhere, that the Islamic Republic has hidden research and development on how to make and deliver a nuclear warhead - allegations that Tehran strenuously denies.
The US and its Western allies have agreed on a series of punishing sanctions in recent weeks designed to add weight to UN penalties on Iran because of its enrichment program, while attempting to persuade Israel that there is currently no need to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/181254/reftab/36/t/Israelis-prefer-preemptive-strike-to-nuclearised-Iran/Default.aspx

[Jah]

Een kijkje in de interne conflicten binnen het Iraanse regime:

More vulnerable than ever

Domestic tension and foreign policy

The first months of 2012 have been dominated by analysis and speculation over a possible attack on Iran over its nuclear plans. In this delicate situation, understanding the calculations of the authorities in Iran is clearly vital. So what is happening in Iran, and how is the combination of internal political developments and external pressures on the government in Tehran - such as tripling sacntions and the threat of war - being played out?

A place to start in answering these questions is the comment by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 8 March 2012 which responded favourably to President Barack Obama's statement that he was not considering war with Iran. Khamenei, speaking to members of the Assembly of Experts (one of Iran's leading constitutional bodies), said: "This talk is good talk, and is indicative that [Obama] is outside of the illusion. But the president of America continued to say that we want to bring the Iranian people to their knees with the sanctions. This part of his talk is indicative that the illusion continues in this respect... Continuing this illusion will hurt American officials and their calculations will fail."

The comment had been preceded by the parliamentary elections in Iran on 2 March which gave a solid majority to the circle around the supreme leader. This outcome raises the question of how current power-struggles within the Iranian elite are likely to affect Iran's foreign-policy course, particularly over its ambitious and costly nuclear programme.

The power-struggle

Ayatollah Khamenei is ultimately in charge of Iran's major foreign-policy decisions, including the nuclear programme. Yet internal factional conflicts, broadly between conservatives and reformists (often perceived as the two wings of Iran's political system - with the supreme leader the central figure in the former camp) can strongly affect the pace of decision-making. Until recently, the balancing factor of inter-party struggles provided Khamenei with political cover. But Khamenei, with his supporting base in major political institutions, has gradually managed - both in the turbulent aftermath of the presidential election in 2009, and again in the 2012 parliamentary elections - to remove reformist forces from Iran's political scene.

Now, conservatives rule almost all major civil and military institutions and the supreme leader has established a commanding role in managing the country's major policies. Thus, any damaging rift between pro-leader conservatives would now put Khamenei in the spotlight, damage his authority, and make him vulnerable to blame for any wrongdoing by his supporters.

Khamenei's awareness of this, and his desire to deflect responsibility for failures and unpopular policies, mean that he tries consistently to present all decision-making (even when carried out with his direct orders or in consultation with him) as a product of collective thinking by his subordinates.

Khamenei enjoys the complete support of the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and is ultimately in charge of all the country's powerful military and intelligence organisations. He has avoided implementing policies that could accelerate the existing rift among the conservatives. This will have an impact on the actions of the newly elected parliament and on the ongoing crackdown on Iran's internal critics and dissidents.

This crackdown has seen many journalists, filmmakers, bloggers, civil-society activists, and workers who attempt to demand their labour rights face the state's iron fist, and are rotinelyroutinely charged with offenses such as "acting against national security" or "presenting a dark portrayal of the state." In addition most reformist leaders, including the opposition presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are either in prison or under house-arrest. Many prominent reformists, such as former president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, face serious limitations on their political activities. There are restrictions on journalists' reporting of their predicament or news related to them.

The reformists played no part in Iran's parliamentary elections. In part as a result, Khamenei has been able to shape the most homogenous ruling group in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet a side-effect of this outcome is that failures and shortcomings in the country's policies can no longer be blamed on reformists, who were in charge for eight years before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in June 2005, and not even on those conservatives who have distanced themselves with the leader.

In this sense, Iran's supreme leader is now in a more vulnerable position than it would appear. Even in the new parliament, again comprised of a conservative majority loyal to Khamenei and critical of Ahmadinejad, support for him is not absolutely assured. Two major conservative groups won more than half of the seats - the Islamic Revolution Stability Front and the United Principalists Front - but the true affiliations of more than 100 new MP's are unclear. Some analysts believe that a large proportion of these could be backed by Iran's vice-president Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is scorned by supporters of the supreme leader. In addition, a small group of the newly elected - which includes Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli - are staunch critics of the government. But since the nominees (under velayat-e faqih, the rule of the jurist), it is almost impossible to find out whose vow of loyalty is real and authentic until they start their work in the parliament.

The political timetable

There are fifteen months to go before Iran's next presidential election in June 2013. Until then a powerful, critical parliament will be able to limit the activities of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - perhaps even impeach him after an investigation into his financial affairs. Just days after the parliamentary elections, the president was questioned before the current MPs. In the style of his seven years in office, his provocative performance was matched by angry reactions from some MPs. Some of them now talk of impeaching Ahmadinejad for his incompetent performance, something that in principle will be easier to pursue in the new parliament.

For his part, Ayatollah Khamenei will seek to prevent the incumbent president from using funds and influence over the next two years to choose a potential successor from among his own friends and affiliates. Khamenei will want to promote his own favourite, possibly Gholamali Haddad Adel, the current deputy speaker of parliament and a close relative of the supreme leader.

The embattled Ahmadinejad thus faces a struggle to survive even until the end of his term in office. But as head government he still holds two powerful cards: Iran's booming oil revenues (partly as a result of the threats of attack) and access to the intelligence ministry. He has insinuated several times that he has information potentially damaging to the supreme-leader's supporters, which he could reveal if necessary. So Ahmadinejad could retaliate in kind if (for example) he is accused of corruption or if he or or his inner circle are put under extreme pressure.

The probability of continued tension between president and supreme leader - where (for example) the president seeks to obstruct any major political decisions taken by the supreme leader or groups under his oversight, especially in areas such as Iran's nuclear programme or its foreign policy - is a recipe for paralysis until the end of Ahmadinejad's term. The implication is that even if the west opens the way to negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, the chances of a successful result that meets the west's concerns are minimal.

The only way out of a political standoff of this kind could be a sweeping crisis in which military groups, particularly the IRGC, practically take control over the country and marginalise the president. That scenario may be why some groups within the Iranian leadership and the IRGC might even welcome any short-lived military attack as a pretext to cement their power inside Iran's ruling elite.

Iran, after all, has long experience of internal forces using foreign policy as a tactic to gain more political power. The case of a military attack by the US or Israel (or both) on Iran's nuclear or military facilities - or even accelerated verbal threats to this effect - would be convenient for those seeking to impose a state of emergency in the country that enabled the IRGC, under the oversight of the supreme leader, to replace Iran's civilian politicians and take control of all state affairs.

Most signals of war from the west suggest that any military attack on Iran would be limited, intended to disable Iran's nuclear facilities and postpone the country's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whether any assault succeeded in this, Iran's more extreme factions could use it to concentrate power in their hands, to suppress dissidents even further, and to reach out to public opinion in the region. It is at least certain that they would be strengthened by an attack.

There are very few options that could today lead to a sudden change in Iran's foreign policy. One is for Ahmadinejad to present the supreme leader with a fait accompli regarding important decisions, such as over Iran's nuclear activities (in 2009 the president acted in this way by dismissing the intelligence minister that Khamenei had handpicked). Another is for Khamenei to reduce the president's authority and delegate fundamental decisions to committees under his control.

This rooted internal tension means that substantial changes in the balance of political forces are unlikely before the presidential election of 2013. But the pattern could alter if Iran's leadership becomes convinced that intensified economic sanctions or military action could lead to irreparable damage to the Islamic Republic's political life.

Iranian leaders know that extreme conditions could challenge the state's rule at its very heart. The defence of the state is the red line that Ayatollah Khomeini and now Ayatollah Khamenei have observed since the Islamic Republic's inception in 1979. In this sense the west's policies towards Iran in the coming months could be more influential over Iran's foreign policy than internal developments.

First published in opendemocracy.net.

Omid Memarian is a journalist who writes for the IPS (Inter Press Service) news agency and the Daily Beast, and whose work has been published in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the San Francisco Chronicle.

http://iranian.com/main/2012/mar/more-vulnerable-ever

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Het zal afhangen, kom maar op  , van de situatie in de VS. Als daar straks een Republikeinse "warpresident" aan de macht komt zou het weleens hommeles kunnen worden in het Midden-Oosten.

Hier heb je absoluut een punt al blijft de vraag of de Israeli zo lang kunnen of willen (mogen) wachten.