ThyssenKrupp Marine ,Sign Canadian Joint Support Ship Design Study Contract

Gestart door andré herc, 09/03/2012 | 19:43 uur

Harald

Citaat van: jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter) op 08/12/2015 | 12:09 uur
Ze hadden beter en goedkoper bij Damen 2-3 x een JSS kunnen bestellen, maar helaas: gepasseerd station.
idd, was een veel betere optie geweest.

tot 2018 leasen ze een AOR, daarna krijgen ze een omgebouwd containerschip en in 2020 pas hun oorspronkelijk bedoelde AOR's, JSS.

Maar goed NL, heeft met 1 JSS ook geen luxe als bevoorradingschip.

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Mourning op 08/12/2015 | 12:13 uur
Ik snap niet dat ze niet bijv. met de USN iets van een deal hebben kunnen sluiten... over geld weggooien gesproken...


Idd.... ze hadden destijds nog beter voor een appel en een ei onze oude Zuiderkris kunnen over nemen, die had het nog wel een paar jaar gered.

Mourning

Ik snap niet dat ze niet bijv. met de USN iets van een deal hebben kunnen sluiten... over geld weggooien gesproken...
"The only thing necessary for Evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing"- Edmund Burke
"War is the continuation of politics by all other means", Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege/On War (1830).

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Harald op 08/12/2015 | 12:01 uur
Wat een visie/planning !  ... daar in Canada.
Nu komt er een interim AOR (verbouwd containerschip), welke hopelijk klaar is in 2017 en de echte JSS-schepen moeten nog gebouwd worden komen pas in 2020/2021.  De kiel is nog niet eens gelegd voor het eerste schip.

Ze hadden beter en goedkoper bij Damen 2-3 x een JSS kunnen bestellen, maar helaas: gepasseerd station.

Harald

Citaat van: Mourning op 08/12/2015 | 11:57 uur
LOLLLLL.....

Wat een visie/planning !  ... daar in Canada.
Nu komt er een interim AOR (verbouwd containerschip), welke hopelijk klaar is in 2017 en de echte JSS-schepen moeten nog gebouwd worden komen pas in 2020/2021.  De kiel is nog niet eens gelegd voor het eerste schip.

Mourning

"The only thing necessary for Evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing"- Edmund Burke
"War is the continuation of politics by all other means", Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege/On War (1830).


Harald

A stop-gap mindset is sinking Navy's procurement plans

Many Canadians know Asterix as a pint-size comic book warrior with a fondness for wild boar and thumping Roman soldiers. The MV Asterix, on the other hand, is a hulking German-built container ship.

Now Asterix, the ship, is about to get an important new mission: keeping the Royal Canadian Navy afloat. The Liberal government confirmed last week that it would proceed with a sole-source contract with Quebec City's Davie shipyard to convert the MV Asterix into a navy supply vessel by 2017 – a controversial deal signed by the Conservatives days before this summer's election call.

The ship conversion, dubbed Project Resolve, is an acknowledged stop-gap measure – a temporary half solution to the government's failure to provide timely replacements for its two 1960s-vintage supply ships that were removed from service last year. One of those, the HMCS Protecteur, caught fire during exercises in the Pacific Ocean in early 2014 and was rescued off Hawaii by the U.S. Navy.

Since then, the Canadian navy has endured the indignity of relying on foreign supply vessels to keep its fleet of frigates at sea, limiting what the ships can do both at home and on international missions.

Leasing the converted MV Asterix, at a cost of up to $587-million, is "the most viable course of action" to fuel and support Canada's fleet of 12 frigates and other vessels, the government said in a statement. The Liberals had initially put the deal on hold, concerned the contract was granted without competitive bids. But cancelling the deal would have cost nearly $90-million.

It is the latest chapter in the sad saga of delays, cost overruns, pork-barrel politics and bailouts that have marked too many big military purchases in Canada.

It's not as if no one saw this coming. Former prime minister Paul Martin ordered that the vital ships be replaced more than a decade ago. The Conservatives announced a plan to replace the ships in 2006, only to halt the project when bids came in significantly above budget.

The Conservative government had chosen Seaspan ULC in Vancouver to eventually build two permanent support ships, at a cost of roughly $2.6-billion. Construction still hasn't begun, and as the months go by, the cost of the ships could grow.

Delivery of the vessels is now not slated until 2020 and late 2021, respectively, or at least 15 years after the government first said it needed new ones.

That's like waiting years after the last shingle on your leaky house has shrivelled up and blown away before ordering a new roof.

It wouldn't be such a tragedy if the pattern was restricted to the supply ship replacement project. But it's become the M.O. for too many major military procurement programs in Canada, under successive Liberal and Conservative governments.

The new supply ships are part of a massive $34-billion rebuild of the navy and coast guard, announced by the Conservatives in 2011. It too is moving ahead at the speed of a dingy. Already, the navy is warning that the cost of the various purchases could swell to more than $40-billion.

Big-ticket purchases of search-and-rescue aircraft, next-generation fighter jets, Arctic patrol ships, a major icebreaker and maritime helicopters have also been hit by delays and soaring costs.

Military experts blame the current ship problems on Ottawa trying to do too much, all at once, after years of neglect. The result is that the government had little experience across various ministries in the complex business of planning, designing and acquiring modern military hardware.

At the same time, the capacity of domestic shipyards and other military suppliers to deliver also dwindled during the lean years. They have had to ramp up capacity and expertise.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/how-a-stop-gap-mindset-sinks-the-canadian-navys-procurement-plans/article27627088/

Harald

Canada turns to Asterix for stop gap at-sea support    ( .. MV Asterix wordt als tussenoplossing verbouwd tot AOR ... wat een verbouwing !  )

Key Points
•Commercial container ship MV Asterix to be converted into the RCN's interim AOR by Chantier Davie
•The German-built vessel is expected to arrive from Singapore in early October for conversion at a cost of CAD250-300 million

Two shipyards in eastern Canada are preparing to convert a commercially operated container ship into an auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessel for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), as the service seeks to fill a gap in its at-sea logistic capability.

The 183 m-long, 23,800 dwt MV Asterix will be transformed into an 'interim AOR' at the Chantier Davie yard in Lévis, Quebec, and the Aecon fabrication facility in Pictou, Nova Scotia. This will fulfil an urgent operational requirement for underway replenishment supply pending the entry into service of two purpose-built vessels under the Joint Support Ship (JSS) programme.

The navy's legacy AORs, HMCS Preserver and HMCS Protecteur , were retired early in 2014. With the two Queenston-class JSSs not expected to enter service until late 2020 and 2021, the government announced on 1 August 2015 that it had signed a letter of intent with Davie for the provision of a stop gap capability for up to five years.

Built in Germany in 2010, Asterix was acquired by Davie from Greek company Capital Ship Management for CAD20 million (USD15 million) and will be converted at a cost of CAD250-300 million (USD190-228 million), according to Canadian media reports.

The rebuilt vessel - with a civilian crew and a Davie-led technical management package - will be chartered to the RCN by a holding company called Project Resolve at an annual cost of up to CAD75 million, the reports said.

Asterix sailed from Singapore on 11 September and is expected to arrive at Aecon's Pictou shipyard on 6 October for initial conversion work, before moving to Lévis in the second quarter of 2016.

http://www.janes.com/article/55006/canada-turns-to-asterix-for-stop-gap-at-sea-support

huidige MV Asterix (containerschip) :



Na verbouwing :



Zeewier

Heb het gevoel dat in de Canadese tender een zwaartepunt ligt op wie bereid is de werven te renoveren en open te houden. Ze kopen niet enkel schepen, ze kopen scheepswerfrenovatie in. Vrij grote werven met personeel waar ThyssenKrupp en Navantia later ook wat mee moeten. Zo'n soort risico moet een kleinere scheepsbouwer niet nemen wanneer ze die capaciteit voor grote schepen al in bezit heeft.

De JSS was inderdaad voldoende voor wat ze nodig hadden, tegen een naar nu blijkt redelijke prijs bij een serie van 3.

In Australië speelt een exact zo'n zelfde situatie. Het gaat heel slecht met hun Australische scheepsbouwindustrie en dus willen ze vooral een gezond consortium dat daar meer wilt bouwen, hun personeel aan het werk houdt en lucratieve scheepsorders binnensleept. Echter alles wat daar te water wordt gelaten is ver boven begroot budget gerealiseerd. Met bijbehorende negatieve politieke- en media-aandacht. En wij zitten echt niet op heroplevende concurrentie te wachten. Nieuwe generatie ANZAC fregatten tegen een goede prijs/kwaliteit bouwen voor het economisch kleinere Nieuw-Zeeland, daar heb je geen Australische werf voor/bij nodig. Sowieso is wat Australië wilt opleveren in project SEA 5000 niet te betalen voor Nieuw-Zeeland.

Harald

Canada's Navy In Talks To Rent Spanish Replenishment Ship     ( Canada had beter mee kunnen liften met het JSS ontwerp van Damen )

VICTORIA, British Columbia and MADRID — Spain and Canada are negotiating a mutual logistic arrangement (MLSA) to deploy a Spanish replenishment ship with the Canadian fleet in the North Atlantic, both navies confirmed. 

The ship deployed "during some periods of 2016" could be the auxiliary oiler and replenishment ship (AOR) Cantabria or Patiño, Spanish Navy sources said. The  logistic arrangement is "to cover the Canadian navy's temporary need of logistic support vessels."

..../....

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/navy/2015/10/15/canadas-navy-talks-rent-spanish-replenishment-ship/74005714/

Zeewier

Election 2015: The RCN needs attention*

http://www.vanguardcanada.com/2015/08/11/election-2015-make-rcn-policy-a-priority/

*Resumerend: Conservatives steunen de vliegtuigindustrie (F-35) en de Democrats de scheepsbouw (JSS & opvolging Iroquois-klasse).

Zeewier

Veel bevestiging van wat we al dachten, echter als Vanguard het schrijft ligt het waarheidsgehalte een stuk hoger. Één aanpassing van mij in de tekst.  :P

The RCN's Joint Support Ship disaster

Henning Jacobsen   Aug 12 2015
In late May, the Royal Canadian Navy paid off HMCS Protecteur, last of two remaining support ships. Built in the 1960s, the Protecteur-class was expected to be replaced by 2012. At present, the government is working with Seaspan Shipyards to begin construction on two Joint Support Ships, to be known as the Queenston class. In the interim, however, it may have to consider a commercial alternative to bridge the gap between now and when new ships enter service in 2020. Henning Jacobsen served as a consultant on the initial Joint Support Ship Program that was cancelled in 2008. He argues the program to deliver a new support ship should never have reached this point.
The Royal Canadian Navy entered the 21st century with three underway-replenishment vessels. Today, the service has none. How did we reach this unfortunate state? The history of the Joint Support Ship (JSS) replacement program is littered with missteps and might be instructive as a lesson for the future.

On 16 April 2004, then Prime Minister Paul Martin announced plans to procure three new support ships to replace the Protecteur-class of underway-replenishment vessels. This new class of ships, in addition to supporting naval operations, would perform sealift and be able to transport an army battle group – a capability Canada's navy has lacked since the departure of the light carrier HMCS Bonaventure in 1970. The new ships would also have reinforced hulls enabling support of the soon to be developed Arctic Ocean Patrol Ships (AOPS) to facilitate operations in the Arctic Ocean. The requirement for three JSS was re-affirmed in June 2006 by the newly elected Conservative government, which summarily issued a request for proposals for a funded project definition phase.
As one of the largest navy shipbuilding contracts in the past 20 years, the RFP attracted four syndicates vying for two contracts. The two down-selected consortia were ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Canada (TKMSC), and SNC-Lavalin (SNC); the unsuccessful bidders were Irving Shipbuilding and BAE Systems. TKMSC and SNC prepared and then submitted their respective project definition proposals in March 2008. The government announced that one bidder would be awarded the project implementation contract later that year and the first 28,000-tonne vessels would be delivered in 2012.

Murphy's Law
The two teams were well qualified, though not without their deficiencies. SNC Lavalin, a large engineering firm, had vast expertise in project management. Though it had no experience with naval shipbuilding, it partnered with Washington Group's Vancouver Shipyard (today known as Seaspan) and ProFac, an in-service support provider with a sound track record on previous Canadian maritime programs. Vancouver Shipyards was in turned assisted by a U.S. marine architect during the design phase.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems of Germany, an international naval designer and shipbuilder perhaps best known for its MEKO-class of surface combatants, built in shipyards throughout the world, often in counties with little shipbuilding experience. In Canada, it partnered with PKS Kiewit of Newfoundland, a shipyard better known for building oil rigs. At the time, more suitable partners such as Davie Shipbuilding were in bankruptcy and Irving Shipbuilding was involved in repair and overhaul of the current fleet of Canadian frigates. Though Kiewit had no naval shipbuilding experience or a suitable facility, this did not appear a problem for TKMS, which had extensive experience in providing management to shipyards in less developed countries – after 20 years without a naval building program, Canada fit this category.

The straightforward project for three underway replenishment vessels had grown into a more ambitious project. Throughout 2007 major increases in requirements emerged and the basic replenishment ship morphed into a support and troop carrier, with roll-on, roll-off capability for some 100 vehicles and 500-600 soldiers, and a command center for directing operations ashore. National Defence's (DND) ambitions quickly outstripped the cost. The initial budget of $2.9 billion, which included a 10-year in-service support contract, was never realistic for the evolving design. Yet, to be compliant, both teams were compelled to accommodate the growing wish list.
TKMSC responded by adding Flensburger Shipbuilders, a leading designer and builder of roll-on, roll-off car ferries, as a design partner. In recognition of a potential budget shortfall, Flensburger prepared their own cost analysis and concluded that the price could be met if the department would accept three ships built to a commercial standard. DND refused to budge, suggesting that TKMSC was overstating costs. The department advised both TKMSC and SNC that Canada would not accept any cost increases for the design as it was proposed. As a result, an alternative proposal based on Flensburger's commercial design was never offered.
In early 2007, TKMSC made a presentation to the JSS Program Office, demonstrating the difficulty in meeting the project implementation price, informing DND that the baseline budget for the program was six years out of date – in the intervening years steel prices had increased by nearly 100 percent; copper by 400 percent; and engines costs had doubled. In addition, engine delivery schedules had increased by a full year over the schedule prepared by DND in 2002.
But TKMSC's appeal was to no avail – DND did not adjust the budget or the schedule.
By May, TKMS DE had performed a bid evaluation that resulted in a no-bid decision. But believing that Canada would either reduce the number of ships or down-scope the design requirements, senior management in the parent company gave its subsidiary approval to go ahead with a bid.

During the final DND program review in June, TKMSC again repeated its concerns about the unrealistic overall budget. It is my belief, however, that DND opted to proceed after being emphatically assured by the SNC program manager that their team could deliver the JSS at the budgeted price. It appeared to have been a spur of the moment decision by the project manager, possibly in order to gain favour with the department.
At this stage, however, Murphy's Law took over. In February 2008, just before the proposal deadline, Vancouver Shipyards withdrew from the SNC team and the competition. The reason was reported to be schedule risks and inability to meet the budget price. It was also reported that the yard did not have a suitable facility unless the government floating dock was made available, which would have meant repair and maintenance on other naval vessels would not have been possible for the duration of the JSS program.
At about the same time, ironically, TKMSC received confirmation that Kiewit was withdrawing after revealing the true cost to modify their yard to meet the requisite naval standards. I was never told exactly how much the yard conversion was going to cost, but one could surmise that it was in the range of $500 to $600 million. Kiewit was a division of an American firm and the parent company was adamant that the yard conversion be included in the price of the program, not as a partial investment by Kiewit. It also appeared that both shipyards were facing manpower shortages and cost issues.

As a result, by March 2008 both primes found themselves without shipyard partners. SNC rushed to confirm a partnership with Davie Shipbuilding, which was now under Norwegian ownership, but in subsequent meetings with Davie management it was learned that the commitment was nonexclusive. In fact, Davie was positioning itself to be available to whoever got the JSS contract.
For reasons that were never shared with me, TKMS Germany decided to stand by its initial partner, Kiewit, and proceed by including the high capital cost in its bid. (This was apparently supported by advice from TKMSC's Canadian partners and consultants stating that Canada would in the end find the extra money). I suspect TKMSC felt that changing horses at such a late juncture would eventually cause a credibility problem.
When SNC and TKMSC submitted their project definition proposals, their bids were reported to be $700 to $800 million over budget. Consequently, the JSS program was cancelled and the government launched a study that led to the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, the outcome of which has been the selection of shipyards on the East and West coasts to build combatant vessels non-combatant vessels, respectively.

Conclusion
The political imperative in Canada is to have a stable shipbuilding pork barrel industry, one that can also serve the country's maritime defence needs in the future. It is a noteworthy objective. But how to get there is more complicated than having the political will to dole out sole source contracts.
In the first round of the joint support ship program, TKMSC had the full support of its globally experienced parent company; Vancouver Shipyards, an all Canadian yard, had assistance from some of the best U.S. naval architects to develop its proposal based on a realistic understanding of costs. Neither bidder had all the capabilities to be prime on such an ambitious multi-shipbuilding project, yet even with highly capable support both bids greatly exceeded the $2.9 billion budget.
Crucially, the backing experience to both teams, especially TKMS, meant there was a certain amount of "safety" to both bids – a large parent company that DND could "lean-on" to ensure a successful outcome. This may not be the case with the current reissued program.

http://www.vanguardcanada.com/2015/08/12/the-joint-support-ship-debacle/

andré herc

Navy News - Names chosen for the Royal Canadian Navy's new Joint Support Ships
Minister of National Defence Rob Nicholson announces the names of the new Joint Support Ships to be built by Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd.
October 25, 2013
Names have been chosen for the Royal Canadian Navy's two new Joint Support Ships (JSS), which will be built by Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. in North Vancouver, B.C.
The ships will be named Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) Queenston and HMCS Chateauguay in recognition of the significant battles of Queenston Heights and Chateauguay during the War of 1812.
The announcement was made by the Honourable Rob Nicholson, P.C., Q.C., Member of Parliament for Niagara Falls and Minister of National Defence, during a ceremony in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ont., October 25.
"The names recognize the achievements and sacrifices of those early Canadian soldiers who fought and died in these critical battles during the War of 1812," said Minister Nicholson. "The War of 1812 was a defining moment in our nation's history that contributed to shaping our identity as Canadians and ultimately our existence as a country."
"Canada's rich military history is a source of inspiration for the men and women who currently serve in the Royal Canadian Navy," said Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, Commander Royal Canadian Navy. "The events surrounding the War of 1812 remind us of the sacrifices of soldiers and sailors who fought for their country during a pivotal moment in Canadian history."
Traditionally, the name of a class of warship is derived from the name of the first vessel in this class to be constructed. HMCS Queenston will be built first, therefore, the two JSS will be known as the Queenston-class.
These ships will provide underway replenishment capability for fuel and other supplies, and offer hospital facilities and strategic sealift for operations ashore. They will ensure that the military can continue to monitor and defend Canadian waters and make significant contributions to international naval operations. The JSS will provide Canada with a modern, task-tailored, globally deployable support capability for naval task groups for extended periods.

http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=names-chosen-for-the-royal-canadian-navy-s-new-joint-support-ships/hnbfat21
Den Haag stop met afbreken van NL Defensie, en investeer in een eigen C-17.

dudge

Citaat van: Elzenga op 19/10/2013 | 10:44 uur
dat ze bepaalde kennis en kunde verliezen..

http://rt.com/business/russia-arctic-development-program-400/

Ik vraag me af of deze kennis en kunde zoveel waard is. Temeer omdat na het verkrijgen het instandhouden van de kennis en vaardigheden ook veel geld gaat kosten. We zouden in Nederland ook weer een bedrijf op kunnen zetten dat Onderzeeers bouwt, maar dat kost bergen geld, en vervolgens gaat het waarschijnlijk failliet door gebrek aan orders.

De baten die deze kosten opleveren zijn m.i. betwistbaar. Reparatie en ontwikkelingsfaciliteiten zijn waardevoller, omdat die het voortzettingsvermogen ondersteunen. Nu ervaring opdoen zodat over 40 jaar weer 2 schepen gekocht kunnen worden, denk het niet. Niet te vergeten dat gat van 2 jaar of meer dat dan valt, wat een groter strategisch risico is dan het niet zelf kunnen bouwen.

Dat miljard dat overblijft kan voor andere zaken worden uitgegeven, MPA's bijvoorbeeld, of Drones, of wat dan ook.