Internationale fighter ontwikkelingen, deel 2

[dudge]

Dat laatste mag ik betwijfelen...ook het HCSS schrijft in haar rapport in opdracht van het CLSK over de voordelen van de 5e generatie.....en daar doelt men duidelijk mee op de JSF/F35

Aan het toestel wordt dan doorgaans ook gerefereerd als zijnde een 5de generatie, hell, die term is vrijwel uitgevonden voor dat toestel. Maar als je dan kijkt naar de eigenschappen die een 5de generatie zou moeten hebben, en tot de conclusie komt dat de F35 die niet allemaal heeft......

Hangt er dus maar net vanaf. Supercruise bijvoorbeeld, volgens sommige onnodig, volgens andere een standaard/essentiële eigenschap van een 5de generatie toestel. Er bestaat geen harde definitie, voor zover ik weet, en dus kun je er mee spelen, zeker jij als WO'er weet hoe belangrijk definities zijn .

[Elzenga]

Overslaan? Ach, eerst nog maar eens bestendigen. Voorlopig is er maar 1 5th gen toestel (F22) en is er maar 1 op komst (PAK-FA). De F35, afhankelijk van welke bron je raadpleegt voor dit subjectieve begrip, is nog gewoon een 4th++/4.5th whatever generation 

Dat laatste mag ik betwijfelen...ook het HCSS schrijft in haar rapport in opdracht van het CLSK over de voordelen van de 5e generatie.....en daar doelt men duidelijk mee op de JSF/F35

[dudge]

Hoezo achter de feiten aansukkelen?! ik geloof dat we elders nog een discussie zagen of de 5th generatie niet een "overslaan" generatie wordt en de 6th zich al aandient (o.a. Boeing FX) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eI37a_DefoU )

Het lijkt mij inmiddels duidelijk dat de 4++/4,5 generatie het nog prima een tijdje uithoudt...er weinig scenario's en potentiële tegenstanders zijn die daar echt iets tegenover kunnen stellen of in zijn geheel geen luchtstrijdkrachten hebben...

Het is welhaast zonde van het geld om dan een 5th generatie toestel in te voeren....kun je mijns inziens beter investeren in de 6e generatie...die over 20-30 jaar dan instroomt. Tot die tijd houden de "oudjes" het nog wel uit...er zijn meer wegen om bijvoorbeeld de voordelen van stealth te "compenseren" of te ondergraven.

Overslaan? Ach, eerst nog maar eens bestendigen. Voorlopig is er maar 1 5th gen toestel (F22) en is er maar 1 op komst (PAK-FA). De F35, afhankelijk van welke bron je raadpleegt voor dit subjectieve begrip, is nog gewoon een 4th++/4.5th whatever generation 

[dudge]

Met hierbij het verschil dat het (hopelijk) een gezonde mix zal worden, een deel voor het moeilijke werk en een deel voor als er luchtoverwicht is.

Dat is niet echt wat er lijkt te staan. 'highly contested airspace' zou betekenen dat er nog geen luchtoverwicht is.....en dan moeten de 'teen-fighters' dus gewoon mee kunnen komen.....

[Elzenga]

.......
Een prima oplossing natuurlijk, jammer alleen dat de Amerikanen dit wel kunnen doen en we hier in Europa een beetje achter de feiten aan blijven sukkelen... tenzij....

Hoezo achter de feiten aansukkelen?! ik geloof dat we elders nog een discussie zagen of de 5th generatie niet een "overslaan" generatie wordt en de 6th zich al aandient (o.a. Boeing FX) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eI37a_DefoU )

Het lijkt mij inmiddels duidelijk dat de 4++/4,5 generatie het nog prima een tijdje uithoudt...er weinig scenario's en potentiële tegenstanders zijn die daar echt iets tegenover kunnen stellen of in zijn geheel geen luchtstrijdkrachten hebben...

Het is welhaast zonde van het geld om dan een 5th generatie toestel in te voeren....kun je mijns inziens beter investeren in de 6e generatie...die over 20-30 jaar dan instroomt. Tot die tijd houden de "oudjes" het nog wel uit...er zijn meer wegen om bijvoorbeeld de voordelen van stealth te "compenseren" of te ondergraven.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Waarom zouden ze? Een 4th generation is natuurlijk levensgevaarlijk voor de piloten. Zo snel mogelijk al die troep de USAF uit, echt schandalig dat ze hun piloten nog een een 4th generation 'highly contested airspace' in willen sturen....

Met hierbij het verschil dat het (hopelijk) een gezonde mix zal worden, een deel voor het moeilijke werk en een deel voor als er luchtoverwicht is.

Een prima oplossing natuurlijk, jammer alleen dat de Amerikanen dit wel kunnen doen en we hier in Europa een beetje achter de feiten aan blijven sukkelen... tenzij....

[dudge]

"This RFI [request for information] seeks information concerning the availability of a system at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or above that allows 5th Generation fighters to digitally connect to and exchange data with 4th Generation fighters and other platforms when operating in highly contested regions," reads a USAF document.

Waarom zouden ze? Een 4th generation is natuurlijk levensgevaarlijk voor de piloten. Zo snel mogelijk al die troep de USAF uit, echt schandalig dat ze hun piloten nog een een 4th generation 'highly contested airspace' in willen sturen....

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

USAF seeks information on connecting 4th and 5th gen fighters

By:   Dave Majumdar Washington DC / 15 Feb 2013 

The US Air Force is seeking information on a "communications gateway" that would one day be able to digitally link fourth and fifth-generation fighters inside a highly contested threat environment.

"This RFI [request for information] seeks information concerning the availability of a system at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or above that allows 5th Generation fighters to digitally connect to and exchange data with 4th Generation fighters and other platforms when operating in highly contested regions," reads a USAF document.

The USAF hopes to eventually procure a system that would "improve battlespace awareness through sensor target data sharing in order to attain a real-time Common Tactical Picture/Common Operational Picture (CTP/COP)," the RFI reads. The data-link would also increase the survivability of friendly aircraft by improving mutual support and reducing fratricide incidents. It would also "increase targeting efficiency through the exchange of engagement status information to diminish redundant weapons expenditure," the document reads. It should also make the combination of fourth and fifth-generation fighters more "lethal" in combat.

The USAF wants the system to be installed on an existing Link 16 platform that can be used from close enough distances to highly contested airspace to connect with Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors via the Intra-Flight Data Link (IFDL) and eventually Lockheed F-35s via the Multifunctional Advanced Data Link (MADL). Because the new "communications gateway" will be operating with fifth-generation fighters, it will need to be equipped with multi-level security features, the RFI reads.

The RFI comes as the USAF Scientific Advisory Board is investigating how to maintain secure communications while operating against an anti-access/area denial threat environment.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-seeks-information-on-connecting-4th-and-5th-gen-fighters-382396/?cmpid=SOC%7CFGFG%7Ctwitterfeed%7CFG_military&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

[Harald]

Kosten verschillen en aanname's in de begrotingen van Canada voor vervanging van de CF-18 door de F-35


Estimating the Cost of Replacing Canada's Fighter Jets
   
(Source: Canada Library of Parliament; issued Feb. 13, 2013)

In recent years, there has been considerable discussion about the costs of replacing Canada's fleet of CF-18 fighter jets, possibly with a fleet of F-35 Lightning IIs. This discussion has highlighted the role of estimating costs over a program's life cycle.

The "cradle-to-grave" approach to estimating costs encompasses both recurring and one-time costs during all phases of a program, including planning, acquisition, operation and maintenance, as well as disposal. The role of life-cycle costing is outlined in Treasury Board policies and the project approval directive of the Department of National Defence (DND).

Estimating life-cycle costs can help decision-makers evaluate alternative solutions, assess the affordability of the proposed program, manage existing budgets, develop future expenditure profiles, evaluate opportunities for cost reduction, and identify areas of financial risk and uncertainty.

This HillNote sets out various estimates of the costs of acquiring and operating a fleet of F-35 fighter jets (see Table1), and explains that variations among the estimates relate, in part, to life-cycle costs.

Tabel 1 : http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2013-04_table1-e.htm

Estimating the costs of a fleet of F-35s

In July 2010, the Minister of National Defence announced the government's intention to acquire 65 F-35 fighter jets. At the time, DND indicated that the costs of acquiring the jets and the associated weapons, infrastructure, initial spares and training simulators, as well as contingency funds and project operating costs, would amount to $9 billion.

Subsequently, the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) was asked to produce an independent cost forecast, and in March 2011, he released his report providing a high-level estimate of the financial impact of acquiring and supporting the F-35 [pdf] (1.1 MB, 65 pages). Using historical trends in the costs of fighter aircraft, the PBO forecasted that total ownership costs, including acquisition and long-term sustainment, of 65 F-35 fighter jets would be US$29.3 billion over 30 years.

In response, DND provided a breakdown of its $9 billion acquisition cost estimate, as well as its estimated cost of $5.7 billion for sustainment over a 20-year period, for a total estimate of $14.7 billion.

In April 2012, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) released an audit of the decision-making process to replace the fighter jets. In its report, the OAG noted that the cost estimate that DND used for decision-making in June 2010 included not only the elements noted above, but also $4.8 billion for operating costs and $4.7 billion for personnel, for a total estimate of just over $25 billion.

As part of its seven-point plan prepared in response to the audit report, in December 2012, DND released a fighter capability update with a cost estimate based on a life-cycle framework developed by the consulting firm KPMG. The estimate included development costs of $565 million over a 12-year period, acquisition costs of $9 billion, and sustainment and operating costs of $35.2 billion over a 30-year period, for a total estimate of close to $45 billion over 42 years.

At this time, the government signalled its intention to review its options in replacing the CF-18 fighter jets.

Variations among estimates

One reason for variations among the estimates is that DND's initial estimates, while consistent with previous methods of presenting costs for major defence acquisitions, were based not on the full life cycle of the F-35, but on a 20-year period. Additionally, they did not include all components related to life-cycle costs.

The Auditor General recommended that DND should provide complete costs related to the full life cycle of the F-35 capability. DND subsequently presented an estimate based on KPMG's life-cycle framework.

It should be noted that some estimates of elements of life-cycle costs have changed over time. The PBO's estimate differs primarily because his office used an alternative methodology to estimate life-cycle costs.

Considerations

When comparing the costs of options to replace Canada's fleet of fighter jets, some issues that could be considered include:
-- the framework used to estimate costs;
-- the degree of confidence in the estimates;
-- the elements included in the estimate; and
-- the capability achieved for a given cost.


Toevoegingen van de schrijver :
(EDITOR'S NOTE: Table 1 in this comparison shows that Canada's Dept. of National Defence reduced its final estimate of F-35 costs by excluding some program-related purchases and investments.
The amount budgeted for weapons, for example, was reduced from $270m to $52m, while the cost of "Canadian modifications" was cut, from $420m to zero.
Estimates for infrastructure costs were reduced from $400m to $244m, while provision for contingency and inflation were reduced from $830m to $602m.)

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Saab rechnet mit Gripen-Aufträgen über 7 Milliarden Franken

Aktualisiert am 15.02.2013

http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Saab-rechnet-mit-GripenAuftraegen-ueber-7-Milliarden-Franken/story/16222412

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Australian MP about JSF: Why did Lockheed give misleading information?

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl om 19:25 onder Aanschaf JSF, Andere JSF landen

In a speech delivered by Dr Dennis Jensen in the Parliament (Federation Chamber) on 13-feb-2013 in the Australian Parliament he gives a clear overview of the Australian JSF project. Most of the criticism may be applied to all other JSF partner countries. The speech of Dr. Jensen is a clear summary of a project that ran into irreversible problems, due to its wrong concept and design.

Here the plain text of the speech of Dr. Dennis Jensen about the JSF Program:
The truth is incontrovertible. "Malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end there it is." So said Winston Churchill. The Department of Defence has a problem with accepting the truth.

Late delivery, false expectations

Questioned in 2004 regarding the joint strike fighter, Air Marshal Houston stated, 'The expectation is they will begin arriving in Australia by 2012.' He went on to say, 'It is a conservative estimate. That is when we would expect.'
In 2005 he said, 'We are still planning on 2012.'
In 2007, he again stated delivery would be in 2012 and the initial operational capability, or IOC, would be in 2014-15.

In 2009 Dr Gumley, head of the Defence Materiel Organisation, said, 'The JSF is on schedule. I think the test program is running four or five months late.' To reiterate—'running on schedule'. We have been talking about 2012 and initial aircraft in 2014 with IOC—well, initially 2013 IOC—and he said, 'It is not something I lose much sleep about.' I do. And if I were Dr Gumley, he should have. Because ultimately these aircraft are not experiments in marketeering; rather they are tools young men and women in uniform will use to defend this great nation from enemies with superior technologies. It is a question about lives, not maintaining the extravagant livelihoods of Lockheed Martin executives.

In 2011, Air Vice Marshal Osley told parliament that the US JSF program manager, Vice Admiral Venlet, said, 'The program is now founded on a great deal of realism.' Air Vice Marshal Osley said, 'I think our estimate is now becoming a realistic estimate instead of a conservative estimate.'

Then the IOC was taken to be 2018, and he reiterated his confidence on this numerous times in testimony. But a few months ago we were told that this has now slipped to 2020, and Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week and Space Technology, the trade bible, states that IOC in the US is only likely to be in 2020. Even if this does not slip, how would you like to order a 1991 (Holden) VN Commodore (editor's note: Australian produced car) and finally take delivery when the competition is producing the FG, or current model, Falcons?
How competitive would that (Holden) VN Commodore be? Should you stick with your VN Commodore? The Department of Defence seems to think so. On Defence's risk management matrix, a slip of merely 12 months is considered an extreme level of risk, yet the program is now over half a decade late and there are no flags being thrown up.

Why no red flags after price explosion since 2005?

In 2005, Air Marshal Houston said, 'Currently the indicators are that the flyaway costs for the F-35 will be about $45 million.'
In 2006, Air Commodore Harvey is talking about "approximately $US47 million on 2002 base year".
We are getting them early, so Harvey said 'approximately $55 million average for our fleet'. Then in 2008, Dr. Gumley stated that he would be surprised if we paid more than about $75 million a copy for the aircraft measured in 2008 dollars, 'assuming we buy at least 75, or three squadrons'. I was told by Defence in then Minister Nelson's office that the average unit procurement cost that was being worked on by Defence was $131 million per unit.
So why did Dr Gumley say he would be surprised if we paid more than $75 million each? Defence deliberately talk costs that make up the price instead of the price, so that they can obfuscate.
In 2010, then Air Vice Marshal Harvey, in talking about fleet, said it was $75 million in 2008 dollars at a 0.92 exchange rate. The Government Accountability Office in the United States, talking about average procurement cost of the JSF, said it has gone up from $69 million in October 2001. In April 2010 it was up to $114 million each.
In June 2010, after a Nunn-McCurdy breach, it was revised to $133 million per copy. Using the risk management matrix at 10 per cent, increase in cost is severe and a combination of severe and almost certainly means that you will have a category of extreme level of risk. Once again, why no red flags?

Air Power Australia are routinely denigrated by Defence which will obviously have a negative impact on the work they get as well as organisations such as REPSIM. The reason they are denigrated is that they have the audacity to criticise the JSF program. Problematically for Defence they tend to be accurate, whereas Defence woefully fails. Take cost, for example. In 2006-07, Air Power Australia had an estimate of between $136 million and $176 million, far more accurate than Defence talking about significantly less than $100 million. Were they
just deliberately misleading parliament, given they had admitted the $131 million average unit procurement cost to me in 2007? They tend to hide behind many definitions of cost, deliberately obfuscating failed projects by throwing various prices and costs out there.

Other countries also critical

Vice Marshal Osley also boasted of no foreign customers having pulled out and he even boasted of it 'not being beyond my level of expertise to comment on politics in Canada' before assuring us that it was just politics in Canada and Canada would stay in.
In fact Canada has pulled out of the program. The Danes have ordered advanced F-16s as a stopgap which I am told will likely become the final capability—in other words, they will
dump the JSF as well. The Dutch are prevaricating and the probability is that they will pull out.

Failing aerodynamic performance

As I have said, there has been unfair criticism of APA by Defence. As an example, Air Vice Marshal Osley stated of APA's criticisms of the F-35's aerodynamic performance that it was:
... inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and the eight other partner nations.
He further stated that their analysis was:
... basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and the lack of knowledge of the classified F-35 performance information.

The Joint Operational Requirements Document, or JORD, had specifications on various measures of performance. For acceleration at 30,000 feet the objective was 40 seconds or less and the threshold or bare minimum was 55 seconds.
We were told by Defence that it would meet spec and Tom Burbage, head of the JSF
program with Lockheed Martin, misled parliament in March last year by stating: 'The airplane will continue to be well in excess of its basic requirement. The aircraft is meeting all other requirements to date.' He stated 'other' because it failed to meet the range requirement of 590 nautical miles and they have conveniently changed the definition of the requirement for the A-model which Defence recommends we get so that it could reach spec.

Acceleration and turnrate similar to 50-year old Vietnam-era F-4 Phantom

In terms of that acceleration spec, the JSF program office in the US has asked the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, or JROC, to relax the requirement to 63 seconds which is similar to the performance of a 50-year-old F-4 Phantom—so much for meetings spec. In 2006, APA calculated the A-model would take over 60 seconds for acceleration which has now proven correct. This is on record at the same time that Defence and LockMart were telling us it was meeting or exceeding spec. Whose analysis is flawed now?

Similarly, for turn performance, the aircraft had an objective to sustain six g at 15,000 feet with a bare minimum threshold of 5.3 g. In 2006, APA calculated it could only sustain 4.7 g, at the same time that Defence and LockMart were assuring us that it would meet spec. Once again, JPO has requested JROC to relax the spec to 4.6 g. This is less than said 50-year-old F-4 Phantom, which was known as a truck for its turn performance at the time. Whose analysis is flawed now? So much for the years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the
JSF program office, Lockheed Martin and eight other partner nations.

Weight problems restricts future changes

This aircraft has had very austere specifications placed on it in the JORD, and LockMart has designed the aircraft not to meet the objectives—which were not much of a stretch anyway—but with the bare minimum threshold specs, and have failed to even meet them. They have a weight problem with the aircraft, and military aircraft always put on weight. This aircraft is only 270 pounds under the maximum allowable empty weight according to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. They have even gone so far as to remove fuel stop valves and extinguishers in the dry bays, which, according to the DOT&E, increases the aircraft's vulnerability to ground fire by 25 per cent compared with legacy aircraft.

JSF program based on magic!

But this program is based on magic! Because, in terms of the fundamentals of air combat, this aircraft is a comprehensive and hugely expensive failure. It is a $1 trillion program over its life, so no wonder we are getting so much spin and so little substance. By every measure, the aircraft is an outlier. We are told that this aircraft will let the missiles do the work—no need for high aerodynamic performance; it will all occur at beyond visual range.
So why do they crow about the 50 degree angle of attack capability which is only important in close combat? The reason is that, according to Defence and LockMart, the JSF is the answer, and therefore anything it can do is important and great but what it cannot do is irrelevant. They are quite willing to mislead, lie and obfuscate— anything to ensure the continuation of this white elephant.
Remember, even if it achieves the 2020 IOC, this turkey will be in service until 2060 or so. Do you really think it will be remotely competitive then? Why are the Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans and indeed LockMart with its other fighter, the F-22, spending so much money for these aircraft to have supermanoeuvrability and supercruise—or the ability to cruise supersonically without using afterburner—if it is not important? Indeed, the JSF will have to light up the sky to get into a position to fight using a lot of fuel-hungry and very hot afterburners which can be seen from a long distance away, just to get to the speed required to do that.

Does Lockheed have be the only correct view of air combat?

Does the JSF program really have the ultimate and only correct view of air combat, a view that bets against the basics of air combat that have been shown to be fundamental to air combat time and again over the last century, despite people having bet against said fundamentals on numerous occasions? Are those who designed the J-20, J-31, F-22, Eurofighter, Gripen and Rafale all wrong? Are the fundamentals of air combat and the wisdom of the likes of John Boyd and von Clausewitz all wrong, and only the mighty Lockheed Martin Fort Worth division is correct?

Why did Tom Burbage give misleading information?

I want Tom Burbage, the head of the JSF program with Lockheed Martin, to come to parliament and explain why he did not give false and misleading information to this parliament. If we do not insist on full transparency, our fighting men and women will be the ones to pay the price, not those in Russell offices or the boardrooms of Lockheed Martin. Finally, no doubt Defence and LockMart will state that the magic is classified and hidden, and we will have to take them on trust that it truly is revolutionary, it will change the nature of air combat, and that is why it is a world-beater. The problem is, on all unclassified measures where we have had the opportunity to compare the facts with what they have assured us is correct, they have been shown to be wrong.

Independent experts demonstrated to be correct

Furthermore, when independent experts have been demonstrated to be correct on these measures where Defence and Lockheed Martin have failed so dismally, when they warn us that the JSF is uncompetitive, I believe we should take what they have to say extremely seriously and demand evidence from Defence and LockMart. We should demand that they show us, not simply assure us.

In the final analysis, facts are stubborn things and I am more stubborn still.

Author: Dr. Dennis Jensen, Member of Parliament, Australia

Background:
Dr Dennis Jensen (born 28 February 1962 in Johannesburg, South Africa), Australian politician, was elected to the Australian House of Representatives at the 9 October 2004 federal election for the Division of Tangney, Western Australia, for the Liberal Party.
He was educated at RMIT University, Melbourne University and Monash University, from where he has a PhD in materials engineering on ceramics. He was a research scientist with the CSIRO and a defence analyst before entering politics.

Source:
Austrlian House of Representatives; proof; Federation Chamber;
Bills Appropriation Bill (No. 3) 2012-2013 and Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2012-2013
Second Reading Speech MP Dr. Dennis Jensen; Wednesday, 13 February 2013; by authority of the house of representatives.

JSFNieuws130214-DJ/pg

http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?p=941

[Huzaar1]

Komt er in principe nu op neer dat we allemaal aan het dokken zijn voor die C versie.
Hardstikke fijn..

En de B...

Naar wat ik begreep ging dat wel goed, de enige met echte problemen was de stovl.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

A Stealthy Manoeuvre to Keep the F-35 Alive

Posted: 02/14/2013

"We will not be constrained by the Statement of Requirements," says the Minister announcing the (re)start of an Options Analysis. No kidding.

There was a time when the Statement of Requirements led to the plane the Conservatives want -- the F-35. Now, it leads nowhere. By the time the Conservatives are ready to (re)pull the trigger, the fifth generation F-35 will still be somebody's fantasy and the Pentagon's albatross. The Conservatives need a different path to the F-35. That's the Options Analysis.

We all know of course that "fifth generation" is Lockheed Martin's marketing code for its F-35. According to their website, "fifth generation" refers to a certain set of attributes and capabilities unique to the F-35 design: stealth, sensor fusion and a very fancy helmet-mounted display. Impressive. But this plane's in trouble.

In January, the Pentagon's testing and evaluation shop released its latest report on its most expensive weapons system ever -- the F-35. It's a laundry list of problems: efforts to reduce weight have made it more vulnerable than the planes it's intended to replace; the threat of lightning-induced fuel system explosions has forced designers back to the drawing board; and turns out, it doesn't accelerate or turn as fast as hoped and advertised. It never did boast the performance features of the latest fighter jet technologies such as thrust-vectoring engines and supersonic cruise -- attributes one might reasonably consider necessary for Canadian air defense.

All of this just reconfirms what most experts have been saying about this plane all along: it's a bit of a pig with wings.

As a telling summary of the evaluation, the Pentagon decided to reduce the performance specifications for the plane. And how did the F-35's fifth generation capabilities fare? Well, the stealth coating is -- still -- peeling off the tail. Problems with the helmet-mounted display system remain. In fact, a new one has emerged -- "green glow." Mission system development is delayed and less capable. The plane "lacks maturity," concluded the Pentagon and Congress can't yet bring itself to require the US Armed Services to estimate an Initial Operational Capability date.

The implications are clear. At no time soon will this plane fulfill the Statement of Requirements for Canada's next generation fighter jet. By 2020, it'll fly, but it won't be fifth generation. Ah, how to get out of this box?
The Australians, partners like us in the Joint Strike Fighter program, have a way. It's expensive though.

Having anticipated as recently as 2009 that they'd be in possession of their first F-35 by 2014 -- and have three squadrons in the air by 2021 -- a recently leaked Defense White Paper anticipates that their RAAF will be in possession of just two F-35s by 2020. The speculation is that they'll bridge the gap to the F-35s by procuring another tranche of Boeing's Super Hornet. They've done this once and appear set to do it again and there's speculation that Canada is set to follow.

Recently, as part of the resurrected Options Analysis, the government sent out a survey to Lockheed Martin and its competitors. The survey divides the acquisition of a new fighter jet into two time periods -- 2020 to 2030 and 2030 and beyond. Super Hornets for the first decade? Perhaps.

Now, there are many mysteries surrounding the F-35 procurement -- some of them enduring. For example, why is this government so committed to this troubled plane? Or, in other terms, who's got them in a headlock and why can't they get out?

Other mysteries are revealed as we go. For example, how on earth were we ever going to be able to buy 65 F-35s for $9 billion? Turns out, we weren't. As we know from multiple reports including the recent KPMG report, we were misled -- by tens of billions -- by this Conservative government.

But sometimes, there is no mystery -- it's just a matter of listening carefully to what they're saying. The Minister has told us -- over and over again -- that she "won't be constrained by the Statement of Requirements." And with that, so disappears the requirement for fifth generation capabilities by 2020.

Apparently, 2030 will do. And the F-35 remains the only plane on the Conservatives' shopping list.
True enough, the Conservatives won't be constrained by the Statement of Requirements. They found another way back to the F-35 -- yes, by stealth -- through the Options Analysis. And it is as it always was -- the only way to escape this government's commitment to the F-35 and ensure that we get the right plane for the right price is by way of an open and transparent competition.

Why won't they do that?

Well, that's one of those enduring mysteries.

http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/matthew-kellway/a-stealthy-manoeuvre-to-k_b_2664048.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Saab Signs Agreement for the Next Generation Fighter Aircraft Gripen E and Receives Development Order

Published: February 15, 2013

LINKÖPING, Sweden — Regulatory News:

Defence and security company Saab has signed an agreement with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) for Gripen E. The agreement includes development and modification of Gripen E for Sweden during the period 2013-2026 and a possible order for new production of Gripen E from Switzerland. FMV has today placed an initial development order of SEK 2.5 billion for operations during 2013-2014. Remaining orders from Sweden are expected in 2013-2014. The total value of possible orders under the agreement amounts to a total of SEK 47.2 billion.

The Swedish Parliament, has with a broad majority, decided that Sweden will acquire Gripen E. The agreement signed leads to an initial delivery of Gripen E to Sweden in 2018. The agreement with FMV includes several parts. The first part, ordered today, relates to development of Gripen E in 2013-2014 and is worth SEK 2.5 billion. The remaining parts of the agreement include orders as follows:

• Remaining development work for Gripen E to Sweden of SEK 10.6 billion – expected in the first quarter 2013.
• Modification of 60 Gripen C to Gripen E with first deliveries to Sweden in 2018 – expected in the fourth quarter 2013 at the latest.
• Mission-specific equipment and support and maintenance for Gripen E to Sweden with initial deliveries in 2018 – expected in the fourth quarter 2014 at the latest.
• In Switzerland, a possible acquisition of 22 Gripen E is to be processed in the parliament. The agreement therefore includes provisions of delivery of 22 brand new Gripen E, and related equipment to Switzerland, if Switzerland decides to acquire Gripen E.


All orders under the agreement, including a possible order from Switzerland via FMV, amounts to a total value of approximately SEK 47.2 billion and will be booked when each order is received.

The agreement includes rights for FMV - conditional to certain pre-requisites - to fully or partly make cancellations. If so, Saab has the right to compensation for costs already taken and costs for discontinuation. The agreement also includes sections regulating the conditions should Switzerland decide not to acquire Gripen E.

"This is an historic event for Saab. We are proud to continue to deliver a world-leading fighter aircraft to the Swedish Air Force. Gripen has long been the backbone of the Swedish Air Force as well as for several other countries. This next step also creates more opportunities in the export market for many years to come. Our existing customers that operate the Gripen C/D version will also be able to take advantage of some of the development in their future upgrades," says Saab's President and CEO Håkan Buskhe.

"We are now entering a development and test phase which will occupy many of our existing employees. We also anticipate that we will need to recruit. The production will take place in Sweden with suppliers from several countries," says Lennart Sindahl, Head of business area Aeronautics, and adds:

"With this agreement we continue to develop the successful Gripen concept with our own innovative and unique design as well as our own software combined with sub-systems from different suppliers around the world."

Gripen E has a substantially developed capability compared to previous versions. The aircraft is based on the same smart design and innovative technological solutions, which leads to considerable savings compared to other alternatives. Gripen E has a more powerful engine with the capacity to operate for a longer duration and carry more weapons and payload. New electronic radar, upgraded presentation systems in the cockpit and modern avionics (aircraft electronics) enhances the ability to perform successful missions. The technological steps that have been taken with Gripen E have been proven in the Gripen 39-7 E/F demonstrator program, where the test aircraft has flown more than 250 hours in Sweden, the UK,India and Switzerland among others since 2008.

Through upgrading both hardware and software, Gripen E becomes a modern system that is easy to further develop for the future.

Saab serves the global market with world-leading products, services and solutions ranging from military defence to civil security. Saab has operations and employees on all continents and constantly develops, adapts and improves new technology to meet customers' changing needs.

The information is that which Saab AB is required to declare by the Securities Business Act and/or the Financial instruments Trading Act. The information was submitted for publication on 15 February at 07.00 CET.

This information was brought to you by Cision http://www.cisionwire.com

Read more here: http://www.heraldonline.com/2013/02/15/4622397/saab-signs-agreement-for-the-next.html#storylink=cpy

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Italian Cut in JSF Order Would Reduce Workshare

Feb. 14, 2013   
By TOM KINGTON   

ROME — As Italian politicians call for a reduction in Italy's Joint Strike Fighter purchase, a senior Lockheed Martin official has warned that any cut in the order will mean a corresponding cut to Italy's workshare on the program.

Speaking during a visit here, Stephen O'Bryan, vice president of JSF program integration and business development, said that Italy's workshare, including production of wings by Alenia Aermacchi, had already been reduced following Rome's decision in 2012 to cut the number of aircraft to be purchased from 141 to 90.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130214/DEFREG01/302140027/Official-Italian-Cut-JSF-Order-Would-Reduce-Workshare?odyssey=nav%7Chead