Internationale ontwikkelingen maritiem

[Harald]

Concepten van een jaar oud rondom het systeem

Ik denk ook idd dat "oude" ideeën en technieken nu weer getest en uitgeprobeerd worden, om tot een nieuw/verbeterd concept te komen welke ze willen gaan toepassen voor de bevoorrading, herladen van de VLS-en op zee. 

[Parera]

US Navy Set To Trial VLS Reloading System At Sea

The US Navy is planning a key proof-of-concept test this year to prove a system designed to enable the reloading of vertical launch missile silos at sea.

...

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/us-navy-set-to-trial-vls-reloading-system-at-sea/

Concepten van een jaar oud rondom het systeem

[Parera]

Australia To Double Fleet Size With Small Warships

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) fleet will grow from 11 surface combatants to 26 under plans announced by Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, today in Sydney.

...

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/australia-to-double-fleet-size-with-small-warships/

Eerst zien, dan geloven.  De Australische marine staat nou niet zo bekend om haar goed lopende materieel projecten. Wat we wel zien nu bij zowel de Britten als Ausies (en ook de Yanks) is dat de er weer een 2e rangs surface combatant in beeld komt. Deze zijn goedkoper, multirole of zelfs general purpose maar ook met (veel) minder bemanning.

Zoiets zie ik wel voor me bij het vOPV traject voor Nederland, een relatief goedkoop fregat voor algemene taken maar die wel mee kunnen in het hoge geweldsspectrum binnen een taakgroep.

[Harald]

US Navy Set To Trial VLS Reloading System At Sea

The US Navy is planning a key proof-of-concept test this year to prove a system designed to enable the reloading of vertical launch missile silos at sea.

Addressing the WEST 2024 conference in San Diego on 15 February, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Carlos Del Toro said he had instructed the navy to perform an at-sea demonstration of VLS reloading with the Transferrable Re-Arming Mechanism (TRAM) equipment in mid-2024. TRAM, which has been developed 'in-house' by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division to allow the reloading of vertical launcher cells in conditions up to Sea State 5, uses an articulated crane that can lift and rotate a missile canister vertically, then lower it into the launcher cell.

US Navy ships are currently required to return to port to replenish vertical launch silos once missile loadouts are exhausted or diminished. The MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) was originally designed with a so-called strikedown crane to allow for re-arming at sea, but it proved difficult to use in service and was later removed.

Del Toro told the WEST 2024 conference that the navy urgently needed a means to top up weapons magazines while underway – particularly in the Pacific theater. "The capability to rapidly re-arm our missile shooters at sea using our time-proven—and singular—advantage in connected replenishment will revolutionize surface warfare," he said. "Re-arming our missile combatants at sea will make our fleet more lethal—and more present—sending an unmistakable signal to our allies and deterring our adversaries."

SECNAV added that, following discussions with Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sam Paparo, plans are now being drawn up to get an at-sea re-arm capability to the fleet. "I've directed an at-sea demonstration no later than this summer for reloading our vertical launch systems at sea using the [TRAM] mechanism developed at Port Hueneme," Del Toro said, adding: "As we move deeper into this critical decade, the near-term deterrent effect of fielding TRAM in the fleet cannot be overstated. "You don't have to look any further than the dozens of missile engagements conducted in the Red Sea by our destroyers to realize that a capability like TRAM is long overdue."

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/us-navy-set-to-trial-vls-reloading-system-at-sea/

[Harald]

Australia To Double Fleet Size With Small Warships

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) fleet will grow from 11 surface combatants to 26 under plans announced by Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, today in Sydney.

As part of the government's long-awaited response to a surface fleet review commissioned last year, Marles said, Australia will build a new fleet of "Tier 2" warships which will complement a smaller number of "Tier 1" combatants. This decision, he said, will see the size of the surface fleet more than double by the mid-2040s.

In total Australia will build 17 new "Tier 2" combatants under the plan. The mainstay of this force will be 11 general purpose guided missile frigates, able to perform air-defence, land-strike and escort missions. While eight of these vessels will be built in Western Australia, the first three will be built overseas, in Spain, Germany, Korea or Japan to enable delivery before the end of the decade. Designs from these four countries have been shortlisted for the requirement according to Minister Marles, with the final selection to be made next year.

The rest of the "Tier 2" force will be made up of six "optionally crewed" large surface vessels, built in Western Australia and based on work underway in the United States on large-unmanned surface combatants, that will "significantly enhance" the RANs long-range strike capabilities. According to the review, they'll be armed at least 32 vertical launch systems, and equipped with the AEGIS combat system.

These will be complemented by nine "Tier 1" combatants, including six Hunter class frigates and three Hobart class air warfare destroyers, as well as a fleet of 25 "minor war vessels" including six Arafura class OPVs and up-to 19 Evolved Cape Class Patrol boats. The first Hunter will now be delivered to the RAN in 2032, with the final vessel delivered in the early-2040s, at that time the shipyard in Adelaide will "immediately" begin work on replacements for the Hobart class.

In the shorter term, the two oldest Anzac class frigates; HMAS Anzac and HMAS Arunta will be decommissioned early, with HMAS Anzac to be decommissioned this year and Arunta in 2026. The remaining six Anzac class frigates will also no longer undergo comprehensive "Transcap" upgrades. Instead, they'll be upgraded with unspecified "enhanced maritime strike" capabilities. Cancelling the TransCap upgrade and retiring Anzac and Arunta is expected to free up much needed-funding in the short-to-medium term.

How to pay for it?
The government is investing an additional $11 billion AUD into the fleet over the next decade, with $1.7 billion flowing in initially over the next three years, however, offsets have been found in other programs to help pay for the expanded fleet. The government has slashed the number of Hunter class frigates being built in South Australia from nine to six, after the review found that the cost to build all of the planned frigates had grown to $65 billion AUD (~$42 billion USD) up from $45 billion AUD. The troubled $3.96 billion AUD (~$2.5 billion USD) Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel program (OPV), which finally launched ship number two late last year, is also on the chopping block with the program cut from 12 to just 6 ships.


Hunter-class frigate scale model on BAE Systems booth at IndoPacific 2023. The Hunter class program has now been cut to just six hulls to help pay for an expanded fleet.

While cuts to both programs will undoubtedly result in some savings, it's not clear if they will be delivered in a useful time frame for the money to be reinvested into the immediate priority of constructing a "Tier 2" fleet. In the case of the Hunter class program, only the final three ships, not the initial six, have been cancelled meaning that major savings, bar long-lead items, will not be realised until well into the next-decade.

People a Problem
Workforce challenges, both in the defence industry and RAN, have the potential to derail the government's plans for the new fleet before it even gets off the ground. In Western Australia, where eight of the new "Tier 2" small warships will be built, military shipbuilders have struggled to attract and retain talent in the face of tough competition from the state's mining industry, which has led to a litany of delays across multiple programs according to the Australian National Audit Office.

The Hunter class program has also struggled with workforce issues in South Australia in the past, and will soon need to compete with not only the private sector, but whichever company is selected to build Australia's SSN-AUKUS submarines there.   

On the Defence side, the RAN is under-strength and consistently missing recruiting targets, leading to a year-on-year decline in active personnel numbers. Worst, according to testimony by the Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mark Hammond in front of the Senate last week, it's overwhelmingly skilled technical personnel who are leaving, creating workforce challenges.

Even though the new "Tier 2" warships will probably require less crew then the Anzac class, there will be more of them, and critical technical skills will no-doubt still be in high-demand across the wider fleet, putting immense pressure on the Navy workforce at the same time as the AUKUS effort ramps up.

A Difficult Path Ahead
While the government's response to the review sounds good on paper, implementation is another beast. Successive Australian governments have struggled to manage shipbuilding projects, with reform and change promised, but rarely delivered. Now, due to these failures and delays, the RAN is operating the oldest fleet it has ever had in its history, at a time where demands on the service continue to increase and the strategic environment continues to deteriorate. 

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/australia-to-double-fleet-size-with-small-warships/

[Parera]

Zuid-Korea wil ballistische raketten aan boord marineschepen

Zuid-Korea wil in de nabije toekomst ballistische raketten aan boord van meerdere oppervlakteschepen plaatsen als onderdeel van het verhogen van de strategische aanvalscapaciteit van het land. De ballistische raketten moeten de Zuid-Koreaanse marine de mogelijkheid geven om strategische doelen op land aan te vallen. Hiermee zal Zuid-Korea tot een zeer select groepje landen horen dat ballistische raketten aan boord van oppervlakteschepen plaatst.


https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Zuid-Korea-wil-ballistische-raketten-aan-boord-marineschepen-150224.html

[Harald]

Assessing the true value of air and missile defense intercepts in the Red Sea

Recent media coverage frequently portrays air and missile defense intercepts through the lens of a simplistic cost comparison: the expensive interceptor versus the seemingly cheap missile or drone it destroys. While such headlines grab attention, Wes Rumbaugh, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues this approach paints an incomplete and potentially misleading picture. In a recent analysis, he delves deeper, urging a more nuanced understanding of the complex factors at play.

Rumbaugh acknowledges the cost disparity between interceptors and their targets. Technical demands make interceptors inherently expensive, requiring exceptional speed, range, and guidance capabilities to successfully engage incoming threats. However, he emphasizes that focusing solely on this cost exchange ratio ignores crucial aspects:

- Operational realities: Defenders prioritize effectiveness over cost when engaging threats. While cheaper options exist, they may lack the range, area coverage, or capability to adequately protect larger areas or counter sophisticated threats like anti-ship cruise missiles.
- Value of defended assets: The cost of an interceptor pales in comparison to the value of assets it protects. In the Red Sea, air and missile defense safeguards vital commercial shipping lanes crucial to global trade. Similarly, defending military vessels like the USS Gravely, worth billions of dollars, justifies the use of more expensive interceptors despite cheaper alternatives.
- Strategic considerations: Air and missile defense serves broader strategic goals beyond individual interceptions. Protecting freedom of navigation and national sovereignty, like Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression, carries immense intangible value that transcends dollar figures.

Rumbaugh doesn't dismiss cost concerns. He acknowledges the importance of efficient spending and explores potential cost-saving measures within air and missile defense programs. However, he urges a shift in perspective: the primary goal isn't minimizing financial expenditure, but rather achieving strategic objectives effectively. Evaluating air and missile defense solely through the lens of individual interceptor costs, he argues, provides an incomplete and potentially dangerous assessment.

By advocating for a broader understanding of cost, value, and strategic purpose, Rumbaugh invites a more informed and nuanced discussion on the crucial role of air and missile defense systems in today's complex security landscape. This analysis serves as a valuable reminder that headlines only scratch the surface, and true evaluation requires deeper consideration of the multifaceted realities underpinning these critical defense systems.

https://alert5.com/2024/02/15/assessing-the-true-value-of-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts-in-the-red-sea/


Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts

With numerous missile defense engagements in the Red Sea, a common framing for news reporting has been the relative cost of the interceptor and the missile or drone it intercepts. These data points are frequently used to illustrate the gap between the two costs, which can lead to the impression that defenses are too expensive to sustain. Multiple media outlets have, for instance, highlighted the U.S. Navy's use of a $2 million Standard Missile-2 to intercept $2,000 Houthi drones. It makes for a good headline, but the simplistic comparison can be misleading. While analysis of these adverse cost exchange ratios is a tempting and sometimes useful framework, it obscures both the complexity of air and missile defense engagements and the complicated value of air and missile defense.

The Insufficiency of the Cost Exchange Ratio
The "cost exchange ratio" framework is attractive because it is rooted in some truth: air and missile defense interceptors are relatively expensive. Budget documents for FY2024 suggest that U.S. defensive missiles are, overall, roughly twice as expensive as offensive missiles (see table below), when averaging all-up-round unit costs. Highly capable U.S. offensive missiles are also likely more expensive than less sophisticated missiles provided to the Houthis by Iran, though there is some evidence of underestimating the cost of these systems.


https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-02/240213_Cost_Defense_Table.jpg?VersionId=PSmU4cC82KC4jf_zx7RKkv9wQgocc98a

This asymmetry is mostly due to the significant technical demands of air and missile defense interceptors. While offensive missiles have gotten more precise, their requirements for precision targeting and maneuvering capability still pale in comparison to defensive interceptors. To successfully intercept an attacking missile, air and missile defense interceptors must possess exceptional speed, range, and sophisticated guidance. This is what makes missile defense "the ultimate precision guidance challenge."

Despite these technical challenges, a careful look suggests that the U.S. Navy has had some success in reducing interceptor costs over time, when considering inflation and different missile variants. These trends are visible for the average unit cost of Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) in inflation-adjusted dollars (see graph below). These figures show that interceptor costs often fall over time, while cost jumps are associated with the introduction of new, more capable variants. The 2024 spike in SM-6 unit costs stemmed from procuring the new Block IB variant, which features a new second stage rocket motor to extend the interceptors' range. But between 2018 and 2023, when the U.S. Navy was purchasing a mix of Block I and IA SM-6 missiles, the unit cost declined every year on an inflation-adjusted basis, a trend also evident in the unit costs of the ESSM Block II missile.



Operational Complexities Affect Intercept Decisions
Two other aspects of the usual cost exchange ratio comparison should also be considered. In the first instance, the difficult decisions made by air and missile defense operators cannot be captured by a simple accounting exercise of comparing the cost of the weapons being fired. Air and missile defense engagement decisions are far more complex than choosing an interceptor that is of similar cost to the attacking missile. All else being equal, operators on the ship are likely to choose the cheapest possible option to successfully engage a threat. But the complexity of air and missile defense can often render cheaper interceptor options ineffective or create unnecessary operational risk to U.S. assets.

To defend shipping in the Red Sea, U.S. naval assets must defend larger areas, rather than a specific point target. This requires interceptors with longer ranges to increase the area of protection of any individual ship. Shorter-range interceptors are cheaper, but also can only provide defenses to a smaller area around the ship. These cheaper interceptors are useful for defending the ship itself from attacks but cannot provide the area-wide coverage to also defend shipping vessels.

The constraints of ship-based air defense also introduce unique challenges that may require the use of a more expensive interceptor. Ships deploy with the missiles they were loaded at port. These loadouts are overwhelmingly tailored to defeat the most stressing threats. The need to intercept more capable threats like anti-ship cruise missiles or ballistic missiles (both of which have been fired by the Houthis) means more expensive interceptors must be part of the deployed inventory. But if a less expensive munition, like a drone, is the only threat, this could lead to the use of a more expensive interceptor for a less capable threat. No loadout is perfect, but a ship commander must defend the ship and its crew. The alternative mistake, having too few expensive interceptors for a more challenging threat, could invite catastrophe. Commanders likely err toward greater capability relative to expected missions in selecting defensive interceptor loadouts, increasing the cost of interceptors on board.

Interceptor Cost versus Value of Defended Assets
A second problem with typical media reporting is that it does not consider the value of the defended assets, and thus the relationship between cost and the value of the assets defended. In the case of engagements with Houthi missiles, U.S. interceptors have been protecting commercial ships in the Red Sea that accounted for about 10 percent of global seaborne trade in 2023. While global shipping costs have risen in response to Houthi missile attacks, those costs would likely be higher if they were consistently hitting commercial vessels.

In addition to defending commercial shipping, air and missile defenses protect the value of the U.S. ships deployed to the region. The recent air defense engagement by the USS Gravely (DDG 107) illustrates the potential risk of overemphasizing the relative cost of interceptors. In that engagement, the Gravely used its Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) to engage an incoming anti-ship cruise missile. The 20-millimeter (mm) rounds fired by the CIWS were likely cheaper than the anti-ship cruise missile they engaged. The cost of using these cheaper interceptors, however, was operational risk, allowing the missile within a mile of the roughly $2 billion ship and all of the sailors on it before it was shot down.

To be sure, the entire value of air and missile defense can be hard to quantify. A decision not to defend international shipping from Houthi attacks could call into question the U.S. desire or capability to defend freedom of navigation more broadly. The utility of air and missile defense, however, is clearly profound in today's threat environment. In the words of deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense, John D. Hill, "Integrated air and missile defense is why Ukraine remains sovereign." It is difficult to place a direct dollar value on international freedom of navigation or Ukraine's sovereignty, but protecting these intangible assets remains a worthy goal of U.S. national security policy.

Toward Better Valuation
The impulse toward efficiency and cost consciousness in defense spending is important in spending taxpayer money effectively. However, the goal of the Department of Defense is not to have the most favorable accounting balance, but to provide a military capable of supporting U.S. national security priorities. Over the long term, the United States cannot afford to play catch against every Houthi missile attack in the Red Sea. Air defenses buy time to find another means to end the Houthi threat to shipping lanes. In this light, the important issue is not whether a single interceptor costs more than the missile it defeated, but rather whether those interceptors successfully allowed the United States to pursue its goals in the region effectively. If so, the employment of air defense interceptors in the Red Sea represents funds well spent.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts

[Parera]

Should The U.S. Navy Adopt Precision Stike Missiles For The Mark 41 VLS?

Naval News asked naval military analysts what are their thoughts on if the U.S. Navy should adopt the U.S Army's Precision Strike Missile aboard their AEGIS warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS).

Designed to replace the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic strike missile, the Army's Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is narrower (two can fit in the place of one ATACMS) and flies farther and is also (supposed to be) cheaper. Further upgrades will include an active multi-mode seeker head that can target moving vessels, making the PrSM a true land-based anti-ship missile (LBASM) system when fired from the 6×6 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) operated by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) or the U.S. Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

PrSM's objective range of 60 to 650 kilometers (37 to 403 miles) gives it a much greater reach than the USMC's Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS's Naval Strike Missile has a range of 100+ nautical mile (115-mile or 185 kilometers)) and is mounted on a modified and uncrewed 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)).

While the "big anti-ship warfare (ASuW) missile stick" for the U.S. Navy will be the reprogrammable Maritime Strike Tomahawk cruise missile with its unrivaled range of over 1,000 miles, the PrSM's range falls between the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the NMESIS and the 100+ mile Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Only Tomahawk and Harpoon are carried aboard U.S. warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS). (Sixteen Naval Strike Missiles will be carried in their own canister launchers by the FFG 62 USS Constellation-classfrigates equipped with 32 Mark 41 VLS cells).

With a length of 156 inches (396 centimeters) and a diameter of 17 inches (43 centimeters), the PrSM will fit inside the Mark 41 VLS as the VLS-fitting Tomahawk cruise missile has a length of 247 inches (627 centimeters) and a width of 23 inches (58 inches).

Thus, would it make logical sense to equip U.S. Navy's VLS warships, or the ships carrying the Mark 70 Payload Delivery System, with the Precision Strike Missile? This concept of turning an Army missile into a naval one is not that far-fetched as the U.S. Army's Patriot PAC-3 MSE Surface-to-Air missile is being studied to fit inside a Mark 41 VLS.

Naval News asked Lockheed Martin who referred all questions about a naval PrSM to the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy did not reply to media inquires on the Mark 41 VLS PrSM concept.

Naval News then asked military analysts for their opinions on this PrSM inside a Mark 41 concept.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/should-the-u-s-navy-adopt-precision-stike-missiles-for-the-mark-41-vls/

[Harald]

Delivering the Royal Navy's future surface fleet



The British Royal Navy is in the middle of a significant programme of fleet renewal. Two major projects are currently underway that will ultimately see the commissioning of eight Type 26 anti-submarine warfare and five Type 31 general purpose frigates. Together, they will replace over two thirds of the navy's major surface combatants. Responsible for ensuring the delivery of these new warships to time and budget is the Naval Ships Delivery Group, currently headed by Mark Beverstock. ESD recently spoke with him about the challenges involved in securing the success of an endeavour that has huge importance for both the future Royal Navy and the revitalisation of the British naval construction sector.

https://euro-sd.com/2024/02/articles/armed-forces/36541/delivering-the-royal-navys-future-surface-fleet/

[Harald]

Should The U.S. Navy Adopt Precision Stike Missiles For The Mark 41 VLS? 
( Dit kun je voor elke Marine toepassen, wel erg interessant )

Naval News asked naval military analysts what are their thoughts on if the U.S. Navy should adopt the U.S Army's Precision Strike Missile aboard their AEGIS warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS).

Designed to replace the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic strike missile, the Army's Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is narrower (two can fit in the place of one ATACMS) and flies farther and is also (supposed to be) cheaper. Further upgrades will include an active multi-mode seeker head that can target moving vessels, making the PrSM a true land-based anti-ship missile (LBASM) system when fired from the 6×6 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) operated by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) or the U.S. Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

PrSM's objective range of 60 to 650 kilometers (37 to 403 miles) gives it a much greater reach than the USMC's Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS's Naval Strike Missile has a range of 100+ nautical mile (115-mile or 185 kilometers)) and is mounted on a modified and uncrewed 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)).

While the "big anti-ship warfare (ASuW) missile stick" for the U.S. Navy will be the reprogrammable Maritime Strike Tomahawk cruise missile with its unrivaled range of over 1,000 miles, the PrSM's range falls between the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the NMESIS and the 100+ mile Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Only Tomahawk and Harpoon are carried aboard U.S. warships equipped with the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS). (Sixteen Naval Strike Missiles will be carried in their own canister launchers by the FFG 62 USS Constellation-classfrigates equipped with 32 Mark 41 VLS cells).


The Precision Strike Missile will receive an active multi-mode seeker head that allows it to target moving vessels for true anti-ship purposes.

With a length of 156 inches (396 centimeters) and a diameter of 17 inches (43 centimeters), the PrSM will fit inside the Mark 41 VLS as the VLS-fitting Tomahawk cruise missile has a length of 247 inches (627 centimeters) and a width of 23 inches (58 inches).

Thus, would it make logical sense to equip U.S. Navy's VLS warships, or the ships carrying the Mark 70 Payload Delivery System, with the Precision Strike Missile? This concept of turning an Army missile into a naval one is not that far-fetched as the U.S. Army's Patriot PAC-3 MSE Surface-to-Air missile is being studied to fit inside a Mark 41 VLS.

Naval News asked Lockheed Martin who referred all questions about a naval PrSM to the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy did not reply to media inquires on the Mark 41 VLS PrSM concept.

Naval News then asked military analysts for their opinions on this PrSM inside a Mark 41 concept.

The RAND Corporation's Dr. Bradley Martin, a retired U.S. Navy captain and Director, Institute for Supply Chain Security, replied via email, "PrSM is a ballistic missile, which at the moment still does not have a multi-mode seeker that will allow it to track and engage moving targets.  Such a seeker is envisioned, but the delivery for this capability is still somewhere in the (relatively near) future.

"PrSM can be made to fit into a MK41 VLS cell, but the Navy is generally looking for weapons that most effectively advance its tactical need and fit within the architecture that it has already developed.  For anti-surface warfare, it is in the process of introducing the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the SM-6, which together and once fully delivered will meet most of the Navy's AsUW requirements.  That is not to say that a system like PrSM wouldn't be a useful addition, but we then get into issues of quantity, efficient production, and program management.  Adding more and different types of systems can be an acquisition headache and a sustainment nightmare.

"There's no doubt that PrSM might fill capability gaps and, once it receives a multi-mode seeker, will be more capable than Harpoon. However, the cost-benefit analysis might not make it an ideal candidate to go on MK-41 equipped ships," wrote Dr. Martin to Naval News.

"My understanding is that PrSM would be a backup or auxiliary for the Navy, their primary long range anti-ship missile being Maritime Strike Tomahawk. The two missiles seem to be quite similar, but the Navy has a lot of experience with Tomahawk. That said, it's useful to have alternatives because war games show that the Navy quickly runs out of preferred munitions."

Mark Cancian, a retired USMC colonel and Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program

The 2026 "Invasion of Taiwan scenario CSIS wargame" Mr. Cancian was referring to can be found here.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/csis-wargame-chinas-invasion-of-taiwan-in-2026/

Naval News has also reached out to the Heritage Foundation and they acknowledged the media inquiry but did not provide analysis or comment on a naval Mark 41 VLS PrSM before publication.With the PrSM just entering service and production for the U.S. Army as of December 2023, it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions on if the PrSM will actually become an anti-ship weapon aboard U.S. Navy Mark 41 VLS-equipped warships. The PrSM will surely fit inside the Mark 41 VLS cell, but only time will tell if the U.S. Navy sees a requirement for an anti-ship missile with a range between the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the Naval Strike Missile and Harpoon

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/should-the-u-s-navy-adopt-precision-stike-missiles-for-the-mark-41-vls/

[schipper.b]

Nederland is nog steeds van de gedachte dat alles wel losloopt.
Ik denk dat we een serieuze keuze moeten maken , als we een defensie willen dan wel een die stevig is en terug kan slaan / zichzelf kan verdedigen ofwel we laten defensie los en investeren gewoon niets.
Want als men onze jongens en meiden op pad sturen en ze kunnen niets of te weinig is dat voor mij zoiets als een zelfmoord commando.
Moet men niet willen dat er slachtoffers vallen door  bezuinigings drift van ambtenaren.
 Dus zorg voor een marine die in staat is om te vechten cq verdedigen als dat politiek bete ligt ( hoe hypocriet eigenlijk).
Geld ook voor de land en luchtmacht.

[Parera]

Ja een prachtige capaciteit die we in Nederland al lange tijd niet meer hebben. We zouden toch zonder al te veel gedoe zo een batterij of twee NSM op Gryphus of zelfs BuMa kunnen op tuigen binnen het KMARNS.

Niet alleen goede capaciteit om de havens en Noordzee te beschermen maar eventueel ook uit te zenden naar het Caribische gebied bij een dreiging.

[Harald]

Blue Spear 5G SSM - Estonia's coastal defence

The shipment of the Blue Spear 5G SSM anti-ship missile system at the outset of this year represents a quantum leap in Estonia's maritime warfare capabilities. This high-tech missile system is part of Estonia's comprehensive coastal defence complex solution and covers almost the entire Baltic Sea with its firing range.

The Blue Spear 5G SSM, the Estonian Defence Forces' latest addition, is a cutting-edge missile system engineered for optimal performance under all combat conditions. It boasts day-and-night, all-weather capability, with a striking range of up to 290 kilometres. Its advanced targeting capabilities, leveraging active radar guidance, precision navigation, and a hardened communication network, render it resilient against electronic countermeasures.

"The acquisition of anti-ship missiles is of critical importance for raising the level of the Navy's and, more broadly, Estonia's defence capabilities. We have reached another significant milestone, which is necessary for ensuring the security of the people of Estonia and for defending the country at sea, on land, and in the air. The presence of Blue Spears in the Navy significantly increases the firing range of the Estonian Defence Forces and strengthens deterrence against a potential aggressor," said Minister of Defence Hanno Pevkur.

"The Blue Spear 5G anti-ship missile system, together with sea mines, forms the cornerstone of Estonian maritime defence for the coming decades. I thank the contracting partners and the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments, who have adhered to deadlines and made significant efforts despite difficult times. I thank the naval personnel who have shown determination, patience, and willpower in commissioning both mentioned weapon systems," said the commander of the Estonian Navy, Commodore Jüri Saska.

The anti-ship missiles were supplied to Estonia by Proteus Advanced Systems, a joint venture between two companies, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and ST Engineering Land Systems from Singapore. "We are honored to equip the Estonian Defence Forces with Blue Spear type missiles," said Ron Tryfus, CEO of Proteus Advanced Systems. "With this, the Estonian Navy has acquired a high-tech defence capability, a next-generation land-to-land missile system developed in cooperation between two companies, IAI and ST Engingeering Land Systems," he added.

The Estonian government decided on the missile system's funding in 2020, and a contract between the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) and Proteus Advanced Systems was signed in 2021. "I want to thank our contracting partner, who has respected their international obligations and stood by the promise that the missile system would arrive on time," said Ramil Lipp, ECDI's Strategic Category Manager.

The project also involves the Estonian defence industry company Pro Lift OÜ, which carried out the vehicle modifications suitable for the missile system.

https://www.kaitseinvesteeringud.ee/en/blue-spear-anti-ship-missile-system-significantly-improves-estonias-defence-capability/



Estonia's Blue Spear AShM System Achieves IOC

Estonian authorities have officially confirmed that the Blue Spear anti-ship missile system has reached initial operational capability.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/estonias-blue-spear-ashm-system-achieves-ioc/#prettyPhoto

[Harald]

https://www.naval-technology.com/news/uk-royal-navy-revamp-their-amphibious-landing-craft/?cf-view

UK Royal Navy revamps its amphibious raiding craft

After the UK announced it will donate more than half of its landing craft to Ukraine, the Royal Navy has announced a re-designed version of its existing fleet.

The UK Royal Navy announced its induction of the Commando Raiding Craft (CRC), a re-designed version of the Royal Marines' Offshore Raiding Craft – commonly known in the Corps as the 'ORC'.

ORCs are an enduring fast boat used by the Royal Marines for troop insertion and patrols. The craft are 9.1m in length with a displacement of 5 tonnes.

There are two variants: a fire support variant and a troop-carrying variant. While the former carries four personnel, three machine guns and a 40mm grenade launcher the latter is capable of carrying eight troops.

Until December 2023, the Royal Marines had operated 35 ORCs until the UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps announced that 23 units will be donated to Ukraine – a loss of 65% of its ORC fleet – along with two Sandown-class mine-hunting vessels.

"The current fleet of craft were ageing and had limited range and capacity," explained Major Joe Brown, from the Commando Force Acquisition team.

"An opportunity was taken to revamp this fleet to deliver a considerable upgrade to the current craft through the development of in-service hulls," he added.

"It is an example of developing for the future through maximising the potential within existing capabilities."

CRC features
The commanding officer of 47 Commando, Colonel William Norcott, noted: "We are really excited to have something that does what it says on the tin," in contrast to the legacy ORCs.

Re-painted in grey for greater concealment, the CRC also uses new engines providing increased range –more than 200 nautical miles – and speed – up to 40 knots – and a new configuration with driving position moved from the back to front for better manoeuvrability.

It also employs new cooling systems, mast, trim for better protection from sea conditions and a sophisticated electronic suite for communications and navigation.

The CRC has three crew who rotate on long journeys but also space to launch drones, carry payloads and to store a smaller Inshore raiding craft to deploy on some landings if required.

"Crucially, this is a life extension and upgrade to the ORC and, although it is more than just a stop-gap," the Navy stated. "In the long run Commando Forces are developing a boat that will replace the ORC, CRC and larger landing craft vehicle personnel."

In the meantime, CRC is already deployed on operations – namely with 47 Commando's 539 Raiding Squadron and the Littoral Response Group (South) task force in the Mediterranean.

"The CRC in this role, with the new communications architecture fitted to enable rapid information flow, is ably demonstrating a broader utility than simply moving people from ship to shore," said Major Dan Wake, Officer Commanding of 539 Raiding Squadron.

[ARM-WAP]

Kapers op de kust! Frankrijk bied FDI aan de Noren aan.

https://www.opex360.com/2024/02/08/la-marine-nationale-fait-la-promotion-de-la-fregate-de-defense-et-dintervention-en-norvege/

Dat programma loopt vlotjes maar ik vermoed dat de Noren daarin niet zullen geinteresseerd zijn.
Allemaal compleet andere sensoren en wapens dan de Noren mee werken.
Maar ik denk dat de Fransen nog exportsuccessen zullen boeken met dit ontwerp waarvan ze blijkbaar makkelijk wensen van de klant aanpassen, zoals ze met de Griekse versie doen (die beter lijkt dan de versie voor de Marine Nationale).