US Combat Ship Decision Coming in 'Very Near Future'

Gestart door jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter), 09/11/2014 | 10:32 uur

dudge

Citaat van: jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter) op 11/01/2016 | 11:12 uur
Ze kunnen m.i. beter een "mini" Burke klasse ontwikkelen of een volledig nieuw specifiek FF ontwerp al kost dat ongetwijfeld kostbare tijd in een steeds meer (onverantwoord) krimpende USN.

Ik denk niet dat een Burke schaalbaar is. Daarbij vraag ik me af of je dat moet willen, de eerste werd ook 30 jaar geleden getekend, en nu zal er flink aan verbeterd zijn, maar vraag me af of het niet toch een verouderd ontwerp blijft.

Daarbij, die tijd hebben ze wel. En dat LCS is misschien ook wel aan te passen. LM kwam in ieder geval met wat plaatjes van vergrote uitvoeringen voor het Saudische fregatten programma.  Het kan veel kanten op, maar met alle financiële beperkingen, en belangen, is het te hopen dat het ook gebeurd. Meer survivable maken klinkt leuk, maar heb begrepen dat juist dat vaak lastig achteraf te integreren is.

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Thomasen op 11/01/2016 | 11:01 uur
Schuiven ook weer wat meer af van die LCS flauwekul richting een fregat.
Maar moet nog maar zien of het echt wat gaat worden.

Ze kunnen m.i. beter een "mini" Burke klasse ontwikkelen of een volledig nieuw specifiek FF ontwerp al kost dat ongetwijfeld kostbare tijd in een steeds meer (onverantwoord) krimpende USN.

dudge

Citaat van: Harald op 11/01/2016 | 10:17 uur
De Amerikanen zijn duidelijk ook hulp plannen/ideeën aan het bijstellen voor hun "Future Frigate" programma

Schuiven ook weer wat meer af van die LCS flauwekul richting een fregat.
Maar moet nog maar zien of het echt wat gaat worden.

Harald

De Amerikanen zijn duidelijk ook hun plannen/ideeën aan het bijstellen voor hun "Future Frigate" programma

Navy's Future Frigate Will Be Optimized For Lethality, Survivability; Will Not Retain LCS's Speed

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Whereas a high sprint speed was a driving factor in designing the Littoral Combat Ship, the follow-on frigate will instead be optimized for lethality and survivability, the Navy's frigate program manager said Thursday.

As the LCS program transitions to a multimission frigate, the 40-knot sprint speed requirement will go away to allow for more armor, more weapons, an over-the-horizon missile and full-time anti-torpedo protection, Capt. Dan Brintzinghoffer said at an American Society for Naval Engineers event.

This change, he said, is a recognition of simple physics.

"If we don't change anything [in the hull design] and add a lot of weight, they're not going to go as fast as they do today," he said, noting that a total redesign to maintain the high speed is out of the question.
"It's acknowledging the reality of physics: it's heavier, it's not going to go as fast, and it's no longer a requirement they have to design to."

Instead, he said the frigate will be more lethal, more survivable, and will be able to conduct surface warfare and ant-submarine warfare simultaneously, whereas the LCS had to choose only one mission package to work with at any given time.

The frigate will take the basic LCS designs – likely keeping both hull variants – and add extra armor. It will have a torpedo decoy, variable depth sonar and multi-function towed array permanently onboard, rather than included in a part-time mission package for LCS; will deploy two 7-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats rather than the 11-meter RHIBs on the LCS surface warfare package; and will retain the Mk 50 30mm guns rather converting to the more common 25mm gun. The ship will be upgunned with a SeaRAM anti-ship missile system, a ship-launched Hellfire missile system and an over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missile system that will be competitively contracted. A common combat system, the Lockheed Martin Combat Management System Component Based Total Ship System – 21st Century (COMBATSS-21), will manage those weapons.

Among the challenges of turning the LCS – which performs either surface warfare, mine countermeasures or anti-submarine warfare at a time through single-mission packages of equipment – into a multimission ship is command and control. Brintzinghoffer said the combat information center will need more and possibly different consoles to accommodate hunting a submarine and firing a missile at a surface target at the same time, for example.

Brintzinghoffer said he was also given the challenge of reducing lifecycle costs, in addition to creating a multimission ships with greater survivability and lethality.

"One of the ways you do that is by inserting commonality, so where we can ... we're going to make [the two frigate variants] the same, and we're in the process of going through trade studies to figure out what exactly that means system by system, box by box."

As a result, Brintzinghoffer said he expects much more government-furnished equipment on the frigates compared to the LCS, where prime contractors Lockheed Martin and Austal USA were given leeway to outfit the ship as they saw fit so long as the final ship design met certain mission-based requirements.

The captain noted, though, that commonality could come in many forms. The two frigate designs may be common with each other to reduce costs for the program, but there are also lifecycle savings opportunities by creating commonality between the LCS and the frigate, or the frigate and other classes of surface combatants.

"The key for us is to strike the balance between the performance of the system, the cost of the system – in some cases we're going to change to something that's more expensive, or make a change that costs money in order to save in the long-run – and this is our opportunity to do that."

Brintzinghoffer told USNI News after his presentation that for each change his office looks to make – whether it is intended to increase capability, create commonality or save money through efficiencies – the program conducts "a cost-based analysis that will tell you if you implement a change and it costs $5, how quickly will you get a return on your investment. And that's what we're balancing against, added capability versus when will you get a return on your investment."

One idea is to use LED lighting instead of fluorescent light bulbs, which Brintzinghoffer said will cost a little more upfront but begin to save money quickly – the Navy won't have to buy replacement bulbs or store them on ships, and there won't be any manpower costs associated with changing burnt-out bulbs.

For ideas that change the overall capability of the ship, Brintzinghoffer said he has to get approval from the resource sponsor, the surface warfare directorate on the chief of naval operations' staff (OPNAV N96). For changes that do not affect warfighting capability, such as the LED lighting, Brintzinghoffer gets the final say in the cost-benefit analysis.

After the program office completes these studies and finalizes its preliminary design, Brintzinghoffer said during his presentation that he expects to release a request for proposals for ship construction in late calendar year 2017, and the contracts will be awarded in fiscal year 2019. Contracts for the over-the-horizon missile and other pieces of GFE will be handled separately, and he said the Navy does not yet have a timeline for those acquisition projects.

http://news.usni.org/2015/10/15/navys-future-frigate-will-be-optimized-for-lethality-survivability-will-not-retain-lcss-speed

Harald

Capacity for modular weapons key for USN's future surface combatant

Key Points
•Future surface combatant will glean lessons from LCS and Zumwalt destroyer programmes
•Weapons capacity and system modularity likely to drive requirements

As the US Navy (USN) assesses how best to recapitalise its fleet of Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers (CGs) and eventually Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), the naval staff's surface warfare head told IHS Jane's on 7 January that he is seeking modular weapons and radar systems to provide long-range offensive punch, as well as multilayered defensive capability.

Rear Admiral Peter J Fanta, director of surface warfare (N96), said that the USN's future surface combatant effort must glean lessons from ongoing warship programmes, and build upon new concepts and technologies being introduced on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) destroyer.

http://www.janes.com/article/57088/capacity-for-modular-weapons-key-for-usn-s-future-surface-combatant

Ace1


Harald

Integration focus for US frigate development

The US Navy will focus on integrating new weapon and survivability systems on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to turn it into the new future frigate.

Speaking at Sea-Air-Space 2015, RAdm Brian Antonio from PEO LCS, said that PMS 515 had been created in January within his procurement division at Naval Sea Systems Command to look at the integration effort required.

The new frigate programme was originally envisaged as a modified LCS because it will be based on the two existing LCS platforms: Freedom and Independence.

Antonio said that since its creation in late January 2015 the new PMS 515 has been working on the integration required to facilitate the transition from the LCS to a modified LCS (now frigate).

'We are in the process now of systems selection, engineering work, space configurations, and acquisition strategy,' Antonio said. 'We owe the Secretary of Defense a framework for that acquisition strategy in the next several weeks,' he added.

'The frigate is not a new design,' Antonio stressed, 'the new design from scratch was one of the options that the Secretary of Defense asked the navy to look at.'

But the requirement is to start building the ships no later than 2019 and the design phase is for the transition will start in the next couple of years.

'This is not a development initiative, it is an integration effort,' Antonio said. 'From a tactical perspective we are looking for weight reduction ideas, a high capability impact, low cost, least disruptive ideas. From a strategic perspective we are looking for additional warfighting capability.'

The new frigate will be expected to have additional survivability capabilities including: improved 3D Air Surveillance Radar; improved decoy systems; an upgrade to SeaRAM; SEWIP light EW package; a multifunction towed array sonar; torpedo defence; armour protection around the magazine; and a 25mm gun.

The lethality capabilities are expected to comprise: an over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missile; anti-submarine warfare (ASW)/surface warfare (ASuW) helicopter weapons such as Hellfire, MK 54 torpedo, and 50 cal guns; a multifunction towed array sonar for ASW and a 57mm gun.

In its ASuW configuration the frigate can be expected to have 30mm guns; 11m RHIBs and a ship-launched Hellfire missile capability. In its ASW configuration it will have a variable depth sonar.

Antonio said that the key to introducing these systems to the LCS platform is weight reduction and that the navy's LCS industrial partners (Lockheed Martin and Marinette Marine for the Freedom-class and General Dynamics and Austal for the Independence-class) are being brought in early to help find a solution.

The other key is to find more commonality between the two variants of LCS. These activities will continue from FY15 through to the beginning of FY19 when a frigate contract is expected later that year. Technical Data Packages and an RfP for Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) for combat management systems, warfare system integration and vulnerability improvements are expected earlier during FY17-18 with an award in FY19 alongside the frigate award.

Only four LCS have been delivered so far, but some early integration of systems will be attempted on later variants of the LCS from FY16-18 (hulls 9-16) as opportunity platforms for the weight reduction work during post-shakedown availability to de-risk the frigate project.

In 2014 the US Secretary for Defense asked the Secretary for the Navy to look at LCS capabilities due to concern that with 52 LCS due to be delivered that one-sixth of the USN fleet would comprise LCS and wanted to look at what could be done to mitigate this.

Following months of study the USN submitted a recommendation that was accepted by the Secretary of Defense at the end of 2014 to design, develop and procure a multi-mission modified LCS with the systems described above focussing on ASW and SuW.

Therefore instead of 52 LCS there will be 32 (16 of each variant) and then a move to 20 frigates (modified LCS).
'The initial frigates are just the start, we are going to continue to look for weight reduction ideas and ways to bring that capability to the fleet. Flexibility is still key to enable the ships to be relevant with a 25 year service life it will take the ships out to 2050,' Antonio concluded.

http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/imps-news/sas-2015-integration-focus-us-frigate-development/

Ace1

Als ik het goed begrijp worden er compacte wapensystemen ontwikkeld of gebruikt voor de LCS, wellicht dat er modules zijn die dan bruikbaar zijn voor de OPV's van de Holland Klasse?

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)


Harald

Dec 11/14: Little Choice Stated

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appears to have shied away from making any drastic dedision with the future of the LCS, by choosing to base 20 future Small Surface Combatants... based on "modified LCS hull designs." The use of the plural form implies that there is no down-select to just one of the 2 LCS designs. By omission, mine warfare seems out, since modular requirements are maintained solely for capabilities against surface ships and submarines.

Predictably the SSCs will have to be both more survivable and better armed, since these points are among the weaknesses most often pointed out by LCS detractors. The list of goodies to achieve that:

◾ over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missiles
◾ air defense sensor and weapon upgrades
◾ 1 advanced electronic warfare system
◾ advanced decoys
◾ 1 towed array system for submarine detection and torpedo defense
◾ 2 25mm guns
◾ 1 armed helicopter equipped with Hellfire missiles and MK-54 torpedoes
◾ 1 unmanned FireScout helicopter for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting

The armed helicopter and rotorcraft are not new, and 25mm guns are not going to make much of a difference except against the smallest threats. The rest is getting SSCs closer to how LCS has been pitched to export prospects, and to what even smaller ships pack in foreign fleets. Beyond that, the Navy still has to pin down many specifics, discuss crew size, or explain how they will contain costs.

Sources: US Navy Moving Forward With LCS external link | USNI News external link.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

Navy Moving Forward With LCS
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84849

Harald

Hagel: New Ship To Be Based on LCS

US Navy Will Not Choose Single Design, Source Says

WASHINGTON — The decision is in, and the decision is — to be decided.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has accepted the Navy's recommendation that the design of the small surface combatant (SSC), a more powerful ship to follow the littoral combat ship, will be based on existing LCSs, Pentagon sources said Thursday.

The decision rules out several choices that included new designs or a version of the Huntington Ingalls patrol frigate.

But Hagel — contrary to widespread expectations — did not decide whether the SSC ....


http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141211/DEFREG02/312110041/Hagel-New-Ship-Based-LCS?odyssey=mod|newswell|text|World News|p

Harald

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/

Future Surface Ships

■The CSBA think tank published a plan external link [PDF] to reinvigorate US Navy surface warfare. The US Navy is going to be both overstretched, and technically challenged to maintain sea control against modern navies. CSBA lays out a solution that would change the roles of many ships, reconfigure air defense to a whole different model, emphasize offensive long-range surface strike and anti-air weapons

Hieronder via de link is het rapport te lezen :

http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/A-Plan-To-Reinvigorate-US-Navy-Surface-Warfare.pdf

Wel een interessant rapport, mede voor de NL vervanging van de M-fregatten.

dudge

Citaat van: Harald op 10/11/2014 | 14:12 uur
Eigenlijk is de ontwikkeling naar SSC (small surface combatant) of ook wel Sea Controle Frigate, te vergelijken met onze ontwikkeling van de vervanger M-fregat en de MKS180 bij de Oosterburen (Duitsland).

Kernpunten :
Langer in zetbaar, grote range, Multi-functioneel, grote heliplaats/deck/hangaar, gebruik UAV of mini-heli's, Multi-Mission bay, Slipway (gebruik van RHIB's, 10 a 16 meter), Wapensystemen voor alle doeleinden, dus ASW, Anti-Air, Anti-Surface Nieuwe radar (active-phased array radar). maar ook goede EW systemen en CIWS. Ook een boardkanon 76 mm of groter.

ASW met zowel vaste sonar, als sleep sonar. Als ook dipping sonar vanaf helicopters.   

En dit alles met een zo klein mogelijke bemanning van rond de 100 - 130 koppen.

Maar als ik kijk naar de kosten, welke de Amerikanen denken dat hun SSC schepen zullen gaan kosten, dan schrik ik heel erg als ik dit vergelijk met de kosten van onze LCF fregatten en/of Karel Doorman Klasse of de Iver Huitfeldt klasse fregatten (Denemarken) en ook het budget van de M-vervanger (volgens mij) ca, € 450 miljoen euro per stuk.

De Amerikanen denken aan zo´n $ 800 miljoen USD ( € 624 miljoen) per schip.

Wat voor een volwaardig fregat niet een erg ongangbare prijs is. Hoewel aan de hoge kant gezien de verwachte order grote en gebruik van bestaande technologieën.

Harald

It's time Time for a "Sea Controle Frigate"    (erg interessant artikel)

While  Oliver Hazard Perry-  class frigates are not the only platforms you would want for a serious confrontation, they are great independent-deployers and effective at a multitude of missions such as escort operations and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). As the Navy decommissions the last 15 frigates, soon to be joined by 21  Ticonderoga-  class  cruisers, we will call on our existing hulls to support their ongoing missions. There is little doubt the littoral combat ship (LCS) fills some of this void, but even the top brass seem to agree that it's ineffective in a high-endurance, blue-water setting. 

In January, a report from the Pentagon described a plan to cut the amount of LCSs from 52 to 32 ships, and in a leaked classified memo, Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Admiral Tom Copeman called for a new type of multi-mission ship.  1   Many envision a new combatant ship that incorporates air- and missile- defense radar and an electromagnetic railgun. While it is imperative that the Navy build these types of ships, a multibillion-dollar warship juggernaut is simply unnecessary when a new, cost-effective frigate could effectively accomplish the same missions.

Of the many potential frigate designs, Huntington Ingalls Industries offers one derived from its successful national security cutter (NSC) hull dubbed the "patrol frigate," originally intended and modeled for international navies. At first, it may seem preposterous to paint a Coast Guard cutter gray and call it a warship. In the July 2013 issue of  Proceedings  , Norman Polar opined that more frigates were needed, but was quick to dismiss a patrol frigate as a viable option. He claimed it "lacked growth potential and service life, as well as certain military features." 2   But tweaking the NSC could turn it into a viable candidate that meets the Navy's needs.

The Patrol Frigate Baseline

The  Legend  -class NSC is 418 feet long, displaces 4,500 metric tons, has a draft of 22 feet (the same as the  Perry  s), and operates with a combined diesel-and-gas propulsion system, which allows twin screw propulsion on a single engine. Its sprint speed can exceed 30 knots on full power and 18 knots with one engine online. It has a large 50 by 80 foot flight deck, twin hangar bays that accommodate two Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawks or four MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicles, and a stern launch ramp for small boat operations. It's equipped with a Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS), a Bofors 57-mm main gun, six .50 caliber machine guns, Mk 36 SRBOC (rapid chaff decoy launchers), Nulka active decoys, and the same SLQ-32v2 electronic-warfare suite found on  Arleigh Burke-  class destroyers (DDG-51s).  3   

In 2012, Ingalls introduced the "Patrol Frigate 4921" concept ship with improved weapons and combat systems. It has an upgraded 76-mm main gun, a new CEAFAR 4th generation active-phased array radar, and both a hull mounted sonar and multi-functioned towed array (MFTA). Installed behind the main gun on the forecastle in a "reserved space" is a 12-cell Mk 56 Vertical Launch System (VLS) capable of holding 12 Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSMs) with up to a 30-mile engagement range. In lieu of the Phalanx is a more effective SeaRAM CIWS with 11 RIM-116 rolling airframe missiles. In place of the stern launch ramp is one Mk 32 triple torpedo tube set and eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles. It supports the SH-60 Light Airborne Multipurpose System Mk III with either Mk 54 Torpedoes for an ASW mission or AGM-114 Hellfire missiles for antisurface warfare. It has a 45-day endurance and a range of over 8,000 nautical miles at 12 knots.  4    (In comparison, LCS-1 and 2 have ranges of 3,500 nm and 4,300 nm with a 21-day endurance, and DDG-51 has a range of 4,400 nm with a 30-day endurance.  5   ) 

This "patrol frigate" concept is an interesting starting point, but it's not exactly what we need. With the right research and a little creativity, a more ideal "sea control frigate" variant could be developed without additional hull modifications.

Sea-Control Frigate Transformation

To effectively transform the "patrol frigate" into the "sea-control frigate," its weapon system must be upgraded. After careful analysis of the hull, adequate space is available to accommodate the installation of a centerpiece 16-cell Mk 41 tactical length VLS that takes the place of the proposed Mk 56 VLS on the forecastle, as well as an accompanying VLS and radar cooling and support system.  6   The VLS supports a multi-mission configuration of ESSMs, antisubmarine rockets (ASROCs),
and long-range antiship missiles (LRASMs). This brings a tremendous capability to the frigate, as ESSMs are quadpacked into each cell for an increased maximum of up to 64 missiles. A sizable ESSM loadout using CEA radar and illuminators is specifically designed to overcome the vulnerability of existing shipboard systems to saturation attacks by supersonic sea skimmers such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn or SS-N-27 Sizzler, which have reaches of several hundred miles.  7   Thus, this added capability is especially necessary to conduct tasking in these resulting anti-access areas, notable across several areas of operations. 

With an ever-increasing subsurface threat, ASROCs are an essential defense-in-depth element that hedge against the possibility of the presence of diesel-electric submarines in a vital area outside the range of over-the-side torpedoes. Moreover, the prospects of supporting the LRASM, slated to enter serial production in 2015 to replace the aging Harpoon, is an important future requisite to be a value-added in a surface action group. With a reach greater than 200 miles, and jam-resistant multimodal radio and electro-optical targeting systems, it has a truly effective over-the-horizon anti-surface capability.  8   

Because of the added LRASM, the less effective Harpoon missiles are removed from the fantail, and the torpedo tube set is either moved to the port midships or removed completely. A clear fantail is then used to hold additional rigid-hull inflatable boats or serve as a flexible "creative space" for any future capabilities. For example, it could support special-operations equipment, unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, or antisurface decoys. Furthermore, the fantail has the space to support small mission-module containers that have common roots with the NSC's systems.  9   This opportunity allows for the installation of a plug-and-play variable-depth sonar, which greatly enhances deep-water ASW capability, especially in conjunction with the integrated MFTA.  10       

Another interesting possibility is a mine-countermeasures module that takes full advantage of the WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System technology, but with a smaller container footprint. Although not a primary mission, having the potential to install a mine-warfare capability would be invaluable in any future conflict. Both systems are already being designed for the LCS, which might rationalize spending the time and money needed to develop the mission packages while pursuing a plan that cuts the amount of LCSs in service.

On a final note, there is ample space to install two remotely operated Mk44 Bushmaster II 30-mm chain guns amidships, above the helo hangar, on either side of the SeaRAM. These guns have 50 percent more firepower than the smaller Mk 38 Mod 2 25-mm variant and are already integrated into the LCS surface-warfare mission package.  11    In addition to covering all axes of the ship with firepower, they also supplement the main 76-mm gun against crucial threats like swarm attacks.

Surviivability

The biggest potential drawback has been that while the hull is built to U.S. Navy structural design standards, other elements of the ship do not fully meet the frigate level II survivability requirements, defined in OPNAVINST 9070.1 as an "ability for sustained operations when in support of a Battle Group and in the general war-at-sea area" and "an ability for sustained combat operations following weapons impact." 12    Additionally, the vessel does not fully comply with the American Bureau of Shipping's naval vessel rules, controversially created after the NSC was designed, that established a code of specifications to militarize a ship.  13   

A new frigate must be capable of taking and surviving hits similar to the two Exocet missiles that struck the USS  Stark  (FFG-31) in 1987 and the mine that crippled the USS  Samuel B. Roberts  (FFG-58) in 1988. That's not to say NSCs aren't highly survivable ships; they have a state-of-the-art damage-control system, a collective protection system for chemical, biological, and radiological protection, and various other comprehensive and redundant systems.  14   However, there are still some shortcomings, specifically in the area of shock and survivability, with no assurance that it could survive in a hostile environment.  15   

In September 2012, a survivability revision came out that recognized the changing nature of ship design and system threats, measured against other objectives (such as cost, which eliminates the prescriptive survivability characteristics).  16   When asked, an Ingalls representative said the company would be willing to help define the needed survivability requirements and mitigate shortcomings with manageable design changes for a newly proposed sea-control frigate.  17   These enhancements include anti-vibration engine mounts and a passive countermeasures system to reduce acoustic and radar signatures, respectively, and installing ballistic resistant steel plating, side and bottom protection, additional system redundancies, and a variety of extra damage-control devices.

However, even with additional enhancements, it's impractical to check off every minute box that may be requested for survivability, especially specific rules detailing things like the exact designs of firemain systems and other features established in the naval vessel rules that were not yet in existence when the hull was designed. Nevertheless, a holistic view of these modifications and the improved weapon system in accordance with the latest survivability instructions, for all practical purposes, show that a sea-control frigate can indeed become an extremely survivable combatant, even comparable to the  Oliver Hazard Perry  class. It's also substantially more survivable than the aluminum-hulled LCS that was built to the lowest level I survivability standards and never intended for actual combat.  18

Affordability

The last production cost for an NSC was $490 million, with a total average drive-away price of $684 million (the rest accounting for government-furnished equipment, post-delivery test and evaluations, etc.).  19    How much would a sea-control frigate cost? The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has already explored limiting the purchase of the LCS and buying 20 of the aforementioned patrol frigate types as an option to reduce overall acquisition costs.  20   The report concluded it would cost $60 million per ship to upgrade the CIWS to a SeaRAM, install a Mk 54 VLS system, radar, illuminators, and ESSM missiles, and integrate the weapon systems. To further convert it to a sea-control frigate, additional costs would be incurred from other improvements: most notably, the larger VLS, and the survivability redesigns with comprehensive shock hardening. 

An exact price estimate is dependent on multiple factors such as timing, quantity, and contracting methodology. Although it can't be determined without a formal feasibility study, information from the congressional report and the price of installing these weapon systems on other warships suggests that adding a likely $120 million would result in an end cost of $800 million. This is about half the price for a DDG-51 Flight IIA ($1.8 billion) and a third of the price for a DDG-51 Flight III ($2.3 billion).  21   Recent estimates put the final price of the LCS with mission modules at 70 percent of this cost, a comparable target price recently reported as a key requirement for a medium-sized surface combatant.  22   

Design costs, upfront testing, and the learning curve are minimal; eight other similar hulls would have gone through production, and all the combat systems are operational on other Navy platforms. Efficiency and standardization are at their prime. Because of recognized deficiencies from the first three cutters, substantial changes to the structural design were made to achieve greater fatigue life.  23    Recently, NSCs have been operating in far-reaching places like the Arctic Ocean with no reported stress or fatigue issues, and the hull is now recognized by the Coast Guard as being able to support a 230-day-per-year underway operational tempo.  24   The Navy would be getting a proven product, and the class wouldn't be plagued by as many delays and similar deficiencies typical in the introduction of ship classes. Likewise, industry sources acknowledged that a fixed-price contract can be established from the start, which would prevent any cost overruns—a rarity in present-day shipbuilding.  25   

Even more features can be added when weighed appropriately against a higher cost. Some options include additional survivability enhancements, a composite deckhouse structure, upgrading the 76-mm gun to a 5-inch, substituting the radar with a SMART-S or a lighter Aegis SPY-1F (possibly modified to support ballistic-missile defense queuing), or even slightly lengthening the hull for more module or VLS room.

......../..........

gehele artikel

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-04/its-time-sea-control-frigate

Harald

http://blog.usni.org/tag/small-surface-combatant

'Sea Control Frigate' – Analysis of Alternatives

Since its publication in April's Proceedings, I've been pleased that "It's Time for a 'Sea Control Frigate'" has helped start a discussion about a new small surface combatant (SSC) on message boards, the blogosphere, and social networking platforms. The article describes how a modified version of the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter with improved survivability features and combat systems could offer a terrific supplement to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). With the attention the article received, various readers had questions concerning some ideas brought up, so I've taken the time to address them.

Analyzing Cost and Production

Many asked how the projected cost for the ship could cost $800 million with the last national security cutter price costing $735 million. Surely the upgrades mentioned in the article are greater than $65 million. They are indeed. However, what was probably missed is that the $735 million order for the last NSC was for a single ship – economies of scale can drastically reduce the cost per unit due to various efficiencies gained. For example, when the Coast Guard ordered several at a time, pre-NSC #5, the cost was substantially less. My math: the 2006 per unit cost for an NSCs (in a bulk order) was $584 million – when we account for inflation, it goes up to a current value of $650 million, or $85 million less than the last single contract. (The Coast Guard had to order the later ships one by one because it wasn't written into the budget at the time –and it was uncertain if the 7th and 8th NSCs would even be funded). Thus, a procurement cost of $684 million, which is used in the article and various other official reports, is an average between all the ships. Most likely a base hull would be even less than this, as the price doesn't include the initial hull design costs (this was incorporated into the NSC program), there are increased economies of scale, and various items included in the NSC price are not be needed on a navy frigate (eg: the complex stern boat launching apparatus). While I estimated $800 million by adding the cost of a VLS, an upgraded 76mm gun, a new radar, and various survivability upgrades, in accordance with navy and congressional reports, a fixed price will likely creep closer to the $900 million mark due to inflation over the next few years and other add-ons the Navy incorporates (this would happen with all of navy shipbuilding though).

Ship Force Numbers and Value Metrics

The latest LCS estimates are at $550 million per ship including mission modules vs. $800 million for a sea control frigate. Assuming we have the same budget to work with, and we're deciding between a basic LCS only, we'll either have to choose between 20 LCSs, or 13-14 frigates. This led many to question if it's worth having a lesser amount of warships for the same price. First of all, for the most part, comparing these numbers are like apples and oranges – who cares about the amount of a certain ship if they can't do the missions that we need them to do, especially cost efficiently? However, as much of a red herring the argument is, politically, it's still hard to rationalize, especially since many elected officials find it easier to talk about our ship count in terms of our budget, vice a thoughtful debate on capabilities and requirements. In contrast, one good metric to take into consideration is the average number of ships at sea on missions per day. 20 LCSs on a 3 crews-2 ships-1 deployed plan, averages 20 total days a quarter of underway time on assignments, or 4.5 ships per day. 14 stateside frigates on a traditional deployment cycle average 32 days a quarter out to sea on assignments, or 4.9 ships per day. This means that despite a lesser amount of ships, the sea control frigate still has more underway time doing planned missions than the LCSs. I calculated this data from the class average of underway hours per quarter, and verified this by known historic and planned deployment operational schedules for frigates/destroyers and littoral combat ships.

At first, this may seem contradictory to statements made by officials like Rear Admiral Rowden, who recently claimed that 26 forward deployed LCSs equate to 120 CONUS-based single-crewed ships. This kind of statement is misleading. The Admiral is correct for certain missions and events like foreign nation cooperation and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), vessels in distress or under pirate attack, counter-narcotics operations, and little-to-no notice popup missions like special ops support. For example, let's take an earthquake in a Southeast Asian country. The LCS is perfectly fitted to get underway immediately from Singapore, speed to the location, and provide necessary humanitarian assistance, all within hours. However the same can't be said about the majority of tasking and deployments that have requirements already defined by combatant commanders relating to sea control, like naval escort, focused operations, and deep-water anti-submarine warfare. These missions all require more consecutive days-at-sea, which helps explain the reason why, by design, the LCS averages less mission days per ship than frigates and destroyers.

That's not to say the 3-2-1 cycle isn't the right method with the LCS. On paper, minus the sea swap trap, it's actually a smart plan that saves money and optimizes the ships very well. It's also necessary to have a flexible warship forward deployed for the reasons stated above, but only for quick back and forth missions in the littoral environment, not sustained blue-water deployments. If we do end up purchasing LCS variants, most of these ships will regrettably end up getting pulled from the presence and shaping missions they were designed for to support these missions.

Determining Feasible Designs

Earlier this month, a request for information (RFI) came out that asked the shipbuilding industry on input for a follow-on to the LCS from mature designs, which led many readers to ask what's actually on the table. The context of the RFI may seem like it's targeting a number of different ships and shipbuilders, but it's in fact just a formality required in the consideration process for any future acquisitions; there are actually only a few possibilities here. The foreign contender with the best shot, if any, is Norway's Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate because of its past relationship working with NAVSEA and Lockheed Martin. Although any proper frigate is preferred over the LCS because it's better optimized for operating in blue water environments, I'm partial to the sea control frigate because of its large flight deck and hangar spaces, which gives it the flexibility to support drones and manned helicopters together, something that will likely become the norm within the next 30 years. However, the truth is because of the timeliness of the request and decision making process, together with the red tape that a foreign design has to go through (which was touched on in the original article), it's probably too late in the process already to even consider a foreign design, regardless or not if it meets what the Navy's looking for. This is unfortunate; we've essentially locked ourselves in a box by not starting this process earlier (or coming up with an organic solution for that matter).

There are several different variants of the LCS that are likely to be considered alternatives– most concepts have been pitched publically in some manner, mostly to international navies under the banners of "International LCS" and "Surface Combat Ship". These variants could include similar features to a sea control frigate, such as a Mk 41 VLS supporting ESSM and ASROC, a CEAFAR or SPY-1F radar and fire control system, other survivability features, and for the LCS-1 class, an upgraded 76mm gun. However, there are still some problems with this: unlike the NSC hull which was built with reserved spaces that can accommodate a VLS and other systems without hull modifications, a variant of the LCS would likely require design changes more substantial than any NSC-derivative. One industry news source remarked that an international LCS design pitched to Israel that incorporated some of the above mentioned weapons features had an estimated cost of over $700 million (this was in 2008, so it would likely be even more today). Another claimed a rough order-of-magnitude cost would be $800 million, equivalent to a sea control frigate. However, the price pitched to the Navy by Lockheed or Austal might not even matter – with the trends of the LCS shipbuilding program, it's possible that whatever price is proposed will balloon up even further. This is probably not a risk the navy would want to already take for a program already under heavy scrutiny for its ever-rising costs, especially with a fixed-price option on the table for a sea control frigate. Secondly, it's likely that no design changes will be able to offer an improved endurance and range; therefore, even with upgrades in weapons and survivability, it would still be ill-suited for blue water missions. Moreover, the manning structure and contractor reliance wasn't made to accommodate long lasting blue-water missions either, which means even some small casualties that are normally fixed by a DDG/FFG ship's force could and throw off an entire mission; something probably not ideal for optimizing the readiness kill chain.

This leads us back into re-examining the numbers. With the same budget, an up-armed LCS design with a higher unit cost reduces the number of LCSs that are produced. For example, an improved LCS costing $650 million each (which by all estimates are very optimistic) buys only 17 ships, three less than planned. As the LCS cost continues to increase, the ship price per unit gap continues to close, until its relatively the same price.

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