NAVO missie in Afghanistan

[Ros]

en met vrij goed weet hoe de basis ingericht is.

Niet zo vreemd met inside Intell.........

[Lex]

Mariniers vervolgd voor urineren over doden

Goede zaak.

[Elzenga]

Mariniers vervolgd voor urineren over doden
WASHINGTON - Twee Amerikaanse mariniers worden vervolgd voor hun rol bij een video waarop te zien is hoe Amerikaanse militairen op dode Afghanen urineren.

Dat heeft het Amerikaanse Korps Mariniers maandag bekendgemaakt.

Joseph W. Chamblin en Edward W. Deptola worden berecht door een krijgsraad. Zij worden er ook van beschuldigd dat zij niets hebben gedaan om het gedrag van jonge mariniers te voorkomen. Ook hebben zij het wangedrag niet aan hun meerderen gemeld.

Vorige week kregen drie Amerikaanse militairen die ook bij het filmpje betrokken waren, te horen dat zij niet worden berecht. De zaak wordt afgedaan met een disciplinaire sanctie, zoals een berisping, degradatie of de inhouding van een deel van hun soldij.

Het filmpje is op 27 juli 2011 gemaakt in de Afghaanse provincie Helmand, waar de Taliban zeer actief zijn. Vier Amerikaanse militairen plassen op drie bebloede lijken. Een van hen zegt: ''Heb een mooie dag, kameraad'', verwijzend naar een van de doden.
Door: ANP

[Elzenga]

Beelden van de voorbereiding van de aanval door de Taliban. Opvallend dat sommige geblocked zijn..(blanken?) en met vrij goed weet hoe de basis ingericht is.

http://archive.org/details/shorab

[dudge]

Description : Afghanistan: one of the most isolated and barren landscapes on earth is a strange place for an empire or a superpower to invade. But for three of the greatest powers the world has seen, it became an unlikely target and an enduring obsession. The 19th century British invasions into Afghanistan, immortalised by Rudyard Kipling as 'The Great Game', ended in a huge loss of life, a British retreat and created a template for the perils of incursion in this mountainous country. In this two-part series Rory Stewart MP - author, journalist and former deputy governor during the coalition's occupation of Iraq - travels to Afghanistan to uncover the fears, the paranoia and perceived threats that led three very different superpowers - Britain, Russia and the United States - into Afghanistan from the 19th century to the present day. (Source: BBC)

_{Hogere kwaliteit is wel ergens te krijgen, bv via watchseries.eu, maar weet niet of ik daar naar linken mag.}





Afghanistan: the Great Game, BBC Two, review
Nigel Farndale reviews Rory Stewart's two-part documentary on Afghanistan, the "graveyard of empires".

Marx said that history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. In the case of Afghanistan, as Rory Stewart so eloquently showed over two nights this week, it is tragedy both times. In fact the only farcical element of his documentary Afghanistan: the Great Game (Monday and Wednesday, BBC Two) was the fact that it wasn't aired on consecutive nights.

Stewart should be the subject of a documentary himself. He's as much a maverick as Lawrence of Arabia. "Stewart of Afghanistan" as we might one day be calling him, is now, at the age of 39, a Conservative MP but, unlike most MPs, he'd already had several careers before arriving at Westminster: diplomat, solider, deputy governor of a province in Iraq. And in 2002 he went on an epic 32-day solo walk across Afghanistan, to try to get to know the country the West was trying to occupy — and then he wrote a bestselling book about it.

In this documentary he set out to explore the notion that Afghanistan is "the graveyard of empires". Given that this phrase arose in reference to the British Empire, he wanted to know why two other empires, the Soviet and the American, deluded themselves into thinking it wouldn't apply to them, too.

The parallels with what the Americans are doing now and what the British did in the 19th century were shocking, even down to the talk of a threat to national security and regime change. As one historian put it to Stewart: "It is easy getting in to Afghanistan. Getting out again is the hard part." The Russians thought it would.......
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/9299771/Afghanistan-the-Great-Game-BBC-Two-review.html

[Huzaar1]

19 September 2012 Last updated at 01:07 GMT
Viewpoint: Counter-insurgency lessons from Vietnam

The rise in so-called insider attacks by rogue Afghan security forces has highlighted the perils of joint operations in counter-insurgency. But former US soldier David Donovan, who fought in Vietnam, says lessons learnt long ago have been forgotten.

If you could feel the heat and sweat of the tropics. If you could hear the noise of battle and sense the fears.

If you could put yourself on the other side of the world where you are the selectee of your government to advise and help a unit of foreign fighters defend their village.

And if you and that unit are at this moment in combat but they are being slow to react, you might come close to understanding how I felt one day in 1969 in the Mekong delta of Vietnam.

The enemy were in a nearby tree-line. They had taken us under fire, and bullets were cutting leaves from the trees.

We already had wounded - one man shot in the foot, another in the side. Everyone had gone to ground and the Vietnamese officer, my counterpart, was down behind a small dike with some of his soldiers. He was fixed in place, not taking the lead.

I was an American infantry officer there to provide assistance when possible and leadership when necessary. Frustrated at our slow reaction, I ran toward my counterpart intent on getting him to lead his men. But as I made my way, a background programme had already begun running in my mind. It asked, "What are you doing here? Is this ever going to mean anything?"

I was in Vietnam because the United States had decided to assist an ally in fighting an insurgency stimulated and supplied from across international boundaries. The rights and wrongs of our intervention were a matter of vigorous debate, but that debate was not mine.

I was an Army officer trained in counter-insurgency and I was in Vietnam to lead a small advisory team in a remote village near the Cambodian border. We were doing counter-insurgency focused on two things - improving village security and encouraging local development.

Improving security meant improving the fighting skills of the local militia. They were poorly equipped and poorly led, neither of which helped morale. Improving their fighting skills meant going into combat with them, fighting beside them and learning first hand what it means to fight a guerrilla war. Encouraging development meant helping local officials initiate projects meant to improve community life.

The main enemies to security were the local guerrillas.

The main enemy to development was a corrupt bureaucracy.

We finally made our assault that day back in 1969. When my counterpart proved hesitant, I knew the leadership had fallen to me. I signalled to my US teammate on the operation that we were moving out. Then he and I, waving and shouting at the others, began a manoeuvre against the enemy's tree-line.

The unit followed our lead, but our delay had allowed most of the enemy to slip away. It was not an uncommon result, the reasons for which are complex and range from the military to the religious and everything in between. That is why counter-insurgency is such a complicated task.

So you might imagine my concern during the past decade as my country has made its way into two counter-insurgency wars at the same time and has bumped first into one problem then another. Our ineptness at the enterprise has been frustrating because the difficulties reported have seemed so predictable.

I know what it means to do counter-insurgency. I know what it means to do war in the village, and I know from the outside looking in how large US units, simply because of their size and American nature, can perturb a local culture and make friends into enemies without really meaning to.

And counter-insurgency is not won by firepower alone. It is won by a government attracting the loyalty of its own people.

If Vietnam taught us anything, it is that we can help an ally do that, but we cannot do the job by ourselves. The host government has to be interested and active in winning that basic loyalty.

Those were my thoughts in 2003, 2004 and 2005 when we had American, British and other allied soldiers fighting wars in two different countries where even the people claiming to be our friends wanted us gone as soon as possible.

It didn't help that our counter-insurgency programmes seemed to lack focus. It was maddening. The US military had had decades of counter-insurgency experience in Asia, Latin America and even Europe. Where were the lessons-learned manuals? Had no-one read them? Was no-one paying attention?

In 1985, I had written a book entitled Once a Warrior King about my experiences in Vietnam. On the basis of it alone, in 2006 I was invited to attend an Army conference where then Lieutenant General David Petraeus was commanding. The conference was on the training of indigenous forces by US advisors, but the related issue of counter-insurgency also came up in discussions.

The conference was interesting but disheartening. It became clear from the presentations that many of the lessons learned in Vietnam and elsewhere had been lost from our institutional memory.

General Petraeus acknowledged that and said the loss had occurred in the 1990s as the US military had been rebalanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those old lessons were still having to be relearned in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said. That was hard for former advisors to hear. Lessons and principles that should have been learned, partly from our own sweat and blood, had been discarded like a pair of old shoes.

So what are those lessons? First, ask questions before you get involved - and hear the answers unfiltered by political agendas. From the US perspective, the leading question ought to be, what are the American interests in the host country and are they sufficiently vital to require American action?

South Vietnam eventually fell to North Vietnam, but with no consequences to us other than the high price we had paid to help a friend who in some ways would not be helped.

Another question - what is the level of internal support for the host government? A narrowly-supported and entrenched oligarchy does not bode well for a counter-insurgency effort. On the other hand, entrenched and unpopular does not mean irremediable.

So the next key question is, what is the host government's willingness and ability to make the changes necessary for winning the loyalty of its people? Without that, no counter-insurgency programme will succeed - and this is an important point because it is aimed at preventing Saigon Syndrome, that condition wherein the strong are pulled down by the weak.

The heaviest drag downward is government corruption. It is a cancer that destroys from within. In Vietnam, corruption meant, among other things, that officials would buy or sell of government jobs, pedal influence or divert procurements for their own profit. Such practices devalue a government in the eyes of its own people and in that way actually feed the insurgency.

So what has come of our more recent counter-insurgency efforts? Not much, I fear. Our military is now out of Iraq, but in that stew of government obliquity and secular animosities, no claims of success can be made until we know what kind of government survives in the long run. The possibilities there remain troubling.

In Afghanistan, the war continues - but that is a place of even lower promise. The Afghan government remains famously corrupt and appears either unwilling or unable to make changes.

Some allied officials have tried to dismiss corruption as a cultural matter and in that way deflect calls for action. That is a mistake. Ignoring corruption now only means the Afghan government will suffer for it later. Its people will remain disaffected while its enemy operates with two strong motivations - religious fervour and ethnic xenophobia.

The mullahs in the hills and valleys declaim against our presence today exactly as they did against British forces a century and a half ago.

I hope I am wrong, but I fear things will not turn out well.

It is hard to escape the adage that the main thing we learn from history is that we don't learn much from history - and those old questions from 1969 come to mind again.

What are we doing? Is it ever going to mean anything?

Listen to David Donovan read his essay on the BBC Radio 4 Broadcasting House programme website, or download the podcast.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19634728

Prachtig stuk Elzenga.

[Lex]

Extra troepen VS weg uit Afghanistan

WASHINGTON - Amerika heeft de 33.000 extra militairen die drie jaar geleden door president Barack Obama naar Afghanistan waren gestuurd teruggetrokken. Dat maakte een hoge Amerikaanse defensiefunctionaris vrijdag bekend.

De Amerikaanse troepen kregen destijds versterking om de taliban terug te dringen. Ook de NAVO-troepen moesten daardoor extra ruimte krijgen om het Afghaanse leger te trainen zodat Afghanen hun land zelf konden beveiligen.

De terugkeer van de troepen komt na een golf van aanvallen op NAVO-troepen in Afghanistan door hun lokale bondgenoten waarbij dit jaar meer dan 50 buitenlandse militairen om het leven kwamen. De NAVO kondigde daarop deze week aan dat gezamenlijke operaties met Afghaanse troepen worden teruggeschroefd, wat vragen oproept over het plan van Obama om het land te stabiliseren vóór de verwachte terugtrekking van de meeste gevechtstroepen tegen het einde van 2014.

ANP,
21 september 2012 4:55

[Ace1]

Belgen bijna werkloos in Afghanistan

BRUSSEL - De Belgische militairen in Kunduz mogen niet meer op het terrein gaan met de Afghanen die ze opleiden. Een pijnlijk gevolg van de strakke nieuwe Navo-veiligheidsmaatregelen.
De Navo zette gisteren de operaties waarbij buitenlandse soldaten zij-aan-zij met Afghaanse militairen werken op een lager pitje. De aanleiding was een aanslag in de buurt van de luchthaven van Kabul op een busje met buitenlandse werknemers. Een tweetal weken geleden kwamen ook Amerikaanse Special Forces om bij een aanslag door een Afghaanse politierekruut.

De algemene maatregel die de Navo nu uitvaardigt, heeft grote gevolgen voor de Belgische militairen in het Noord-Afghaanse Kunduz. Ze mogen de Afghaanse soldaten die ze trainen, niet meer begeleiden bij hun opdrachten buiten de poort van de compound. De Belgische soldaten zijn in Kunduz verantwoordelijk voor de opleiding van het Afghaanse bataljon Kandak 209. Normaal bereiden de Afghanen samen met het Belgische Military Advisory Team (MAT) hun operaties voor en voeren ze hun activiteiten te velde uit onder begeleiding van de Belgen. Maar begeleiden is er dus niet meer bij. De Belgen kunnen, als gevolg van de nieuwe Navo-richtlijn, in principe alleen nog 'intra-muros' met de Afghanen werken. Ze kunnen de militaire operaties mee voorbereiden, maar mee patrouilleren en bijstand verlenen tijdens de operaties mogen ze niet meer.

'We doen de laatste weken minder dan een kwart van de normale activiteiten van een Opleidings-en Mentoringteam', zegt een bron bij Defensie. Alleen opdrachten met een zeer laag veiligheidsrisico kunnen nog. Maar dan alleen mits uitdrukkelijke goedkeuring van de 'red card holder', die de Belgische opdrachten toetst aan alle veiligheidsbeperkingen.

Ten laatste tegen 2014 moeten de Afghaanse soldaten zonder hun Belgische begeleiders kunnen functioneren. Tegen dan wil de Navo Afghanistan verlaten en moeten de Afghanen zelf instaan voor de veiligheid. Die voorwaarde is echter allerminst vervuld. 'Dat land is absoluut niet veilig', aldus een goedgeplaatste militaire bron. 'Als de Navo daar weg is, zit je drie jaar later opnieuw in de situatie van voor 2001.'

Het MAT is samen met het Belgische Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz goed voor een kost van 144 miljoen euro.

http://www.nieuwsblad.be/article/detail.aspx?articleid=DMF20120918_00301384

[Elzenga]

 19 September 2012 Last updated at 01:07 GMT
Viewpoint: Counter-insurgency lessons from Vietnam

The rise in so-called insider attacks by rogue Afghan security forces has highlighted the perils of joint operations in counter-insurgency. But former US soldier David Donovan, who fought in Vietnam, says lessons learnt long ago have been forgotten.

If you could feel the heat and sweat of the tropics. If you could hear the noise of battle and sense the fears.

If you could put yourself on the other side of the world where you are the selectee of your government to advise and help a unit of foreign fighters defend their village.

And if you and that unit are at this moment in combat but they are being slow to react, you might come close to understanding how I felt one day in 1969 in the Mekong delta of Vietnam.

The enemy were in a nearby tree-line. They had taken us under fire, and bullets were cutting leaves from the trees.

We already had wounded - one man shot in the foot, another in the side. Everyone had gone to ground and the Vietnamese officer, my counterpart, was down behind a small dike with some of his soldiers. He was fixed in place, not taking the lead.

I was an American infantry officer there to provide assistance when possible and leadership when necessary. Frustrated at our slow reaction, I ran toward my counterpart intent on getting him to lead his men. But as I made my way, a background programme had already begun running in my mind. It asked, "What are you doing here? Is this ever going to mean anything?"

I was in Vietnam because the United States had decided to assist an ally in fighting an insurgency stimulated and supplied from across international boundaries. The rights and wrongs of our intervention were a matter of vigorous debate, but that debate was not mine.

I was an Army officer trained in counter-insurgency and I was in Vietnam to lead a small advisory team in a remote village near the Cambodian border. We were doing counter-insurgency focused on two things - improving village security and encouraging local development.

Improving security meant improving the fighting skills of the local militia. They were poorly equipped and poorly led, neither of which helped morale. Improving their fighting skills meant going into combat with them, fighting beside them and learning first hand what it means to fight a guerrilla war. Encouraging development meant helping local officials initiate projects meant to improve community life.

The main enemies to security were the local guerrillas.

The main enemy to development was a corrupt bureaucracy.

We finally made our assault that day back in 1969. When my counterpart proved hesitant, I knew the leadership had fallen to me. I signalled to my US teammate on the operation that we were moving out. Then he and I, waving and shouting at the others, began a manoeuvre against the enemy's tree-line.

The unit followed our lead, but our delay had allowed most of the enemy to slip away. It was not an uncommon result, the reasons for which are complex and range from the military to the religious and everything in between. That is why counter-insurgency is such a complicated task.

So you might imagine my concern during the past decade as my country has made its way into two counter-insurgency wars at the same time and has bumped first into one problem then another. Our ineptness at the enterprise has been frustrating because the difficulties reported have seemed so predictable.

I know what it means to do counter-insurgency. I know what it means to do war in the village, and I know from the outside looking in how large US units, simply because of their size and American nature, can perturb a local culture and make friends into enemies without really meaning to.

And counter-insurgency is not won by firepower alone. It is won by a government attracting the loyalty of its own people.

If Vietnam taught us anything, it is that we can help an ally do that, but we cannot do the job by ourselves. The host government has to be interested and active in winning that basic loyalty.

Those were my thoughts in 2003, 2004 and 2005 when we had American, British and other allied soldiers fighting wars in two different countries where even the people claiming to be our friends wanted us gone as soon as possible.

It didn't help that our counter-insurgency programmes seemed to lack focus. It was maddening. The US military had had decades of counter-insurgency experience in Asia, Latin America and even Europe. Where were the lessons-learned manuals? Had no-one read them? Was no-one paying attention?

In 1985, I had written a book entitled Once a Warrior King about my experiences in Vietnam. On the basis of it alone, in 2006 I was invited to attend an Army conference where then Lieutenant General David Petraeus was commanding. The conference was on the training of indigenous forces by US advisors, but the related issue of counter-insurgency also came up in discussions.

The conference was interesting but disheartening. It became clear from the presentations that many of the lessons learned in Vietnam and elsewhere had been lost from our institutional memory.

General Petraeus acknowledged that and said the loss had occurred in the 1990s as the US military had been rebalanced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those old lessons were still having to be relearned in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said. That was hard for former advisors to hear. Lessons and principles that should have been learned, partly from our own sweat and blood, had been discarded like a pair of old shoes.

So what are those lessons? First, ask questions before you get involved - and hear the answers unfiltered by political agendas. From the US perspective, the leading question ought to be, what are the American interests in the host country and are they sufficiently vital to require American action?

South Vietnam eventually fell to North Vietnam, but with no consequences to us other than the high price we had paid to help a friend who in some ways would not be helped.

Another question - what is the level of internal support for the host government? A narrowly-supported and entrenched oligarchy does not bode well for a counter-insurgency effort. On the other hand, entrenched and unpopular does not mean irremediable.

So the next key question is, what is the host government's willingness and ability to make the changes necessary for winning the loyalty of its people? Without that, no counter-insurgency programme will succeed - and this is an important point because it is aimed at preventing Saigon Syndrome, that condition wherein the strong are pulled down by the weak.

The heaviest drag downward is government corruption. It is a cancer that destroys from within. In Vietnam, corruption meant, among other things, that officials would buy or sell of government jobs, pedal influence or divert procurements for their own profit. Such practices devalue a government in the eyes of its own people and in that way actually feed the insurgency.

So what has come of our more recent counter-insurgency efforts? Not much, I fear. Our military is now out of Iraq, but in that stew of government obliquity and secular animosities, no claims of success can be made until we know what kind of government survives in the long run. The possibilities there remain troubling.

In Afghanistan, the war continues - but that is a place of even lower promise. The Afghan government remains famously corrupt and appears either unwilling or unable to make changes.

Some allied officials have tried to dismiss corruption as a cultural matter and in that way deflect calls for action. That is a mistake. Ignoring corruption now only means the Afghan government will suffer for it later. Its people will remain disaffected while its enemy operates with two strong motivations - religious fervour and ethnic xenophobia.

The mullahs in the hills and valleys declaim against our presence today exactly as they did against British forces a century and a half ago.

I hope I am wrong, but I fear things will not turn out well.

It is hard to escape the adage that the main thing we learn from history is that we don't learn much from history - and those old questions from 1969 come to mind again.

What are we doing? Is it ever going to mean anything?

Listen to David Donovan read his essay on the BBC Radio 4 Broadcasting House programme website, or download the podcast.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19634728

[Elzenga]

Ha ha ha, over focus spelen gesproken.  Nederlandse testvliegers vonden in de jaren 90, dat de Tiger / Tigre een te laag maximum startgewicht (MTOW) had en de Cobra en Apache waren aanzienlijk zwaarder gepantserd.   De Aussies gaan in warm weer spelen met de summier bepantserde Tiger.  En ... damn not enough MTOW!  En dan kregen de Tigres die in Afghanistan werden ingezet, nog eens extra pantser aangemeten.
IK ken de limieten waaraan onze AH-64D's waren onderworpen in Afghanistan. En dan is het fijn als je MTOW is gebaseerd op een veel uitgebreidere en zwaardere Koude Oorlog wapen configuratie, dan heb je nog marge.    En dan gaat men met zo'n 'conceptueel geëvolueerde Gazelle of  PAH-1 Bolkow-105'  nabijheidssteun verlenen.  Die heeft die marge nu niet, er zijn dan wel motoren beschikbaar die 14% meer vermogen leveren.  Maar de Tigre / Tiger staat slechts aan het begin van zijn loopbaan en zal de komende jaren gegarandeerd ook qua leeggewicht gaan groeien.    Een beetje jammer.

tja, laat ik de discussie hierover maar niet gaan herhalen Hopelijk hebben de Apaches in Afghanistan hun werk goed gedaan en zo Nederlandse levens gered. En blijven ze dat doen. Maar misschien weet jij al meer waarom er maar 21 worden genoemd in de Defensieparagraaf van de Miljoenennota (zie ander topic).

[Poleme]

Tests met een Zweedse NH-90 in zomers Zuid-Spanje lieten zien, dat er maar enkele volledig uitgeruste militairen konden worden vervoerd.
Dan de Tigres in de Afghaanse zomer: 450 30mm granaten en slechts 1 meervoudige lanceerbuis met slechts een handvol ongeleide 68 mm raketten.
Die qua totaal gewicht het equivalent zijn van slechts 1 Hellfire raket.  Een KLu Apache had in de Afghaanse zomer in het munitie ruim een extra 492 liter peut tank, naast 400 30mm granaten; 2x lanceerbuizen met in totaal 14x 70mm raketten en daarnaast 2 a 3 Hellfire raketten.  De begeleidende Gazelle helikopters nemen in de winter totaal 4 24,5 kg zware draadgeleide HOT raketten mee.  Maar in de zomer kan de Gazelle helemaal geen HOT raketten meevoeren.  Een beetje jammer.

Tja we kunnen focus-spelletjes gaan spelen...maar deze nadelen hebben ook voordelen en de voordelen hebben weer nadelen. Zo waren Kamerleden in 1995 ook erg onder de indruk van die enorme partij wapens die de Apache kon meevoeren. Ook tel-spelletjes werden er gespeeld door KLu en Kamerleden..van Apache kan dit meer meevoeren dan Tiger = dus beter. Wat blijkt nu. Bij de meeste missies wordt maar een klein deel van de meegevoerde bewapening daadwerkelijk ingezet bleek uit onderzoek. De heli kan simpelweg niet langer doorvliegen...peut op...of de missie vraagt maar beperkte bewapening. Verder is de Apache specifiek ontworpen om veel mee te nemen...dus zwaardere motoren....doel waren de vele Sovjettanks en pantservoertuigen die de Duitse laagvlakte zouden op komen stormen. Bij de Tiger is, op basis van de laatste kennis en ervaringen, veel meer gekozen voor een mix van taken en dus andere prioriteiten. Al is men het inderdaad er nu wel over eens dat de motoren wel een slagje sterker hadden gekund. De focus op ook verkenningstaak bleek minder nodig met de snelle opkomst van de UAVs. 

Ha ha ha, over focus spelen gesproken.  Nederlandse testvliegers vonden in de jaren 90, dat de Tiger / Tigre een te laag maximum startgewicht (MTOW) had en de Cobra en Apache waren aanzienlijk zwaarder gepantserd.   De Aussies gaan in warm weer spelen met de summier bepantserde Tiger.  En ... damn not enough MTOW!  En dan kregen de Tigres die in Afghanistan werden ingezet, nog eens extra pantser aangemeten.
IK ken de limieten waaraan onze AH-64D's waren onderworpen in Afghanistan. En dan is het fijn als je MTOW is gebaseerd op een veel uitgebreidere en zwaardere Koude Oorlog wapen configuratie, dan heb je nog marge.    En dan gaat men met zo'n 'conceptueel geëvolueerde Gazelle of  PAH-1 Bolkow-105'  nabijheidssteun verlenen.  Die heeft die marge nu niet, er zijn dan wel motoren beschikbaar die 14% meer vermogen leveren.  Maar de Tigre / Tiger staat slechts aan het begin van zijn loopbaan en zal de komende jaren gegarandeerd ook qua leeggewicht gaan groeien.    Een beetje jammer.

[Poleme]

Tests met een Zweedse NH-90 in zomers Zuid-Spanje lieten zien, dat er maar enkele volledig uitgeruste militairen konden worden vervoerd.
Dan de Tigres in de Afghaanse zomer: 450 30mm granaten en slechts 1 meervoudige lanceerbuis met slechts een handvol ongeleide 68 mm raketten.
Die qua totaal gewicht het equivalent zijn van slechts 1 Hellfire raket.  Een KLu Apache had in de Afghaanse zomer in het munitie ruim een extra 492 liter peut tank, naast 400 30mm granaten; 2x lanceerbuizen met in totaal 14x 70mm raketten en daarnaast 2 a 3 Hellfire raketten.  De begeleidende Gazelle helikopters nemen in de winter totaal 4 24,5 kg zware draadgeleide HOT raketten mee.  Maar in de zomer kan de Gazelle helemaal geen HOT raketten meevoeren.  Een beetje jammer.

Poleme als je de Hellfire raketten in de toekomst  vervangt door de Thales LMM raketten die een stuk lichter wegen  hoeveel scheelt dat dan?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-114_Hellfire          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lightweight_Multirole_Missile

Elke M299 Hellfire lanceer rails kan een container meevoeren met 4x 70mm 15,8 kg zware laser geleide DAGR raketten.
Dus is het theoretisch mogelijk om 1 Hellfire raket te vervangen door 4x 13 kg zware LMM raketten.

[IPA NG]

En dat voor helemaal niets...

[onderofficier]

Kun je nagaan, als de opvolger van de AV8B er al was geweest, had dit een schadepost van mogelijk zo'n 2,5 miljard betekend. Mag ook NL zich nog even realiseren, dat een 'oorlogsverlies' ook mogelijk is, zelfs in een conflict als in Afghanistan.

?

Uit mijn hoofd aan Nederlandse zijde.

2x chinook
1x F-16
2 x patria
2 x Buma
tig x YPR en MB's.

genoeg oorlogsverlies hoor.

Helaas vergeet men hier even het ergste oorlogsverlies          R.I.P. gevallenen        maar ook de gewonden niet vergeten...

Over het materiaal: niet alles kan onder oorlogsverlies worden geschoven   ongelukken hadden ook in NL kunnen gebeuren

[Huzaar1]

Kun je nagaan, als de opvolger van de AV8B er al was geweest, had dit een schadepost van mogelijk zo'n 2,5 miljard betekend. Mag ook NL zich nog even realiseren, dat een 'oorlogsverlies' ook mogelijk is, zelfs in een conflict als in Afghanistan.

?

Uit mijn hoofd aan Nederlandse zijde.

2x chinook
1x F-16
2 x patria
2 x Buma
tig x YPR en MB's.

genoeg oorlogsverlies hoor.