De Chinese expansie(drift)

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

di 16 okt 2012, 07:17

Chinese marine opnieuw in betwiste wateren TOKIO -  Zeven Chinese marineschepen hebben dinsdag rondgevaren in wat Japan beschouwt als zijn territoriale wateren bij de onbewoonde eilandjes in de Oost-Chinese Zee. Dat heeft het Japanse Ministerie van Defensie gemeld.

Japan en China ruziën al enige tijd over de eilandengroep. Volgens het ministerie zou het gaan om twee torpedoboten, twee fregatten, twee onderzeeërs en een bevoorradingsschip.

De schepen zouden 49 kilometer ten zuidwesten van het internationaal erkende Japanse eiland Yonaguni zijn gesignaleerd.

http://www.telegraaf.nl/buitenland/13080216/__Marine_China_bij__Japans_gebied___.html

[Elzenga]

Japanese, U.S. Troops Mull Drill To Take Island: Reports
Oct. 14, 2012 - 04:28PM   | 
By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE   |   Comments   

TOKYO — Japan and the United States are mulling a joint military drill to simulate retaking a remote island from foreign forces, reports said, amid a festering row between Tokyo and Beijing over disputed islets.

The exercise, part of broader joint maneuvers to start in early November, would use an uninhibited island in Okinawa, southernmost Japan, Jiji Press and Kyodo News agencies quoted unidentified sources as saying on Oct. 13.

The drill would involve Japanese and U.S. troops making an amphibious and airborne landing to retake the island using boats and helicopters, Kyodo said.

Japan and China have long been at loggerheads over the sovereignty of rocky outcrops in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China.

The Tokyo-administered island chain is uninhabited, but is thought to be sitting on top of valuable resources.

The dispute flared in August and September with landings by nationalists from both sides and the subsequent nationalization of the islands by Tokyo.

The exercise would reportedly use the uninhabited island of Irisunajima. The tiny island, used as a firing range for U.S. forces, is also in the East China Sea but hundreds of kilometers (miles) away from the disputed island chain.

Jiji said some Japanese and U.S. government officials were cautious about holding the drill, fearing a likely angry response from China.

[Flyguy]

Die laatste twee foto's lijken wel in de jaren '90 genomen te zijn.
Maarja, mooi bootje hoor. Is wel wat anders dan het museum of restaurant dat het zou worden...

Wanneer komt er een chinese carrier battle group op bezoek? Kunnen zij ook ons antwoord aanschouwen: een opv.

[Elzenga]

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year-2012-news/october/668--chinas-aircraft-carrier-air-operations-have-started-on-qliaoningq-ex-varyag.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Toward a 'New Age of Carriers' in Asia Pacific

Posted by Tamir Eshel

After decades of unchallenged naval supremacy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, new naval powers are looming in the area, and new alliances are formed. The ceremonial commissioning of the first aircraft carrier by China, and the planned commissioning of the ex-Russian aircraft carrier Vikramaditiya (planned for December but later delayed to 2013) are two points indicating this new vector of growing importance of regional naval air power in Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

While the two carriers, by themselves, are not challenging the US supremacy at sea, undoubtedly, more will be fielded over the coming decade. Russia is planning to build six new aircraft carriers after 2020. Russian naval planners foresee at least one Russian Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), comprising 15 vessels supporting the aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean by 2017. A second CVBG will be deployed with the Northern Fleet. Each CVBG will include at least one flat deck carrier (CV), missile cruisers (CG), destroyers (DDG), multi-purpose submarines (SSN), frigates (FFG), corvettes, landing craft and other ships such as icebreakers for the Arctic zone.

The US Navy currently deploys six of its 11 aircraft carriers in the Pacific Ocean. The US plans to reduce the number of carriers deployed with the Third and Seventh fleets in the Pacific Ocean to five, with the planned withdrawal of the USS Enterprise, but the number will increase again in 2015, as the new Gerald R. Ford is commissioned in 2015.

China has already indicated that the new 'Liaoning' is only a training platform, for its navy to practice the operational and technical aspects of naval aviation operations. These lessons will be implemented in the design, construction and fielding of future Chinese built carriers. India is also planning to build two Majestic class aircraft in the next 10 years. India has been operating aircraft carriers since 1961 when the ex-Royal Navy HMS Hercules was inducted into service as INS Vikrant. She was retired in 1997, replaced by the INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes), which entered service with the Indian Navy in 1987.

Through the years India has built a sizable naval aviation force, extending its reach into the Indian Ocean. As part of this plan, India prepared to deploy three carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean by the year 2015, reflecting its growing Indian interests as a regional power. However, with the commissioning of its new carrier delayed for next year, and introduction of the first indigenous carrier delayed at least to 2017, the Indian naval air power is hanging on the thread of the 60 year old Viraat, whose service is now stretched at least through 2020. To prepare for the extended service life, INS Viraat is scheduled to enter four months refit at the Cochin Shipyard, to be completed around April 2013, leaving India without any operational carrier...

Eventually, Viraat will be succeeded by the first of two indigenously built Majestic class carriers – INS Vikrant, to be commissioned not earlier than 2017. The second Majestic class carrier, INS Vishal is currently planned to enter service in 2022.

The Thai Navy also operates one aircraft carrier but does not have strike aircraft to support combat operations. Other navies in the pacific are operating 'helicopter carriers' landing assault ships include Japan, South Korea and, in the near future -Australia. Other navies in the Pacific While the number of aircraft carriers in the Pacific Ocean will not reach the World War II levels, the range, operational flexibility and firepower they possess will make these naval assets as dominant and crucial as their WW II predecessors.

http://defense-update.com/20121008_toward-a-new-age-of-carriers-in-asia-pacific.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

South-east Asia splashes out on defence, mostly maritime

Updated 11:41 AM Oct 09, 2012

SINGAPORE - Indonesia is buying submarines from South Korea and coastal radar systems from China and the United States. Vietnam is getting submarines and combat jets from Russia, while Singapore - the world's fifth-largest weapons importer - is adding to its sophisticated arsenal.

Wary of China and flush with economic success, South-east Asia is ramping up spending on military hardware to protect the shipping lanes, ports and maritime boundaries that are vital to the flow of exports and energy.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, fuelled by the promise of rich oil and gas deposits, have prompted Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei to try to offset China's growing naval power.

Even for those away from that fray, maritime security has been a major focus for Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.

"Economic development is pushing them to spend money on defence to protect their investments, sea lanes and exclusive economic zones," said Mr James Hardy, Asia Pacific editor of Defence Weekly. "The biggest trend is in coastal and maritime surveillance and patrol."

As South-east Asia's economies boomed, defence spending grew by 42 per cent in real terms from 2002 to last year, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute show.

High on the list are warships, patrol boats, radar systems and combat planes, along with submarines and anti-ship missiles that are particularly effective in denying access to sea lanes.

"Submarines are a big thing," said Mr Tim Huxley, Executive Director for Asia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "They can do immense damage without being seen, without being anticipated, and they can do that anywhere in the region."

For decades, much of South-east Asia spent little on weapons other than guns and small tanks. Most threats were internal and the umbrella of US protection was deemed enough to ward off any potential aggression from overseas.

With China's growing muscle and more funds available, the shopping lists are getting more sophisticated. Most countries in the region are littoral, so the emphasis is on sea- and air-based defence.

Malaysia has two Scorpene submarines and Vietnam is buying six Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Thailand also plans to buy submarines and its Gripen warplanes from Sweden's Saab AB will eventually be fitted with Saab's RBS-15F anti-ship missiles, the IISS says.

Singapore has invested in F-15SG combat jets from Boeing in the US and two Archer-class submarines from Sweden to supplement the four Challenger submarines and powerful surface navy and air force it already has.

Indonesia, a vast nation of islands with key sea lanes and 54,700km of coastline, has two submarines now and ordered three new ones from South Korea. It is also working with Chinese firms on manufacturing C-705 and C-802 anti-ship missiles after test-firing a Russian-built Yakhont anti-ship missile last year.

"STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY"

While it is not an arms race, analysts say, the build-up is being driven by events in the South China Sea, long-standing squabbles between neighbors and a desire to modernize while governments have the money.

Piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, terrorism and disaster relief also play their parts, along with keeping the influential military happy in places such as Thailand and Indonesia.

There is a "general sense of strategic uncertainty in the region" given China's rise and doubts about the US ability to sustain a military presence in Asia, said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

"Southeast Asian countries will never be able to match China's defense modernization," he said, citing Vietnam's push for a deterrent. "If the Chinese did attack the Vietnamese, at least the Vietnamese could inflict some serious damage."

SIPRI says Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand took the lead in boosting their defense budgets by between 66 and 82 per cent from 2002 to 2011.

But the region's biggest spender with the best-equipped military is Singapore. Along with Malaysia and Indonesia, the wealthy city-state sits on the Strait of Malacca that links the Pacific and Indian oceans. A teeming shipping route, the strait is also a narrow "choke point" with huge strategic implications for the energy, raw materials and finished goods flowing east and west.

At US$9.66 billion (S$12.08 billion), Singapore's 2011 defense budget dwarfed Thailand's US$5.52 billion, Indonesia's US$5.42 billion, Malaysia's US$4.54 billion and Vietnam's US$2.66 billion, IISS says.

The situation is far less intense than in North Asia where China, Japan, the United States, Russia and the two Koreas are involved. But Southeast Asia seems to be following the trend of pursuing military systems that can be used offensively.

"It's an indefinite process," said Huxley at IISS. "Governments are likely to go on devoting resources - that are increasing in real terms - to defense and military modernization." REUTERS

http://www.todayonline.com/World/EDC121009-0000068/South-east-Asia-splashes-out-on-defence,-mostly-maritime

[dudge]

[dudge]

Nu maar hopen op geen happy trigger finger een ongelukje zit immers in een klien hoekje.

ja, en dat hoeft dan helaas ook niet eens afhankelijk te zijn van een trigger happy finger. Er kan ook zomaar aangestuurd worden op escalatie. Nu nog niet denk ik, maar er komt een moment, binnen mogelijk 5 jaar, dat de Chinezen hun spierballen ook gewoon durven te gebruiken, en dan beginnen de problemen.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

China stuurt schepen naar betwiste eilanden

Nu maar hopen op geen happy trigger finger een ongelukje zit immers in een klien hoekje.

[Lex]

China stuurt schepen naar betwiste eilanden

TOKIO -  Zeker vier Chinese patrouilleboten zijn dinsdag aangekomen in de wateren bij de onbewoonde eilandjes in de Oost-Chinese Zee, die door zowel Japan als China worden geclaimd. Dat meldde de Japanse kustwacht.

Chinese schepen varen wel vaker het betwiste gebied binnen. Japan en China ruziën al jaren over de eilanden, die onlangs zijn gekocht door de Japanse overheid. De eilanden zijn klein, maar strategisch gelegen en rijk aan natuurlijke hulpbronnen.

Telegraaf,
di 02 okt 2012, 07:45

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Liaoning – Paper Tiger or Growing Cub?

September 28, 2012

By Colonel Brian Killough

On Tuesday, the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined 9 other nations—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, India, Thailand, Spain, Italy, and Brazil—that have aircraft carriers in their naval arsenal. But what does that mean for nations in the region and how should we assess the long-term implications?

For many regional observers, the announcement hardly ruffles feathers. In fact, some see it as a liability. For example, "The fact is the aircraft carrier is useless for the Chinese Navy," You Ji, a visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, said in an interview. He continued, "If it is used against America, it has no survivability. If it is used against China's neighbors, it's a sign of bullying." Chinese leaders are the first to admit the Liaoning is for training purposes only and in fact, China's air force doesn't even have aircraft capable of landing on the carrier. Furthermore, carriers are more vulnerable without their protective and supporting battle groups. These battle groups require technology, investment, and training over the course of a decade or more to bring them together as an effective fighting force. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, as a concentration of capabilities, resources, and manpower, a carrier quickly becomes both a high-value asset and a high-value target for adversaries.

What benefit does the carrier bring to the PRC? First, it is a symbol of national pride for a nation that is rallying more and more frequently to nationalism in the waters of the East and South China Sea. Second, it serves as a testbed and developmental vessel for the next generation of up to five more Chinese carriers which have been reported to be in design and development. Third, even if the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has no desire to go into battle with other world superpowers, it would certainly give the nation an option for displaying military might in regions where the PRC has strategic interests around the globe. This hearkens back to the concept of nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy. For example, if you are a coastal African nation with significant resource trade with the PRC and there is a dispute over future rights or how Chinese citizens are treated, and a PRC aircraft carrier shows up off your coastline, it may influence your decision calculus. It also gives the PLAN a lot of staying power closer to home in the disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. If the ship is equipped with a wing of J-15 aircraft (currently under development in China), and then deployed near the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Paracel, or Spratly Islands, the PRC will have arguably established sustainable air dominance over the area.

So, the question remains, is the Liaoning a significant new capability or is it a waste of money on a capability that China will never realize? The reality probably lies between the two possibilities. PRC leaders understand that with exponentially increasing demands for raw goods caused by their growing economy, they must be prepared to field a blue-water navy to protect their strategic interests. The Liaoning is a measured step in the long trek toward a globally-capable navy that an emerging superpower needs. For a nation that takes a long and measured view of history, it is a logical investment. It is also a solid indicator of intent, but not a threat ... yet.

Colonel Brian Killough is U.S. Air Force Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. This piece originally appeared in the Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog.

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/09/28/liaoning-paper-tiger-or-growing-cub/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

De dreigende cocktail van nationalisme en militarisering in China

Rob de Wijk − 28/09/12

column Eindelijk. China heeft een vliegdekschip. Tijdens de ingebruikname, waarbij president Hu Jintao en premier Wen Jinbao aanwezig waren, werd met veel fanfare duidelijk gemaakt waarvoor dit schip geschikt is: het beschermen van de nationale soevereiniteit. Dat leek mij een open deur. Waarvoor zou je zo'n schip anders willen gebruiken.

Een probleempje is dat dit schip helemaal niet inzetbaar is. En dat komt niet omdat het een tweedehandsje is dat China overnam van Oekraïne, die het schip weer overnam uit de failliete boedel van de Sovjet-Unie. Het probleem is dat China geen vliegtuigen heeft die vanaf dit schip kunnen opstijgen. Maar ook al zouden die vliegtuigen er wel zijn, dan nog is het ondenkbaar dat China het schip snel kan inzetten. Vliegdekschepen zijn niet alleen ongehoord duur, maar ze zijn ook ongehoord complex. Het kostte de Amerikanen decennia om van een carrier battle group een effectief wapen te maken. Voorlopig kan dit schip alleen bij oefeningen worden gebruikt.

Zo bezien lijkt het vliegdekschip weggegooid geld. Maar schijn bedriegt.

Terwijl wij hier in Europa onze defensie reduceren tot tweederangs legertjes waarmee onze belangen nauwelijks meer verdedigd kunnen worden, zien we in Azië precies het tegenovergestelde. In landen als China, India en Singapore is men tot de conclusie gekomen dat het beschermen van handelsroutes en de ongehinderde toegang tot grondstoffen van economisch levensbelang is. Precies om die reden worden krijgsmachten ontwikkeld die ver van huis kunnen opereren. Het vliegdekschip past hierin.

Niet alleen China, maar ook India bouwt de komende jaren ongeveer honderd nieuwe marineschepen. En inmiddels heeft stadstaat Singapore een grotere marine dan Nederland. Interessant is dat Singapore een relatie legt met haar handelsbelangen en haar haven (een van de grootste ter wereld). Wie in Nederland een verband legt tussen handelsbelangen, Rotterdam en onze marine wordt weggehoond, hoewel precies om deze reden Nederland meedoet aan de antipiraterijmissie voor de Somalische kust.

Deze antipiraterijmissie was voor China aanleiding om voor het eerst sinds het begin van de vijftiende eeuw oorlogsschepen buiten haar territoriale wateren in te zetten. Tegelijkertijd zet ze in op de militarisering van de Indische Oceaan en de Oost- en Zuid-Chinese zeeën. Overal verrijzen bases. En we zien groeiende confrontaties met Japan, Vietnam en de Filipijnen over grondstoffenrijke zeegebieden. Het conflict rond de door China en Japan betwiste olie- en gasrijke Senkaku/Diaoyutai eilanden, dat deze week verder escaleerde, is daar een duidelijk voorbeeld van.

Deze escalatie heeft ook te maken met het door de communistische partij aangewakkerde nationalisme. Gezien het collectieve trauma dat de Chinezen ten opzichte van Japan hebben, kost dat aanwakkeren weinig moeite. Wat dit betreft was de ingebruikname van het vliegkampschip, de Liaoning, een demonstratie van nationale trots gevoed door een breed gevoelde bedreiging van de Chinese soevereiniteit.

Al met al is deze combinatie van dreiging, nationalisme en militarisering een zorgwekkende ontwikkeling. Vooral omdat deze militarisering wordt gedreven door het al dan niet terechte inzicht dat economische belangen worden bedreigd.

http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/6844/Rob-de-Wijk/article/detail/3323548/2012/09/28/De-dreigende-cocktail-van-nationalisme-en-militarisering-in-China.dhtml

[Elzenga]

Natuurlijk heeft china nog geen vliegtuigen voor haar eerste vliegdekschip, maar men  lkan dat tot die tijd natuurlijk ook oplossen door gevechtshelicopters erop te stationaren en dan heb je ten opzichte van buurlanden ook weer airpower op zee, terwijl deze landen zelf niets hebben. met uitzondering van Japan en Zuid Korea, die ook LHD's hebben waarop men gevechtshelicopters kan stationeren.

Het zou me niet verrassen als er opeens wel toestellen landen e.d. En men ergens heeft kunnen oefenen op het land. Tot welke seastate is de vraag.

[Ace1]

Natuurlijk heeft china nog geen vliegtuigen voor haar eerste vliegdekschip, maar men  lkan dat tot die tijd natuurlijk ook oplossen door gevechtshelicopters erop te stationaren en dan heb je ten opzichte van buurlanden ook weer airpower op zee, terwijl deze landen zelf niets hebben. met uitzondering van Japan en Zuid Korea, die ook LHD's hebben waarop men gevechtshelicopters kan stationeren.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

China neemt vliegdekschip in gebruik

Een voorbeeld rondom "showing the flag" in optima forma...

Ja het schip is klaar om te varen en dan heb je het gehad voor de komende jaren. Het feit alleen al dat de Chinesen nu een carrier hebben, zelfs ver van operationeel, is al een statement waar de werleld, gezien de veelvuldige publiciteit, niet om heen kan.

In Nederland zou men zich eens moeten afvragen waarom dit zo is zonder meteen weer, totaal visieloos, de botte bijl te hanteren, en te brullen dat OPV's het middel zijn om indruk te maken...