Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

[Lex]

Defensie zet Airbus te koop die nog tot november moet vliegen

Het ministerie van Defensie heeft zijn tweede Airbus A310 begin september te koop gesteld, terwijl het toestel nog tot eind november dienst moet doen. Zo is in militaire kringen bevestigd. Het toestel staat reeds sinds 7 september te koop op de website enot.publicprocurement.be.

De A310-222 wordt verkocht met een reservereactor en verscheidene wisselstukken. Geïnteresseerden hebben tot 15 oktober de tijd om een bod te doen.

De eerste Airbus A310 werd in augustus 2009 uit dienst genomen. Het toestel werd gekocht door MAD Africa uit Brussel, die ook nog een dertigtal militaire helikopters van het Belgische leger kocht. Die werden onder meer doorverkocht aan Madagascar en Nederland.

De twee Airbussen dateren uit 1985 en werden in 1997 door Defensie aangekocht. In totaal hebben ze elk meer dan 35.000 vlieguren. Ze kwamen de laatste jaren echter vooral in het nieuws door defecten die militairen en ministers aan de grond hielden.

Sinds november werden ze vervangen door een Airbus A330 die van een Portugese leasingmaatschappij gehuurd wordt.

Belga, maandag 27 september 2010, 16u04

[Reinier]

The future of British defence
Into the storm
The government's strategic defence review—and impending cuts to the defence budget—will define Britain's approach to security for a decade and beyond

Sep 9th 2010

ON SEPTEMBER 17th the newly formed National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the prime minister, David Cameron, will begin discussing how to cut Britain's defence budget. The conversation will be informed by the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which the coalition government embarked upon within weeks of taking office. Whereas the last such exercise, completed by the Labour government in 1998, took over a year to conclude, this one must be finished by October 20th, when the coalition will announce the results of its overall review of public spending. The outcome of these deliberations will define not just the shape of Britain's armed forces, but also its role in the world and sense of itself as a nation.

It is not just the rush that is making this such a difficult and painful process. Britain's annual defence budget is around £40 billion ($62 billion), including the extra cash (£4.6 billion this year) that the Treasury provides for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is munificent by international standards—Britain ranks third in global defence spending, behind America and China. But defence benefited much less than other departments from the largesse of the boom years (see chart). The Labour government was ignobly reluctant to meet the costs of its lengthy military engagements.

It also abjectly failed to reform the wasteful procurement regime at the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As Liam Fox, the Conservative defence secretary, has argued, even by Labour's profligate standards, the financial situation he inherited is unique. In a speech last month, Dr Fox identified "an unfunded liability in defence of around £37 billion over the next ten years." Under Labour, the MoD ordered equipment costing over £20 billion, "without ever having an idea whether the budget would be able to afford it".

All that created a chasm between Britain's military ambitions and its capacity (or willingness) to pay for them. Now an overstretched defence budget faces a massive cut: as part of the bid to address Britain's fiscal deficit, defence faces a cumulative squeeze of between 10% and 20% over five years. The result is some very hard and worryingly hurried choices. Since Britain is America's most important military ally, they will be keenly awaited in the Pentagon, as well as Whitehall.

Were Britain prepared to sacrifice some of its global influence and prestige, those choices would be easier. Some argue that the real threats to Britain's security—invasion or attack by a powerful state—have rarely been smaller, and that defence spending should decline accordingly. Many, including quite a few Liberal Democrats, the Tories' coalition partners, would like Britain to get out of the business of projecting large-scale military force overseas. Instead, they argue, Britain should humbly focus on meeting the collective security obligations imposed by NATO membership, limiting its expeditionary goals to humanitarian interventions approved by the United Nations, rather like Canada and some of the Scandinavian countries.

There is not the slightest sign, however, that the government intends to reappraise Britain's traditional ability to "punch above its weight" militarily and diplomatically. In another recent speech Dr Fox said that the country needed "robust and well-equipped armed forces, capable of intervening abroad whenever necessary." But whether Dr Fox, a right-winger with neoconservative leanings, can reconcile that aim with the demands of an impatient Treasury is questionable. His strained relationships with the three most powerful members of the NSC—Mr Cameron, George Osborne, the chancellor of the exchequer, and William Hague, the foreign secretary—may also affect the wrangling.


Fighting the next war

Dr Fox and the NSC must begin by balancing Britain's current obligations in Afghanistan with the challenges of the future. According to Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI, a think-tank, even though continuing operations in Afghanistan are notionally funded by the Treasury, the campaign is still absorbing about 30% of the MoD's budget. That is because sustaining roughly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan ties up many times that number in training and support. That means the army will perforce be largely protected from the immediate savings the government is looking for—increasing pressure on the other services.

Yet the fact that Britain has recently been involved in two troop-heavy counter-insurgency campaigns does not mean that all or even most future conflicts will be similar. In ten or 20 years the threat from jihadi terrorists operating from failed states may have receded. Iran could trigger a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East. Violent competition over scarce resources may erupt with or between emerging superpowers, such as China and India. And so on into the unknown unknowns.

One obvious approach would be to inflict equal pain on each of the services. But Dr Fox has described that method as "intellectually indefensible and strategically dangerous". He also rejects the idea of simply trying to do what Britain does now, but with less money, since that would mean neglecting investment in new fields such as cyber-warfare. Dr Fox is sounding radical—perhaps too radical, given the uncertainty about future threats.

Up to 40 separate studies of defence expenditure are close to completion, which will be submitted to the NSC's small secretariat, led by the new national security adviser, Sir Peter Ricketts, a former head of the Foreign Office. The indications are that the individual services are reluctant to compromise. The army is arguing that big reductions in its size would lead to a collapse in morale, particularly among officers who would see their career prospects diminished. The navy insists that it is already at or near the minimum needed to be a coherent maritime force (it already has less than a tenth of the number of ships it boasted in 1945). As for the Royal Air Force (RAF), it stubbornly clings to a view of itself as a miniature version of the American Air Force.

One of the gravest problems is the way a number of very large procurement programmes are bunched together over the next few years. They include the purchase of 40 more Typhoon aeroplanes for the RAF for around £2.8 billion; two new 65,000-tonne aircraft carriers that are due to come into service in 2016 and 2018, at a cost of £5.2 billion; the 138 F-35 strike fighters that go with the carriers (about £10 billion); seven Astute-class attack submarines, the first three of which cost £4 billion; and the £20 billion programme to replace the Trident nuclear deterrent.

The RAF looks certain to be hit hard. Douglas Barrie, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, reckons that the air force will shrink dramatically, losing perhaps 200 jets through the early retirement of Tornadoes and Harriers and a scaling back of the plan for a 160-strong Typhoon fleet. Attack helicopters and unmanned drones will increasingly be used to support ground operations instead. The order for F-35 jets, which are to be shared between the navy and the air force, looks certain to be more than halved to around 60, saving more than £5 billion in purchase costs and at least as much in maintenance.

Theoretically, one or both of the navy's aircraft carriers could be cancelled. That would drastically reduce Britain's expeditionary capability; but the advanced state of construction, the amount of money already spent and the 10,000 or so jobs at stake make it unlikely. Ditching just one of them is impractical, since two are needed if one is to be continuously available for operations. Despite some excitable recent talk of sharing a carrier with France, the difficulty of agreeing what to do with such a shared vessel make that idea unworkable. Dr Fox has ruled it out, though he is exploring other areas of co-operation.


The conspiracy of optimism

The most controversial programme of all is the replacement of Britain's Trident nuclear submarines (Dr Fox has wasted political capital in a fruitless row with the Treasury about who should pay for the renewal). The coalition is committed to keeping the deterrent, albeit with the reluctant support of the Lib Dems. But it may be possible to delay ordering the new boats by several years, and to make do with three submarines rather than the current four. That would put back the costs and save several billion pounds. Alternatives to Trident, such as converting an attack submarine to do the job, seem likely to be dismissed on grounds of cost and effectiveness.

And despite Afghanistan, the army will not escape entirely. A growing emphasis on special forces in ground warfare, combined with rising scepticism about the future utility of heavy armour should allow two or three battalions of infantry to be eliminated, the mothballing of most of the army's main battle tanks and thus big savings in manpower and logistical support. A smaller army—comprising perhaps 95,000 soldiers rather than the current 107,000—would also make it possible to repatriate most of the roughly 19,000 British troops still stationed in Germany without building new bases or housing.

Less sexy than those headline cuts, but just as important, are the savings to be made in the way the MoD itself operates. Above all, it needs a rational procurement policy. An independent report it commissioned last year described a "conspiracy of optimism" between the services, the defence establishment and industry. Knowing that major programmes are rarely cancelled outright, each of the armed forces has a systematic incentive both to underestimate the likely cost of equipment and to aim for the highest possible specification regardless of risk. The results are routine delays and vast cost overruns.

So there is a pressing need to bring order and sanity to Britain's overstretched defence budget. But that cannot be achieved overnight. Given the ten-year time horizon that defence planning requires, attempting severe cuts too quickly may be risky militarily and financially, since it might prove costlier to revive needed capabilities in the future than to preserve them now. That will be the message that Dr Fox will take to his colleagues on the NSC. It may well fall on deaf ears. The government's priority is the deficit, not a sensible defence review.

Bron: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/16994358

[KapiteinRob]

Defensie zou daarom hebben besloten om een groot deel van de administratieve taken door burgers te laten overnemen. Die krijgen alleen salaris uitbetaald, geen toeslag.

Hoewel we het hier over Britse defensie hebben, vraag ik me af op wat voor toeslagen dan gedoeld wordt. Daarbij neem ik aan dat net als in NL in de UK nog steeds een behoorlijk aantal administratieve functies operationeel zijn. En op de non-operationele functies zitten al vaak burgers en is er de ruimte voor collega's met de meer operationele dienstvakken om ook een "niet operationele functie" te vervullen zodat die niet continu van hot naar haar moeten vliegen.

Dat gezegd hebbende mogen ze mijn huidige functie zo omklappen naar burger en mij daarop geplaatst een burgerkloffie aan laten trekken. Dan werk ik op die stoel wel door tot mijn 67e....... 

[andré herc]

Einde Duitse dienstplicht in zicht

BERLIJN - De Duitse dienstplicht verdwijnt nu vrijwel zeker. De Duitse CSU-leider Horst Seehofer heeft zijn verzet tegen afschaffing opgegeven, meldde hij zaterdag in het Duitse tijdschrijft Der Spiegel.

Seehofer ziet geen noodzaak meer voor de dienstplicht in vredestijd. Per jaar moeten enkele duizenden Duitse jongemannen moeten zes maanden lang de zogeheten Wehrpflicht vervullen.

Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (Defensie) had vorige maand voorgesteld om drastisch te bezuinigen op het leger. De dienstplicht moest daarbij plaatsmaken voor een vrijwilligersdienst en het aantal beroepsmilitairen zou flink omlaag gaan van 245.000 tot 163.500.

Leider Seehoder van regeringspartij CSU wil echter wel meer beroeps- en vrijwillige soldaten behouden dan voorgesteld. De CSU denkt eerder aan totaal 185.000 man voor de zogeheten Bundeswehr. Daarvan zouden er 15.000 vrijwilligers moeten zijn. (ANP)

Za 11 september, 15 u 47

ad.nl

[Elzenga]

Het bewuste artikel...

Defence spending: thousands of troops to be cut

By James Kirkup, Political Correspondent
Published: 10:01PM BST 10 Sep 2010

The cuts, which are part of the strategic defence review, will lead to a substantial reduction in the size of the Army, which will also have to give up many of its tanks and armoured vehicles. Soldiers could also be ordered to serve longer on the front line in Afghanistan, and be given less time to recuperate between tours.

Senior ministers are poised to make the first painful decisions on cuts next week as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Daily Telegraph has learnt that deep cuts to military manpower are high on the agenda.

The Armed Forces have about 180,000 uniformed personnel, but can keep a fighting force in the field of barely one twentieth of that. Paying for housing and supporting uniformed personnel is one of the biggest drains on the £36 billion Ministry of Defence budget.

According to the review, employing each uniformed serviceman was 50 per cent more expensive than employing an MoD civil servant, and twice as costly as the average civil servant. Many Armed Forces personnel carrying out administrative roles could be replaced by civilians, ministers were told.

The review also concluded provisionally that:

    * Cutting the size of the Army would make it easier to honour a Tory pledge to bring troops out of Germany. But Dr Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, was advised that an early exit could potentially increase costs since the forces there currently would need new British bases.

    * The Trident nuclear deterrent should be replaced with another four-submarine deterrent. However, the Trident vessels could be kept in service longer to delay spending on the replacement.

    * The Royal Navy's two new aircraft carriers were likely to be approved, costing more than £5 billion. However, the type and number of aircraft they would carry remained the subject of debate.

    * Dr Fox was said to be winning an argument with the Treasury to have capital spending for defence set out for 10 years instead of four, allowing better long-term planning of equipment procurement.

    * There would be "winners" from the review, however. Some of the money saved would be spent on improving Britain's "cyber-warfare" capabilities and expanding Special Forces units. There would also be extra investment in technology to counter mines and other "passive" weapons such as roadside bombs.

The Coalition's spending cuts meant that the MoD budget was likely to be cut by almost a fifth. Defence officials calculated that each 20,000 reduction in Forces manpower would save £1 billion in the first year, and larger amounts in subsequent years from reduced pension and wage costs.

As the largest of the three services, the Army was likely to bear the brunt of the cuts. Commanders would be told to "do more with less" and increase "force generation" ratios, which determine the total number of troops required to field a specified front line force.

Currently, an Army of almost 100,000 was required to sustain a force of about 10,000 in Afghanistan, partly due to the time required for training before each six-month tour and recuperation time afterwards.

Military rules known as Harmony Guidelines dictate that units should have 24 months at home after every operational tour. However, those rules treated a six-month posting in locations such as Cyprus in the same way as tour in Afghanistan.

The National Security Committee, chaired by David Cameron, is expected to consider the details of the proposed cuts next week.

"This review is going to be painful, much worse than most people realise," said one senior source.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/7995646/Defence-spending-thousands-of-troops-to-be-cut.html

[andré herc]

Banen Britse militairen op de tocht

Toegevoegd: zaterdag 11 sep 2010, 10:23

Tienduizenden Britse militairen dreigen hun baan kwijt te raken. De Britse krant The Daily Telegraph heeft van bronnen binnen Defensie gehoord dat er fors bezuinigd moet worden.

Veel militairen bij de landmacht, de luchtmacht en de marine doen louter administratief werk. Maar omdat zij een uniform dragen krijgen zij een forse vergoeding voor huisvesting en levensonderhoud, net als de militairen die veldwerk doen.

Defensie zou daarom hebben besloten om een groot deel van de administratieve taken door burgers te laten overnemen. Die krijgen alleen salaris uitbetaald, geen toeslagen

nos.nl

[andré herc]

Italy Eyes Defense Cuts

Sep 10, 2010

By Andy Nativi
Genoa


Italy is not immune to the defense cuts that are spreading across Europe. While the government has yet to present a plan for reducing military spending, Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa has revealed highlights of the reductions he will announce by the end of October.

The finance minister plans to impose across-the-board cuts of 10% to the budget of every ministry. This will meet the government's goal of reducing spending by €29 billion ($36.8 billion) from 2011-13.

La Russa deflected measures that would have affected military pay, but had to accept reductions that have not been welcomed by service personnel. These include such expenses as trips abroad for training and meetings.

So far the ax has not affected the €1.5 billion Italy spends annually on international missions, which is outside the defense budget. In July, parliament approved the extension of current missions to the end of the year without cuts. This is important because Italy is conducting a surge in Afghanistan, which will bring 4,000 soldiers in theater by the end of 2010, along with 800 vehicles and 32 aircraft. This mission alone requires €366 million to year-end.

Funds will continue to be provided for operations in Lebanon, where 1,800 soldiers are deployed; stabilization missions in the Balkans, which account for 1,200 troops; and other peacekeeping activities. But it is clear that maintaining these funding levels will be difficult next year, and La Russa says he will try to reduce the Balkans commitment. Italy recently turned down command of the NATO mission in Kosovo, which would have required at least 100 troops. Even if NATO is eager to disengage from Kosovo, the situation on the ground has worsened, with renewed clashes between Serbian minorities and the Albanian majority following affirmation of Kosovo independence. This could affect plans to reduce troop levels. (For a report on conditions in Belgrade, see DTI July/August, p. 52.)

La Russa also announced plans to reduce the size of the military to 180,000 from 190,000. This is more of a tactical announcement, since the force is already around 185,000 due to a slowdown in the enlistment of new soldiers and reenlistments. The minister hinted at personnel reform, saying there are too many senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and higher-ranking officers. A broad cut of civilian personnel is envisioned, as well.

La Russa pledged to cancel, reduce or postpone procurement programs to achieve €5 billion in savings. The minister points as an example to the proposed acquisition of 25 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3B aircraft, which will be canceled, saving at least €2 billion. In May Eurofighter delivered a price proposal for 124 Tranche 3B aircraft—valued at around €8 billion and including options in weapons and system integration—to the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, which acts on behalf of the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain. The contract is to be signed in 2011. Under the original umbrella contract, Italy was planning to buy 121 Typhoons but will now stop at 96, unless it can sell some Tranche 1 aircraft to a foreign customer.

Another air force program that has been deferred is acquisition of a sigint/intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system, to be jointly operated with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. The platform, a Gulfstream G550, has been specified, and there is a competition underway between Lockheed Martin and Israel Aerospace Industries to provide mission systems.

No decision has been taken on the number of F-35 aircraft that Italy will acquire for the air force and navy, with a tentative combined requirement of 135 A and B versions.

La Russa also wants to end procurement of Fremm multimission frigates at six vessels rather than 10. The navy needs them to replace as many as 12 frigates, some already worn out. The minister has not mentioned a program termination, but wants to defer the decision to procure the remaining four vessels in 2013, possibly selling them to international buyers.

Procurement savings from these efforts will not be immediate. Since almost all program payments are spread over a number of years, the €5 billion of savings could be achieved only in the mid-term.

These moves will have a major impact on Italy's defense industry and be scrutinized by parliament, which has asked for a wide-ranging defense restructuring instead of cuts and cost reductions.


aviationweek.com

[mikemans]

Defensie zou prima binnen budget kunnen blijven als met dat budget slechts dagene gedaan zou worden dat ook bijdraagt aan het efficient en effectief invullen van de gestelde doelen. Teveel van het budget gaat echter verloren aan economische en/of sociaal maatschappelijke doelen c.q. invulling geven aan individuele belangen (semi corruptie).

Dit uit zich voornamelijk in het te duur aanschaffen van niet benodigt materieel (irrationele aanschaf) en kapitaalvernietiging (vervangen van materieel dat nog niet aan vervanging toe is).

[Reinier]

Goed artikel!
De problemen die de Britten hebben, zijn vergelijkbaar met de problemen die wij hebben.

Het grote probleem is dat, zowel de Britten als wij, de politiek aan de ene kant een flexibele krijgsmacht willen hebben met "boots on the ground" en "winning hearts and minds". En aan de andere kant defensie die best de taak van veredelde Rode Kruis wilt uitvoeren, maar ook nog materieel achter de hand moet hebben voor verdediging eigen land/ belangen of grondgebied elders (Falklands, Antillen, etc).
Beide taken/ scenario's liggen ver uit elkaar en kosten veel geld.

Echter bij een flexibele krijgsmacht, in de ogen van politici, horen geen (grote aantallen) tanks, fregatten, onderzeeërs, etc etc. Daar win je immers "the hearts and minds" niet mee. Daarentegen ziet defensie nog wel plaats voor fregatten, tanks, etc. Wellicht logisch en goed te onderbouwen, echter waar defensie de fout in gaat, is dat zij nog steeds als tijdens de Koude Oorlog het beste van het beste willen hebben (deels logisch), maar defensie materieel wordt steeds duurder. Een goed voorbeeld is de JSF.
Dus met krimpend defensie budget en stijgende prijzen van materieel (...) volgt logischer wijze dat er steeds minder kan worden aangeschaft.

Wat moet je doen als defensie die zowel een flexibele als een "traditionele" krijgsmacht taken moeten vervullen met een krimpend budget?
Toch maar de JSF aanschaffen al is maar de helft van het aantal dat je zou willen hebben? Er is behoeft aan 2 vliegdekschepen, maar geld voor maar 1?

Stalin zei al;  "kwantiteit is een kwaliteit op zich". Dus gaan we straks voor €4,5 miljard 45 JSF's aanschaffen of 90 Saab GNG? Is 1 JSF beter dan 2 Saab's? Waarom een heel nieuw ontwerp maken voor 1 JSS voor (...) als je voor de helft van het geld ook een 'simpele' bevoorrader kan bouwen? De JSF is misschien iets beter dan een Saab of Eurofighter, maar is dat 2 keer zoveel geld waard en heb je dat klein beetje extra nodig?

Het inkrimpen van de krijgsmacht heeft defensie zelf in de hand, alleen moeten ze zich afvragen; gaan we voor materieel dat misschien 10% beter is dan het alternatief of kiezen we voor het alternatief maar dan 2 maal zoveel in aantal?

[hudinie]

Mooi stuk om te lezen Dudge, ....ook in de UK is geen visie lijkt het..vindt dat de Britse krijgsmacht de laatste 10 jaar al genoeg heeft ingeleverd, ze waren er zelf bij met Desert Storm met hun Desert Rats..en nu fors bezuinigen op de gemech eenheden ?

[Mourning]

Dudge, bedankt voor het plaatsen van dat stuk! (thumbsup)

[IPA NG]

Overigens wordt die Amerikaanse nucleaire paraplu ook steeds kleiner en is aan het verouderen, en Obama wilt geen nieuwe wapens ontwikkelen.

[IPA NG]

Als goede bondgenoten hun krijgsmacht ook kapot aan het bezuinigen is het des te belangrijker dat wij dit niet doen. We zullen dus meer op onszelf aangewezen zijn in bepaalde scenario's.

[Lex]

British Defense Cuts Could Fracture Alliance

The British Government is about to complete its Defense Review 2010. Scheduled under the former Labor government, the review is taking place under the guiding hand of the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government and in the midst of the most severe economic crisis in Britain's post-war history. The government has made it clear that it intends to close a yawning budget deficit primarily through deep budget cuts and that defense will not be immune from significant reductions.

Estimates of the severity of the hit to the U.K.'s defense budget vary from 15 to 30 percent. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has been told that it will now have to find the funds within its planned resources to maintain the U.K.'s nuclear deterrent. The estimated $32 billion price tag for a new fleet of nuclear missile submarines would act as an explicit tax on the already shrinking resource base for the British military.

Even a 15 percent reduction in defense spending would cause major perturbations to the current defense program. This level of budget cuts would require eliminating tens of thousands of uniformed and civilian personnel, particularly in the Army. Like U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, the British Defense Secretary Liam Fox has proposed significant cuts in overhead activities, including reducing the number of senior military positions.

A 30 percent reduction would gut the British military, rendering it largely irrelevant except for the most prosaic of military tasks. A draft report of possible cuts leaked to the British press includes a 40 percent reduction to the Army's armored vehicle fleet, the loss of a 5,000-strong brigade of troops and the cancellation of programs for new platforms. The Navy could lose two submarines, three amphibious ships and 2,000 sailors and marines. The proposed cuts to the Royal Air Force would be particularly devastating. The RAF could see its entire force of 120 GR4 Tornado fighter-bombers retired, the number of new Eurofighter Typhoons reduced from 160 to 107 planes and the fleet of 36 Hercules transport aircraft replaced by 22 new A400M planes. The long-delayed program to acquire nine Nimrod MR4 reconnaissance aircraft would be vulnerable to cancellation. Ironically, these reductions could make the Joint Strike Fighter program bulletproof since it would be the only way for the U.K. to have a viable future fighter force.

The report concludes that, "if implemented, the cuts will mean that Britain will almost certainly depart the world stage as a major military power and become what military chiefs call a 'medium-scale player.'" In essence, this means that the British military would have to abandon any pretense of being a full-spectrum force and settle for limited, even niche, capabilities.

For more than 60 years Great Britain has been this country's closest ally. Were it not for the special relationship, it is not certain that the United States would have remained in Europe after World War Two or would have agreed to become a member of the NATO alliance. Great Britain has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States through crisis and war, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even today, the British Army is the third largest in NATO, behind only those of the United States and Turkey. But the days of Britain playing Sancho Panza to our Don Quixote may be over.

The cumulative effect of cuts in defense budgets and military forces among virtually all of the NATO membership, including in the United States, could prove devastating to the alliance. For example, Germany's defense minister has proposed cutting that country's military by a third and recommended major cuts in defense programs such as the NH90 transport helicopter, the Tiger combat helicopter, Typhoon Eurofighters or resell the planes and A400 transports. Where all the proposed cuts implemented across the alliance, the result would be that Europe, with a population greater than that of the United States and a GDP to match, would have a military smaller and less capable than that of developing nations such as India and China.

Looming defense cuts in Europe raise questions about that continent's ability to defend itself from all but the smallest and least harmful threats. The United States has long complained about the appearance of shouldering an unequal burden in the defense of Europe. If U.S. allies in Europe lose the ability to provide for its own defense, never mind to project power, then the future of the alliance is very grim. The last anchor holding the United States to the defense of Europe is the special relationship with Great Britain. Deep cuts to that country's military could be the final straw.


----
Daniel Goure, Ph.D.
Early Warning Blog

Defpro.com, 18:28 GMT, September 9, 2010

[Ace1]

Ik heb nog even in mijn foto archief gekeken en heb nog iets gevonden, vorig jaar genomen tijdens de Belgische vlootdagen

Een kleine onderzeeer als je deze vergelijkt met de Walrus?