Internationale ontwikkelingen maritiem

[Parera]

Ik vind het ook interessant dat de Ausies een aantal noemen voor deze XLUSV's.

Met een oppervlakte vloot van 3 Destroyers, 6 Tier I fregatten & 11 Tier II fregatten is het aantal van 6 XLUSV's naar mijn mening wat mager. Dit betekend per 3,33 oppervlakte schip 1 XLUSV, ik zou juist de aantallen omgedraaid verwachten.

Overigens zie ik die 11 Tier II fregatten nog wel gereduceerd worden tot 8 of 9 stuks vanwege de toch onverwachte hoge kosten. Daarnaast nog 6 OPV's (i.p.v. 12 gepland), 4/5 SSN's i.pv. 12 SSK's.

Naar mijn idee zou de Australische vloot er compleet anders uit moeten zien:
- 6 DDG's
- 6 FFG's Tier I
- 6 FFG's Tier II
- 6 OPV's (potentieel FFG Tier III)
- 6 SSK/SSN

[Harald]

Australia To Bet Big On Heavily Armed, Optionally Crewed Warships  (na de VS, NL nu ook Australie interesse in schepen ala TRIFIC)

Missile-armed optionally crewed ships and new smaller frigates are just part of a transformational plan for the Australian Navy.

Australian authorities want to acquire a new class of six optionally-crewed ships for the country's Navy as part of a cooperative effort with the U.S. Navy. The plan is for these vessels, each of which will have 32 vertical launch system cells, to provide additional distributed magazine depth at a lower cost to bolster the capabilities of the country's larger surface combatants. This is part of a broader plan to transform and roughly double the size of the Royal Australian Navy's major surface combatant fleets by the 2040s which also includes the acquisition of up to 11 new general-purpose frigates.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's government released an unclassified summary of the new overall plan for the Royal Australian Navy's surface fleets, which is the product of an independent analysis that builds out from the 2023 Defense Strategic Review (DSR), yesterday. In addition to the planned acquisition of the six optionally-crewed ships and between seven and 11 general purpose frigates, the review also calls for trimming back the planned fleet of new Hunter class frigates from nine to six ships, a cut to Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) procurement from 12 to six ships, and the acquisition of additional small patrol boats.

A major planned upgrade and life extension program for the Royal Australian Navy's existing Anzac class frigates is also now set to be axed, though some of those ships are still going to receive enhanced maritime strike capabilities.

The inclusion of the six optionally-crewed vessels in the new Royal Australian Navy fleet plan is particularly eye-catching as this is a type of ship not in any way in service in the country, or anywhere else in the world currently.

The "six Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs) with 32 Vertical Launching System cells" will provide "enhanced lethality through additional multi-domain strike capacity and directly increasing survivability, lethality and endurance," according to the new review. The "Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs) should be acquired through formal engagement with the United States Navy program as a fast follower to enable construction of the LOSVs at either the Henderson shipyard in Western Australia or overseas."

The new surface fleet review does not explicitly name the U.S. Navy program the Royal Australian Navy would hope to piggyback on when it comes to its future optionally-crewed vessels. However, the U.S. Navy is in the midst of a program to develop and acquire a class of Large Uncrewed Surface Vessels (LUSV) with similar sounding capabilities, including between 16 and 32 vertical launch system cells.

.../...

https://www.twz.com/sea/australia-to-bet-big-on-heavily-armed-optionally-crewed-warships

[Huzaar1]

Je opmerking snijdt opzich hout, maar ...
Bevoorrader met kraan moet oorlogsschip voorzien van canisters in de VLS-en.
Het hijsmechanisme van de kraan moet dezelfde bewegingen maken als het oorlogsschip ivm golfbewegingen om de canisters te kunnen plaatsen.

Een windmolen beweegt niet, dus maar 1 bewegend voorwerp. Met 2 schepen heb je 2 bewegingen onafhankelijk van elkaar.

Daardoor wordt het juist complexer.
En dan ook nog dat de canisters met raketten precies pas zijn voor de VLS-en, daardoor nog moeilijker.

Geen probleem om dit voor beide scheoen mee te nemen.

[Harald]

Nederland heeft een arm ontworpen voor onderhoud aan windmolens op zee. De arm wordt totaal gestabiliseerd waarmee je dus  bewegingsloos een brug kun maken naar de molen.

Dit concept moet de weg zijn naar reloading op zee en ik denk dat niemand hier aan heeft gedacht.

Je opmerking snijdt opzich hout, maar ...
Bevoorrader met kraan moet oorlogsschip voorzien van canisters in de VLS-en.
Het hijsmechanisme van de kraan moet dezelfde bewegingen maken als het oorlogsschip ivm golfbewegingen om de canisters te kunnen plaatsen.

Een windmolen beweegt niet, dus maar 1 bewegend voorwerp. Met 2 schepen heb je 2 bewegingen onafhankelijk van elkaar.

Daardoor wordt het juist complexer.
En dan ook nog dat de canisters met raketten precies pas zijn voor de VLS-en, daardoor nog moeilijker.

[Parera]

Nederland heeft een arm ontworpen voor onderhoud aan windmolens op zee. De arm wordt totaal gestabiliseerd waarmee je dus  bewegingsloos een brug kun maken naar de molen.

Dit concept moet de weg zijn naar reloading op zee en ik denk dat niemand hier aan heeft gedacht.

Ik neem aan dat jij het hebt over de Ampelmann kranen /bruggen?

https://www.ampelmann.nl/systems

[Huzaar1]

Nederland heeft een arm ontworpen voor onderhoud aan windmolens op zee. De arm wordt totaal gestabiliseerd waarmee je dus  bewegingsloos een brug kun maken naar de molen.

Dit concept moet de weg zijn naar reloading op zee en ik denk dat niemand hier aan heeft gedacht.

[Harald]

Concepten van een jaar oud rondom het systeem

Ik denk ook idd dat "oude" ideeën en technieken nu weer getest en uitgeprobeerd worden, om tot een nieuw/verbeterd concept te komen welke ze willen gaan toepassen voor de bevoorrading, herladen van de VLS-en op zee. 

[Parera]

US Navy Set To Trial VLS Reloading System At Sea

The US Navy is planning a key proof-of-concept test this year to prove a system designed to enable the reloading of vertical launch missile silos at sea.

...

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/us-navy-set-to-trial-vls-reloading-system-at-sea/

Concepten van een jaar oud rondom het systeem

[Parera]

Australia To Double Fleet Size With Small Warships

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) fleet will grow from 11 surface combatants to 26 under plans announced by Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, today in Sydney.

...

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/australia-to-double-fleet-size-with-small-warships/

Eerst zien, dan geloven.  De Australische marine staat nou niet zo bekend om haar goed lopende materieel projecten. Wat we wel zien nu bij zowel de Britten als Ausies (en ook de Yanks) is dat de er weer een 2e rangs surface combatant in beeld komt. Deze zijn goedkoper, multirole of zelfs general purpose maar ook met (veel) minder bemanning.

Zoiets zie ik wel voor me bij het vOPV traject voor Nederland, een relatief goedkoop fregat voor algemene taken maar die wel mee kunnen in het hoge geweldsspectrum binnen een taakgroep.

[Harald]

US Navy Set To Trial VLS Reloading System At Sea

The US Navy is planning a key proof-of-concept test this year to prove a system designed to enable the reloading of vertical launch missile silos at sea.

Addressing the WEST 2024 conference in San Diego on 15 February, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Carlos Del Toro said he had instructed the navy to perform an at-sea demonstration of VLS reloading with the Transferrable Re-Arming Mechanism (TRAM) equipment in mid-2024. TRAM, which has been developed 'in-house' by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division to allow the reloading of vertical launcher cells in conditions up to Sea State 5, uses an articulated crane that can lift and rotate a missile canister vertically, then lower it into the launcher cell.

US Navy ships are currently required to return to port to replenish vertical launch silos once missile loadouts are exhausted or diminished. The MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) was originally designed with a so-called strikedown crane to allow for re-arming at sea, but it proved difficult to use in service and was later removed.

Del Toro told the WEST 2024 conference that the navy urgently needed a means to top up weapons magazines while underway – particularly in the Pacific theater. "The capability to rapidly re-arm our missile shooters at sea using our time-proven—and singular—advantage in connected replenishment will revolutionize surface warfare," he said. "Re-arming our missile combatants at sea will make our fleet more lethal—and more present—sending an unmistakable signal to our allies and deterring our adversaries."

SECNAV added that, following discussions with Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sam Paparo, plans are now being drawn up to get an at-sea re-arm capability to the fleet. "I've directed an at-sea demonstration no later than this summer for reloading our vertical launch systems at sea using the [TRAM] mechanism developed at Port Hueneme," Del Toro said, adding: "As we move deeper into this critical decade, the near-term deterrent effect of fielding TRAM in the fleet cannot be overstated. "You don't have to look any further than the dozens of missile engagements conducted in the Red Sea by our destroyers to realize that a capability like TRAM is long overdue."

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/us-navy-set-to-trial-vls-reloading-system-at-sea/

[Harald]

Australia To Double Fleet Size With Small Warships

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) fleet will grow from 11 surface combatants to 26 under plans announced by Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, today in Sydney.

As part of the government's long-awaited response to a surface fleet review commissioned last year, Marles said, Australia will build a new fleet of "Tier 2" warships which will complement a smaller number of "Tier 1" combatants. This decision, he said, will see the size of the surface fleet more than double by the mid-2040s.

In total Australia will build 17 new "Tier 2" combatants under the plan. The mainstay of this force will be 11 general purpose guided missile frigates, able to perform air-defence, land-strike and escort missions. While eight of these vessels will be built in Western Australia, the first three will be built overseas, in Spain, Germany, Korea or Japan to enable delivery before the end of the decade. Designs from these four countries have been shortlisted for the requirement according to Minister Marles, with the final selection to be made next year.

The rest of the "Tier 2" force will be made up of six "optionally crewed" large surface vessels, built in Western Australia and based on work underway in the United States on large-unmanned surface combatants, that will "significantly enhance" the RANs long-range strike capabilities. According to the review, they'll be armed at least 32 vertical launch systems, and equipped with the AEGIS combat system.

These will be complemented by nine "Tier 1" combatants, including six Hunter class frigates and three Hobart class air warfare destroyers, as well as a fleet of 25 "minor war vessels" including six Arafura class OPVs and up-to 19 Evolved Cape Class Patrol boats. The first Hunter will now be delivered to the RAN in 2032, with the final vessel delivered in the early-2040s, at that time the shipyard in Adelaide will "immediately" begin work on replacements for the Hobart class.

In the shorter term, the two oldest Anzac class frigates; HMAS Anzac and HMAS Arunta will be decommissioned early, with HMAS Anzac to be decommissioned this year and Arunta in 2026. The remaining six Anzac class frigates will also no longer undergo comprehensive "Transcap" upgrades. Instead, they'll be upgraded with unspecified "enhanced maritime strike" capabilities. Cancelling the TransCap upgrade and retiring Anzac and Arunta is expected to free up much needed-funding in the short-to-medium term.

How to pay for it?
The government is investing an additional $11 billion AUD into the fleet over the next decade, with $1.7 billion flowing in initially over the next three years, however, offsets have been found in other programs to help pay for the expanded fleet. The government has slashed the number of Hunter class frigates being built in South Australia from nine to six, after the review found that the cost to build all of the planned frigates had grown to $65 billion AUD (~$42 billion USD) up from $45 billion AUD. The troubled $3.96 billion AUD (~$2.5 billion USD) Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel program (OPV), which finally launched ship number two late last year, is also on the chopping block with the program cut from 12 to just 6 ships.


Hunter-class frigate scale model on BAE Systems booth at IndoPacific 2023. The Hunter class program has now been cut to just six hulls to help pay for an expanded fleet.

While cuts to both programs will undoubtedly result in some savings, it's not clear if they will be delivered in a useful time frame for the money to be reinvested into the immediate priority of constructing a "Tier 2" fleet. In the case of the Hunter class program, only the final three ships, not the initial six, have been cancelled meaning that major savings, bar long-lead items, will not be realised until well into the next-decade.

People a Problem
Workforce challenges, both in the defence industry and RAN, have the potential to derail the government's plans for the new fleet before it even gets off the ground. In Western Australia, where eight of the new "Tier 2" small warships will be built, military shipbuilders have struggled to attract and retain talent in the face of tough competition from the state's mining industry, which has led to a litany of delays across multiple programs according to the Australian National Audit Office.

The Hunter class program has also struggled with workforce issues in South Australia in the past, and will soon need to compete with not only the private sector, but whichever company is selected to build Australia's SSN-AUKUS submarines there.   

On the Defence side, the RAN is under-strength and consistently missing recruiting targets, leading to a year-on-year decline in active personnel numbers. Worst, according to testimony by the Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mark Hammond in front of the Senate last week, it's overwhelmingly skilled technical personnel who are leaving, creating workforce challenges.

Even though the new "Tier 2" warships will probably require less crew then the Anzac class, there will be more of them, and critical technical skills will no-doubt still be in high-demand across the wider fleet, putting immense pressure on the Navy workforce at the same time as the AUKUS effort ramps up.

A Difficult Path Ahead
While the government's response to the review sounds good on paper, implementation is another beast. Successive Australian governments have struggled to manage shipbuilding projects, with reform and change promised, but rarely delivered. Now, due to these failures and delays, the RAN is operating the oldest fleet it has ever had in its history, at a time where demands on the service continue to increase and the strategic environment continues to deteriorate. 

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/australia-to-double-fleet-size-with-small-warships/

[Parera]

Zuid-Korea wil ballistische raketten aan boord marineschepen

Zuid-Korea wil in de nabije toekomst ballistische raketten aan boord van meerdere oppervlakteschepen plaatsen als onderdeel van het verhogen van de strategische aanvalscapaciteit van het land. De ballistische raketten moeten de Zuid-Koreaanse marine de mogelijkheid geven om strategische doelen op land aan te vallen. Hiermee zal Zuid-Korea tot een zeer select groepje landen horen dat ballistische raketten aan boord van oppervlakteschepen plaatst.


https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Zuid-Korea-wil-ballistische-raketten-aan-boord-marineschepen-150224.html

[Harald]

Assessing the true value of air and missile defense intercepts in the Red Sea

Recent media coverage frequently portrays air and missile defense intercepts through the lens of a simplistic cost comparison: the expensive interceptor versus the seemingly cheap missile or drone it destroys. While such headlines grab attention, Wes Rumbaugh, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues this approach paints an incomplete and potentially misleading picture. In a recent analysis, he delves deeper, urging a more nuanced understanding of the complex factors at play.

Rumbaugh acknowledges the cost disparity between interceptors and their targets. Technical demands make interceptors inherently expensive, requiring exceptional speed, range, and guidance capabilities to successfully engage incoming threats. However, he emphasizes that focusing solely on this cost exchange ratio ignores crucial aspects:

- Operational realities: Defenders prioritize effectiveness over cost when engaging threats. While cheaper options exist, they may lack the range, area coverage, or capability to adequately protect larger areas or counter sophisticated threats like anti-ship cruise missiles.
- Value of defended assets: The cost of an interceptor pales in comparison to the value of assets it protects. In the Red Sea, air and missile defense safeguards vital commercial shipping lanes crucial to global trade. Similarly, defending military vessels like the USS Gravely, worth billions of dollars, justifies the use of more expensive interceptors despite cheaper alternatives.
- Strategic considerations: Air and missile defense serves broader strategic goals beyond individual interceptions. Protecting freedom of navigation and national sovereignty, like Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression, carries immense intangible value that transcends dollar figures.

Rumbaugh doesn't dismiss cost concerns. He acknowledges the importance of efficient spending and explores potential cost-saving measures within air and missile defense programs. However, he urges a shift in perspective: the primary goal isn't minimizing financial expenditure, but rather achieving strategic objectives effectively. Evaluating air and missile defense solely through the lens of individual interceptor costs, he argues, provides an incomplete and potentially dangerous assessment.

By advocating for a broader understanding of cost, value, and strategic purpose, Rumbaugh invites a more informed and nuanced discussion on the crucial role of air and missile defense systems in today's complex security landscape. This analysis serves as a valuable reminder that headlines only scratch the surface, and true evaluation requires deeper consideration of the multifaceted realities underpinning these critical defense systems.

https://alert5.com/2024/02/15/assessing-the-true-value-of-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts-in-the-red-sea/


Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts

With numerous missile defense engagements in the Red Sea, a common framing for news reporting has been the relative cost of the interceptor and the missile or drone it intercepts. These data points are frequently used to illustrate the gap between the two costs, which can lead to the impression that defenses are too expensive to sustain. Multiple media outlets have, for instance, highlighted the U.S. Navy's use of a $2 million Standard Missile-2 to intercept $2,000 Houthi drones. It makes for a good headline, but the simplistic comparison can be misleading. While analysis of these adverse cost exchange ratios is a tempting and sometimes useful framework, it obscures both the complexity of air and missile defense engagements and the complicated value of air and missile defense.

The Insufficiency of the Cost Exchange Ratio
The "cost exchange ratio" framework is attractive because it is rooted in some truth: air and missile defense interceptors are relatively expensive. Budget documents for FY2024 suggest that U.S. defensive missiles are, overall, roughly twice as expensive as offensive missiles (see table below), when averaging all-up-round unit costs. Highly capable U.S. offensive missiles are also likely more expensive than less sophisticated missiles provided to the Houthis by Iran, though there is some evidence of underestimating the cost of these systems.


https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-02/240213_Cost_Defense_Table.jpg?VersionId=PSmU4cC82KC4jf_zx7RKkv9wQgocc98a

This asymmetry is mostly due to the significant technical demands of air and missile defense interceptors. While offensive missiles have gotten more precise, their requirements for precision targeting and maneuvering capability still pale in comparison to defensive interceptors. To successfully intercept an attacking missile, air and missile defense interceptors must possess exceptional speed, range, and sophisticated guidance. This is what makes missile defense "the ultimate precision guidance challenge."

Despite these technical challenges, a careful look suggests that the U.S. Navy has had some success in reducing interceptor costs over time, when considering inflation and different missile variants. These trends are visible for the average unit cost of Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) in inflation-adjusted dollars (see graph below). These figures show that interceptor costs often fall over time, while cost jumps are associated with the introduction of new, more capable variants. The 2024 spike in SM-6 unit costs stemmed from procuring the new Block IB variant, which features a new second stage rocket motor to extend the interceptors' range. But between 2018 and 2023, when the U.S. Navy was purchasing a mix of Block I and IA SM-6 missiles, the unit cost declined every year on an inflation-adjusted basis, a trend also evident in the unit costs of the ESSM Block II missile.



Operational Complexities Affect Intercept Decisions
Two other aspects of the usual cost exchange ratio comparison should also be considered. In the first instance, the difficult decisions made by air and missile defense operators cannot be captured by a simple accounting exercise of comparing the cost of the weapons being fired. Air and missile defense engagement decisions are far more complex than choosing an interceptor that is of similar cost to the attacking missile. All else being equal, operators on the ship are likely to choose the cheapest possible option to successfully engage a threat. But the complexity of air and missile defense can often render cheaper interceptor options ineffective or create unnecessary operational risk to U.S. assets.

To defend shipping in the Red Sea, U.S. naval assets must defend larger areas, rather than a specific point target. This requires interceptors with longer ranges to increase the area of protection of any individual ship. Shorter-range interceptors are cheaper, but also can only provide defenses to a smaller area around the ship. These cheaper interceptors are useful for defending the ship itself from attacks but cannot provide the area-wide coverage to also defend shipping vessels.

The constraints of ship-based air defense also introduce unique challenges that may require the use of a more expensive interceptor. Ships deploy with the missiles they were loaded at port. These loadouts are overwhelmingly tailored to defeat the most stressing threats. The need to intercept more capable threats like anti-ship cruise missiles or ballistic missiles (both of which have been fired by the Houthis) means more expensive interceptors must be part of the deployed inventory. But if a less expensive munition, like a drone, is the only threat, this could lead to the use of a more expensive interceptor for a less capable threat. No loadout is perfect, but a ship commander must defend the ship and its crew. The alternative mistake, having too few expensive interceptors for a more challenging threat, could invite catastrophe. Commanders likely err toward greater capability relative to expected missions in selecting defensive interceptor loadouts, increasing the cost of interceptors on board.

Interceptor Cost versus Value of Defended Assets
A second problem with typical media reporting is that it does not consider the value of the defended assets, and thus the relationship between cost and the value of the assets defended. In the case of engagements with Houthi missiles, U.S. interceptors have been protecting commercial ships in the Red Sea that accounted for about 10 percent of global seaborne trade in 2023. While global shipping costs have risen in response to Houthi missile attacks, those costs would likely be higher if they were consistently hitting commercial vessels.

In addition to defending commercial shipping, air and missile defenses protect the value of the U.S. ships deployed to the region. The recent air defense engagement by the USS Gravely (DDG 107) illustrates the potential risk of overemphasizing the relative cost of interceptors. In that engagement, the Gravely used its Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) to engage an incoming anti-ship cruise missile. The 20-millimeter (mm) rounds fired by the CIWS were likely cheaper than the anti-ship cruise missile they engaged. The cost of using these cheaper interceptors, however, was operational risk, allowing the missile within a mile of the roughly $2 billion ship and all of the sailors on it before it was shot down.

To be sure, the entire value of air and missile defense can be hard to quantify. A decision not to defend international shipping from Houthi attacks could call into question the U.S. desire or capability to defend freedom of navigation more broadly. The utility of air and missile defense, however, is clearly profound in today's threat environment. In the words of deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, John D. Hill, "Integrated air and missile defense is why Ukraine remains sovereign." It is difficult to place a direct dollar value on international freedom of navigation or Ukraine's sovereignty, but protecting these intangible assets remains a worthy goal of U.S. national security policy.

Toward Better Valuation
The impulse toward efficiency and cost consciousness in defense spending is important in spending taxpayer money effectively. However, the goal of the Department of Defense is not to have the most favorable accounting balance, but to provide a military capable of supporting U.S. national security priorities. Over the long term, the United States cannot afford to play catch against every Houthi missile attack in the Red Sea. Air defenses buy time to find another means to end the Houthi threat to shipping lanes. In this light, the important issue is not whether a single interceptor costs more than the missile it defeated, but rather whether those interceptors successfully allowed the United States to pursue its goals in the region effectively. If so, the employment of air defense interceptors in the Red Sea represents funds well spent.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts

[Parera]

Should The U.S. Navy Adopt Precision Stike Missiles For The Mark 41 VLS?

Naval News asked naval military analysts what are their thoughts on if the U.S. Navy should adopt the U.S Army's Precision Strike Missile aboard their AEGIS warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS).

Designed to replace the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic strike missile, the Army's Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is narrower (two can fit in the place of one ATACMS) and flies farther and is also (supposed to be) cheaper. Further upgrades will include an active multi-mode seeker head that can target moving vessels, making the PrSM a true land-based anti-ship missile (LBASM) system when fired from the 6×6 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) operated by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) or the U.S. Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

PrSM's objective range of 60 to 650 kilometers (37 to 403 miles) gives it a much greater reach than the USMC's Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS's Naval Strike Missile has a range of 100+ nautical mile (115-mile or 185 kilometers)) and is mounted on a modified and uncrewed 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)).

While the "big anti-ship warfare (ASuW) missile stick" for the U.S. Navy will be the reprogrammable Maritime Strike Tomahawk cruise missile with its unrivaled range of over 1,000 miles, the PrSM's range falls between the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the NMESIS and the 100+ mile Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Only Tomahawk and Harpoon are carried aboard U.S. warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS). (Sixteen Naval Strike Missiles will be carried in their own canister launchers by the FFG 62 USS Constellation-classfrigates equipped with 32 Mark 41 VLS cells).

With a length of 156 inches (396 centimeters) and a diameter of 17 inches (43 centimeters), the PrSM will fit inside the Mark 41 VLS as the VLS-fitting Tomahawk cruise missile has a length of 247 inches (627 centimeters) and a width of 23 inches (58 inches).

Thus, would it make logical sense to equip U.S. Navy's VLS warships, or the ships carrying the Mark 70 Payload Delivery System, with the Precision Strike Missile? This concept of turning an Army missile into a naval one is not that far-fetched as the U.S. Army's Patriot PAC-3 MSE Surface-to-Air missile is being studied to fit inside a Mark 41 VLS.

Naval News asked Lockheed Martin who referred all questions about a naval PrSM to the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy did not reply to media inquires on the Mark 41 VLS PrSM concept.

Naval News then asked military analysts for their opinions on this PrSM inside a Mark 41 concept.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/should-the-u-s-navy-adopt-precision-stike-missiles-for-the-mark-41-vls/

[Harald]

Delivering the Royal Navy's future surface fleet



The British Royal Navy is in the middle of a significant programme of fleet renewal. Two major projects are currently underway that will ultimately see the commissioning of eight Type 26 anti-submarine warfare and five Type 31 general purpose frigates. Together, they will replace over two thirds of the navy's major surface combatants. Responsible for ensuring the delivery of these new warships to time and budget is the Naval Ships Delivery Group, currently headed by Mark Beverstock. ESD recently spoke with him about the challenges involved in securing the success of an endeavour that has huge importance for both the future Royal Navy and the revitalisation of the British naval construction sector.

https://euro-sd.com/2024/02/articles/armed-forces/36541/delivering-the-royal-navys-future-surface-fleet/