Begroting en Politieke toekomst Duitsland

[Harald]

Germany Faces Tall Task in Reversing Bundeswehr's Decline

Despite promises of support and some big-ticket equipment purchases in the pipeline, the Bundeswehr is still short of basics such as assault rifles and bandages and the €100 billion Special Fund is not enough to reverse the trend – even if it is more than what it received in past decades.

"War has returned to Europe. Germany and its allies once again confront a military threat. The international order is being attacked in Europe and around the world. We are experiencing a turning point, or Zeitenwende, as it is called in German."

So begins the new German defense policy guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2023) released by Germany's Defense Minister Boris Pistorius on November 10.

The new defense policy guidelines are the first for Germany since 2011 and follow on the country's first-ever National Security Strategy published earlier this year in June.

Together both documents build upon Chancellor Olaf Scholz's announcement on February 27, 2022, that Germany would need to undertake a massive shift in defense policy in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

During that announcement at a special session of the Bundestag (German parliament), Scholz outlined two fundamental goals crucial to the revamping of the Bundeswehr:

The elevation of annual German defense spending up to, and above, the 2 percent of GDP minimum NATO budgetary requirement

The ring-fencing and allocation of a one-off €100 billion ($108 billion) "Special Fund" (Sondervermögen) that would fall outside the core defense budget and be used to help modernize and upgrade Bundeswehr equipment.

The Special Fund required opposing political parties in the Bundestag to agree to a change in the German constitution to allow the additional debt, which – due to the amendment passed on June 3, 2022 – effectively allows Berlin's financial planners to bypass the national Schuldenbremse, or "debt brake". The debt brake is a rule that limits new federal debt to 3.5 percent of GDP unless the legislature declares there is an economic crisis, as it did from the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 through 2022.

Passage of the measure was both unprecedented and a rare moment of political agreement on a sensitive subject for a nation with an ingrained pacifist culture.

This pacifist outlook – a result of the former West Germany confronting the crimes of the former Nazi regime during the post-Second World War-era – has enabled multiple generations of German politicians to ignore the decrepit state of the Bundeswehr.

The result of this neglect emerged in early 2022, when Bundeswehr Chief, General Alfons Mais, posted on social media that the German Army was more or less depleted and that its pleas for more investment – dating back to Russia's takeover of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014 – had fallen on deaf ears.

Hence the rebuilding of the Bundeswehr presents a daunting challenge for Pistorius and his ministry.

The latest defense policy guidelines spell out laudable goals: providing for a warfighting-capable military force, reassuring its NATO allies of its ability to project a credible deterrent, and serving as the backbone in the defense of Europe.

But the journey involved in achieving those goals promises to be a long and difficult one.

Despite efforts to improve and increase Bundeswehr recruitment, the German military remains 30,000 troops short of its targeted strength (Emphasis added throughout--Ed.) of 203,000 personnel. Its reserve component – totaling around 34,000 – requires another 60,000 reservists to meet the national goal.

Ammunition stocks are so low that in the event of hostilities they would only last a few days. Ground troops rely on radio equipment that is 40 years old and analogue. German soldiers are quartered in dilapidated barracks and are left to buy their own equipment.

Transporting soldiers and equipment – crucial to rapid response in a European conflict involving a NATO partner – is limited by a legal system and its labyrinth of separate rules and permits over Germany's 16 states which render moving armored vehicles a logistical nightmare.

For Germany to bring its military up to a more competent standard, much will need to take place. Better training, recruitment, and equipping of troops; the buildup of a robust logistical tail; improvement of the serviceability rates of key platforms; and a shift in public attitude toward the military represent key requirements.

Yet nearly two years since Olaf Scholz made his pronouncement that his government would commit to fielding a stronger, technologically-advanced military there has been little in terms of progress.

While some €30 billion of the €100 billion Special Fund has been earmarked for high-end acquisitions, the delivery timeline for key procurements such as 35 F-35 combat aircraft, 60 CH-47F Block II Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, and a first batch purchase of five P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will run from 2025 through at least 2030. Meaning key future enablers – while on the way – are not arriving today.

Meanwhile, equipment capabilities transferred to Ukraine have yet to be replaced, which in turn extends the timeline for rearming the Bundeswehr.

Further, Germany's Court of Auditors noted in the fall of 2022 that the projects set forth for procurement and financed by the Special Fund exceeded the €100 billion ring-fenced for acquisition. High inflation and a stronger U.S. dollar were cited as some of the impediments at the time, as were the costs of after-purchase servicing of the expensive new equipment.

Plus, the funding is loaned to the Defense Ministry by the Ministry of Finance at a five percent lenders rate, which coupled with inflation reduced the actual purchasing power of the fund down from €100 billion to €85-€90 billion.

There are also looming questions related to the Special Fund, such as: How fast will this spending unfold, and will it be completed before the next scheduled elections of 2025 when the vagaries of politics intrude? And how efficiently will the traditionally understaffed (and inefficient) Defense Ministry's military procurement office (BAAINBw) perform during the rearmament process?

The Scholz government can promise to commit more towards the Bundeswehr and Defense Minister Pistorius can outline goals in a document, but in a country where 71 percent of voters reject Berlin's recent vow to assume a leadership role in the defense of Europe how much follow-through is to be expected through 2025 and beyond? Particularly if the Ukraine conflict is concluded through either armistice or Russia's victory or defeat?

More importantly, at a time Berlin confronts a €17 billion ($18.3 billion) deficit there are few good alternatives left for Olaf Scholz's three-party governing coalition but to make spending cuts. In a country where fiscal issues and historical concerns over hyperinflation are in the forefront of voters' minds, committing to guns over butter is a surefire political loser. And while the government has declared its intention of hitting the 2 percent of GDP target for defense spending, initial plans for 2024 indicate it will continue to fall well short – even with allocations from the Special Fund factored into the planned €52 billion ($56 billion) defense budget topline.

Right now, what the Bundeswehr has are promises of support and some big-ticket equipment purchases in the pipeline. For a military short of basics such as assault rifles and bandages this is not enough – even if it is more than what it received in past decades.

NATO allies have long lost patience with Berlin over its lack of military capability and commitment, while the German public is less than thrilled with the prospect of remilitarization in any form.

Decades of political decisions and policies have placed Berlin in its current predicament, and it will take no less than a full decade to being pulling the Bundeswehr out from its lowly position. Yet merely doing so comes with no guarantee.

A long and difficult road ahead, indeed.

https://www.defense-aerospace.com/germany-has-made-little-progress-in-reversing-bundeswehrs-decline/

[Harald]

ThyssenKrupp Restructuring Moving Forward, Plans to Spin-Off Marine Unit

After a challenging FY23, ThyssenKrupp has laid the groundwork for a transformed company in the year ahead.

For the company's 2023 fiscal year ended September 30, 2023, ThyssenKrupp's sales fell almost 9 percent to EUR37.5 billion compared to EUR41.1 billion in FY22. Net loss for the year was EUR2.0 billion compared to net income of EUR1.2 billion in the year ago period. The 2023 loss was primarily attributed to impairment losses of EUR2.1 billion at the Steel Europe unit.

For the past several years the company has been working through its various restructuring efforts. The latest of these was announced in September 2023 and will see the company reorganized around five units, Automotive Technology, Decarbon Technologies, and Materials Services segments. Steel Europe and Marine Systems will remain part of the group for the time being with the ultimate plan to spin off these operations into independent entities.

Once these efforts reach fruition, ThyssenKrupp will be focusing much of its efforts on green technologies not only through its new Decarbon unit but also throughout its remaining operations.

Through its Material Services segment, the company supplies raw materials and components to the aviation industry through ThyssenKrupp Aerospace. The unit stocks a range of materials required in aircraft manufacturing such as aluminum, titanium, steel, special alloys and aerospace plastics. It also offers processing services for the industry, providing cut-to-size, machine-ready material for manufacturers. Finally, the aerospace unit also provides logistics services including warehousing, distribution, and supply chain management.

The plan for its defense-facing business, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, is to position it as a standalone operation or combine it in an alliance to improve its competitive position. As part of an effort to strengthen its business, TKMS acquired MV Werften's Wismar shipyard from the insolvent company in mid-2022. The plan is that this yard, which used to produce cruise ships, will take on additional submarine production, possibly as early as 2024.

The firm's order book for submarines has been growing of late. While no major orders were signed in 2023, intake in previous years has provided the segment with a healthy EUR12.6 billion backlog. Included in this total is a EUR5.5 billion order from Norway and Germany for six submarines, which also included an order from the Italian submarine project. This was followed in 2022, with an EUR3 billion order from Israel for three new-design Dakar class submarines.

Despite the recent success of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, the unit's long-term prospects remain uncertain due to the fragmented nature of European warship production. This fragmentation leads to excessive competition among shipyards for a limited number of contracts.

To address this challenge, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems is pursuing a strategy that encompasses operational strengthening and potential consolidation with domestic rivals. The company has expressed interest in selling a stake in its operations, with potential buyers including Rheinmetall, German Naval Yards (GNYK), Lürssen, and Naval Group, which may occur once it is independent of ThyssenKrupp.

A key factor driving the consolidation push is ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems' 2020 loss of a €4.5 billion contract for four MKS-180 (now designated Type 126--Ed.) frigates for the German Navy to Dutch company Damen. Both the company and the German government view a merger with a domestic rival as a desirable outcome, enabling the creation of a national champion to compete against European powerhouses such as Naval Group in France and Fincantieri in Italy. This consolidation would likely find favor with Germany's strong labor unions.

Previous attempts to establish a cross-border partnership with Naval Group have faltered due to political concerns about shipyard closures and job losses. A potential solution could involve ThyssenKrupp specializing in submarine construction, while Naval Group focuses on surface combatants. However, such a deal would likely face significant labor challenges arising from the consolidation process.

https://www.defense-aerospace.com/thyssenkrupp-restructuring-moving-forward-plans-to-spin-off-marine-unit/

[Lynxian]

waarom is dit niet van meerwaarde voor de krijsmacht?

Waarom is deze bezuinigingsmaatregel wel van meerwaarde voor onze en de Duitse krijgsmacht? Zodat we nu samen een beetje hebben wat ??n land vroeger had, maar met minder budget en verlies van het kunnen voeren van een onafhankelijk nationaal buitenlandbeleid? Als ??n van de twee landen onafhankelijk van de ander wil optreden dan verliezen beiden meteen onderdelen waar ze op leunen. (En nee, het argument "NL en DUI treden toch nooit zelfstandig op" snijdt geen hout; dat komt door zwakke politici, dezelfde zwakke politici wiens bezuinigingsdrift deze noodmaatregel nodig maken in de ogen van de krijgsmachten.) Je moet te allen tijde zelfstandig kunnen optreden en alles in huis hebben. Als je dat hebt ?n vervolgens wil je nog vergaand samenwerken dan is dat prima. (Dat is natuurlijk ook hoe de NAVO vroeger werkte.) Dit is een ramp in slow-motion, ??n die nu ook nog eens extra duidelijk zichtbaar is met het Duitse beleid richting Rusland en de oorlog in Oekra?ne. De Nederlandse en Duitse regeringen staan op momenten lijnrecht tegenover elkaar. En daarmee willen we onze landmacht integreren? Gekkenwerk!

[Huzaar1]

Aangezien aan alles nu wordt gewerkt op de achtergrond is zoiets moeilijk wordt te beantwoorden. Letterlijk overal is zo veel beweging dat dit geen nee kan zijn.

[Harald]

Nee, gev ost ehdn maken een brigade niet vierkant.

Ok. Duidelijk, dus dat maakt geen verschil.

Weet jij ook of er eerdaags nog nieuws komt over gev osteuning of is dit toch lange termijn?

[Huzaar1]

Nee, gev ost ehdn maken een brigade niet vierkant.

[Harald]

Dat is nog niet bepaald zo te zien, maar op die plek in de andere eenheden zit een (volgens de NAVO symbolen) eenheid met artillerie en luchtafweer. Maar het kan ook heel goed vuursteun zijn door een groter kaliber kanon op een wiel (boxer) voertuig.

Zou in de toekomst wel een eenheid kunnen zijn met :
Boxer Skyranger SPAAG/ Luchtafweer of
Boxer 30/35mm IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) /Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV)

Beide type voertuigen/ varianten van de Boxer zullen zeer waarschijnlijk aangeschaft worden door NL

[Mourning]

Dat is nog niet bepaald zo te zien, maar op die plek in de andere eenheden zit een (volgens de NAVO symbolen) eenheid met artillerie en luchtafweer. Maar het kan ook heel goed vuursteun zijn door een groter kaliber kanon op een wiel (boxer) voertuig.

Het is i.i.g. een eenheid van bataljonsgroote. Artillerie zit er al (weer) in 13 Licht, dus dat lijkt me eigenlijk ook sterk. Wel interessant om te zien wat dit gaat worden.

Btw stond er in DN2022 ook niets over heavy infantry en dat men daar iets mee wilde gaan doen, maar het was nog niet duidelijk wat dat precies zou gaan inhouden?

[Mourning]

Navo eisen zijn 4 bataljons per brigade.

Ja, daarom ben ik wel benieuwd wat voor een bataljon dit zal worden? Gemechaniseerde infanterie met Boxers? Een tankbataljon?

[Parera]

Wat mij opvalt is dat 13 Licht er een Duits bataljon bij krijgt? Wat voor bataljon is dat? Of is dat dat stukje tekst met nog nader te bepalen?

Dat is nog niet bepaald zo te zien, maar op die plek in de andere eenheden zit een (volgens de NAVO symbolen) eenheid met artillerie en luchtafweer. Maar het kan ook heel goed vuursteun zijn door een groter kaliber kanon op een wiel (boxer) voertuig.

[Huzaar1]

Navo eisen zijn 4 bataljons per brigade.

[Mourning]

Wat mij opvalt is dat 13 Licht er een Duits bataljon bij krijgt? Wat voor bataljon is dat? Of is dat dat stukje tekst met nog nader te bepalen?

[Parera]

Ik ben niet helemaal thuis in de NAVO symbolen maar als ik het zo snel doorlees lijkt het er op dat onze KL straks van elke Duitse categorie een brigade heeft/krijgt:
- 11 LMB = licht
- 13 = medium wiel
- 43 = zwaar rups

Wat voornamelijk opvalt is de kop onder 11 LMB dat daar staat '' onder voorbehoud van verdere besluiten'' terwijl 11 lmb al veel langer samen gevoegd is met de Duitsers dan 13 medium.
Zijn er plannen om de organisatie 11 LMB aan te passen? Wat me daarnaast opvalt aan de symbolen is dat (volgens mij) de 11 LMB luchtmobiel zijn terwijl de Duitse eenheden omschreven staan als ''airborne''.

Zo te zien zit de grootste wijziging binnen 11 LMB en daarna in 13 medium (nu 13 licht).

[MartijnR]

Nederland erbij getekent alsof het een pak pasta is dat je in je winkelkarretje flikkert, bah! Des te sneller deze hele integratie-onzin wordt gestopt des te beter.

waarom is dit niet van meerwaarde voor de krijsmacht?

[Lynxian]

Nederland erbij getekent alsof het een pak pasta is dat je in je winkelkarretje flikkert, bah! Des te sneller deze hele integratie-onzin wordt gestopt des te beter.