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#1
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Internationaal) / Re: Internationale fighter ont...
Last post by Sparkplug - Vandaag om 08:40F-35 Tech Upgrade Slips to 2025; 'Truncated' Version in the Fall
April 23, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak
Deliveries of full-up Tech Refresh Three-equipped F-35s, previously expected in the middle of this year, now won't come until 2025, Lockheed Martin officials reported on their April 23 first-quarter earnings call. In the meantime, they hope to deliver a so-called "truncated" version of the hardware/software package this fall.
Chief Executive Officer Jim Taiclet said there will be two releases of TR-3: a "combat training-capable" version that should be delivered in the third quarter of this and a "fully combat-capable" version in 2025. Lockheed has been storing newly-built F-35s with the TR-3 pending completion of testing and integration. Some 70 aircraft are in storage at an undisclosed location, awaiting a green light for delivery.
The factory floor at Lockheed Martin's F-35 factory in Fort Worth, Texas. Lockheed Martin courtesy photo
.../...
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/f-35-tech-upgrade-2025-truncated/
April 23, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak
Deliveries of full-up Tech Refresh Three-equipped F-35s, previously expected in the middle of this year, now won't come until 2025, Lockheed Martin officials reported on their April 23 first-quarter earnings call. In the meantime, they hope to deliver a so-called "truncated" version of the hardware/software package this fall.
Chief Executive Officer Jim Taiclet said there will be two releases of TR-3: a "combat training-capable" version that should be delivered in the third quarter of this and a "fully combat-capable" version in 2025. Lockheed has been storing newly-built F-35s with the TR-3 pending completion of testing and integration. Some 70 aircraft are in storage at an undisclosed location, awaiting a green light for delivery.
The factory floor at Lockheed Martin's F-35 factory in Fort Worth, Texas. Lockheed Martin courtesy photo
.../...
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/f-35-tech-upgrade-2025-truncated/
#2
Nieuwe ontwikkelingen op Defensiegebied / Re: Duitse fregat ontwikkeling...
Last post by Harald - Vandaag om 08:30Zweiter Marinebetriebsstoffversorger auf Kiel gelegt
https://esut.de/2024/04/meldungen/49081/zweiter-marinebetriebsstoffversorger-auf-kiel-gelegt/
https://esut.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Klasse-707-Marineversorger-Stb_Schraeg_Vorne_Oben_NVL-1536x864.jpg
Op de scheepswerf Neptun in Rostock, onderdeel van de Meyer Group, is vandaag de tweede scheepsbrandstofleverancier vastgelegd. Met deze traditionele ceremonie wensen de fabrikant en toekomstige eigenaar het schip en zijn bemanning een veilige reis.
"Tegelijkertijd symboliseert het leggen van de kiel een belangrijke mijlpaal op weg naar de voltooiing van een schip en vervolgens toetreding tot de vloot. Nu de mijlpaal zoals gepland vandaag is bereikt, geven wij als industriële partner ook een zichtbaar signaal af van onze bijdrage aan de modernisering van de Duitse marinevloot", aldus projectmanager Beate Debold van NVL (Naval Vessels Lürssen), die het project leidt. .
De twee nieuwe bevoorradingsschepen voor de Duitse marine worden vervaardigd onder leiding van de in Bremen gevestigde NVL Group in samenwerking met de Meyer Group.
De NVL Groep, die naast het MBV-project als hoofdaannemer verantwoordelijk is voor tal van andere lopende maritieme projecten in de oppervlaktescheepsbouw, zegt dat zij als systeemintegrator ook het projectmanagement op zich neemt, de mariene specifieke delen van de platform en implementatiesysteem, evenals uitgebreide diensten om leveringsgereedheid te creëren, wat een succesvolle inzetbaarheid van schepen in het logistieke systeem van de Bundeswehr garandeert.
Zoals de NVL schrijft, worden de 173 meter lange klasse 707 marine-eenheden vervaardigd, in gebruik genomen en getest in Rostock. De dubbelwandige tankers met een waterverplaatsing van 20.000 ton maken maximaal drie parallelle tankbeurten op zee mogelijk met een laadvolume van bijna 13.000 kubieke meter dieselbrandstof.
Daarnaast beschikken de units over tal van modulaire containerruimtes, bijvoorbeeld voor het transport van voedsel en reserveonderdelen. Om vitale reddingsoperaties efficiënt te ondersteunen, is er ook directe toegang vanaf de cockpit naar het medische station.
Medio 2021 is het inkoopproject ondertekend tussen de opdrachtgever en branchepartners. De eenheden, die vanaf 2025 arriveren, zullen de verouderde marinetankers van de Rhön-klasse vervangen. De marinetankers zullen verantwoordelijk zijn voor de brandstofvoorziening op volle zee met een vaste bemanning van 42 personen en een extra inschepingscontingent van 23 personen.
https://esut.de/2024/04/meldungen/49081/zweiter-marinebetriebsstoffversorger-auf-kiel-gelegt/
https://esut.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Klasse-707-Marineversorger-Stb_Schraeg_Vorne_Oben_NVL-1536x864.jpg
Op de scheepswerf Neptun in Rostock, onderdeel van de Meyer Group, is vandaag de tweede scheepsbrandstofleverancier vastgelegd. Met deze traditionele ceremonie wensen de fabrikant en toekomstige eigenaar het schip en zijn bemanning een veilige reis.
"Tegelijkertijd symboliseert het leggen van de kiel een belangrijke mijlpaal op weg naar de voltooiing van een schip en vervolgens toetreding tot de vloot. Nu de mijlpaal zoals gepland vandaag is bereikt, geven wij als industriële partner ook een zichtbaar signaal af van onze bijdrage aan de modernisering van de Duitse marinevloot", aldus projectmanager Beate Debold van NVL (Naval Vessels Lürssen), die het project leidt. .
De twee nieuwe bevoorradingsschepen voor de Duitse marine worden vervaardigd onder leiding van de in Bremen gevestigde NVL Group in samenwerking met de Meyer Group.
De NVL Groep, die naast het MBV-project als hoofdaannemer verantwoordelijk is voor tal van andere lopende maritieme projecten in de oppervlaktescheepsbouw, zegt dat zij als systeemintegrator ook het projectmanagement op zich neemt, de mariene specifieke delen van de platform en implementatiesysteem, evenals uitgebreide diensten om leveringsgereedheid te creëren, wat een succesvolle inzetbaarheid van schepen in het logistieke systeem van de Bundeswehr garandeert.
Zoals de NVL schrijft, worden de 173 meter lange klasse 707 marine-eenheden vervaardigd, in gebruik genomen en getest in Rostock. De dubbelwandige tankers met een waterverplaatsing van 20.000 ton maken maximaal drie parallelle tankbeurten op zee mogelijk met een laadvolume van bijna 13.000 kubieke meter dieselbrandstof.
Daarnaast beschikken de units over tal van modulaire containerruimtes, bijvoorbeeld voor het transport van voedsel en reserveonderdelen. Om vitale reddingsoperaties efficiënt te ondersteunen, is er ook directe toegang vanaf de cockpit naar het medische station.
Medio 2021 is het inkoopproject ondertekend tussen de opdrachtgever en branchepartners. De eenheden, die vanaf 2025 arriveren, zullen de verouderde marinetankers van de Rhön-klasse vervangen. De marinetankers zullen verantwoordelijk zijn voor de brandstofvoorziening op volle zee met een vaste bemanning van 42 personen en een extra inschepingscontingent van 23 personen.
#3
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Nationaal) / Re: Rijksbegroting & Politieke...
Last post by Master Mack - Vandaag om 08:25Citaat van: Zander op 25/04/2024 | 23:49 uurWat er vooral niet gebeurd is het opbouwen van productie.Tuurlijk willen we allemaal sneller maar 30 jaar afbraak zort ervoor dat we niet in één keer van ze achteruit in de vijfde versnelling kunnen schakelen. Met te weinig mensen nu even een munitiefabriek contract fixen bijvoorbeeld liever gister maar er zijn nog heel veel naïeve sterke machten en krachten die denken dat ze de vrede bewaren door ons te vertragen. Goed bedoeld maar helaas wat me altijd weer doet denken aan die Engelse PM zwaaiend met dat papiertje vlak voor WO2 uitbrak.
Met regels winnen we geen oorlog.
Pure politiek correcte bullshit allemaal.
We kunnen zo veel meer doen als de politiek de regels aannde kant schuift en dit alles als een echte crisis gaat behandelen.
In de Covid pandemie konden ook alle regels aangepast worden gedurende het spel. Pure politieke onwil en besef van urgentie.
#4
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Internationaal) / Re: Internationale Helicopter ...
Last post by Harald - Vandaag om 08:23Head start: Early '25 may be first flight for Black Hawk with T901 engine
Sikorsky is using remaining FARA dollars to test out the new T901 engine in anticipation of integrating it on a UH-60 M Black Hawk later this year.
GE's prototype of its T901 turbine, selected by the Army for its Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP)
The US Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is dead, but Sikorsky is using the remaining dollars for the year testing out a new engine it hopes to fly a UH-60M Black Hawk with early next year.
"You could kind of view this as giving us a head start," the company's president Paul Lemmo told reporters on Wednesday.
After a lengthy delay receiving General Electric's Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP), also known as the T901, last year, Sikorsky and Bell began integrating them into their respective FARA prototypes. By February, though, the Army announced that they would halt FARA work at the end of fiscal 2024 and delay T901 production.
Since T901 is also slated to be integrated into the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache fleets and Sikorsky still has FARA money for its Raider X, it is using the last few months focusing on getting that engine ready for its Black Hawk fleet.
On April 10, the company "lit off" the T901 engine and turned rotors at a "low speed" for the first time on its FARA prototype, Lemmo said.
"This is the first time it's under a full load and a real aircraft, you know, turning rotors," he added.
The plan is to continue doing similar ground runs to gather as much data as possible about the engine, while also getting a UH-60M Black Hawk ready for its integration.
"We are burning down risk for the ITEP engine to go on the Black Hawk," he added.
If all goes as planned, Lemmo said the company will receive a new T901 this summer, spend about a month integrating it into the Black Hawk and then spend five months conducting ground runs at various speeds. The goal is to have the helo up in the air shortly thereafter, around the early 2025 timeframe.
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/head-start-early-25-may-be-first-flight-for-black-hawk-with-t901-engine/
Sikorsky is using remaining FARA dollars to test out the new T901 engine in anticipation of integrating it on a UH-60 M Black Hawk later this year.
GE's prototype of its T901 turbine, selected by the Army for its Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP)
The US Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is dead, but Sikorsky is using the remaining dollars for the year testing out a new engine it hopes to fly a UH-60M Black Hawk with early next year.
"You could kind of view this as giving us a head start," the company's president Paul Lemmo told reporters on Wednesday.
After a lengthy delay receiving General Electric's Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP), also known as the T901, last year, Sikorsky and Bell began integrating them into their respective FARA prototypes. By February, though, the Army announced that they would halt FARA work at the end of fiscal 2024 and delay T901 production.
Since T901 is also slated to be integrated into the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache fleets and Sikorsky still has FARA money for its Raider X, it is using the last few months focusing on getting that engine ready for its Black Hawk fleet.
On April 10, the company "lit off" the T901 engine and turned rotors at a "low speed" for the first time on its FARA prototype, Lemmo said.
"This is the first time it's under a full load and a real aircraft, you know, turning rotors," he added.
The plan is to continue doing similar ground runs to gather as much data as possible about the engine, while also getting a UH-60M Black Hawk ready for its integration.
"We are burning down risk for the ITEP engine to go on the Black Hawk," he added.
If all goes as planned, Lemmo said the company will receive a new T901 this summer, spend about a month integrating it into the Black Hawk and then spend five months conducting ground runs at various speeds. The goal is to have the helo up in the air shortly thereafter, around the early 2025 timeframe.
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/head-start-early-25-may-be-first-flight-for-black-hawk-with-t901-engine/
#5
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Internationaal) / Re: Internationale fighter ont...
Last post by Harald - Vandaag om 08:19Croatian Air Force welcome the arrival of six Rafale fighters
The Croatian Air Force (Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana, HRZ i PZO) officially received its first six Rafale fighter jets in a ceremony held on Apr. 25, at the 91st operational base near Zagreb. This marks a significant milestone in the country's ongoing military modernization efforts.
https://alert5.com/2024/04/26/croatian-air-force-welcome-the-arrival-of-six-rafale-fighters/
The Croatian Air Force (Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzračna obrana, HRZ i PZO) officially received its first six Rafale fighter jets in a ceremony held on Apr. 25, at the 91st operational base near Zagreb. This marks a significant milestone in the country's ongoing military modernization efforts.
https://alert5.com/2024/04/26/croatian-air-force-welcome-the-arrival-of-six-rafale-fighters/
#6
Nieuwe ontwikkelingen op Defensiegebied / Re: US Combat Ship Decision Co...
Last post by Harald - Vandaag om 08:09RAND: What Does The U.S. Navy Need In Its Future Combatants?
Naval News asked the RAND Corporation for their opinions on what the U.S. Navy's next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X), should have in terms of designing the plug-in Payload Module. The DDG(X) Payload Module option is a hull insert that can accommodate, for example, additional vertical launch missile cells to a Mission Module Bay to additional interior rooms.
A notional design concept of how the next-generation DDG(X) destroyer might appear.
Retired U.S. Navy captain, Dr. Bradley Martin, director of the RAND National Security Supply Chain Institute, and a senior policy researcher at RAND, answered Naval News' media inquiry. Dr. Martin has been featured on Naval News before with his comments on the DDG(X) and for "What the U.S. Navy Really Needs."
As Dr. Martin states in his commentary, the U.S. Navy's next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X) is still in its very preliminary design stages, and at this time, it is unknown if DDG(X) will even incorporate the Destroyer Payload Module Option hull insert as a future capability. Therefore, Dr. Martin instead provided a commentary on what criteria the U.S. Navy should follow for its future surface combatants and if the Destroyer Payload Module Option is even needed.
What Does the U.S. Navy Need in its Future Combatants? By Dr. Bradley Martin, RAND.
"Recent events in the Red Sea have shown the unique value of capable surface combatants. Looking at the environment where surface combatants operate, billions of tons of cargo on tens of thousands of ships move goods around the world every day. Enabling the continued movement of that shipping is a fundamental mission of a Navy, particularly one like that of the United States which includes among its missions protecting the global commons. In the Red Sea, U.S. Navy Burke-class destroyers are providing air and surface defense in ways few other joint force capabilities can provide. Surface ships are not the best capability everywhere, but they remain for the most part highly useful and effective platforms across a spectrum of missions and conflict scenarios.
"The original question posed to me by Naval News was which modules should be developed for the prospective DDG-X class, given the possibility that modular development might become the preferred course. Although I understand the desire for some level of certainty on preferred combat systems, this seems to me an unduly specific question at this point. I've accordingly modified the question to one about requirements, specifically capability requirements and then have added an additional question about numbers needed to be effective.
"Too often, individual systems have been developed to very high levels of capability but were then so expensive that only a few could ever be developed. There are times when only a few very capable platforms are the best choice to meet threats and challenges. But, for ships, they can only be in one place at once. The questions cannot be just "what," but also "how many"?
What do surface ships do for the Navy?
"Far back into antiquity and likely well into the future, the majority of ships in the Navy are surface ships. These ships may have widely different purposes and armaments. Aircraft carriers are surface ships just as surely as are minesweepers. Surface combatants are defined primarily by missions they are capable of performing using the weapons and systems installed. U.S. Navy surface combatants are generally multi-mission and have systems to carry out anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare. All can land and refuel helicopters; many can host and maintain helicopters. For our purposes, we will identify surface combatants as guided missile cruisers (CGs), guided missile destroyers (DDGs), guided missile frigates (FFGs), and littoral combat ships (LCS).
"Every surface combatant except LCS is multi-mission, in the sense that each ship has systems allowing it to conduct several different warfare missions, ranging from multi-domain defense of the whole force to strikes against land targets. The ships are also able to carry out more than one mission at a time. For example, CGs and DDGs have simultaneously launched strikes and performed area air defense, and could conceivably conduct anti-surface warfare at the same time. Embarked helicopters could also be carrying out anti-submarine warfare in conjunction with ship systems. In short, a single ship can perform a wide variety of missions, either by itself or as part of a larger task force. These ships can, moreover, protect themselves, participate in command and control networks, receive and process intelligence, and carry out electronic countermeasures. The FFG-62 class now under construction is also conceived as multi-mission, although with a smaller ordnance load and with the understanding that it will not have the same capacity as DDGs or CGs.
"Ability to carry out a variety of missions is facilitated by the system for weapons load-out. U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers keep their strike, anti-air, and anti-surface weapons in vertical launching cannisters, which allows considerable variation in mission package load-out. This same system will be used in the Constellation-class guided missile frigate. However, these weapons have to be connected to some kind of weapons direction system. Spruance-class destroyers were equipped with the vertical launching system, but were not equipped with a three-dimensional air defense radar system, which meant there was little point in putting anti-aircraft missiles into the launching cells.
"LCS differs from other combatants in being configured to carry out one primary mission at a time. Each platform has self-defense and basic control and mobility systems and can embark helicopters. But, the mission modules are for single missions – which equip the ship for anti-surface or mine countermeasures missions – and there is no means to allow a rapid shift of mission focus. If, for example, an LCS receives a mine countermeasures mission module, that is the mission that the ship is likely to perform for years following. This concept is to a degree different than the original mission module conception, which implied that modules could be changed with relative ease, even in expeditionary conditions. Delays in module development and recognition that integrating new modules would be a time-consuming process seem to have forced a change to effectively make these ships either escorts or mine countermeasures vessels for their service lives.
A force structure mix
"Whatever a warship's capability might be, it can only be in one place at one time, and there are situations where only parts of a warship's capability are essential. For example, during the "tanker wars" of the late 1980s, several surface ships were involved in escorting oil tankers and natural gas carriers through the Persian Gulf to Kuwait and then back. The ships needed anti-air and anti-surface capabilities, but the major consideration is that they needed to be in the area. The key was not to have one or two ships with perfect capability, but enough ships with sufficient capability to carry out a mission that was likely to take several months with many Persian Gulf transits.
"For many years, from the 1970s until after the Cold War, the U.S. Navy sought a "high-low" mix of surface combatants, in which there were both very capable combatants that were assessed as able to perform specific warfare missions effectively and a large number of smaller ships. The smaller ships might be less inherently capable than the high-end combatants, but they would be sufficient and, most importantly, they would be available.
"The Navy moved away from this concept for several years as the Perry-class frigate went out of service and the LCSs continued to experience program delays. DDGs came to be not just a capable high-end combatant, but also an all-purpose deployer for situations requiring far less in terms of capability. This high use has created material readiness problems for these ships as they were deployed for a whole variety of missions, sometimes at the expense of scheduled maintenance. There were a few cases where the Navy failed to meet presence missions because ships were not available. Considerable body of evidence indicates that ships, specifically surface combatants, were experiencing lengthy delays once in maintenance periods due to issues caused by lengthy deployments.
"So, what seems clear is that there probably is no single ship that can meet the complete spectrum of demand. Different threat circumstances require different capabilities, and trying to fit all these capabilities on to one platform is unrealistic, at least at any kind of realistic cost. Even if we were hoping to create a modular design allowing substitutions of different capabilities, the fundamental issue is that any ship can only be in one place at one time. So, the Navy cannot realistically separate capability development from force structure requirements.
What should the overall surface force structure look like?
"There are several key characteristics that should be considered in the surface combatant force structure. Note that these should be thought of as applying across the force: that's not to say the whole force has identical characteristics, but that in totality, ships exist in sufficient quantity with sufficient capability to meet the range of missions.
"There are several characteristics that every ship should possess. These key common core characteristics should include:
- Ability to be produced in sufficient quantity to meet world-wide presence demands. This implies the procurement cost is within the nation's ability to pay for and produce.
- Closely related is the ability to be sustained over a long period. This requirement implies that the manning requirements must be in line with the nation's demography, that the maintenance requirements not be as onerous as they've historically been, and that ease of maintenance and repair is built into the platforms.
- Sufficient self-defense capabilities against every class of threat so that ships do not become easy targets. For example, a ship might not be able to serve as an area air defense platform, but it should have the ability to provide point defense to protect itself.
Ability to securely connect with and routinely use world-wide communications and intelligence networks. Although ability to securely communicate has long been a requirement for deploying Navy ships, current requirements are for nearly continuous communication and future requirements are likely to grow. There are vulnerabilities associated with being part of a network, which can be even more acute when there's a requirement to transmit, but the world will likely not return to a place where ships could rely on broad and infrequently transmitted orders.
- Ability to embark a helicopter or comparable unmanned aerial system. This should also be considered a key common feature, enabling multiple different mission areas, and indeed sometimes providing a capability the ship by itself could not effectively deliver.
"After all these other basic requirements are met, the issue of capability to meet broader mission requirements comes to the fore. Here, very real tradeoffs between costs, capabilities, and numbers are encountered. We will examine these tradeoffs in more detail.
"As in the Red Sea, threats to international shipping can come from a variety of different sources, but the threat from air and missile sources seem particularly acute, with aerial drones, for example, becoming particularly widespread. That suggests that area air and missile defense is a particularly critical mission. However, making a ship capable in this area adds considerably to the cost when we consider the sensors and weapons direction capabilities required. To illustrate, an LCS class without such systems costs about $700 million while a Constellation- class frigate, similar in size to LCS but with a SPY radar for air defense, will likely cost over $1.3 billion. This makes clear that including the capability for area air defense would mean there would have to be fewer ships. Making a ship into a capable air defense platform is the equivalent of half a ship without such equipment. If simple numbers are part of the calculus, air defense capability for a large number of ships is likely out of reach. The exact number of ships that should have this capability requires more analysis than we can provide here. But, we can say that not every surface combatant can have this capability, not if there's to be a sustainable and sufficiently numerous surface fleet.
"It's important to consider the question of numbers because there are other missions surface ships might reasonably have to provide. If we look at Red Sea operations, the threat is not just from missiles and drones but also from boarding teams harassing transiting ships. Looking at other theaters, unmanned surface vessels (USVs) have attacked and sunk Russian combatants in the Black Sea. Air defense capabilities would not be relevant in defending against these threats. Indeed, trying to do operations against boarding teams or USVs while also providing air defense across a wide area might be incompatible. A ship could possess both sets of capabilities, but the reality is that doing more than one thing in more than one area would take two ships. In fact, the overall capability might best be served by having several ships with different capabilities than a small number with multiple capabilities.
"We should note here also that the U.S. Navy is developing its own USVs, which can to a degree add capability and capacity for many of these missions. USVs can be networked, armed a variety of different ways, and could be an important addition to surface ship force structure and capability. Their potential roles have some limitations – visit, board, search, and seizure, for example, requires a boarding team – but their potential capabilities and missions require as much consideration as those of larger manned platforms.
So, how to establish the requirements?
"The U.S. Navy regularly conducts a force structure assessment to arrive at a number of ships needed to meet a set of planning and presence requirements. This assessment, however, assumes a set of capabilities and does not attempt to balance numbers against systems capabilities. There is a complete joint process for the validations of capabilities requirements – the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. This system has long been criticized for being cumbersome, but the issue in this particular instance is that the focus on capabilities may cause insufficient focus on numbers.
"The most complete answer is to first consider the most likely missions, which are not necessarily the ones requiring individual platforms and the most advanced capabilities. Those mission could then be associated with a number that could then be connected with a set of capabilities residing in a joint and fleet architecture.
"That approach could yield a better mechanism for determining the capabilities particular ship classes might require. A modular approach might be effective in some cases. A ship could conceivably have modules that augment its ability in one scenario and then have them replaced by some other augmentations in another. Some examples might be ballistic missile defense or advanced electronic attack or intelligence collection. In some cases, the modular augmentations might not be difficult, but in some others, they could be extremely complicated and might require shipyard periods to complete. The history with the LCS modules does not suggest that this will be an easy process. Modules also do not solve the problem of force structure. However a ship is configured, it can still only be in one place at one time.
"However, an architectural approach where numbers are considered as well as capabilities across a spectrum of use, from steady state to global protection of trade routes to intense warfare, might illuminate when a modular approach is the best. There likely will be times when a rapid change-out of modules might be the most effective way to keep a credible presence. However, what has not to date been designed is a force that together creates a flexible and effective capability. Such a force would likely include a mix of ships, large and small, sophisticated and simple, multi- and single-mission, manned and unmanned."
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/rand-what-does-the-u-s-navy-need-in-its-future-combatants/
Naval News asked the RAND Corporation for their opinions on what the U.S. Navy's next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X), should have in terms of designing the plug-in Payload Module. The DDG(X) Payload Module option is a hull insert that can accommodate, for example, additional vertical launch missile cells to a Mission Module Bay to additional interior rooms.
A notional design concept of how the next-generation DDG(X) destroyer might appear.
Retired U.S. Navy captain, Dr. Bradley Martin, director of the RAND National Security Supply Chain Institute, and a senior policy researcher at RAND, answered Naval News' media inquiry. Dr. Martin has been featured on Naval News before with his comments on the DDG(X) and for "What the U.S. Navy Really Needs."
As Dr. Martin states in his commentary, the U.S. Navy's next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X) is still in its very preliminary design stages, and at this time, it is unknown if DDG(X) will even incorporate the Destroyer Payload Module Option hull insert as a future capability. Therefore, Dr. Martin instead provided a commentary on what criteria the U.S. Navy should follow for its future surface combatants and if the Destroyer Payload Module Option is even needed.
What Does the U.S. Navy Need in its Future Combatants? By Dr. Bradley Martin, RAND.
"Recent events in the Red Sea have shown the unique value of capable surface combatants. Looking at the environment where surface combatants operate, billions of tons of cargo on tens of thousands of ships move goods around the world every day. Enabling the continued movement of that shipping is a fundamental mission of a Navy, particularly one like that of the United States which includes among its missions protecting the global commons. In the Red Sea, U.S. Navy Burke-class destroyers are providing air and surface defense in ways few other joint force capabilities can provide. Surface ships are not the best capability everywhere, but they remain for the most part highly useful and effective platforms across a spectrum of missions and conflict scenarios.
"The original question posed to me by Naval News was which modules should be developed for the prospective DDG-X class, given the possibility that modular development might become the preferred course. Although I understand the desire for some level of certainty on preferred combat systems, this seems to me an unduly specific question at this point. I've accordingly modified the question to one about requirements, specifically capability requirements and then have added an additional question about numbers needed to be effective.
"Too often, individual systems have been developed to very high levels of capability but were then so expensive that only a few could ever be developed. There are times when only a few very capable platforms are the best choice to meet threats and challenges. But, for ships, they can only be in one place at once. The questions cannot be just "what," but also "how many"?
What do surface ships do for the Navy?
"Far back into antiquity and likely well into the future, the majority of ships in the Navy are surface ships. These ships may have widely different purposes and armaments. Aircraft carriers are surface ships just as surely as are minesweepers. Surface combatants are defined primarily by missions they are capable of performing using the weapons and systems installed. U.S. Navy surface combatants are generally multi-mission and have systems to carry out anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare. All can land and refuel helicopters; many can host and maintain helicopters. For our purposes, we will identify surface combatants as guided missile cruisers (CGs), guided missile destroyers (DDGs), guided missile frigates (FFGs), and littoral combat ships (LCS).
"Every surface combatant except LCS is multi-mission, in the sense that each ship has systems allowing it to conduct several different warfare missions, ranging from multi-domain defense of the whole force to strikes against land targets. The ships are also able to carry out more than one mission at a time. For example, CGs and DDGs have simultaneously launched strikes and performed area air defense, and could conceivably conduct anti-surface warfare at the same time. Embarked helicopters could also be carrying out anti-submarine warfare in conjunction with ship systems. In short, a single ship can perform a wide variety of missions, either by itself or as part of a larger task force. These ships can, moreover, protect themselves, participate in command and control networks, receive and process intelligence, and carry out electronic countermeasures. The FFG-62 class now under construction is also conceived as multi-mission, although with a smaller ordnance load and with the understanding that it will not have the same capacity as DDGs or CGs.
"Ability to carry out a variety of missions is facilitated by the system for weapons load-out. U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers keep their strike, anti-air, and anti-surface weapons in vertical launching cannisters, which allows considerable variation in mission package load-out. This same system will be used in the Constellation-class guided missile frigate. However, these weapons have to be connected to some kind of weapons direction system. Spruance-class destroyers were equipped with the vertical launching system, but were not equipped with a three-dimensional air defense radar system, which meant there was little point in putting anti-aircraft missiles into the launching cells.
"LCS differs from other combatants in being configured to carry out one primary mission at a time. Each platform has self-defense and basic control and mobility systems and can embark helicopters. But, the mission modules are for single missions – which equip the ship for anti-surface or mine countermeasures missions – and there is no means to allow a rapid shift of mission focus. If, for example, an LCS receives a mine countermeasures mission module, that is the mission that the ship is likely to perform for years following. This concept is to a degree different than the original mission module conception, which implied that modules could be changed with relative ease, even in expeditionary conditions. Delays in module development and recognition that integrating new modules would be a time-consuming process seem to have forced a change to effectively make these ships either escorts or mine countermeasures vessels for their service lives.
A force structure mix
"Whatever a warship's capability might be, it can only be in one place at one time, and there are situations where only parts of a warship's capability are essential. For example, during the "tanker wars" of the late 1980s, several surface ships were involved in escorting oil tankers and natural gas carriers through the Persian Gulf to Kuwait and then back. The ships needed anti-air and anti-surface capabilities, but the major consideration is that they needed to be in the area. The key was not to have one or two ships with perfect capability, but enough ships with sufficient capability to carry out a mission that was likely to take several months with many Persian Gulf transits.
"For many years, from the 1970s until after the Cold War, the U.S. Navy sought a "high-low" mix of surface combatants, in which there were both very capable combatants that were assessed as able to perform specific warfare missions effectively and a large number of smaller ships. The smaller ships might be less inherently capable than the high-end combatants, but they would be sufficient and, most importantly, they would be available.
"The Navy moved away from this concept for several years as the Perry-class frigate went out of service and the LCSs continued to experience program delays. DDGs came to be not just a capable high-end combatant, but also an all-purpose deployer for situations requiring far less in terms of capability. This high use has created material readiness problems for these ships as they were deployed for a whole variety of missions, sometimes at the expense of scheduled maintenance. There were a few cases where the Navy failed to meet presence missions because ships were not available. Considerable body of evidence indicates that ships, specifically surface combatants, were experiencing lengthy delays once in maintenance periods due to issues caused by lengthy deployments.
"So, what seems clear is that there probably is no single ship that can meet the complete spectrum of demand. Different threat circumstances require different capabilities, and trying to fit all these capabilities on to one platform is unrealistic, at least at any kind of realistic cost. Even if we were hoping to create a modular design allowing substitutions of different capabilities, the fundamental issue is that any ship can only be in one place at one time. So, the Navy cannot realistically separate capability development from force structure requirements.
What should the overall surface force structure look like?
"There are several key characteristics that should be considered in the surface combatant force structure. Note that these should be thought of as applying across the force: that's not to say the whole force has identical characteristics, but that in totality, ships exist in sufficient quantity with sufficient capability to meet the range of missions.
"There are several characteristics that every ship should possess. These key common core characteristics should include:
- Ability to be produced in sufficient quantity to meet world-wide presence demands. This implies the procurement cost is within the nation's ability to pay for and produce.
- Closely related is the ability to be sustained over a long period. This requirement implies that the manning requirements must be in line with the nation's demography, that the maintenance requirements not be as onerous as they've historically been, and that ease of maintenance and repair is built into the platforms.
- Sufficient self-defense capabilities against every class of threat so that ships do not become easy targets. For example, a ship might not be able to serve as an area air defense platform, but it should have the ability to provide point defense to protect itself.
Ability to securely connect with and routinely use world-wide communications and intelligence networks. Although ability to securely communicate has long been a requirement for deploying Navy ships, current requirements are for nearly continuous communication and future requirements are likely to grow. There are vulnerabilities associated with being part of a network, which can be even more acute when there's a requirement to transmit, but the world will likely not return to a place where ships could rely on broad and infrequently transmitted orders.
- Ability to embark a helicopter or comparable unmanned aerial system. This should also be considered a key common feature, enabling multiple different mission areas, and indeed sometimes providing a capability the ship by itself could not effectively deliver.
"After all these other basic requirements are met, the issue of capability to meet broader mission requirements comes to the fore. Here, very real tradeoffs between costs, capabilities, and numbers are encountered. We will examine these tradeoffs in more detail.
"As in the Red Sea, threats to international shipping can come from a variety of different sources, but the threat from air and missile sources seem particularly acute, with aerial drones, for example, becoming particularly widespread. That suggests that area air and missile defense is a particularly critical mission. However, making a ship capable in this area adds considerably to the cost when we consider the sensors and weapons direction capabilities required. To illustrate, an LCS class without such systems costs about $700 million while a Constellation- class frigate, similar in size to LCS but with a SPY radar for air defense, will likely cost over $1.3 billion. This makes clear that including the capability for area air defense would mean there would have to be fewer ships. Making a ship into a capable air defense platform is the equivalent of half a ship without such equipment. If simple numbers are part of the calculus, air defense capability for a large number of ships is likely out of reach. The exact number of ships that should have this capability requires more analysis than we can provide here. But, we can say that not every surface combatant can have this capability, not if there's to be a sustainable and sufficiently numerous surface fleet.
"It's important to consider the question of numbers because there are other missions surface ships might reasonably have to provide. If we look at Red Sea operations, the threat is not just from missiles and drones but also from boarding teams harassing transiting ships. Looking at other theaters, unmanned surface vessels (USVs) have attacked and sunk Russian combatants in the Black Sea. Air defense capabilities would not be relevant in defending against these threats. Indeed, trying to do operations against boarding teams or USVs while also providing air defense across a wide area might be incompatible. A ship could possess both sets of capabilities, but the reality is that doing more than one thing in more than one area would take two ships. In fact, the overall capability might best be served by having several ships with different capabilities than a small number with multiple capabilities.
"We should note here also that the U.S. Navy is developing its own USVs, which can to a degree add capability and capacity for many of these missions. USVs can be networked, armed a variety of different ways, and could be an important addition to surface ship force structure and capability. Their potential roles have some limitations – visit, board, search, and seizure, for example, requires a boarding team – but their potential capabilities and missions require as much consideration as those of larger manned platforms.
So, how to establish the requirements?
"The U.S. Navy regularly conducts a force structure assessment to arrive at a number of ships needed to meet a set of planning and presence requirements. This assessment, however, assumes a set of capabilities and does not attempt to balance numbers against systems capabilities. There is a complete joint process for the validations of capabilities requirements – the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. This system has long been criticized for being cumbersome, but the issue in this particular instance is that the focus on capabilities may cause insufficient focus on numbers.
"The most complete answer is to first consider the most likely missions, which are not necessarily the ones requiring individual platforms and the most advanced capabilities. Those mission could then be associated with a number that could then be connected with a set of capabilities residing in a joint and fleet architecture.
"That approach could yield a better mechanism for determining the capabilities particular ship classes might require. A modular approach might be effective in some cases. A ship could conceivably have modules that augment its ability in one scenario and then have them replaced by some other augmentations in another. Some examples might be ballistic missile defense or advanced electronic attack or intelligence collection. In some cases, the modular augmentations might not be difficult, but in some others, they could be extremely complicated and might require shipyard periods to complete. The history with the LCS modules does not suggest that this will be an easy process. Modules also do not solve the problem of force structure. However a ship is configured, it can still only be in one place at one time.
"However, an architectural approach where numbers are considered as well as capabilities across a spectrum of use, from steady state to global protection of trade routes to intense warfare, might illuminate when a modular approach is the best. There likely will be times when a rapid change-out of modules might be the most effective way to keep a credible presence. However, what has not to date been designed is a force that together creates a flexible and effective capability. Such a force would likely include a mix of ships, large and small, sophisticated and simple, multi- and single-mission, manned and unmanned."
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/rand-what-does-the-u-s-navy-need-in-its-future-combatants/
#7
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Nationaal) / Re: Rijksbegroting & Politieke...
Last post by Zander - 25/04/2024 | 23:49 uurCitaat van: Huzaar1 op 25/04/2024 | 22:39 uurJe weet niet wat er allemaal gebeurt en er zijn gewoon regels.Wat er vooral niet gebeurd is het opbouwen van productie.
Met regels winnen we geen oorlog.
Pure politiek correcte bullshit allemaal.
We kunnen zo veel meer doen als de politiek de regels aannde kant schuift en dit alles als een echte crisis gaat behandelen.
In de Covid pandemie konden ook alle regels aangepast worden gedurende het spel. Pure politieke onwil en besef van urgentie.
#8
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Nationaal) / Re: Rijksbegroting & Politieke...
Last post by Huzaar1 - 25/04/2024 | 22:39 uurCitaat van: Zander op 25/04/2024 | 21:38 uurAls het allemaal echt zo doordrongen van urgentie zou zijn, dan zouden we inmiddels allang een oorlogseconomie hebben en zouden de productielijnen allang zijn uitgebreid door financiële input vanuit de politiek.
Die vrijmarkt eindigt wanneer Ivan op de Dam staat.
Je weet niet wat er allemaal gebeurt en er zijn gewoon regels.
#9
KM / Re: LPX
Last post by Master Mack - 25/04/2024 | 21:55 uur1 ding is zeker drones voegen een compleet nieuwe dimensie toe aan het oorlogvoeren. Dus lijkt het me meer dan logisch dat we voor de ATS kiezen voor een mini flattop 6 zou kunnen maar dan moeten ze zoals we hieronder hebben beschreven wel een stevige eigen bewapening hebben om zelfstandig een deel van de taken te kunnen uitvoeren. We moeten nog even geduld hebben nou even dan
#10
Defensie Nieuws & Media (Nationaal) / Re: Rijksbegroting & Politieke...
Last post by Zander - 25/04/2024 | 21:38 uurCitaat van: Huzaar1 op 25/04/2024 | 19:19 uurZo werkt een vrije markt nu eenmaal. Je oordeelt zonder enige wetenschap of kennis van wat er speelt en zou beter moeten weten.Als het allemaal echt zo doordrongen van urgentie zou zijn, dan zouden we inmiddels allang een oorlogseconomie hebben en zouden de productielijnen allang zijn uitgebreid door financiële input vanuit de politiek.
Die vrijmarkt eindigt wanneer Ivan op de Dam staat.