Rusland's Expansie

[Benji87]

T-90M's thermal camera matrix is Russian-made under French license

An interesting video appeared a few days ago. It was informational and featured the Russian T-90M Proryv tank. Observant users noticed the wording Thales on the fire control system. Accordingly, various speculations began.

One of them is that the Russian tank is equipped with a thermal imaging matrix produced by the French company Thales. Comments and speculations began that France was supplying Russia with its thermal imaging matrices. Others have suggested that Russia once bought such dies from France and quite possibly has them in stock.

However, there is a third possibility that is supported by facts. BulgarianMilitary.com does not claim this possibility to eliminate the other two, but for the sake of argument and objectivity, it should be exposed to the public.

The T-90M Proryv was introduced in 2012. One of the main features of the tank was the fire control system [fire control system] called Kalina, which included the Sosna-U sight and the Hawk's Eye panoramic sight.

Both sights are based on French 2nd generation Catherine-FC thermal imaging matrices operating in the 8-12 micron range. The fact is that these matrices were not delivered en masse to the Russian Federation, but were produced. The production was carried out under the license of NPO Orion for AD VOMZ with 80% localization. Only the control unit was supplied from France and was not manufactured in Russia.

There is one more fact: since 2015, Russia has been the 4th country to master the production of its own thermal imaging matrices of the 2nd and 3rd generation. The claim that Russia has run out of thermal imaging sights due to economic sanctions is also exaggerated.

Quantitative production

When thermal imaging matrices are produced, they are not produced for a specific number of military equipment, but quantitatively for an entire military domain. For example – ground combat vehicles. I.e. Russia has produced thermal imaging arrays for both its tanks and APCs, MTLBs, self-propelled howitzers, and other infantry fighting vehicles.

There have also been claims that Russia has a shortage of tube components that is preventing sight assembly. This information is also contradictory because Russia has a problem, not with tribal components, but with FPGA chips. Russia just didn't produce FPGA chips before, so they had to be bought from Xilinx and others.

But they were not made until 2020 – now the situation is different. For example, the new Russian FPGA chips of the 5578TS084, 5578TS094, 5576ХС1Т series can replace imported counterparts, and in fact, according to sources, this has already happened precisely because of the imposed economic sanctions against Russia.

For example, the R-168-25UE radios have an internal FPGA and ADC from JSC VZPP-S, which means that the situation is similar in the sight control units. In the latest photos of the T-90M 2022, it can be seen inside that there is no Sosna-U sight, it has been replaced by a PNM-T sight with a homemade Irbis-K thermal imaging module from NPO Orion, as in fact the PK PAN Hawkeye sight.

Comparison

How good Russian thermal imaging matrices are compared to French – this is a comparison that is difficult to make because it depends on many factors. But let's present a comparative technological characteristic between the Russian matrix PNM-T and the French Catherine-FC.

Catherine-FC has two fields of view, a range of 8-12 microns [LWIR technology], matrix resolution is 754×576 pixels, detection of infantry at a distance of up to 6 km, armored vehicles at up to 10 km, helicopters at 14 km.

The Russian PNM-T has two fields of view, a range of 8-12 microns, a resolution of 640×512 pixels, detection of infantry at a distance of 5 km, armored vehicles at 11 km, and helicopters at 14 km.

T-14 Armata

As you can see, the resolution of the Russian matrix is lower, but the picture is more detailed since the processor has more advanced DSP and image processing algorithms. In addition, the picture from the Russian thermal camera is more contrasty and does not have strong interference when the environment is very hot, which means that the T-90M and T-72B3 can see perfectly both day and night.

Russian 3rd generation thermal imaging matrices with a sensor substrate made based on gallium arsenide [GaAs] from NPO Orion are said to have a resolution of 800×600 pixels with uncompressed interpolation up to 1024×720 pixels. Such thermal imaging cameras are installed on the T-14 Armata, but their picture is on a completely different level

Bron: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/amp/2023/10/06/t-90ms-thermal-camera-matrix-is-russian-made-under-french-license/

[Benji87]

Russia Is Losing More Of Its Best T-90 Tanks, Perhaps Because It Has More T-90s To Lose

Russian forces in Ukraine are losing more and more of their best T-90M tanks. Believe it or not, that's not entirely good news for Ukraine, nor bad news for Russia.

That's because the spike in T-90 write-offs seems to be related to the growing number of T-90s on the front line, 21 months into Russia's wider war on Ukraine. The Russians are losing more T-90s because they have more T-90s to lose.

If it's really happening—and it's not 100-percent certain it is—the surge in T-90 deployments would underscore the bizarre disposition of the Russian armored corps as its wartime losses exceed 2,100 tanks. That's two-thirds of the tanks the Russians went to war with in February 2022.

The Russians have lost so many tanks that they've had no choice but to reactivate and rush to the front hundreds of 50-, 60- and even 70-year-old T-72 Ural, T-62 and T-54/55 tanks, often with no major upgrades to their optics, fire-controls or armor.

But the aged tanks are expedients: temporary stopgaps as Russian industry mobilizes and adapts to tightening foreign sanctions on the imported high-end electronics the industry once depended on.

The Kremlin for nearly two years has been trying to boost tank production. And the effort finally is paying off. Russian-made optics are replacing sanctioned optics from France. And where before just one factory—the Uralvagonzavod plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast—built tanks from scratch (T-72B3Ms and T-90Ms); now Omsktransmash in Siberia also is retooling for tracks-up production of T-80BVMs.

How many new and upgraded tanks the plants can produce is, for outsiders, a matter of speculation. In April, CNN estimated Uralvagonzavod alone delivered around 20 tanks a month. But a few weeks earlier, Defense Express reported that Uralvagonzavod, Omsktransmash and various upgrade workshops together could deliver 90 tanks a month.

If Defense Express's number is accurate, then Russian industry is very close to completing enough new and upgraded tanks every month to keep up with losses.

And while the upgraded tanks—including the oldest T-62s and T-54/55s—are a finite resource, relying as they do on existing chassis and turrets, there's a good reason to believe reactivated mid-Cold-War tanks are accounting for a shrinking proportion of overall Russian tank deliveries since peaking in late 2022.

That evidence is losses. Broadly speaking, an army should lose tanks roughly in proportion to how many of a particular tank model it deploys. While the specific capabilities of a tank type might make it more or less survivable relative to other types, those differences really only matter on the margins.

Look closely. Russian losses of old T-62s peaked in October 2022. Losses of upgraded T-80s peaked in June this year. And now T-90 losses are peaking: the Russians in total have written off around 60 of the 53-ton, three-person tanks, with most of the losses occurring in just the last few months.

The destroyed and captured T-90s account for roughly 15 percent of all T-90s the Russians had in their inventory before the wider war. But that doesn't take into account new production. Uralvagonzavod since early 2022 has had time to produce several hundred new T-90s.

And as those new T-90s arrive on the front line, oftentimes with airborne units or other elite formations that may have spent much of 2023 as operational reserves, they afford the Ukrainians more opportunities to knock out or capture T-90s.

Yes, it's being generous to the Russians to characterize a spike in T-90 losses as good news for the Kremlin's genocidal war effort. But it's hard to characterize the gradual, but successful, mobilization of the Russian tank industry as anything but an ominous development for Ukraine. The Ukrainians would be better off if the only replacement tanks the Russians could deploy were 70-year-old T-54Bs.

What's most ominous is that, nearly two years into the wider war, Ukraine's main tank tank plant—the Malyshev Factory in Kharkiv—still isn't producing new tanks from scratch. Yes, the factory reactivates, upgrades and repairs ex-Soviet T-64s, T-72s and T-80s. But it hasn't produced a totally new tank in three decades—and shows no sign of mobilizing the way Uralvagonzavod and Omsktransmash have mobilized.

That leaves the Ukrainian tank corps at the mercy of Kyiv's foreign allies. The only new, or new-ish, tanks the Ukrainians can count on receiving are those its allies deign to release from their own inventories, or divert from active production lines.

So far, foreign donations have been paltry—at least when it comes to Western-style tanks such as German Leopard 2s, British Challenger 2s and American M-1s. Ukraine is getting just 85 Leopard 2s, 14 Challenger 2s and 31 M-1s. In just six months, Uralvagonzavod could manufacture enough new T-90Ms to match Ukraine's entire inventory of modern Western tanks.

Bron: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/10/06/russia-is-losing-more-of-its-best-t-90-tanks-perhaps-because-it-has-more-t-90s-to-lose/?sh=1db71df6496f

[Benji87]

KABOEM.........

https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1710994704794296363

Zou die nog kunnen rijden? 

[pz]

KABOEM.........

https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1710994704794296363

[Huzaar1]

Er zitten wel wat meer verschillen tussen de leopard2a5 en stridsvagn. Overigens zijn die 2 stridsvagn's naar ik weet geborgen.

[Benji87]

Een recent artikel van de Kiyv Post over de Stridsvagn 122. De Oekraïners zijn er erg over te spreken. Overigens staat in het artikel niet vermeld dat er inmiddels 2 zijn achter gelaten na in een mijnenveld gereden te zijn en door drones zijn uitgeschakeld. Schade is nog onduidelijk

ANALYSIS: The Stridsvagn 122 – How Sweden's 'Best Tank in the World' is Helping Liberate Ukraine

Sweden has provided Ukraine with ten modern Stridsvagn 122 tanks, a modified version of the Leopard 2A5, all of which are already on the front line engaging Russian troops.

Ukraine recently received ten Stridsvagn 122s, the upgraded Swedish-modified models of the Leopard 2 tank with enhanced capabilities for all-weather employment, which are currently being used in combat on the front lines.

Sweden's head of the Operational Department, Mats Ludvig, announced the delivery of the vehicles on the official website of the Swedish Armed Forces last month.

"We have given them everything we could in good material and good knowledge. Now we wish them all the best in liberating their country," said Ludvig.

The same press release from also noted with some pride, that it had been named by some experts as "the best tank in the world."

Sweden had a total of 120 such tanks, 10 of which were transferred to Ukraine. This is over 8 percent of the total number of tanks the Nordic country had in its inventory.

Ludwig emphasized the donation percentage of Sweden's stockpile to show his nation's level of commitment to assisting Ukraine.

What we know about the Stridsvagn 122 tank

The Stridsvagn 122, or "Strv 122," is an improved version of the German Leopard 2A5 tank, which is manufactured in Sweden under license. The term "Stridsvagn" translates from Swedish as "tank."

The Swedish armored vehicle received an improved chassis, additional armor, an updated fire control system, and the French smoke grenade launcher GALAX.

The Strv 122 has been specially designed to operate effectively in a wide variety of Swedish environments, including wooded and urban areas. Many of its adaptations would also be suitable for the Ukrainian forces in the field, especially as winter approaches.



Swedish modification

In the early 1990s, the Swedish army made the decision to discontinue the development of their own tanks. To determine the best option for Sweden, a competition was held. The winner was the German Leopard 2A5 tank.

By the end of 1994, several contracts were signed to regulate the process of manufacturing and upgrading the armored vehicles for Sweden's specific needs, both geographic and doctrinal.

In the first stage, Germany delivered 160 completed Leopard tanks with the 2A4 modification to Sweden. These tanks were designated Strv 121 and were adopted by the Swedish army.

The development of an improved and adapted version of the Leopard 2A5 was underway to meet Swedish requirements, which was re-designated the Strv 122. According to the agreement, 120 such tanks were to be delivered.

The first 29 tanks of the new model were assembled at the German factory Krauss-Maffei Wegmann.

Later, production was moved to Sweden, to the Bofors and Hägglunds factories. The assembly of the Strv 122 continued until 2002.

After receiving all the tanks of the new model, the Swedish army began to write off and return the previously delivered Strv 121 tanks to Germany. As a result, by the end of the 2000s, only 120 new Strv 122 tanks remained in service in Sweden.

Several significant improvements were made to the Strv 122 during its service life. In the early 2000s, some of the vehicles were rebuilt as part of the Strv 122B project, aimed at improving mine protection and other characteristics [another adaptation needed by Ukraine].

It was used as the basis for the Strv 122B Int., which was designed for export use abroad for various international users.

This variant received new communications and control equipment compatible with NATO standards. In addition, special measures were taken to ensure better performance of the vehicle in hot climates. Further modifications, referred to as C and D models, included various improvements to the fire control system and more.

Significant differences from the Leopard 2

The Stridsvagn 122 tank is an improved version of the German Leopard 2A5, specially adapted to the unique requirements of the Swedish Army. Although the tank retains the general architecture and some parts of the basic model, the vehicle is quite distinctive.

The Stridsvagn 122 received modern electronics and equipment, with a focus on increasing combat effectiveness through improved protection for the tank crew and more efficient fire control systems.

As a result of the improvements, the Strv 122 has become one of the most heavily protected modern tanks with the latest technologies in reactive armor shielding.

The basis of the protection is the non-explosive reactive armor (NERA), which, thanks to special materials, reliably protects the tank from the effects of both kinetic [solid metal projectile] and combined effects [armor-piercing and spallation-inducing] types of shells.

The tank is additionally equipped with composite screens that provide an additional level of protection. The Swedish version also has extra protection for the top of the turret.

Overall, the hull protection is significantly superior to the German Leopard. Destroying a Swedish armored vehicle head-on with a single shot is an almost impossible task.

The improved version of the Strv 122B features an additional underbody cover that protects the crew and critical vehicle systems from anti-tank mines [again, a feature for which Ukrainian forces have a dire need].

The Swedes also added their signature Barracuda camouflage to the B modification, which provides visual camouflage and reduces the tank's infrared footprint.

Saab's Barracuda camouflage systems provide multi-spectral protection, which reduces the visibility of military vehicles in the ultraviolet, visual and infrared spectrums.

In addition, Barracuda not only reduces the heat footprint of the vehicle but also protects it from external heat.

The chassis has also changed. The Strv 122 tank has become more reliable due to the enhancement of the torsion shafts. The armored vehicle received shock absorbers from the German PzH 2000 artillery system.

The stabilizing electro-hydraulics were replaced with a fully electric, more durable and more fireproof system. The Swedes also partially modified the gun to allow for the use of more powerful ammunition.

Armament

The main armament of the Strv 122 remains unchanged from the original Leopard 2 – the 120mm smoothbore cannon from Rheinmetall.


This cannon, in combination with extended-range capable modern electronics, is capable of effective fire at up to 4 kilometers.

While the average range for Soviet tanks is about 1,600-2,000 meters, the Strv 122 is double that.

The German cannon has exceptional ballistic characteristics. A well-trained and skilled loader can reload this cannon in just 6 seconds.

The Swedish version was equipped with two Ksp m/94 machine guns (the Swedish equivalent of the German MG3) and French-made smoke grenade launchers GALIX.

The Strv 122 is ideally suited for precise engagement of enemy vehicles, making it a sniper among tanks.

Thanks to its exceptional ballistic characteristics and fast reloading, this tank can effectively fire over long distances with a more rapid rate of fire.

The Strv 122's advanced thermal imager and night vision device allow it to quickly detect and destroy enemy vehicles under many atmospheric conditions.

The Strv 122 tank was equipped with a completely new fire control system, which proved to be much more effective than the previous version, installed on the Leopard 2A5.


The new system has significantly improved the speed and accuracy of target detection and identification, as well as the accuracy of firing. It is now possible to fire simultaneously at multiple targets sequentially.

The fire control system is based on a modern computer platform that can simultaneously process information for all types of projectiles. It includes a thermal imager, laser rangefinder, night vision device, biaxial stabilizer and a digitally based ballistic corrector (upgraded fire control computer).

The Strv 122 tank uses the EMES-15 sight, which is based on less harmful Raman spectroscopy. The standard magnification in the daytime is ×12, and in the panoramic view - ×3.

The Strv 122 tank is renowned for its high maneuverability and mobility, just as much as the German Leopard 2A5, as the powertrain of the Swedish and German tanks is identical.

The 12-cylinder MB873 Ka-501 diesel engine with a volume of 47 liters produces 1,500 horsepower and lets the Strv 122 accelerate to 70 km/h.

The Swede also has a decent reverse speed of 30 km/h, which allows the vehicle to quickly leave the battlefield in the event of a dangerous situation. For comparison, the Soviet T-72 has a reverse speed of just 4 km/h.

The Strv 122 is not impeded by deep snow or muddy ground. If necessary, the tank can easily overcome fords up to 1.4 meters high.

The delivery of such modern and highly protected tanks, such as the Strv 122, could significantly help the Ukrainian army during the ongoing counteroffensive in certain parts of the frontline.

Sweden itself does not have many such tanks, but its contribution still provides significant assistance to Ukraine.

These tanks impress not only with their combat power but also their ability to securely protect their crew from various types of threats.

Modern Western tanks, such as the Strv 122, differ significantly from the approach that characterized the tanks of the former Soviet Union.

One of the key features of NATO tanks is the emphasis on crew safety and comfort. After all, the crew should be focused on fighting, not on surviving in difficult conditions.

The concept is that the tank crew is the most valuable resource, and all design solutions must ensure the comfortable and safe operation of tank crews.

Ukrainian crews have been trained in Sweden in all aspects of realistic combat employment of the Strv 122, according to Expressen.

The Ukrainian tanker training took place under the authority of the Swedish parliament's mandate to provide military assistance to Ukraine, which included, among other things, Stridsvagn 122 tanks and Archer artillery systems.

Bron: https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/22362

[Benji87]

Official: Sweden is preparing a new military aid package for Ukraine and is going to consider transferring JAS 39 Gripen fighters to the AF

The Swedish government, following Spain, is preparing a new military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Here's What We Know

This was announced by Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson. The new package should mainly include ammunition, as well as spare parts for previously delivered equipment. This will be the 13th military aid package that Sweden has prepared for Ukraine.

In addition to additional weapons, the country's defence ministry has also confirmed that it will consider giving Ukraine fourth-generation JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets. If the deliveries are approved, they will start only after Sweden becomes a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. By the way, Ukrainian pilots have already undergone familiarisation training on this type of aircraft.

https://gagadget.com/en/weapons/329918-official-sweden-is-preparing-a-new-military-aid-package-for-ukraine-and-is-going-to-consider-transferring-jas-39-/

[Benji87]

Duitsland en Spanje leveren extra luchtafweer aan Oekraïne

GRANADA-

Duitsland en Spanje hebben donderdag nieuwe luchtverdediging aan Oekraïne beloofd. Madrid levert zes HAWK-systemen en Berlijn heeft nog een Patriot-systeem toegezegd. De Oekraïense president Volodymyr Zelensky is momenteel in het Spaanse Granada en deed daar een beroep op zijn bondgenoten voor meer luchtafweer voor de komende wintermaanden.
Spanje leverde eerder ook al zes HAWK-systemen. Duitsland stuurde eerder drie Patriot-systemen en nog twee luchtverdedigingssystemen van het type Iris-T. De Duitse bondskanselier Scholz benadrukte dat de luchtafweer nu het meest nodig is in Oekraïne. De verwachting is dat Rusland deze winter net als vorig jaar veelvuldig de Oekraïense energievoorzieningen zal aanvallen. Zelensky uitte op X zijn dank voor de luchtafweer.

ANP, 05-10-2023, 20:10

Ter verduidelijking: Duitsland stuurde niet eerder 3 patriot systemen naar Oekraïne. Ze hebben eerder 1 volledige batterij en later een halve batterij gestuurd wat met Nederland tot een gehele batterij werd gevormd. Dit wordt nummer 3 en zal het totale aantal beschikbare batterijen op 4 zetten (de Amerikanen hebben er ook 1 geleverd) al met al een significante boost in de lucht verdediging capaciteit van Oekraïne. Ik hoop dat halverwege november ook wat meer duidelijk wordt over de nieuwe Amerikaanse steun aan Oekraïne.

[Lex]

Duitsland en Spanje leveren extra luchtafweer aan Oekraïne

GRANADA-

Duitsland en Spanje hebben donderdag nieuwe luchtverdediging aan Oekraïne beloofd. Madrid levert zes HAWK-systemen en Berlijn heeft nog een Patriot-systeem toegezegd. De Oekraïense president Volodymyr Zelensky is momenteel in het Spaanse Granada en deed daar een beroep op zijn bondgenoten voor meer luchtafweer voor de komende wintermaanden.
Spanje leverde eerder ook al zes HAWK-systemen. Duitsland stuurde eerder drie Patriot-systemen en nog twee luchtverdedigingssystemen van het type Iris-T. De Duitse bondskanselier Scholz benadrukte dat de luchtafweer nu het meest nodig is in Oekraïne. De verwachting is dat Rusland deze winter net als vorig jaar veelvuldig de Oekraïense energievoorzieningen zal aanvallen. Zelensky uitte op X zijn dank voor de luchtafweer.

ANP, 05-10-2023, 20:10

[Lex]

Poetin: Westen heeft contact met werkelijkheid verloren

MOSKOU-

De Russische president Vladimir Poetin vindt dat de oorlog in Oekraïne laat zien hoe ver het Westen het contact met de werkelijkheid is kwijtgeraakt. "Wij zijn de zogenaamde oorlog in Oekraïne niet begonnen. Integendeel - we proberen hem te beëindigen", beweerde Poetin in een toespraak tijdens een bijeenkomst in de badplaats Sotsji aan de Zwarte Zee.
Het Westen zou de oorlog hebben veroorzaakt omdat de Verenigde Staten zichzelf beschouwen als de enige scheidsrechter van de waarheid op de planeet, zei de Kremlinleider. Volgens Poetin hebben de leiders van het Westen "hun realiteitszin" verloren door wat hij het "koloniale denken" van Washington noemde. Hij vroeg zich af welk recht de VS hebben om andere landen de les te lezen.

De grootschalige Russische invasie in Oekraïne leidde tot een grote breuk tussen het Westen en Rusland.

ANP, 05-10-2023, 17:21

[Benji87]

Nieuwe spoorlijn en snelweg moeten aanvoer Russische leger behoeden voor Oekraïens artillerievuur

Het Russische leger is druk bezig met het aanleggen van nieuwe wegen en spoorlijnen verder achter het front in Oekraïne, zo blijkt uit bestudering van recente satellietbeelden. De nieuwe verbindingen moeten de bezette provincies Cherson en Zaporizja beter bereikbaar maken voor de aanvoer van materieel.

Het Russische leger wordt daarmee minder afhankelijk van de brug die de Krim met het Russische vasteland verbindt, die dikwijls door aanvallen onklaar wordt gemaakt.

Het Russische leger kan de nieuwe spoorlijn goed gebruiken, omdat de enige bestaande spoorverbinding over land naar het westen soms op nog geen 5 kilometer achter het front ligt. Dat maakt het een eenvoudig doelwit voor het Oekraïense leger om te raken met artillerie. In feite is vervoer over spoor hierdoor nagenoeg niet mogelijk en moeten alle treinwagons met zwaar materieel via de Krim naar bezet gebied in het zuiden.

Sinds juli werken de Russen daarom bij het treinstation van het gehucht Boerne in de provincie Donetsk aan een aftakking van het spoor, zo blijkt uit satellietbeelden van Planet Labs. Hemelsbreed 55 kilometer verderop moet die spoorlijn aansluiten op het bestaande spoornet richting het zuiden naar de bezette stad Marioepol en het westen richting de bezette gebieden in de provincie Cherson.

De spoorverbinding waar de Russen nu aan werken ligt buiten het bereik van Oekraïense artillerie, op zo'n 45 kilometer achter het front. De spoorlijn kan nog wel geraakt worden met raketten met een groter bereik, maar het gebruik daarvan is voor het Oekraïense leger veel kostbaarder. De Oekraïense burgemeester van het bezette Marioepol Petro Andrjoesjtsjenko noemt de aanleg van de spoorlijn "een algemene oplossing voor het probleem van militaire en civiele logistiek" van het Russische leger, omdat de Russische afhankelijkheid van de spoorbrug bij de Krim hiermee "drastisch" afneemt. Andrjoesjtsjenko deelde vorige week op Telegram een foto van werkzaamheden aan een spoorbrug over de rivier Kalmioes nabij het dorp Hranitne. Satellietbeelden bevestigen de recente werkzaamheden bij de rivier.

Het is nogal wat om een spoorlijn aan te leggen, zegt Carel Sellmeijer, genieofficier bij de Nederlandse landmacht en universitair docent Landoptreden bij de Nederlandse Defensie Academie in Breda. "Dat doe je niet zomaar. Maar de Krim is goed in beeld bij de Oekraïners en dus heb je alternatieve wegen nodig om de spullen naar het front te krijgen. Daar past dit in." Het afwerken van de spoorlijn hoeft geen maanden te kosten. "Als ze zich kwaad maken en een paar duizend man met bielzen die kant op sturen, kan het met een aantal weken of een paar maanden gedaan zijn."

Tegelijkertijd lijken de Russen ook bezig met de aanleg van een nieuwe snelweg. Tussen de Russische grensplaats Maksimov en Marioepol 40 kilometer verderop is een doorgaande lijn dwars door weilanden gegraven. De lijn is een stuk breder dan de grachten die Russen door het landschap trekken om tanks tegen te houden, wat een aanwijzing is dat het werkzaamheden zijn om een weg aan te leggen. De weg zou een aanvulling zijn op de bestaande tweebaansweg die tussen Marioepol en de grens met Rusland loopt. Daarmee kan het Russische leger vervoer beter spreiden en zich zo minder kwetsbaar voor Oekraïense luchtaanvallen maken, legt militair Sellmeijer uit. "Je wilt jezelf het liefst niet afhankelijk maken van één weg."

Bron: https://www.demorgen.be/oorlog-in-oekraine/nieuwe-spoorlijn-en-snelweg-moeten-aanvoer-russische-leger-behoeden-voor-oekraiens-artillerievuur~b2682f54/

[Benji87]

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea. Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. The satellite imagery reportedly shows that Russian forces recently moved the Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen frigates, three diesel submarines, five landing ships, and several small missile ships. Satellite imagery taken on October 2 shows four Russian landing ships and one Kilo-class submarine remaining in Sevastopol. Satellite imagery from October 2 shows a Project 22160 patrol ship reportedly for the first time in the port of Feodosia in eastern Crimea, suggesting that Russian forces may be moving BSF elements away from Sevastopol to bases further in the Russian rear. A Russian think tank, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, claimed on October 3 that the BSF vessels' movements from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk were routine, however. Russian forces may be temporarily moving some vessels to Novorossiysk following multiple strikes on BSF assets in and near Sevastopol but will likely continue to use Sevastopol's port, which remains the BSF's base. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen observed on October 4 that Russian vessel deployments have usually intensified following Ukrainian strikes but ultimately returned to normal patterns. ISW will explore the implications of Ukrainian strikes on the BSF in a forthcoming special edition.

Zijn ook satelliet foto's zichtbaar in de bronnen lijst van ISW. Kan alleen geen Twitter foto's plaatsen

[Benji87]

Een verhaal over Rusland buiten de grote steden. Een plek waar het sinds mensenheugenis zo slecht is dat de oorlog het er per saldo beter heeft gemaakt.

Bron: https://www.russiapost.info/regions/majority

interessant stuk, bedankt voor het delen. Het schept ook wat licht over hoe er in Rusland richting de oorlog wordt gekeken. Het bizarre is dat er inmiddels ook een zeer morbide verdien model is ontstaan op de levens van Russische soldaten. Ik kan aflevering #22 van de veldheren podcast ook echt aan raden voor meer info daarover.

[Enforcer]

A.Die komen niet door de bosporus.

Galati?

[PaxImperator]

Een verhaal over Rusland buiten de grote steden. Een plek waar het sinds mensenheugenis zo slecht is dat de oorlog het er per saldo beter heeft gemaakt.

The Majority Never Had It So Good
September 19, 2023
The original version in Russian was published in Sibir.Realii. We are republishing a slightly shortened version with their permission.

My parents have been living in the "private sector" of a big city (what Russians call a district within a city with freestanding houses on small lots – RP) for the last 20 years. It is an injection of rural life into the fabric of big cities. There are no asphalted roads, no sewage system (though almost everyone has bathrooms), telephones and natural gas appeared about 15 years ago. Gas means that in winter you do not have to, as before, carry coal in buckets from the shed two (or even three) times a day and light the stove. Gas is still a luxury; it is not available everywhere. About 10 years ago, foreign cars started appearing next to the fences. Nothing has changed in the last five years.

This summer, I picked up my son from my parents after a weekend. "Come no later than 10 in the morning," my mother told me. I arrived exactly at 10. At 11, a funeral was scheduled on a neighboring street in this "private sector." At 11, the nephew of the neighborhood elder was brought there.

The "elder" is a respected person, like a class leader, only for the neighborhood. His nephew, a deceased "participant of the special military operation," must be seen off with dignity – people should go and honor his memory. He was mobilized in the spring, he fought for six months, returned home on leave and went back again. On the very first day back in Ukraine, he came under fire. He would come home again only in a zinc coffin, with even the glass painted over. That's why I had to pick up my child at 10 – my mother knows that I would not approve of his participating in this memorial event.

On my parents' street there is another "war hero" – a former Wagner soldier and before that a hardened criminal – living at his parents'.

As long as I can remember, he was always in prison, either for petty theft or hooliganism. He would get out for a couple of months, drink, rob and end up back in prison. If during those months something disappeared from someone's garden or house, he was the first suspect. Now he has a medal and a brand-new car. He took his parents to the sea [for vacation]. They supposedly cried with pride for their son.

And right across the road is a lady who worked as a tram conductor – maybe because of this she is known to swear loudly. Over the past year and a half, she says that her son-in-law has been talking more and more about volunteering for the war. After all, the loans will not pay themselves back. And that is the truth – another neighbor drank himself to death because of loans; his heart could not stand the drinking, and before the spring the whole street also came out to bury him.

I lived on this street for 10 years. My parents still live there. This is where they have their banya, their garage, their vegetable garden – not like "in those apartments of yours, where you are on top of each other." As for the Wagner veterans in the neighborhood – well, where are they now not in the neighborhood?

I think about it when I watch the usual YouTube debates between "liberal" emigrants, where they say that because of the unbearable pressure of sanctions, the people will soon understand that the "Putin regime" took everything they had away. They will understand and hopefully rise up. Maybe not rise up, but at least sabotage the regime. Or something like that.

Recently, the well-known psychologist Lyudmila Petranovskaya tried to list all the losses of the Russian people in order to prove that "not all Russians are benefitting from this war." The list included: the national currency and property values in "FX equivalent" collapsing; the world being "closed" for tourists; the prospects for children to study abroad being cancelled; civil rights and freedoms being curtailed; education and culture degrading; families being separated "due to emigration;" etc. After reading this list, I once again thanked fate that I was not born in Moscow and still had not lost touch with reality.

Because if we take two thirds of the Russian population as the "Russian people," then the "Russian people" have not lost any of this. Because they had none of it to begin with. The last time they, the people, held dollars in their hands was 1997 – to amuse themselves, nothing more. They never went to theaters and did not notice how the best directors left Russia and left them, the people, with nothing.

Their children go to the same school that they once went to – perhaps they even had the same teacher, who is already 70 years old. It never occurred to them, the people, that children can be taught without shouting and that they can walk on school lawns. Finally, if their families were "separated," it was only because of prison, mobilization or contract service (in the army). They, the people, did not leave for Georgia or Kazakhstan – none of their relatives ever got outside their city.

And so what that prices in stores have gone up - the people never believed in stores. The people have potatoes and jars of pickles in basements for the whole winter. We will survive somehow.

So, overall, the people have not lost anything. They have nothing special to lose.

But what did they get? They got a lot. First of all, money. So much money.

In my wife's hometown (not as big as ours, but much more industrial), one man came home with three million rubles, which he and his friends spent in 10 days. Three hundred thousand a day for the guys – limitless alcohol and prostitutes. That is life! Those who have families, meanwhile, come home and go to the sea, buy apartments, upgrade their cars.

Secondly, they get to feel like they are part of something great. Just as our grandfathers defeated fascism, we are defeating Nazism in Ukraine (or whatever is there now). At the same time, we are beating the gays, the Jews, the entire collective West, Freemasons, everyone. Those who are older rejoice at the revival of the pioneers, military training in schools, school uniforms and generally all the fixtures of their youth. It's about time, or else today's youth would completely let themselves go! And all these gains without any effort at all, usually without even getting up from the couch.

And what can be offered to the people who, thanks to the war, got rich and feel great, like kings? Clips about the palaces of corrupt officials? The people have known for a long time, since the 90s, that they were robbed, that is not news. Discussions about how the people (who remained) are to blame for the crimes of the regime? Interviews about democracy and human rights? The tragic stories of the imprisoned Berkovich or Melkonyants? Who even are those people – they did not say anything about them on the TV or internet (for example, on the Komsomol'skaya pravda website).

The cash handouts – which the people would not make in years and years from their normal jobs – coupled with the feeling of being part of something great, is an explosive mixture. If you do not take this into account, you might endlessly wonder why in the last elections it was mainly the villages (and not large cities) that voted for the governors appointed by the Kremlin and the "ruling party" – even though it was precisely the village that suffered the most from the mobilization.

It is this explosive mixture that pushes grandmas, who come to the polling stations in dresses they bought 20 years ago, to vote for the regime. They sincerely are for the regime, which they believe will soon build a great country – to spite our enemies, of course.

In our intellectual conversations, as we hope that the nightmare will end soon, we try not to remember this fact: the many hundreds of thousands of men and women who have already taken part in the current war and the process of "rebuilding the new territories" have millions of children.

These millions of children believe that their fathers and mothers are now doing heroic things. They sincerely believe it, as their parents cannot be monsters. These millions of children put on a tricolor tie on September 1 for the start of the school year, watch the same TV, listen to their fathers' stories about "ukropy" (a derogatory term for Ukrainians) and travel through destroyed Mariupol on their way to vacation in Crimea (with or without their fathers).

For public repentance after the end of the war, we will have to wait until these children grow up and have their own children, so that these (not yet born) children can be told that their grandfathers committed undignified acts. For some reason, it's easier to hear about grandfathers than fathers. Internal, rather than external, repentance in Germany began in the 1970s – just when the children of the children of the Nazis grew up.

Thus, by the end of the 2040s, it will be possible to talk to the people about the losses that Russian society actually suffered from the current war. At least some of them will really listen. In addition, by that time teachers whose careers began under Brezhnev will finally stop teaching.

In the meantime, the people are experiencing perhaps the best period in their lives. Sure, some of them periodically come back from the war in zinc coffins. On the other hand, the whole street will be out for the funeral – how is that for reviving traditional values.
Bron: https://www.russiapost.info/regions/majority