Internationale fighter ontwikkelingen

Gestart door jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter), 13/11/2011 | 14:54 uur

Lex

Dit topic wordt hier vervolgd.

Lex
Algeheel beheerder


jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Saudi Arabia signs trainer aircraft deal

London, United Kingdom - "A real manna from heaven for BAE and Pilatus"

(WAPA) - Saudi Arabia will purchase 22 BAE Systems Hawk aircraft and 55 Pilatus PC-21 turboprop airplanes. The country has signed a contract of approximately 1.6 billion pounds.

Saudi Arabia has a military fleet composed of modern aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-15 Strike Eagle and now needs to support operations by an advanced training of its pilots. Currently the country's trainer inventory includes 45 aged Hawk 65s (the oldest of which were delivered in 1988). In addition, Riyad also flies 47 Pilatus PC-9s.

As a consequence, the delivery of the PC-21 basic trainers will start in 2014, with the new Hawks to follow from 2016. Obviously, this contract also includes simulators, associated equipment, maintenance and the training of Saudi personnel.

This contract is said to be a "Real manna from heaven for BAE Systems and Pilatus which have both been seeking new customers for their latest trainer aircraft". In fact, BAE has currently completed the production of 28 Hawk 128/T2s for the Royal Air Force, while its Swiss partner has delivered PC-21s to its own air force and to the United Arab Emirates.
(Avionews)

http://www.avionews.com/index.php?corpo=see_news_home.php&news_id=1141139&pagina_chiamante=index.php

Harald

Australia – EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) Aircraft Modification Kits

WASHINGTON --- The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia for 12 EA-18G Modification Kits to convert F/A-18F aircrafts to the G configuration and associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.7 billion.

The Government of Australia has requested a possible sale of 12 EA-18G Modification Kits to convert F/A-18F aircrafts to G configuration, (34) AN/ALQ-99F(V) Tactical Jamming System Pods, (22) CN-1717/A Interference Cancellation Systems (INCANS), (22) R-2674(C)/A Joint Tactical Terminal Receiver (JTTR) Systems, (30) LAU-118 Guided Missile Launchers, Command Launch Computer (CLC) for High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government (USG) and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

The estimated cost is $1.7 billion.

Australia is an important ally in the Western Pacific. The strategic location of this political and economic power contributes significantly to ensuring peace and economic stability in the region. Australia's efforts in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have made a significant impact to regional political and economic stability and have served U.S. national security interests. This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives and facilitates burden sharing with our allies.

The proposed sale will improve Australia's capability in current and future coalition efforts. Australia will use the enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense. Australia will have no difficulty absorbing this new capability into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be The Boeing Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale may require the assignment of additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Australia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded


http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/135423/australia-to-pay-%241.7-billion-for-12-ea_18g-modification-kits.html

Enforcer

Hoe zit het met de software voor de Gripen NG? Wordt daar nog veel aan veranderd, of zal er relatief snel een werkende NG van de band aflopen?

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Harald op 23/05/2012 | 09:07 uur
of zal de achterliggende reden zijn, dat de sofware zover achter licht op schema en dat ze in de software ontwikkeling en intergratie zoveel moeilijkheden tegen komen, dat ; als ze nu de F-35 vol in productie doen in de fabrieken, dat er geen goede software is om er mee te gaan vliegen en dat ze met deze toestellen + huidige software niet bij de squadrons/eenheden kunnen gaan vliegen voor het opwerken naar combat readyness.

Sotfware problemen zal ook zeker effect hebben op de mate van je test-mogelijkheden, dus hierin zal weer vertraging komen. ... dus ook weer voordat eenheden Combat Ready zijn.

Ik hou het maar op een combinatie van factoren. Feit is natuurlijk wel (voor zover publiekelijk bekend) dat de software een zeer grote vertragende factor is.

Gezien het belang van het progamma mag je toch verwachten dat deze problemen een heel eind zijn verholpen tegen 2019/2020.

Harald

Citaat van: jurrien visser op 23/05/2012 | 07:54 uur
F-35: Slowing Down Production Makes No Sense

of zal de achterliggende reden zijn, dat de sofware zover achter licht op schema en dat ze in de software ontwikkeling en intergratie zoveel moeilijkheden tegen komen, dat ; als ze nu de F-35 vol in productie doen in de fabrieken, dat er geen goede software is om er mee te gaan vliegen en dat ze met deze toestellen + huidige software niet bij de squadrons/eenheden kunnen gaan vliegen voor het opwerken naar combat readyness.

Sotfware problemen zal ook zeker effect hebben op de mate van je test-mogelijkheden, dus hierin zal weer vertraging komen. ... dus ook weer voordat eenheden Combat Ready zijn.

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Russia's military aircraft industry: overview and outlook

May 22, 2012
The Voice of Russia

What are the leading tendencies of the Russian aviation industry for the next ten years - an expert ponders.
 
During the round table discussion regarding the current state and the process of re-equipment and the prospects of the Russian Air Force Konstantin Makienko, deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, presented his report on the prospects of producing military aviation equipment for export and the use by the Russian Air Force.

The leading tendency of the next ten years will be the reorientation of the aviation industry from exports to the internal market. According to Makienko, it is linked to the drastic increase of the volume of aviation equipment purchased for the Russian Air Force as well as the expected concurrent drop in the external demand.

The drop in exports will be primarily driven by the end of the Chinese purchase orders and the saturation of the Indian market where the Su-30 MKI program has passed its peak. Besides India, the demand will center around South-East Asia, but naturally that size of that export will be quite smaller than the procurement for the Russian Air Force and the Naval aviation, as well as the huge Chinese and Indian contracts of the late 1990s- early 2000s.

At the same time in the event the necessary political decisions are made and the escalation of the Il-476 project Russia's reentry to the Chinese market is possible. For that purpose the Chinese Air Force and Navy should be offered attack aircraft with a high anti-ship potential, such as modernized Tu-22M3 and Su-32/34. Besides that, if the Il-476 project shows positive dynamics in the next couple of years, one can hope for the restoration of the 2005 contract to purchase 38 Il-76/78 that was not fulfilled due to a number of financial and production related reasons.

The drop in external demand will be well compensated by the procurement for the Russian Air Force and the Navy. Over the last few months, orders have been placed for 92 Su-34 fighter-bombers, 24 MiG-29K carrier-based fighter aircraft and 30 Su-30 CM multipurpose fighter aircraft. According to some sources, the State Rearmament Program 2020 envisions the acquisition of 600 tactical aviation aircraft.

In such circumstances producing a long-term strategy of developing the aviation industry after 2020 when the current 2020 program expires, becomes a matter of principle. With the current state of things in 2020 Russia will have only two competitive products with a good commercial potential – that is the T-50 heavy fighter and a family of trainer/light attack aircraft based on Yak-130. It appears that the development of the Russian aviation industry during this planning period will largely depend on the ability to solve two main tasks in the near future. The first task is to develop a competitive product (for the period after 2020) in the segment of commercial aviation. The second task is to develop a relatively simple and inexpensive combat aviation complex, or a «light» fighter plane that would be able to effectively compete with F-35.

First published in The Voice of Russia

http://indrus.in/articles/2012/05/22/russias_military_aircraft_industry_overview_and_outlook_15816.html

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)


F-35: Slowing Down Production Makes No Sense

Steven Bucci

May 22, 2012 at 5:30 pm

The transparency of some anti-defense ploys boggles the imagination. The most recent one has to do with the production rates of the new F-35 multi-role fighter.

This aircraft will replace several of the worn-out fighters of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps that are sometimes older than the pilots who fly them. The multi-role abilities of the F-35 will benefit the readiness and war fighting capabilities of all the branches of service and will markedly improve national security at a time when threats are increasing in number and magnitude.

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as the F-35 is known, is designed to maximize both capability and survivability. Its production methodology was developed to allow for faster fielding of the aircraft and calls for incremental improvements in the design as early models roll of the line. Safety is not sacrificed, and the process known as "concurrency" puts the best available plane in the hands of the warfighters as soon as possible. It also allows for cuts in cost per copy as efficiencies build upon one another.

Unfortunately, forces that never wanted the nation's pilots to have this aircraft in the first place are now trying to pull a bait and switch. They are saying that there is too much concurrency, and they want to slow down production of the JSF. This would drive up the cost per unit of each JSF and probably force some of our allies to cut the number of planes they have ordered. These cuts would further drive up cost, creating a vicious cycle of cost increases.

The clear goal here is to slow down production and drive up costs in a spiral that will eventually allow opponents of military modernization and proper readiness to call for killing the program altogether. Congress should not allow this to happen.

The U.S. Air Force has already cut back its requests to the bare bones of readiness. To reduce the fleet further, slow the rate of production, and eventually kill the JSF in the name of artificially escalated cost overruns is irresponsible.

Rather than give into this sneak attack, the Department of Defense should push up the rate of production. Congress should support them, protect the F-35 program, and give U.S. forces the aircraft they need to defend the nation.

http://blog.heritage.org/2012/05/22/f-35-slowing-down-production-makes-no-sense/

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

F-35 Reality Check Ten Years On, Part 2: The Jobs Mirage (deel 2 van part 2)

he case of Italy: High-volume, low-margin?

To date, Italy has invested about 1.8 billion euros in the F-35's development, and another 650-850 million euros (estimates vary) to build the FACO facility which, although to be operated by Alenia Aermacchi, is owned by the state. However, despite this investment, Italian industry is not guaranteed any F-35 production work unless its prices are competitive with those of other countries and of Lockheed Martin.

This was stressed by Gen. DomenicoEsposito, Italy's director-general of air force armaments, during a Feb. 1, 2012 hearing(in Italian only—Ed.)by the Chamber of Deputies' defense committee.


"Alenia must remain competitive; it simply cannot produce at a higher cost than Lockheed Martin. If Lockheed Martin, which is now producing probably its 50th wing assembly, is far enough [along the learning curve] that it can reduce its production costs, we have to keep up with them" or lose the work.

Esposito added that, as of early 2012, Italian firms had won orders worth $539 million, of which $222 million in 2011. "If we maintain our commitment to the program, this type of work, at the end of the day, will have an estimated value of up to $14 billion for Italy" provided Italian industry remains competitive.

But neither Esposito nor his boss, MoD Secretary-General and National Armaments Director Gen. Claudio Debertolis, were able to provide clear answers to committee members who wanted to know how much of the work intended for Italian industry would be production, rather than assembly, and what profit margins it will allow.

"Assembling costly parts does not mean there is a high added value," committee member EttoreRosato said during the hearing. "There are companies with a very large turnover and very small margins, and I wouldn't want Italy to assemble very costly parts on which it would have very small returns."

Whatever the ultimate results, it is clear thata lot of water will pass under the bridge before Italy will be able to recoup,through its industry's subcontracting and assembly work,the almost 3 billion euros it has so far contributed to the program – even without counting the cost of actually buying the aircraft.

In a second,follow-on hearing on Feb. 7, Gen. Debertolis told MPs that "We now have a problem with Lockheed Martin, which is insisting on very low costs, much lower than what Alenia can sustain, because we are thinking short-term. Our job will be to force Lockheed to committ itself, from the very beginning, to guaratee Alenia's prices over the entire production run. This will allow Alenia to invest even if this means posting a loss because it will be sure of recouping its investment in the short term, and to post a profit in the longer term."


"If there were no [industrial] returns on the wings, there would be a big problem, that would fast become a political one. We are however resolving the question, and work is continuing in the meantime," Debertolis said.

Obviously, the same considerations also apply to Australian, Canadian, Danish, Dutch Norwegian and Turkish companies, but the effects will be even more perverse as these countries have no guaranteed work allocation similar to Italy's FACO facility.

Great expectations getting smaller

The continued slippages in F-35 production are also playing havoc with subcontractor amortization plans and, thus, their cash-flow. Alluding to this problem, one Australian industry executive quoted by the Canberra Times remarked that ''Production Parts could be 'the canary in the mine'.....Having a contract is one thing, but when the orders don't come through there is no cash flow."

F-35 contractors finance their investments in the expectation that contracts – and related payments – will arrive at given dates. When contracts are delayed by several years, the companies have no incoming cash to pay down their investments, and this causes cash-flow difficulties and, in the case of Precision Parts, bankruptcy.

A related difficulty is the constant reduction of the size of Low-Rate Initial Production batches and their stretching out. The latest such decision, announced in February as part of the FY2013 budget request, reduces F-35 procurement by 13 aircraft in FY13, and by a total of 179 aircraft between FY13 and FY17.

This means that any company that had invested for F-35 production in the expectation of receiving orders and payments for work on those 179 aircraft now finds itself with proportionally lower payments, stretched out over a longer period. Its bills coming due have been neither postponed nor reduced, however.

In short, a sure recipe for failure, especially for the small and medium enterprises that Australia, Canada and the European partners have enticed into joining the F-35 industrial program with the promise of profitable work and technology transfer.

Governments, however, are already beginning to back-pedal on their promises. The Canadian government has now revised downwards the size of the golden F-35 pot it promised in terms of industrial benefits.

Industry Canada now estimates Canadian companies are eligible to bid on as much as US$9.8 billion in contracts — down from an estimate of US$12 billion just last year, The Canadian Press reported May 4. However, none of these figures are guaranteed, the Opposition New Democratic defense spokesman stressed in the same article.

But a senior government official told a parliamentary committee that "this projection assumes the contracts are renewed throughout the nearly 50 years the fighter is expected to be in service," the newspaper reported.

To date, a decade into the program, Canadian companies have signed US$435 million in F-35 contracts, the paper added, of the C$12 billion the government expects its industry to win.

Canada's Auditor-General, in his celebrated April 3 report, voiced "concerns about the basis of the projections of industrial benefits for Canadian companies [as] Projections made by the prime contractors were (and continue to be) extrapolated over the entire production period."


The report adds that the far greater share of projected benefits "are based on a combination of opportunities....that are available through competition to companies from partner countries," but they"are the least certain, since Canadian companies must compete against companies from other partner countries."

The Auditor-General also noted that prior to signing on to the program, senior decision-makers were warned "that industrial benefits could not be guaranteed under the (Joint Strike Fighter) program."

No offsets for partners, only for OTS buyers

What all this means is that F-35 partner nations have given up their right to industrial offsets in exchange for the right to bid on contracts their industry might, or might not win, and on which it might, or might not, make money, and then only if currency exchange rates remain favorable to them.

Given that very high offset rates are normal for a large fighter purchases – India and Switzerland have both requested 100% of the contract value for thefighter purchases they are now negotiating – it is clear that the F-35 partner nations accepted a very bad deal, since it is arithmetically obvious that none will be able to offset its F-35 purchase by anywhere near 100%.

This is in stark contrast to the favorable contractual terms that off-the-shelf buyers of the F-35 are expected to win, and which are downplayed in official announcements.

This very point was made by the EdmondoCirielli, chairman of the Italian lower house's defense committee during the same Feb. 1, 2012 hearing. "The criterion of "best value" could be seen as damaging our industry: while with Eurofighter it had an obligatory return in production work, now it has to fight to win work. This leads us to wonder if, from an economic point of view, it would not have been better to buy the aircraft off-the-shelf, as Japan is doing."

While Lockheed Martin downplays industrial aspects of off-the-shelf sales, offsets that are forbidden to program partners are, in fact, allowed for off-the-shelf buyers.

In announcing Israel's signing of a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for an initial batch of 20 F-35Cs, the CEO of Israel's Defense Ministry, Maj. Gen. (res.) UdiShani, said "the deal also holds tremendous importance for the national economy through the manufacturer's commitment to purchase billions of dollars' worth of equipment from Israeli industries," according to an Oct. 7, 2010 press release by the Israel Defense Force.

In fact, Israel's F-35 deal is doubly sweet: first of all, it pays for the aircraft with US military aid, so at no cost to its economy, and in addition it gets the US to buy billions of dollars' worth of equipment in exchange.

Japan, the second off-the-shelf buyer to date, has decided to buy an initial 42 F-35s for $10 billion. The DSCA's announcement of the deal on May 1, 2012 states "There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale," but a related, Dec. 21, 2011 statement by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) says that the company "has been selected by Air Staff Office, Japanese Ministry of Defense, as a potential domestic contractor to participate in manufacturing and after-servicing of Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF)'s F-X...through license production and operational support." Again, this is a better and more certain deal than offered to the industries of partner nations.

Conclusion

As explained in great detail in the two parts of this article, the F-35 does not back up any of the three most common claims made by partner governments to justify their decision to buy the aircraft:

1. Backers claim that only the F-35 has "fifth-generation capabilities," including stealth and data fusion, that will ensure air supremacy in the future.

In fact, even if its development is a complete success, most of the "revolutionary" capabilities the F-35 will bring to the party in a decade or so, when it finally enters service, already exist. Its advances will mostly be a question of degree, and not the revolution that its backers allege.

And, if the F-22 is anything to go by, the F-35's sensors and electronics will be so outdated by the time it enters service that it will require several very costly upgrades. As the latest estimate for bringing the F-22 fleet up to scratch is over $8 billion – and that's for only part of the 150 aircraft now in service -- the mind truly boggles at how much it might cost to upgrade 400 or 500 early production F-35s.

2. Backers also claim that only the F-35 allows full interoperability with US forces and within future allied coalitions.

The inanity of using interoperability to justify buying the F-35 was clearly stated by NATO's supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. StephaneAbrial, a former chief of staff of the French air force, when he testified before the Canadian House of Commons Defence Committee on May 3.

According to a May 4 report published by Canada's Postmedia news, Abrial told the committee that "We do not advocate a single type of aircraft, single type of ships, single type of rifles....We never wanted to make sure everyone has the same equipment: that's not our goal." Abrial said interoperability has to do primarily with training and ensuring all NATO forces have sufficient skills to function as one on the battlefield, not flying the same aircraft.

3. The third most common justification used by partner nations is job creation: buying the F-35 guarantees highly profitable, high-tech work for the buyer's national aerospace industry, they claim.

As this overview makes clear, the F-35 is the only international aircraft program in recent history to guarantee no industrial benefits whatsoever to its partners. In reality, partner nations have given up the certainty of license-production and direct or indirect offsets in exchange for the chance of bidding on some contracts.

Never has the folly of giving up a bird in the hand for the faint prospect of many in the bush been so obvious. This is a further reason why soldiers should stick to soldiering, instead of thinking they can negotiate international agreements, and why politicians should take military recommendations on equipment with a fistful of salt.

Taxpayers and aerospace workers in the F-35 partner nations will now have ample opportunity, over the next 30 years, to appreciate just how good a deal their governments negotiated.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/135384/f_35-reality-check-part-2%3A-the-jobs-mirage-and-other-stories.html

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

F-35 Reality Check Ten Years On, Part 2: The Jobs Mirage (deel 1 van part 2)


(Source: defense-aerospace.com; published May 21, 2012)
 
By Giovanni de Briganti

Given the contractual arrangements of the F-35 program, it is not clear how many foreign subcontractors will be able to win production orders and – more importantly – whether any of these contracts will actually generate the work-load and profits anticipated by foreign governments. (L-M photo)
PARIS --- Most F-35 partner governments have, at various times, tried to justify joining the F-35 program by the production work the program will provide to their industry, and the high-tech jobs this work will create and support.

However, as for the program's technical promises reviewed in Part 1, ('Fifth-Generation' and Other Myths)the facts are hidden behind a P.R. smokescreen.

The truth is that no partner country has a guaranteed work-share on the program. Being an F-35 partner only gives the right to compete for contracts, with no guarantees of winning, and there is no entitlement to any work at all, however much a country has invested, except for major partners Italy and the United Kingdom.

Furthermore, prospective subcontractors are expected to make all the necessary investments needed to compete for production orders, again with no guarantee of actually winning any work. Finally, companies bidding for work are expected to assume all foreign exchange risk. More on this below.

All of this leaves program prime contractor Lockheed Martin with the best of all worlds,as it is able to award subcontracts to the lowest bidder, and to then transfer work to a cheaper source, or to the country with the best currency exchange rate, while itself benefiting from US dollar-denominated contracts awarded by the Pentagon.

Subcontractors from the customer nations, on the other hand, are much worse off: heavy investments, low profit margins, one- or two-year contracts without any guarantee of renewal, and payments made in US dollars, irrespective of which currency they operate in.

Such is the industrial work-sharing arrangement that Lockheed and the US government have succeeded in foisting on their F-35 partners in the name of efficiency and affordability. This one-sided arrangement has replaced long-standing principles such as "just return" and direct offset contracts that were used in previous international projects, like the European F-16 program, and which are still used in export contracts.

1. No guaranteed work, no offsets, no net return?

Contrary to what some partner governments have stated or implied, there is no contractual obligation for foreign partners to buy the F-35 in order to participate in its production: financially contributing to development is enough.

Conversely, buying the aircraft is no guarantee of winning any production work, either.

In return for having contributed several hundred million dollars to F-35 development, the Netherlands (Tier 2) and the five Tier 3 partner countries have obtained a single privilege: their industry is allowed to compete and bid for production work.

There are only two exceptions to this basic rule: Britain (and BAE Systems), as the only foreign Tier 1 partner, is guaranteed a major share of production work while Italy, the second-largest foreign partner, has obtained the right to establish (at its own cost) a Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility which will be operated by Alenia Aermacchi, its main aerospace contractor. This, however, does not give Alenia any special privilege when it comes to bidding for production work.

None of the other partners, nor their industries, have any guarantee of winning work, because contracts will simply go to the lowest compliant bidder. This is a crucial aspect of the program that most partner governments have glossed over or ignored in their eagerness to highlight the billions of dollars of orders they will generate for their industry. The truth is far less compelling, and failure to win contracts can always be explained away as due to a company's lack of competitiveness.

2.Pay to work?

Because F-35 production contracts are awarded to the company offering the lowest price, there is an obvious incentive for these bidders to invest in the most efficient machinery and work-force to lower their production costs and thus improve their chances of winning production work.

This can lead to heavy costs and to financial imbalances, as one Australian company which went bankrupt waiting for delayed Lockheed orders found out to its expense.

Production Parts, a Melbourne Airport West company which employed 85 people, spent A$6.25 million on equipment needed to fill JSF contracts that were to be worth more than $40 million, the Canberra Times reported on Sept. 22, 2011, and was considering doubling its staff to 170 in expectation of even more production work.

However, the company went into administration on September 2, 2011 because the investment proved too heavy for the amount of F-35-related work it finally obtained, although the strength of the Australian dollar and the slow-down in defense spending also contributed, the newspaper said.
While Production Parts was a small company which might have been overly optimistic as to its financial capacities, contractual problems also affect bigger firms.

Italy's Alenia Aermacchi, for example, had invested to prepare for the production of 1,251 F-35 wing assemblies, but had only received a firm order from Lockheed Martin for 100 pre-production ship-sets. This meant is stood to lose $10 million on just this initial order, as it was unable to recoup its investment on the only contract which Lockheed was willing to guarantee.

"For this reason, the Defence Administration, as part of its industrial policy brief, intervened to ensure that Lockheed increased its commitment to a level that allowed the Italian company to obtain a necessary return on its substantial initial investment," Lt. Col. Antonio Zuliani, chief spokesman for Italy's National Armaments director, told defense-aerospace.com April 20. "This issue was finally resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both companies," he added.

Zuliani denied a report that Alenia Aermacchi was required to make a substantial cash payment to Lockheed Martin because it was unable to produce parts at the price that had been agreed originally. "No such penalty exists in the [F-35] contracts," he said.

The existence of cash penalties for non-achievement of contractual prices was also denied by Lockheed F-35 spokesman Michael J. Rein, who said in an April 19 e-mail statement said that "Lockheed Martin did not request a "penalty payment" from Alenia Aermacchi," and that none would be requested in future.

Rein added that "Lockheed Martin awards contracts on a competitive, best value basis to ensure worldwide industrial participation for the global fleet expected to be more than 3,000 aircraft. All foreign F-35 production contracts are bid in U.S. dollars. Past performance is taken into account as we prepare, develop and negotiate future contracts and re-bids."

US dollar's decline impacts competitiveness

The first contractual anomaly is that all F-35 production subcontracts are drawn up in US dollars, with no compensatory clause in case of major currency variations during the contract's duration.

Given the wild gyrations in the exchange value of the US dollar over the past decade compared to customer's currencies (Australian and Canadian dollars, Euro, UK sterling, etc.), a foreign company winning a contract in US dollars could well end up losing money if the US dollar weakens significantly. And exchange rate variations are inevitable over the F-35 program's planned 30-year life.

So, while for example a British company might win with the lowest bid when the pound sterling is weak compared to the dollar, it could well lose the work if a rising sterling made its widget more expensive than one manufactured by an American, Australian, Canadian or Danish competitor.

An example can illustrate the perverse effects of exchange rate variations.In April 2002, one US dollar was worth 1.13 euros, while last month – 10 years later – it is only worth 0.75 euros, a drop of about 34%.

So, all things being equal, a part that cost 10 euros (then worth $8.85) to make in 2002 now costs about $13.3 when converted at today's rate, which makes it all but impossible for foreign firms to remain competitive with US industry.

And, since Lockheed awards orders on "a competitive, best value basis," a company that suddenly finds that its prices are increased as the dollar's value drops stands to lose its contracts or to lose bids on new contracts.

While Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway have most energetically used the jobs/work angle to rationalize their continued commitment to the program, it is in fact for Italy that this aspect is most critical.

Running the future F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility being built at Cameri air base, near Novara, is the only military business that will support its troubled aerospace major, Alenia Aermacchi, as work on the Tornado and Typhoon programs winds down.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/135384/f_35-reality-check-part-2%3A-the-jobs-mirage-and-other-stories.html

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Lockheed says F-22 problems won't plague F-35

Jean Peladeau, QMI Agency

First posted: Friday, May 18, 2012 05:37 PM EDT | Updated: Friday, May 18, 2012 05:44 PM EDT

OTTAWA - A problem plaguing the breathing apparatus of the F-22 fighter jet should not affect pilot safety in the F-35, says Lockheed-Martin, which makes both planes.

Some U.S air force pilots are refusing to fly the F-22 Raptor saying the problem that affects the F-22 pilot oxygen generator system can cause loss of consciousness while in flight.

Subcontractor Honeywell makes the oxygen system in the F-22. It will also produce the oxygen generation system to be used in the F-35, the fighter jet that the Canadian government is considering to purchase as a replacement for the CF-18s.

"The F-35 program has leveraged the lessons learned from F-22 development to enhance the F-35 across all sub-systems," said Lockheed spokesman Joe DellaVedova.

Differences in the performance characteristics of each aircraft can affect the use of the breathing system, the U.S. Air Force says. The F-22 can fly at twice the altitude and speed of the F-35.

"The F-35 was not designed to operate at F-22 altitudes," said DellaVedova.

The problem with the F-22 oxygen system might be linked to the special attributes of the F-22 and not the system itself, says the air force.

"We're realizing that we operate (the F-22) differently than we operate any of our other fighter aircraft," said U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Janet Wolfenbarger. "We execute maneuvers that are high G and at high altitude."

Two U.S. Air Force pilots told the U.S news magazine show 60 Minutes earlier this month that the oxygen generator in F-22 fighter jets does not give them enough air during high altitude maneuvers.

The U.S. fighter pilots allege the system is not dependable and could cause a pilot to lose consciousness. This phenomenon is known as hypoxia and can be fatal.

"I am not comfortable flying the F-22 right now," U.S. Major Jeremy Gordon, who flies with the Virginia Guard, told 60 Minutes.

http://www.torontosun.com/2012/05/18/lockheed-says-f-22-problems-wont-plague-f-35

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Selex nears AESA radar delivery for Gripen

By:   Craig Hoyle Edinburgh

Selex Galileo is within weeks of delivering a new version of its Raven ES-05 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for integration with Saab's two-seat demonstrator for the next-generation Gripen E/F.

Now in the final stages of testing at the Finmeccanica company's Edinburgh site in Scotland, the sensor will be displayed along with the Gripen at July's Farnborough air show.

"We will begin developmental test flights after Farnborough," says Bob Mason, Selex Galileo's senior vice-president marketing and sales, radar and advanced targeting. The equipment will also support evaluation of the latest AESA standard by pilots from Switzerland's air force and Armasuisse procurement agency later this year. The nation is negotiating a planned 22-aircraft order for the Gripen E/F, following a selection decision taken in November 2011.

Mason says the radar developer has a strong business case linked to the Raven, as Sweden is also expected to acquire the sensor as part of future Gripen purchases or during upgrades to its in-service examples. "It will be much more substantial than the 22 aircraft for the Swiss," he adds.

Another element of the Swedish fighter's next evolution is also currently in the advanced stages of development, with the first Skyward-G infrared search and track sensor due to be delivered for testing at the end of this year or in early 2013. Selex also plans to offer pod-housed versions of the equipment for integration with additional aircraft types.

Meanwhile, work on the Euroradar Captor-E AESA for the Eurofighter Typhoon is also proceeding, with EADS company Cassidian acting as design authority for the new array.

"We are cracking on, with hardware coming together," Mason says. The first test radar should be delivered early in the second quarter of 2013, and flown by Eurofighter partner company BAE Systems on a Typhoon before the end of that year.

The design retains an upgraded processor and receiver from the mechanically-scanned Captor-M, but adds a new array and an electrically-steered repositioner which will increase the sensor's field of regard by +/-100˚.

"The gain in performance is well worth any minor degradation in mean-time between failure," Mason says. The AESA will deliver enhanced detection performance in air-to-air and air-to-ground modes, plus a synthetic aperture radar mapping function.

Mason says discussions with the four core Eurofighter partner nations are continuing, and believes that "those that have money will join the [AESA] programme in the near future". A production contract could come by mid-2013, with deliveries to commence from around 2015.

The Captor-E will be available as an option for Tranche 3A aircraft to be built for Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and as a retrofit option for their Tranche 2 aircraft, along with those of Saudi Arabia. The enhancement is also being offered to other potential export customers for the Typhoon, including Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/selex-nears-aesa-radar-delivery-for-gripen-372125/

dudge

Citaat van: Harald op 22/05/2012 | 09:33 uur
Zij investeren ook erg in hun defensie ! en dat trekt ook voor toeleveranciers voor opdrachten en de wisselwerking hiervan.
Voor wat, hoort wat. ... compensatie van gegeven opdrachten.

Tja, maar moet dat heel veel uitmaken? NL is eea toegezegd, en die toezegging moet worden nagekomen.

Citaat van: Harald op 22/05/2012 | 09:33 uur
en misschien stellen ze zich ook wat harder op, arabieren metaliteit ?
Ik denk dat Turken zelf in ieder geval niet vinden dat ze een arabieren mentaliteit hebben.

Harald

Citaat van: jurrien visser op 22/05/2012 | 09:20 uur
Je moet het de Turken nageven: dat doen ze, tot nu toe, slimmer dan de Nederlanders

Zij investeren ook erg in hun defensie ! en dat trekt ook voor toeleveranciers voor opdrachten en de wisselwerking hiervan.
Voor wat, hoort wat. ... compensatie van gegeven opdrachten.

en misschien stellen ze zich ook wat harder op, arabieren metaliteit ?

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Turkey can be as significant a production base in aeronautics as it is in automotives

Balkans Business News Correspondent - 22.05.2012

Turkey can be as significant a production base in aeronautics as it is in automotives, Turkey's Defense Industries Undersecretary Murad Bayar said yesterday, at a press conference as the Global Industrial Cooperation conference 2012 kicked off.

Touching on the benefits of Turkey's participation in Lockheed Martin's F35 Joint Strike Fighter manufacturing program, he said the industry had taken nearly $8 billion business share to date, Hurriyet Daily reports

http://www.balkans.com/open-news.php?uniquenumber=145792

Je moet het de Turken nageven: dat doen ze, tot nu toe, slimmer dan de Nederlanders