US Combat Ship Decision Coming in 'Very Near Future'

[walter leever]

Hoe top zou het zijn als de Amerikanen hun eigen variant van het LCF of vMFF zouden adopteren.

Zou idd een geweldige "opsteker" zijn,maar dan zie ik persoonlijk de vMFF als grootste kanshebber,ware 't niet dat 't ding nog geen bestaand ontwerp is.
Prijs technisch,ik denk aan een "goede" 600 miljoen per stuk zou dit wel de meest interessante zijn voor de US,denk dat 't LCF(buiten dat 't alweer een wat ouder ontwerp is,nog steeds een zeer capabel schip,daar niet van    )ook gewoon te duur wordt in huidige prijssetting. ;)ze willen namelijk een "goedkoper"ontwerp,wat dan bij de US niet zoveel zegt. (ik geloof dat zo'n Burke dik over 't miljard gaat,zelfs tegen de 2),dus daar zit nog zit nog wel wat ruimte tussen.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

USN re-examines foreign designs for Future Frigate

Hoe top zou het zijn als de Amerikanen hun eigen variant van het LCF of vMFF zouden adopteren.

[Harald]

USN re-examines foreign designs for Future Frigate

Key Points
•USN said it would consider non-US based designs for the Future Frigate LCS follow-on
•USN to seek "full and open competition" and weigh capabilities versus cost

The US Navy (USN) is taking another look at existing US and foreign designs as alternatives to current Future Frigate seaframes, according to USN leadership who spoke to the House Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee on 3 May.

In 2014, a USN small surface combatant task force concluded that existing US and foreign designs did not meet the current minimum Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) survivability requirements and would require major structural improvements that would come at a greater cost than a new design.

http://www.janes.com/article/70110/usn-re-examines-foreign-designs-for-future-frigate

[Harald]

LCS Frigate: Delay A Year To Study Bigger Missiles?

WASHINGTON: The Navy needs to delay a year before awarding the roughly $9 billion contract for the upgraded frigate version of the Littoral Combat Ship, because it needs more time to thrash out cost estimates and detailed designs, says congressional watchdog GAO.

The Government Accountability Office has said this before, but a crucial piece of context has changed in a way that makes their case stronger — even though GAO doesn't mention it in their new report. Specifically, one contractor's frigate proposal opens the possibility of a much better-armed ship than the Navy had anticipated, and that's worth slowing down to study.


The last time GAO advised delay, it was not too hard to argue that the extra time wasn't really necessary, because the frigate design wasn't going to be that different from the current Littoral Combat Ship. In particular, that "minor modified LCS" would have new medium-weight anti-ship missile launchers mounted on deck, a Navy task force advised, but it would be too hard to build a heavy-duty, multi-purpose Vertical Launch system into the hull below deck.

Of the two competing contractors, aerospace giant Lockheed Martin toed the Navy line and didn't add VLS, although they emphasize they could if asked. Upstart Austal, however, rolled out a frigate proposal with 16 VLS tubes. (For comparison, a much larger Aegis destroyer has 96 VLS). That would not only increase firepower but dramatically expand the range of missions the frigate could perform: VLS doesn't just accommodate larger missiles, it can launch a wide range of different types at different targets, from enemy ships to incoming aircraft and missiles to Syrian airbases ashore.

Is Austal's proposal realistic? We need to know the trade-offs, said Bryan Clark, a former top aide to the Chief Of Naval Operations, who'd prefer a new, heavier frigate designed from the start to handle VLS. If you have to fit everything in the small hull of an LCS, Clark told me, adding VLS could require taking out too many other systems. Particularly at risk is kit for anti-submarine warfare, an increasingly important mission as the Chinese and Russian sub fleets grow in size and sophistication. Austal says their VLS-equipped frigate can still hunt subs just fine, but they do acknowledge it can carry fewer helicopters and drones than the original LCS, which could impact ASW and many other missions.

So adding VLS worth the cost, both in money and in other capabilities you have to leave off the ship to make room? That answer requires a complex mix of engineering and tactical analysis — analysis the Navy doesn't plan to do before it commits to a design.

The Navy originally planned to award the frigate contract in 2019, after detailed design work was done on both competitors. Under pressure from the Pentagon to get a better-armed ship in the fleet as fast as possible, however, the service moved that date up a year to 2018 — before detailed design. Likewise, there won't be a final cost estimate in time for a 2018 award. (There will be an Independent Cost Estimate from the Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation office, CAPE). The Pentagon also won't have completed important tests of LCS systems that will carry over to the frigate: Survivability analysis won't be complete until 2018; Initial Operational Test & Evaluation of the anti-ship systems won't be complete until 2018, and IOT&E of anti-submarine systems not until 2019.

Admittedly, lots of defense programs commit to contracts before they know exactly what they're buying, in order to speed things along, but it's always a risky decision. LCS is a poster child for why not to take shortcuts, because skipping the normal analytical process was the program's original sin, which led to expensive design changes halfway through building the first ships, to undersized crews that couldn't keep up with maintenance, and to limited lethality and survivability. Leading naval analyst Ron O'Rourke has written that the study leading to the frigate took similarly problematic shortcuts.

In this case, the Navy argues it doesn't need detailed designs to go ahead, because the frigate will be "over 60 percent common" with the current LCS. Of course, that means the frigate will be up to 40 percent different, and that's without adding a Vertical Launch System.

So why the hurry? One argument is the shipyards need the frigate contracts to keep working at a steady pace, without a hiatus in production that would force layoffs of skilled workers who might never return. But GAO calculates current LCS contracts will keep both competitors busy into 2021. The other argument is that the fleet needs the upgraded ship ASAP. But if the choice is between getting 12 modestly upgunned frigates starting in 2018 and 12 VLS-capable frigates starting in 2019, a year's wait doesn't look too long.

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/04/lcs-frigate-delay-a-year-to-study-bigger-missiles/

[Harald]

GAO Wants Delay In New Frigate Acquisition   (beslissing pas in 2019)

Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Delaying Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable Better-Informed Decisions

The Navy's current acquisition approach for its new frigate—a ship based on a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design with minor modifications—requires Congress to make significant program decisions and commitments in 2017 without key cost, design, and capability knowledge.

In particular, the Navy plans to request authority from Congress in 2017 to pursue what the Navy calls a block buy of 12 planned frigates and funding for the lead ship, which the Navy intends to award in 2018. Approval of these plans would effectively represent the final decision for the entire planned buy of 40 LCS and frigates.

According to the Navy's approved acquisition strategy, the frigates would still require annual appropriations, so Congress would maintain its oversight through its annual appropriation decisions; however, any decision to reduce or delay the program, should that become warranted, could nevertheless be more difficult as the Navy may point to losses in favorable block buy prices, as has been done previously with LCS.

The Navy's impending request presents a key opportunity for Congress to affect the way forward for the frigate program by ensuring the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge on cost, design, and capability before authorizing an investment of a potential $9 billion for a program that:

• has no current formal cost estimate—independent or otherwise,
• will not begin key detail design activities until late fiscal year 2018,
• has significant unknowns in regards to operational performance of the ship upon which its design will be based, and
• based on the existing and planned shipyard workloads, has no industrial base imperative to begin construction in the Navy's planned time frame.

The Navy's previous frigate acquisition plans included achieving a higher degree of ship design knowledge before awarding the lead ship in fiscal year 2019, as the plans included significant detail design activities prior to contract award.

As GAO has previously found, such an approach—which has been supported by shipbuilders—offers greater confidence in the understanding of design changes and how they will affect ship construction costs. Further, as GAO's work on best practices for program cost estimates suggests, the Navy's prior plans for frigate design efforts and an award in fiscal year 2019 would have provided more information on which to base a decision, including a better understanding of risks and costs.

The previous plans also better aligned with LCS test plans to improve the department's understanding of the operational capability and limitations for each ship variant. This knowledge could then be used to inform the Navy's decision on which LCS-based design for the frigate it will pursue.

In addition to the valuable knowledge to be gained by not pursuing the frigate in the planned 2018 time-frame, the existing and planned LCS construction workload for both shipyards is another important factor to consider. Specifically, each shipyard has LCS construction demands that extend into 2021, suggesting no imperative for the Navy to award the frigate in 2018.

Delaying the frigate award until at least fiscal year 2019—when more is known about cost, design, and capabilities—would enable better-informed decisions and oversight for this potential $9 billion taxpayer investment.

Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy envisioned a revolutionary approach for the LCS program: dual ship designs with interchangeable mission packages intended to provide mission flexibility. This approach has fallen short, with significant cost increases, schedule delays, and reduced capabilities—some of which have yet to be demonstrated. The LCS acquisition approach has changed several times.

The latest change led to the frigate—a ship that involves minor modifications to an LCS design.

The House report 114-537 for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to examine the Navy's plans for the frigate. This report examines the Navy's plans for the frigate acquisition as well as remaining opportunities for oversight. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and leveraged prior GAO reports on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices.

What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider not enacting authority pursuant to the Navy's request for a block buy of 12 frigates in fiscal year 2018 and delaying funding of the lead frigate until at least fiscal year 2019, when more information is available on the ship's cost, design, and capabilities. GAO also recommends that DOD delay its procurement plans until sufficient knowledge is attained. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation but is not planning to delay frigate procurement. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/182970/gao-wants-delay-in-new-frigate-acquisition.html

Click here for the full report (34 PDF pages) on the GAO website.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684151.pdf

[ARM-WAP]

Waar ze ook altijd sterk van onder de indruk zijn is de accommodatie aan boord van de (moderne) Europese schepen...
Kleinere cabines, meer sanitaire voorzieningen, eet- en leefruimtes zijn veel minder "marien": valse plafonds die de bekabeling, buizen enz verbergen...
Het lijkt allemaal wat meer op een hotel/thuis dan op een 'oorlogsschip'.

En van (veel) minder belang dat we een (bier)tap in de verschillende messdecks hebben :)

[walter leever]

First Basis ontwerp : Made in NL
Second : Building in US

Dit is niet nieuw, wordt al veel langer toegepast. Buitenlandse leveringen moeten altijd via een US bedrijf gaan of gemaakt worden in de US.

En trouwens ; the Netherlands second 

Klopt wat je zegt hoor Lubbach.

Maar toch ben ik er sterk van overtuigd dat de US voor een eigen ontwerp gaat,alhoewel er op 't net gesproken wordt over de F-100,Fremm,etc(dus een ontwerp in die richting),maar niet door mensen die er toe doen,denk ik.

Ik zou niks liever willen dan dat ze voor een bijv. NL ontwerp zouden gaan(indien deze voldoet natuurlijk),en heb al op verschillende fora gehoord dat de Navy boys en girls nog altijd verlekkerd kijken (als ze er 1 zien)naar de LCF,zijn er toch wel een aantal die:

1- Ontwerp ontzettend mooi vinden.
2-Onder de indruk zijn van de systemen en dan vooral radar.


Zou wel de max zijn ,op een grote internationale oefening(bijv.)op de zijkant"made in the USA ,designed in Holland"

[Harald]

Buiten 't feit dat 't voor hun idd te lang gaat duren,voor er eindelijk een definitieve beslissing genomen wordt aan deze kant van de plas,succes met 't verkopen van een NL ontwerp aan de US.

(weet je nog Harald;"America first"  )

Indien mogelijk (dus niet)wel een giga order,moest er voor de vMPF gekozen worden.

First Basis ontwerp : Made in NL
Second : Building in US

Dit is niet nieuw, wordt al veel langer toegepast. Buitenlandse leveringen moeten altijd via een US bedrijf gaan of gemaakt worden in de US.

En trouwens ; the Netherlands second 

[walter leever]

US Navy considers a more powerful frigate   
(misschien moeten ze bij de USN eens gaan kijken bij ons M-fregat programma ?? ... Tja, dat zal hun (denk ik) te lang duren. Het lijkt mij dat de M-fregat vervangers een betere en uitgebreidere bewapening krijgt dan de FFG )

Switch to an FFG design would add area air defense capability

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is taking a hard look at upgrading its future frigates to protect other ships from anti-air threats in addition to defending against undersea and surface enemies. The move would be a significant enhancement in the effort to develop a frigate from existing littoral combat ship designs.

A study group called the Requirement Evaluation Team, or RET, has been formed to examine how to add a local air defense capability to the frigates to protect Combat Logistics Force ships — the supply and support ships that bring fuel, ammunition, spare parts and food to warships at sea. The frigate design as currently envisioned is armed with anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles, but only to protect itself.

The goal, according to a draft document, is — at a minimum — to double the load out of Block 2 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles from eight to 16, or incorporate a Mark 41 vertical launch system with at least eight Standard Missile-2s. The SM-2 is one of the primary anti-air weapons carried by the fleet's Aegis destroyers and cruises.

.../...

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-navy-considers-a-more-powerful-frigate

Buiten 't feit dat 't voor hun idd te lang gaat duren,voor er eindelijk een definitieve beslissing genomen wordt aan deze kant van de plas,succes met 't verkopen van een NL ontwerp aan de US.

(weet je nog Harald;"America first"  )

Indien mogelijk (dus niet)wel een giga order,moest er voor de vMPF gekozen worden.

[Harald]

US Navy considers a more powerful frigate   
(misschien moeten ze bij de USN eens gaan kijken bij ons M-fregat programma ?? ... Tja, dat zal hun (denk ik) te lang duren. Het lijkt mij dat de M-fregat vervangers een betere en uitgebreidere bewapening krijgt dan de FFG )

Switch to an FFG design would add area air defense capability

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy is taking a hard look at upgrading its future frigates to protect other ships from anti-air threats in addition to defending against undersea and surface enemies. The move would be a significant enhancement in the effort to develop a frigate from existing littoral combat ship designs.

A study group called the Requirement Evaluation Team, or RET, has been formed to examine how to add a local air defense capability to the frigates to protect Combat Logistics Force ships — the supply and support ships that bring fuel, ammunition, spare parts and food to warships at sea. The frigate design as currently envisioned is armed with anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles, but only to protect itself.

The goal, according to a draft document, is — at a minimum — to double the load out of Block 2 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles from eight to 16, or incorporate a Mark 41 vertical launch system with at least eight Standard Missile-2s. The SM-2 is one of the primary anti-air weapons carried by the fleet's Aegis destroyers and cruises.

.../...

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-navy-considers-a-more-powerful-frigate

[dudge]

Dropping Like Flies: Third US Navy Littoral Combat Ship Out of Action

The fourth Littoral Combat Ship breaks down in 12 months.

Lees verder:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/dropping-like-flies-third-us-navy-littoral-combat-ship-out-of-action/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

En vwb die LCF opvolger, wie zegt dat daar nog niet aan gewerkt wordt?

Er wordt over nagedacht, Damen heeft ongetwijfeld, samen met DMO, al schetsen en toekomst visies. Dit zal zeer bescheiden zijn immers: dit komt uit Damens eigen zak, vaart komt er pas in als het gemandateerd is door de Kamer. (middels de A brief)

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Het kan ook wel, zeker bij Amerikanen. Maar dan heb je het over zaken als een DDG1000, waar alles nieuw is. Maar als je gaat sleutelen met elementen waar je al over beschikt kun je behoorlijk besparen. Krijg je ook een minder innovatief schip, maar soit.

Natuurlijk.... vandaar ook dat ingezet wordt op een fregat variant van het LCS

[dudge]

In NL rekent men met 14 jaar... we hadden dus al in de schets/ontwerpfase moet zitten van de LCF vervanger maar helaas hier is zelfs nog geen duidelijkheid over het MFF vervangingstraject.

Houston Den Haag we have a problem.

Het kan ook wel, zeker bij Amerikanen. Maar dan heb je het over zaken als een DDG1000, waar alles nieuw is. Maar als je gaat sleutelen met elementen waar je al over beschikt kun je behoorlijk besparen. Krijg je ook een minder innovatief schip, maar soit.
En vwb die LCF opvolger, wie zegt dat daar nog niet aan gewerkt wordt?

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Van idee tot het eerste staal => 15 jaar

In NL rekent men met 14 jaar... we hadden dus al in de schets/ontwerpfase moet zitten van de LCF vervanger maar helaas hier is zelfs nog geen duidelijkheid over het MFF vervangingstraject.

Houston Den Haag we have a problem.