Opvolger Walrusklasse

Gestart door Elzenga, 27/07/2011 | 21:26 uur

jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 17/11/2013 | 21:51 uur
Waarom blijken conventionele onderzeeërs dan zo effectief in het neerhalen van nucleaire subs, vliegdekschepen, fregatten en commandoschepen?

Stil.... de Walrussen hebben (oefen) slachtingen aangericht.

Huzaar1

Citaat van: Thomasen op 17/11/2013 | 13:03 uur
Nuclair is wel stukken sneller, en die twee maal hogere snelheid is wel nodig om oppervlakteschepen bij te houden. Iets wat in ieder geval Amerikanen doen, omdat ze het kunnen, een sub meesturen met een taakgroep.

Een vol te houden snelheid van 35kts-65km/u is een groot verschil met een korte sprint van de 21kts-39km/u. Daarbij zijn de AIP en dieselelectric subs een heel stuk kleiner dan de nuclaire. De Collins class is met zijn 3300 ton een grote conventionele, maar is nog niks in vergelijking met een 24.000 tons Borei. En dan vraag ik mij af, kun je met conventionele aandrijving uberhaupt voldoende kracht genereren om dat voort te bewegen? Zelfs een kleine strategische sub zoals de Triomphant doet nog 14.000 ton.



Waarom blijken conventionele onderzeeërs dan zo effectief in het neerhalen van nucleaire subs, vliegdekschepen, fregatten en commandoschepen?
"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

dudge

Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 16/11/2013 | 23:21 uur
Weet ik niet, niet nucleair is stukken goedkoper, efficiënter en met het afnemende poolijs vermindert ook de noodzaak om in veel gebieden een nucleaire sub te hebben die lang onder ijs moet verblijven. Ook met alternatieve energiewinningen zal nucleair alleen maar ballast worden en worden de nadelen groter dan de voordelen. De Nederlanders hebben niet voor niets meer nucleaire subs "gekelderd" dan andersom. Zelfs meer dan vliegdekschepen..

Nuclair is wel stukken sneller, en die twee maal hogere snelheid is wel nodig om oppervlakteschepen bij te houden. Iets wat in ieder geval Amerikanen doen, omdat ze het kunnen, een sub meesturen met een taakgroep.

Een vol te houden snelheid van 35kts-65km/u is een groot verschil met een korte sprint van de 21kts-39km/u. Daarbij zijn de AIP en dieselelectric subs een heel stuk kleiner dan de nuclaire. De Collins class is met zijn 3300 ton een grote conventionele, maar is nog niks in vergelijking met een 24.000 tons Borei. En dan vraag ik mij af, kun je met conventionele aandrijving uberhaupt voldoende kracht genereren om dat voort te bewegen? Zelfs een kleine strategische sub zoals de Triomphant doet nog 14.000 ton.


jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)

Citaat van: IPA NG op 17/11/2013 | 00:29 uur
VLS met 10 BrahMos?

:devil:


"Pittig" zou een stevig antwoord vereisen... dan kom je niet meer weg met een OPV.

IPA NG

Citaat van: Zeewier op 13/11/2013 | 00:07 uur
De Amur klasse SSK. Komt in verschillende tonnages. Ook beschikbaar als exportmodel. Onder andere de Oostzee gaat hun werkterrein worden.

VLS met 10 BrahMos?

:devil:
Militaire strategie is van groot belang voor een land. Het is de oorzaak van leven of dood; het is de weg naar overleven of vernietiging en moet worden onderzocht. --Sun Tzu

Huzaar1

Citaat van: IPA NG op 12/11/2013 | 23:33 uur
De Russen hebben altijd zowel nucleaire als conventionele aanvals subs. Dit zal wel zo blijven denk ik.

Weet ik niet, niet nucleair is stukken goedkoper, efficiënter en met het afnemende poolijs vermindert ook de noodzaak om in veel gebieden een nucleaire sub te hebben die lang onder ijs moet verblijven. Ook met alternatieve energiewinningen zal nucleair alleen maar ballast worden en worden de nadelen groter dan de voordelen. De Nederlanders hebben niet voor niets meer nucleaire subs "gekelderd" dan andersom. Zelfs meer dan vliegdekschepen..
"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

Zeewier

De Amur klasse SSK. Komt in verschillende tonnages. Ook beschikbaar als exportmodel. Onder andere de Oostzee gaat hun werkterrein worden.

IPA NG

De Russen hebben altijd zowel nucleaire als conventionele aanvals subs. Dit zal wel zo blijven denk ik.
Militaire strategie is van groot belang voor een land. Het is de oorzaak van leven of dood; het is de weg naar overleven of vernietiging en moet worden onderzocht. --Sun Tzu

dudge

Interesant. Vraag me af of het klopt. Zou me verbazen, hoewel AIP een belangrijke ontwikkeling is, en zeker een groot deel van de markt in zal nemen, vraag ik mij af of voldoende vermogen gegenereerd kan worden voor om een SSBN aan te drijven op mooie snelheid.

Harald

Enigszins off-topic maar de Russen gaan voor de 5th generation Onderzeeboten niet meer voor nucleaire aandrijving maar voor electrisch /   air-independent propulsion (AIP) of dit ook naast de diesel is, wordt niet zo specifiek genoemd maar is wel aannemelijk. Al staat er ook dat de onderzeeboten krijgen een  "new power plant, including fully electric" . dus volledig electrische onderzeeboten ?

Russian Shipbuilder Outlines Concept of Future Attack Submarine

Russia to Go Conventional for Next-Generation Subs

Russia's fifth-generation strategic and attack submarines will most likely be non-nuclear-powered, more compact and less "visible," a senior designer at the Rubin design bureau said Monday.

Large nuclear-powered vessels, including Russia's Typhoon-class strategic boats, have so far dominated past and current trends in combat submarine construction.

"I believe future submarines will be smaller, because of the use of more advanced technologies as well as the pursuit of more cost-effective production," Sergei Sukhanov said in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti.

"The fifth-generation boat will also be less 'visible' compared with existing submarines. They could also feature a new power plant, including fully electric," Sukhanov said, adding that changes could affect other sub-systems of future submarines.

The designer said the most likely substitution for a nuclear reactor on strategic and attack submarines would be an air-independent propulsion plant (AIPP), which would make them stealthier than nuclear-powered boats.

The AIPP allows a non-nuclear submarine to operate without the need to access atmospheric oxygen.

While a nuclear submarine's reactor must constantly pump coolant, generating some amount of detectable noise, non-nuclear boats running on battery power or AIPP can be practically "silent."

"The endurance of submarines with this type of propulsion should be sufficient [for patrol or strike missions] – for a month or even more," Sukhanov said.

He said the construction of fifth-generation submarines in Russia could start in the next 10 to 15 years.

The Russian Navy currently relies on third-generation submarines, with fourth-generation subs of the Project 955 Borey class of strategic boats and Project 885 Yasen class of attack boats just beginning to be adopted for service.

Russia is planning to build eight Borey-class and eight Yasen-class submarines by 2020. They are expected to become the mainstay of the country's nuclear-powered submarine fleet for at least two decades.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/149348/russia-to-go-conventional-for-next_gen-subs.html

Harald

Citaat van: Oorlogsvis op 06/11/2013 | 11:53 uur
@Harald...een interessant artikel..maar apart van dat..een Walrus heeft nog altijd meer gevechtskracht en afschrikking van een Fregat. In mijn ogen zijn onderzeeboten ook onmisbaar voor een Marine als de onze.
'

Helemaal mee eens, de OZD met zijn diesels moeten ook binnen de KM / NL-Defensie blijven.
Maar als NL in 1960 bijvoorbeeld wel voor nucleaire onderzeeboten gekozen had, waren deze in de jaren 2000 zeker wegbezuinigd in 1 van de vele bezuinigingsronden en inkriming van de NL-krijgsmacht.

In de toekomst zal de vervanger van de Walrus ook zeker diesel/electrisch met AIP (moeten) hebben,

 

Oorlogsvis

@Harald...een interessant artikel..maar apart van dat..een Walrus heeft nog altijd meer gevechtskracht en afschrikking van een Fregat. In mijn ogen zijn onderzeeboten ook onmisbaar voor een Marine als de onze.

Harald

De nucleaire optie van de Koninklijke Marine

Interessant stuk over de overweging van NL in de jaren 50 om atoomkracht toe te passen als voortstuwing voor/op onderzeeboten

zie onderstaande Link, blz 24 en verder

http://www.kvmo.nl/pdf/marineblad_okt13.pdf

Ik denk persoonlijk dat het toen een goede beslissing is geweest dat wij geen nucleaire onderzeeboten gingen ontwikkelen en aanschaffen, want anders hadden we nu (zeer waarschijnlijk) al geen onderzeebootdienst meer gehad. Deze was dan al jaren geleden wegbezuinigd.

Harald

Misschien wil de US Navy ook wel een paar Walrus opvolgers aanschaffen ?
zie onderstaand artikel

Take Her Deep: Reforming the U.S. Silent Service

In 1959, The U.S. Navy commissioned its final diesel-electric submarine combatant, the USS Blueback, which served until 1990. She was the last of her kind in the American Navy because of its  insistence, or some would say, dogma, that all combatant submarines must be nuclear powered. After all, diesel-electric submarines are merely surface ships that can submerge only for short periods of time. They are too slow as well, and for these reasons primarily, they are thought to be inferior to nuclear submarines. At least that's the way the U.S. Navy thinks, but I would like to suggest that this thinking is wrong. Not just wrong, actually, but expensive and unreasonable as well. Conventional submarines, especially those with the incredibly quiet and long lasting Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), are arguably an essential weapon for any modern navy, including the U.S. Navy, for reasons that follow.

Try as they might, there is no denying that conventional submarines, even old ones, and despite their lesser speed and submerged duration, have proven themselves quite capable of sinking the U.S. Navy's best and most expensive nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. I documented these defeats extensively in my second book,  but it's worth keeping in mind just how costly and numerous these incidents have been.(1)  To cite just one example, in the late 1960s the U.S. Navy decommissioned an old diesel boat from WWII, the USS Argonaut, and sold it to Canada, a country with a very small navy, thinking that a first-rate navy like the USN no longer had much need for such outdated submarines. The Canadians renamed her HMCS Rainbow, and soon put her to good use. According to author Julie Ferguson, "Rainbow earned her share of accolades and even a mention in a Russian newspaper following her 'sinking' of a U.S. carrier bound for Vietnam" in a training exercise.(2) And contrary to what the U.S. Navy wants us to believe, these sinkings, albeit only theoretical, have been happening all the time. By my count based on unclassified reports, 16 American aircraft carriers, two battleships and 10 U.S. nuclear submarines have been theoretically sunk [or, in the case of the submarines, detected] in exercises and in operations since 1966. The real number, which is obviously classified, is most certainly much higher.

Conventional submarines are less expensive, quieter, require much smaller crews, and are capable of operating in very shallow waters, and thus are often better than nuclear submarines. Now that the USN is supposed to be focusing on the shallow littoral waters as opposed to the open ocean, small conventional submarines really make sense. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy does not seem very interested in acquiring them. Instead, it likes to emphasize that its nuclear submarines are nearly impossible to find, but allies and enemies know better. When my late father flew the CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft in the early 1980s, he told me that Canadian aircrews could find both the Soviet boomers AND the American nuclear attack submarines tailing them, and that the Americans were displeased (and in denial) when they found out that their nuclear submarines were not as stealthy as they claimed.(3)

Aside from this, the late Scott Shuger, a former Naval Intelligence officer, once said  that conventional submarines offer another advantage that rarely gets mentioned: their simplicity of design, relatively speaking, makes it easier and faster for crews and captains to become expert at using them in combat. (4) The Soviets and Russians surely knew this, as Commander Richard Compton-Hall, RN, told us back in the 1980s. He said "It is a great mistake to denigrate SSKs [conventional submarines]: they will continue to be a menace for the foreseeable future and the Soviet Navy knows it."(5)  Similarly, Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) and his military affairs adviser William S. Lind observed,

"While the 'Washington Navy' disparages diesel submarines, the fleet admirals – those commanding battle groups at sea- often say they worry less about Soviet nuclear submarines than about their conventional boats, because the latter are so small and quiet they sneak up on them undetected."(6)

In addition, the U.S. Navy's focus on nuclear engineering at the expense of combat skills compounds the problem. British submarine officers who have served on exchange with the U.S. Navy have often commented that their American friends spend far too much time and money on nuclear engineering and not enough on seamanship and fighting the ship. Back in 2007, a senior Royal Navy submariner of my acquaintance told me about his experiences after completing a two year tour as an exchange officer with the U.S. Navy.  He was not exactly thrilled with how the U.S. Navy trains its submarine skippers.

"There is a conflict between the focus on engineering and warfare. In the USN, engineering wins. Director, Naval Reactors [the admiral in charge of nuclear engineering] is without doubt the most powerful man in the Navy. The self-regulation that they have in place, accepted by the U.S. government, and very successful is paid for by their almost religious concentration on engineering. For example the U.S. submarine Command Course (28 students four times a year) consists of four weeks in the classroom and four weeks at sea and a 9-12 week nuclear engineering course. The average U.S. officer has conducted only two sea going posts at this stage (Junior Officer tour, generally in Engineering) and a Department Head tour. [This means that the U.S. Navy produces better engineers than warriors] The UK split between engineering and warfare is completely correct and many U.S. believe that as well. I have no engineering degree, however am capable of driving a submarine far more effectively than my U.S. counterparts. Experience and not restricting your search for submarine officers to within the engineering community is the key to success. I had 10 years at sea as a warfare officer before I started the Brit "Perisher" course and there were only four of us (six month course with nine weeks in the simulator and four weeks at sea). The difference is staggering. That is not to say that there are some exceptions. My previous U.S. Commodore was a tactical genius, however in 15 rides at sea on different US submarines, I have only found two CO's who match a Brit."

In other words, the Royal Navy, unlike the U.S. Navy, does not focus on engineering, and as a result it has a well-established reputation for producing some of the very best submarine captains in the world. In a recent exercise between the new British nuclear submarine HMS Astute and the USS New Mexico, a new Virginia class submarine, the captain of the Astute reported that his ship was easily able to deal with the USS New Mexico: "The Americans were utterly taken aback, blown away with what they were seeing."(7) Bear in mind that no ship is better than her crew, but it is all too common for people to praise equipment, and forget the human element. Without a well-trained and cohesive crew, the Astute and her excellent sonar would not prevail, and that is something that needs to be addressed in the U.S. Navy.

Recommendations for Reform

1. Firstly, the U.S. Navy needs to reform its training regimen for submarine commanders. The British and the Dutch produce excellent submarine captains, a fact confirmed not just by their fighting records, but by the Americans who have taken (and survived) the British and Dutch submarine command courses in recent years. The Navy should consider making arrangements for all new submarine captains to take one of these courses.

2. Secondly, in keeping with the thinking of the great military and naval thinkers, not only does the U.S. Navy need truly committed and well-trained warriors to command its submarines, it also needs to build more cohesive crews for all its ships, including submarines. The late submariner Captain Edward L. Beach wrote in his 1999 autobiography that personnel turbulence is too high, and sailors often have weak bonds to their crew and their submarine. His remedy is to implement a "home ship" concept in which personnel are specifically assigned to one ship for most of their career. This would improve cohesion, which will generally improve combat readiness, and give the Navy a better return on its considerable investment.(8

3. Finally, As Professor Milan Vego recommended, it is high time for the U.S. Navy to get back into the business of operating conventional submarines. Simply borrowing a boat from Sweden, as it did recently to try to get a handle on the threat from AIP submarines, will not do the trick; America needs to have her own, in addition to her existing nuclear subs.(9) For starters, Chuck Spinney suggests that the Navy "buy 2 or 3 of these AIP boats and set up an experimental squadron which could be used like the Air Force used its Aggressor Squadrons (F-5s) to test the effects of asymmetric capabilities but also to evolve new tactics in free play exercises tailored to these boats and monitored by objective umpires. This would provide a great training platform and a relatively low cost operational testing/experimentation mechanism."

The U.S. Navy has a golden opportunity to reform itself now, and be better prepared to face future threats. Status quo thinking has undermined the Navy for too long, and the changes called for will require leadership and innovation at the highest levels. Unfortunately, history has shown that the Navy will try to resist most attempts at serious reform unless or until blood is drawn in battle, but let us hope the new generation of admirals will be more sensible.

http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2013/take-her-deep-reforming-the-us-silent-service.html


The Dutch submarine HNLMS Walrus (S 802) prepares to moor at Naval Station Norfolk, Va. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Marlowe P. Dix/Released)

yelloow

Een bijzonder beperkt artikel