Internationale pantservoertuigen APC IFV ontwikkelingen

[pz]

Vraag, was de Centurion dan ook een ramp?

Israel had deze ook in de jaren 70 en vocht ermee. Nederland had ook de Centurion....

[Huzaar1]

Het is een kwestie van willen, niet van kunnen! Video: BAE Systems displays next-gen tank concept! https://www.defensenews.com/video/2019/03/28/bae-systems-displays-next-gen-tank-concept/

GB heeft nooit een fatsoenlijke tank geproduceerd als je dit afzet tegenover de standaard, de Duitsers. Of voor WO2, de Amerikanen. Dat is de hele reden dat de Sherman de Westerse markt overspoelde. Nee, BAE kan niet doen wat ze willen, er gaan enorm complexe technologien, procedures en capaciteiten schuil achter elke sector. Dit ongefundeerde geblér slaat nergens op en voegt nada toe. Ook voor kernonderzeeërs koopt BAE buiten de deur.

[Kornet43]

Het is een kwestie van willen, niet van kunnen! Video: BAE Systems displays next-gen tank concept! https://www.defensenews.com/video/2019/03/28/bae-systems-displays-next-gen-tank-concept/

[Huzaar1]

Dat men in de UK genoeg kennis heeft om te produceren wat de regering ook maar wenst! Een bedrijf dat vliegkampschepen en nucleaire subs produceert kan ook tanks produceren!

Nee, dat kan niet. Je legt nu allerlei ongefundeerde verbanden.

[Kornet43]

Dat men in de UK genoeg kennis heeft om te produceren wat de regering ook maar wenst! Een bedrijf dat vliegkampschepen en nucleaire subs produceert kan ook tanks produceren!

[Huzaar1]

Maar BAE Systems Plc. is nog steeds een Britse CORPORATION met 18,3 miljard Pond omzet!

wat wil je daarmee zeggen?

[Kornet43]

Maar BAE Systems Plc. is nog steeds een Britse CORPORATION met 18,3 miljard Pond omzet!

[Sparkplug]

Is dat nu geen BAE Systems  Land?

https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/challenger-2

Dat klopt. In BAE Systems Land zijn bedrijven als Alvis, Vickers en het Zweedse Hagglunds opgegaan.

[Huzaar1]

The Ajax programme (£5.3 billion), designed to replace the Army's armoured reconnaissance vehicles. In May 2020 it emerged that the delivery of the first batch of Ajax vehicles was to be delayed as they were found not to be ready to be accepted into service. The Army expects to procure some 600 of these vehicles by the mid-2020s.

The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (£800 million) has been running since 2011 but, despite having spent over 50% of the allocated budget, has yet to place a manufacturing contract. The programme has experienced significant technical problems, with a current in-service date of 2024 (originally planned for 2017);


The Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme (budget to be determined) aims to extend the tank's service life until 2035. This programme has been revised to increase its scope, including upgrades to improve its lethality and survivability in the face of emerging peer threats;

The Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (£2.8 billion) is a programme to introduce a new high-mobility medium-weight infantry vehicle in the form of the Boxer eight-wheeled vehicle. This will replace the aged FV430 fleet of vehicles and is key to delivery of the Army's Strike Brigade concept; and,
Multi Role Vehicle- Protected (budget to be determined) is a UK requirement to replace the Landrover and existing protected vehicle fleets with a common platform. This programme is currently on hold, partly as a result of the US Army's review of the requirements for its Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programme which is expected to inform the UK's decision on which vehicle to procure.
Individually each of these programmes is important as collectively they represent the replacement or enhancement of the majority of the Army's fighting vehicles. They also contribute to the fulfilment of the Army's current vision for its future and the ability to deploy an armoured division as part of the MOD's Joint Force 2025 objective and represent a significant overall investment in the Army's equipment plan. The Committee has previously noted that any repeat of past failures will "seriously impair, if not fatally undermine" the Army's ability to deploy the warfighting division as envisaged in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Army's new Strike Brigades.

Questions to be addressed by the inquiry

Does the Army have a clear understanding of how it will employ its armoured vehicles in future operations?
Given the delays to its programmes, will the Army be able to field the Strike Brigades and an armoured division as envisaged by the 2015 SDSR?

How much has the Army spent on procuring armoured vehicles over the last 20 years? How many vehicles has it procured with this funding?
What other capabilities has the Army sacrificed in order to fund overruns in its core armoured vehicles programmes?

How flexible can the Army be in adapting its current armoured vehicle plans to the results of the Integrated Review?
By 2025 will the Army be able to match the potential threat posed by peer adversaries?
Is the Army still confident that the Warrior CSP can deliver an effective vehicle capability for the foreseeable future?

To what extent does poor contractor performance explain the delays to the Warrior and Ajax programmes?

Should the UK have a land vehicles industrial strategy, and if so what benefits would this bring?
What sovereign capability for the design and production of armoured vehicles does the UK retain?
Does it make sense to upgrade the Challenger 2 when newer, more capable vehicles may be available from our NATO allies?

What other key gaps are emerging within the Army's armoured vehicle capability?

Has the Army learned from previous failures such as FRES to ensure new vehicles are acquired effectively?

The deadline for written submissions is 5pm on Friday 4 September 2020.

Projecten Waar ze mee bezig zijn en de vragen die eraan ten grondslag liggen ter discussie van de materieelproducten. Hele goede vragen die net als hier worden beantwoord met nonsens antwoorden.  De UK is al heel lang 'ziek'. Alles wat ze militair hebben ontworpen heeft nooit echt de gewenste kwaliteit gehad. Project management zijn ze nog slechter in. Vooral bizar hoe het warrior programma in elkaar stak. 50% van het budget uitgegegeven (miljard euro) en nog niet eens begonnen aan hrt produceren van de mods..laat staan het uitkiezen van een producent.

Dat ligt dan aan het project en ik denk nog mwer aan de opdrachtgevers en de te onderzoeken hoofd en deelvragen die de basis en kaders vormen voor een dergelijke upgrade.

[Ace1]

De Challengers werden gebouwd bij Leeds en Newcastle, door Vickers... bestaat niet meer.

Is dat nu geen BAE Systems  Land?

https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/challenger-2

[Huzaar1]

Je ziet dat hun politieke keuzes niet overeenkomen met hun strategisch beleid.

De brexit is rampzalig voor hun strategische positie in in licht van productie en kennis autonomie.

[ARM-WAP]

Progress in delivering the British Army's armoured vehicle capability
https://committees.parliament.uk/call-for-evidence/205/progress-in-delivering-the-british-armys-armoured-vehicle-capability/
...
Questions to be addressed by the inquiry

Does the Army have a clear understanding of how it will employ its armoured vehicles in future operations?
Given the delays to its programmes, will the Army be able to field the Strike Brigades and an armoured division as envisaged by the 2015 SDSR?
How much has the Army spent on procuring armoured vehicles over the last 20 years? How many vehicles has it procured with this funding?
What other capabilities has the Army sacrificed in order to fund overruns in its core armoured vehicles programmes?
How flexible can the Army be in adapting its current armoured vehicle plans to the results of the Integrated Review?
By 2025 will the Army be able to match the potential threat posed by peer adversaries?
Is the Army still confident that the Warrior CSP can deliver an effective vehicle capability for the foreseeable future?
To what extent does poor contractor performance explain the delays to the Warrior and Ajax programmes?
Should the UK have a land vehicles industrial strategy, and if so what benefits would this bring?
What sovereign capability for the design and production of armoured vehicles does the UK retain?
Does it make sense to upgrade the Challenger 2 when newer, more capable vehicles may be available from our NATO allies?
What other key gaps are emerging within the Army's armoured vehicle capability?
Has the Army learned from previous failures such as FRES to ensure new vehicles are acquired effectively?
The deadline for written submissions is 5pm on Friday 4 September 2020.

Deze vragen zijn interessatn en de antwoorden zullen nog interessanter zijn... maar de politiek heeft een enorme verantwoordelijkheid in wat misloopt/misgelopen is gedurende de voorbije decennia. De geldkraan toedraaien en tegelijkertijd eisen dat inzetmogelijkheden dezelfde blijven...
Deelnames aan operaties zoals de beide oorlogen in Koeweit en Irak mogen ze ondertussen wel vergeten. Het materiaal is er nauwelijks nog en ze hebben ook een personeelsprobleem.

Een "in house design and production"-capaciteit zoals de Britten hadden tijdens de Koude Oorlog zijn ze ondertussen aan het verliezen.
En het heropstarten kost enorm veel: dat hebben de Astute-SSN's aangetoont in Barrow-in-Furness.
De Challengers werden gebouwd bij Leeds en Newcastle, door Vickers... bestaat niet meer.

[pz]

Call for evidence

Progress in delivering the British Army's armoured vehicle capability

https://committees.parliament.uk/call-for-evidence/205/progress-in-delivering-the-british-armys-armoured-vehicle-capability/

ontext

The British Army's current fleet of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) is characterised by increasing age and creeping obsolescence. Vehicles such as the FV430 series armoured personnel carrier have been in service since the 1960s (albeit with a number of life extension upgrades). On a recent visit by the Committee, Army personnel from all ranks expressed concerns about the age of the armoured vehicle fleet. The main armoured infantry vehicle (Warrior) was introduced in the late 1980s, while the Army's main battle tank (the Challenger 2) has been in service for around 20 years and has yet to receive any significant capability upgrades, leaving it outmatched by potential adversaries such as the Russian 'Armata' tank. The Army faces a challenge in determining the shape of its armoured forces, whether they should be configured to deploy heavy forces against peer adversaries in Europe, or medium-weight forces which are capable of expeditionary operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last two decades.

The Army also needs to procure lightly armoured vehicles (the Multi-Role Vehicle Protected - MRVP) to replace light vehicles which were proven to be lethally inadequate in Afghanistan and to consider the replacement of the AS-90 self-propelled gun. With the exception of protected vehicles required for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan[1] and a small number of specialist engineering vehicles the Army has not received a new armoured vehicle since the turn of the century.

[1] Over £3 billion was spent on these vehicles via the Urgent Operational Requirements process. The majority are now being disposed of via the Land Environment Fleet Optimisation Plan.

To address these issues, the Ministry of Defence has in place a series of programmes which have encountered a number of difficulties:

The Ajax programme (£5.3 billion), designed to replace the Army's armoured reconnaissance vehicles. In May 2020 it emerged that the delivery of the first batch of Ajax vehicles was to be delayed as they were found not to be ready to be accepted into service. The Army expects to procure some 600 of these vehicles by the mid-2020s.
The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (£800 million) has been running since 2011 but, despite having spent over 50% of the allocated budget, has yet to place a manufacturing contract. The programme has experienced significant technical problems, with a current in-service date of 2024 (originally planned for 2017);
The Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme (budget to be determined) aims to extend the tank's service life until 2035. This programme has been revised to increase its scope, including upgrades to improve its lethality and survivability in the face of emerging peer threats;
The Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (£2.8 billion) is a programme to introduce a new high-mobility medium-weight infantry vehicle in the form of the Boxer eight-wheeled vehicle. This will replace the aged FV430 fleet of vehicles and is key to delivery of the Army's Strike Brigade concept; and,
Multi Role Vehicle- Protected (budget to be determined) is a UK requirement to replace the Landrover and existing protected vehicle fleets with a common platform. This programme is currently on hold, partly as a result of the US Army's review of the requirements for its Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programme which is expected to inform the UK's decision on which vehicle to procure.
Individually each of these programmes is important as collectively they represent the replacement or enhancement of the majority of the Army's fighting vehicles. They also contribute to the fulfilment of the Army's current vision for its future and the ability to deploy an armoured division as part of the MOD's Joint Force 2025 objective and represent a significant overall investment in the Army's equipment plan. The Committee has previously noted that any repeat of past failures will "seriously impair, if not fatally undermine" the Army's ability to deploy the warfighting division as envisaged in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Army's new Strike Brigades.

Questions to be addressed by the inquiry

Does the Army have a clear understanding of how it will employ its armoured vehicles in future operations?
Given the delays to its programmes, will the Army be able to field the Strike Brigades and an armoured division as envisaged by the 2015 SDSR?
How much has the Army spent on procuring armoured vehicles over the last 20 years? How many vehicles has it procured with this funding?
What other capabilities has the Army sacrificed in order to fund overruns in its core armoured vehicles programmes?
How flexible can the Army be in adapting its current armoured vehicle plans to the results of the Integrated Review?
By 2025 will the Army be able to match the potential threat posed by peer adversaries?
Is the Army still confident that the Warrior CSP can deliver an effective vehicle capability for the foreseeable future?
To what extent does poor contractor performance explain the delays to the Warrior and Ajax programmes?
Should the UK have a land vehicles industrial strategy, and if so what benefits would this bring?
What sovereign capability for the design and production of armoured vehicles does the UK retain?
Does it make sense to upgrade the Challenger 2 when newer, more capable vehicles may be available from our NATO allies?
What other key gaps are emerging within the Army's armoured vehicle capability?
Has the Army learned from previous failures such as FRES to ensure new vehicles are acquired effectively?
The deadline for written submissions is 5pm on Friday 4 September 2020.

[Huzaar1]

de onzinnige voertuiglijstjes, die niets zeggen want je kunt er geen bedrag aan kopen.
Toen wij de YPR kozen, en de Belgen een vergelijkbaar apparaat, kochten zij stuks met torsiestaven van saté prikkers en een vrachtwagen motor, wij niet.
Dit heeft al enorm veel invloed op stuksprijzen, dat zie je alleen nergens in het lijstje terug.
Hetzelfde geldt voor tegenorders, politieke context of opleiding en reserveonderdelen. De CV90 is een per subsysteem vastgesteld voertuig, daar betaalde NL per CV90 4,2 miljoen euro.
Kost een CV90 dan 4,2 miljoen euro? Nee, de Nederlandse die iets hoger, iets kleiner, iets lager, en weet ik wat moest zijn.

Nu krijgen de CV90's ATGM's en ander dit en dat en is de draad totaal kwijt, ontwikkelkosten en aanschafkosten zie je er niet zo snel in terug.
Het is dus nutteloos om lijstjes te maken. En het laatste wat me een verstandig plan lijkt is wielvoertuigen van Frankrijk kopen.

[Harald]

Volgens mij hebben de CV90 rond de 5 miljoen per stuk gekost

Ik zit 10x liever in de Cv90-35mm dan in een Jaguar ...