Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

[Flyguy]

En die twee MFFs die 'we' hebben lossen elkaar af om deel te nemen aan Atalanta/UNIFILs/enz...
Daar komen niet veel Antillenbezoekjes aan te pas.

Ik vond het in de jaren '90 best leuk vertoeven 'in de West', eilandhoppen in een of ander Eskader (Duits of KM).

Is ook leuk. JCL 2006 zou denk ik de laatste keer zijn geweest dat jullie in de West waren?

Maar 2 fregatten doe je meer als met 0 natuurlijk.

Overigens wil ik, als het tot zo'n dieptepunt komt, het genie die op 't idee kwam de fregatten te schrappen bekronen met de titel 'meester der kapitaalvernietiging'. De nieuwste Lcf stamt uit 2005.  :crazy:

Trouwens, doen de Antillen niet redelijk wat aan "Zelfbestuur"? Dan komen er toch geen Heersers uit 't Oude Europa aan te pas?
(behalve dan wanneer er -opnieuw- geld nodig is, dan klopt men even aan...)

In de ogen van een Antilliaan is Nederland nog steeds de grote boze bezetter. Op 'mijn' eiland Aruba is dat gevoel minder geworden en voelt men zich thuis binnen het Koninkrijk, de anderen moeten nog wennen aan hun nieuwe status, vooral Curacao. Heeft ook te maken met dat er op Aruba veel werk is, wat weer een gevolg is van de bescherming van de arbeidsmarkt. (niet iedereen kan er komen wonen en zeker niet werken, een goed idee voor de BeNeLux!)

Nederland doet nog steeds de buitenlandse zaken en defensie, ze zorgen er ook voor dat de boel niet uit de hand loopt , da's alles.

Er zitten trouwens enorm veel Belgen in de West, bij ons op en rond de berg alleen al wonen best een aantal families. Waren er geen mariniers met hun families, dan waren de Belgen in de meerderheid t.o.v. Nederlanders denk ik zo.

[ARM-WAP]

Er worden zelfs scenario's genoemd waarbij we zonder subs én fregatten door het leven gaan. Misschien willen jullie dan af en toe de van der Zaan en de Doorman naar de west sturen als stationsschip? 'The Belgian Antilles', wie weet vinden ze jullie daar zelfs leukere heersers als ons. (hebben jullie wel een 2e wallonië erbij ) 
:lol:

De Antillen zijn te klein om er de harde kern van 'doppers-chomeurs-profiteurs' en "oproerkraaiers" te dumpen.

En die twee MFFs die 'we' hebben lossen elkaar af om deel te nemen aan Atalanta/UNIFILs/enz...
Daar komen niet veel Antillenbezoekjes aan te pas.

Ik vond het in de jaren '90 best leuk vertoeven 'in de West', eilandhoppen in een of ander Eskader (Duits of KM).

Trouwens, doen de Antillen niet redelijk wat aan "Zelfbestuur"? Dan komen er toch geen Heersers uit 't Oude Europa aan te pas?
(behalve dan wanneer er -opnieuw- geld nodig is, dan klopt men even aan...)

[Flyguy]

Wat een trieste zaak!

Nee, bij ons gaat het lekker!  


Er worden zelfs scenario's genoemd waarbij we zonder subs én fregatten door het leven gaan. Misschien willen jullie dan af en toe de van der Zaan en de Doorman naar de west sturen als stationsschip? 'The Belgian Antilles', wie weet vinden ze jullie daar zelfs leukere heersers als ons. (hebben jullie wel een 2e wallonië erbij ) 

:lol:

[ARM-WAP]

... even los van het feit dat Carriers een enorme meerwaarde hebben, zeker Carriers van het formaat en de taakstelling alswelke de Royal Navy in dienst wil stellen

Ik heb enkele weken hard gelachen met het verdict van een of andere commissie in de UK die concludeerde dat de UK MoD (en de huidige regering) schuldig waren aan de oplopende kosten ivm deze Carriers en meer bepaald de switch F-35B -> F-35C -> F-35B.

M.i. was het een goede beslissing van Labour om twee carriers te laten bouwen voor de RN.
Maar daar houdt het ook bij op. Zij wilden ook F-35B... Maar waarom? Weer een "jump jet"... met beperkt bereik en (wapen-)last ivm met échte carriertoestellen...

Men had meteen voor een ontwerp moeten gaan met 'Cats and Traps'... en dan de kat uit de boom kijken voor wat betreft de vliegtuigkeuze. Het formaat van deze schepen staat het gebruik van Hawkeye toe (zoals bij de Franse CdG).
En qua fighters had men nog steeds kunnen kiezen tussen F-35C... de Super Hornet... en... Rafale M...
Gezien de beperkte aantallen die uiteindelijk maar zullen gekocht worden had men meteen verschillende loten kunnen kopen om meteen ook de RAF mee uit te rusten.
Mss had het allemaal zelfs goedkoper kunnen worden dan te blijven prutsen en klooien met die Typhoon Tranches...

De RN en MoD zagen hun kans schoon met de verandering van Labour naar Conservative-Liberal Democrats en hoopten zo alsnog hun carriers te kunnen wijzigen in CATOBAR config... Maar ondertussen werd alles almaar duurder en nu is niemand nog "blij" met wat er uiteindelijk zal rondvaren en -vliegen.
Om nog maar te zwijgen over de almaar slinkende "vloot" van escorteschepen die straks die Carrier(s) moeten beschermen...
Wat een trieste zaak!

[Mourning]

In 1990 Britain had 27 submarines (excluding those that carry ballistic missiles) and France had 17. The two countries now have seven and six respectively.

Then again, I think you can make a credible argument that the money spent on the new carriers might have been better spent on new frigates and destroyers. The Navy has gone "all-in" on the carriers. Even so, I can't think of any good reason – or even any bad one – for why we would need to maintain a Cold War era-sized submarine fleet. When a threat is removed it's perfectly sensible to reduce some of your own counter-measures.

http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/alex-massie/2013/02/europes-defence-budgets-may-not-be-noble-but-they-are-at-least-rational/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=europes-defence-budgets-may-not-be-noble-but-they-are-at-least-rational

... even los van het feit dat Carriers een enorme meerwaarde hebben, zeker Carriers van het formaat en de taakstelling alswelke de Royal Navy in dienst wil stellen slaat wat hij schrijft over de submarines echt helemaal nergens op.

Hij geeft zelf al aan dat de onderzeebootvloot is geslonken van 27 stuks in 1990, het einde van de Koude Oorlog, naar 7 nu. Dat is een reductie van bijna 75% (!!!), maar toch is dat aantal van 7 kennelijk "Cold War era-sized"?  :crazy: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

En kennelijk is een reductie van 75% maar miniem of zo, want er kan nog wel wat vanaf aldus de schrijver...

Dit is wat je krijgt als mensen die totaal geen verstand van zaken hebben stukken gaan schrijven. Hoe goed kun je jezelf tegenspreken c.q. ongeloofwaardig maken?

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Europe's defence budgets may not be noble, but they are at least rational

19 February 2013

Gideon Rachmann is unhappy that european defence budgets are still falling:

Since 2008, in response to the economic downturn, most big European countries have cut defence spending by 10-15 per cent. The longer-term trends are even more striking. Britain's Royal Air Force now has just a quarter of the number of combat aircraft it had in the 1970s. The Royal Navy has 19 destroyers and frigates, compared with 69 in 1977. The British army is scheduled to shrink to 82,000 soldiers, its smallest size since the Napoleonic wars. In 1990 Britain had 27 submarines (excluding those that carry ballistic missiles) and France had 17. The two countries now have seven and six respectively.

And yet Britain and France are commonly regarded as the only two European countries that still take defence seriously.

[...] The situation in most other European countries is worse – Spain devotes less than 1 per cent of GDP to military spending. And much European military spending goes on pensions or pay, not equipment. The Belgians distinguished themselves in the Libyan campaign of 2011. But about 75 per cent of Belgian military spending now goes on personnel – causing one critic to call the Belgian military "an unusually well-armed pension fund".

None of this might matter much if the US was still willing to step in whenever the Europeans fell short. In fact, America is losing patience with Europe's inability to act on its own.

This is fine as far as it goes. The problem is that it does nto go very far. I confess I don't see the point of writing about defence spending without at least attempting to match spending to needs. Nor, in its present predicament, do I quite see how one could realistically expect Spain to be in a position to double defence spending.

Washington often says it is displeased by europe's defence draw-down. Doubtless this is so. It is also the case that Washington has persistently opposed efforts to build a common, independent, european defence capability. There are respectable reasons for this American view. Nevertheless just as it is reasonable to complain about european "free-riders" so it is reasonable to point out that the US has generally been happier with weak european allies within NATO than stronger european allies outwith NATO. That's fine.

It is also true that there are sensible questions to be asked about British defence priorities. It seems quite probable that the present government's cuts go too far, severely reducing Britain's ability to punch at any weight at all.

Nevertheless one can take this too far too. The UK is still building its two new aircraft carriers (though lord knows what will happen to the second one) and is still planning to purchase a reasonable number of spanking new F35 jets. Britannia has not lost all her teeth.

Then again, I think you can make a credible argument that the money spent on the new carriers might have been better spent on new frigates and destroyers. The Navy has gone "all-in" on the carriers. Even so, I can't think of any good reason – or even any bad one – for why we would need to maintain a Cold War era-sized submarine fleet. When a threat is removed it's perfectly sensible to reduce some of your own counter-measures.

Show us the major, three-dimensional war for which europe should be preparing and you'll have a better chance of persuading governments they should invest more in contingency measures.

And Rachmann's lament – familiar as it is – falls down when he lists some future crises for which europe should be better-prepared:


Yet you do not have to look very far beyond Europe's borders to see an array of potential threats massing over the next decade. The Middle East is in turmoil and thousands are dying in Syria, threatening the stability of the whole region. Iran's nuclear programme could well lead to confrontation and threaten European energy supplies. Russian military spending is rising. And growing tensions between China and its neighbours could one day menace the freedom of navigation on which European trade depends.

Well, look, you could double the size of the French and British armies and still find no good reason for intervening in Syria. Nor do I think it likely that rising Russian military spending necessarily threatens Italy or Spain. As for Iran or China, well, if there's trouble to be dealt with in those theatres you can guarantee the Americans will be leading the western response to those potential crises. What's Belgium gonna contribute? What realistic threats to europe are there that Washington will not also consider a threat to its own interests?

I suspect the only way you could make european governments – whatever the economic climate – increase defence spending would be if Washington decided it was going to give up its leadership of the western world and retire from hegemony. Since Washington has no desire to do anything of the sort (and no-one will believe any bluff designed to persuade you Washington wants to get out of the game) europe's defence posture may not be especially noble but it is at least rational.

http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/alex-massie/2013/02/europes-defence-budgets-may-not-be-noble-but-they-are-at-least-rational/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=europes-defence-budgets-may-not-be-noble-but-they-are-at-least-rational

[Oldenhave]

Spangdahlem Air Base's 81st Fighter Squadron is scheduled to inactivate this year as a result of the overall U.S. defense budget cuts.

The 81 FS inactivation became official upon the termination of the Continuing Resolution provision that prohibited the "retirement, divestiture, realignment and transfer" of aircraft. The Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act does not prohibit these actions.
Approximately 500 personnel will be affected by the inactivation.

The 81 FS flies the A-10 Thunderbolt II, or "Warthog," a twin-engine jet aircraft capable of close air support for ground forces.

"While we are disappointed that we will no longer be in Europe supporting the 52nd Fighter Wing's mission, we realize this is just another chapter in the life of a fighter squadron," said U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Clint Eichelberger, 81st Fighter Squadron commander. "As A-10 pilots, we will continue to lend decisive combat power around the world by supporting combatant command authorities with deployable close air support and combat search and rescue expertise."

Specific plans to relocate the squadron's A-10s are not yet finalized; however, the squadron is currently moving some aircraft to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, and Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz., to support training requirements and subsidize the capabilities of the A-10 squadrons. The remaining aircraft and personnel will withdraw from Spangdahlem AB within the year.

Bron: http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123334517#.URpDBt9Poao.twitter

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

U.S. Navy Cuts Fleet Goal to 306 Ships

Feb. 4, 2013 -  By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS 

The U.S. Navy has revised its overall fleet size requirement from 313 to 306 ships — a modest downscaling that reflects modified operational requirements and is not the result of the ongoing budget crisis.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130204/DEFREG02/302040003?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

[Zeewier]

The sad thing is, the European states where already uncapable of deploying a mission like the one they wanted to send to Libya in 2011  

Under current spending trends, there is insufficient demand in Europe to support several competitive next generation large unmanned aircraft programmes. So Europeans must avoid several uncoordinated efforts taking place simultaneously. European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive aerospace programmes prior to the economic crisis. They definitely cannot afford it now.

Ik las ook al iets soortgelijks. Denemarken nam deel aan de eerst door Amerika geleidde aanvallen, waarna de NAVO het overnam. Vanaf dat moment wat er veel te weinig exacte informatie over SAM-installaties. Europa zat op dat moment enorm verlegen om drones, niet voor niets dat Denemarken en Nederland nu onderzoek doen naar gebruik van drones. Ook bleek dat Denemarken zelf te gedateerde wapens voor hun F-16's had om effectief te zijn in Libië. Ze bombardeerde met inderhaast aangekochte precisiebommen van Polen, Israel en... Nederland!

En dit:

"The report is both embarrassing and revealing on several fronts," said Holger Nielsen, defense spokesman for the Socialist People's Party, one of three parties in Denmark's ruling center-left administration.

Wanneer trekt de (Europese) politiek de conclusie dat haar defentiebudget nét aan genoeg is om alle rekeningen te betalen maar dat een missie niet financierbaar is? De Deense PvdA doet het in iedergeval al.

http://www.acus.org/natosource/denmark-criticizes-natos-libya-operation
http://www.acus.org/natosource/report-natos-libya-op-reveals-denmark-bought-munitions-israel-bomb-arab-world-country

[dudge]

As a result, American officials warn that Europeans will soon be incapable of deploying a mission like the one they sent to Libya in 2011.

The sad thing is, the European states where already uncapable of deploying a mission like the one they wanted to send to Libya in 2011  

Under current spending trends, there is insufficient demand in Europe to support several competitive next generation large unmanned aircraft programmes. So Europeans must avoid several uncoordinated efforts taking place simultaneously. European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive aerospace programmes prior to the economic crisis. They definitely cannot afford it now.

En dit gaat niet alleen op voor UASs, maar voor vrijwel alles. Op zich wel een goed stuk, hopen dat de inhoud doordringt in de Europese hoofdjes.

[Zeewier]

Aardige opschaling van Brits defensiebudget. Aankoop F35B lijkt met dit bericht iets dichterbij.

MOD Reveals £160 Billion Plan to Equip Armed Forces

The Ministry of Defence has today published details of how it will equip the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force over the next 10 years and how this will be funded.
For the first time, the government has set out a fully-funded Defence Equipment Plan totalling almost £160 billion.
The affordability of this plan has been scrutinised by the National Audit Office (NAO) and their independent analysis is also published today.
The NAO makes clear that the MOD has:
substantially revised the way it compiles and manages the equipment plan and is now approaching the task on a more prudent basis;
taken difficult decisions to address what was estimated to be a £74 billion gap between its forecast funding and costs;
taken significant positive steps designed to deal with the accumulated affordability gap and lay the foundations for stability going forward.
And concludes that if it continues along this path:
the department will be able to demonstrate it has really turned a corner.
The publication of the equipment plan follows the Defence Secretary's announcement last year that the Defence Budget has been balanced for the first time in more than a decade and that the MOD is taking a new approach to financial planning.
Within the equipment and equipment support budget of around £160 billion over the next ten years, Philip Hammond has introduced for the first time a contingency of £4.8 billion to manage cost variation and protect existing projects.
In addition, within the £160 billion, £8 billion is currently unallocated. This will be allocated as new equipment priorities emerge over the decade and only once the MOD is confident that they are affordable and therefore deliverable.
Priorities will be decided by the Armed Forces Committee, chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff.
Structuring the Defence Equipment Plan and the budget that supports it in this way will enable the MOD to deliver Future Force 2020.
The equipment plan includes the following major investments in state-of-the-art military capabilities and their support over the next ten years:
£35.8 billion on submarines and the deterrent, including a total of seven Astute Class attack submarines and developing a replacement for Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarines;
£18.5 billion on combat air, including Lightning II and Typhoon fast jets and unmanned aerial vehicles;
£17.4 billion on ships, including Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, six new Type 45 destroyers and the development of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship;
£13.9 billion on aircraft for air-to-air refuelling, passenger and heavy lift, such as Voyager and A400M;
£12.3 billion on armoured fighting vehicles, including Warrior, Scout and other land equipment;
£12.1 billion on helicopters, including Chinook, Apache, Puma and Wildcat; and
£11.4 billion on weapons, for example, missiles, torpedoes and precision guided bombs.
The Defence Equipment Plan gives the defence industry more information than ever before about the MOD's priorities to enable them to invest in the capabilities the military will require.
Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said:
"It is essential that our forces are fully equipped to respond to the range of threats we face in this uncertain world. This £160 billion equipment plan will ensure the UK's Armed Forces remain among the most capable and best equipped in the world, providing the military with the confidence that the equipment they need is fully funded.
"For the first time in a generation the Armed Forces will have a sustainable equipment plan.
"Step by step, we are clearing up the culture of over-promising and under-delivering that created a multi-billion pound black hole in the Defence Budget. Today's NAO report confirms that we were right to take the difficult decisions to cut unaffordable expenditure and balance the books."
Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, said:
"Successful operations rely on a proper equipment programme based on sustained funding into the future. Through the Armed Forces Committee to the Defence Board, all 3 Services now have greater input and more certainty than ever before about what equipment they will have and when.
"The clarity provided by the equipment plan builds on the confidence in the budget and shows that Future Force 2020 is affordable and achievable. Our Armed Forces will have the capabilities to respond to global threats and provide the nation's defence."

http://www.defencetalk.com/mod-reveals-160-billion-plan-to-equip-armed-forces-46610/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

European nations cannot afford separate defence programmes

by Clara Marina O'Donnell
01 February 2013

European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive military programmes prior to the economic crisis and they definitely cannot afford it now - says think-tank, calling for more EU defence cooperation

Europe's military spending is in free fall. European Union member states combined have reduced defence spending from €200bn to €170bn since the start of the economic crisis in 2008. In response, governments have signed up to a variety of new bilateral and multilateral initiatives. These are designed to limit the impact of budget cuts on their armed forces. But so far, the savings incurred pale in comparison. Estimates put them at €200m to €300m. Many sensitivities relating to national security make it hard for governments to implement collaborative defence efforts. But at a time when Europe's neighbourhood is replete with instability and the United States is scaling back its own armed forces, Europeans need to do more to stem the damage to their militaries.

Notwithstanding their budget cuts, taken together EU states are still the second largest defence spenders in the world. And not all European countries are reducing the level of funding to their armed forces. According to a 2011 study for the European Parliament, Finland and Denmark have maintained military spending steady in recent years. Poland and Sweden have increased it. But even prior to the economic crisis, most European countries spent less than 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence – even though North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members are in theory committed to devoting at least that much to their militaries.

And, according to the European Parliament study, most middle-sized European countries have cut their defence spending by 10 to 15 per cent since 2009. Some of the smaller states, including Latvia and Lithuania, have cut spending by more than 20 per cent. Britain is reducing its military budget by 7.5 per cent over four years. And according to Andrew Dorman from Chatham House, the actual reduction is nearly 25 per cent because the Ministry of Defence has many unfunded liabilities and has to unexpectedly pay for the replacement of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. France is expected to scale back its military once it announces its new defence priorities this year. As a result, American officials warn that Europeans will soon be incapable of deploying a mission like the one they sent to Libya in 2011.

European governments have acknowledged that closer cooperation between their armed forces could offset – at least partly – the impact of such large spending cuts. They have introduced some welcome measures. For example, last year, 14 countries agreed to buy surveillance drones for a joint NATO-run squadron. Some 18 states now take part in the EU network to facilitate maritime surveillance through information exchanges. Last April, Belgium and the Netherlands decided to cooperate in helicopter maintenance. In September, Bulgaria and Romania agreed terms to make it easier to police each other's airspace. Britain and France are training together to develop a new joint expeditionary force. And the UK and other Europeans are providing logistical support to France's deployment in Mali.

But governments remain wary of pooling military capabilities. They still fear that their partners may block their access to shared equipment if they disapprove of a particular operation. States also disagree on the best way to develop new military technologies. For example, Britain wants to acquire defence equipment with France bilaterally. But since French President François Hollande has been in office, France has become increasingly keen to allow other European countries to take part in Franco-British procurement projects. Many countries are averse to committing to ambitious initiatives because they know that these can be costly in the short term.

Last year, Britain notably abandoned its plans to adapt its aircraft carrier so that French planes could land on it, after realising how expensive the adjustments would be. Several states are loath to integrate their defence companies with those of other countries, as Germany illustrated when it refused to support the merger between BAE and EADS. Finally, governments do not want their defence firms to lose out on contracts. Many in France worry that several of the cost-saving projects proposed by NATO, including missile defence and the joint purchases of surveillance drones, favour US defence companies.

Europeans need to overcome some of these continued aversions to cooperation. Even though governments would prefer to avoid using military force, they might not have a choice. Several conflicts risk undermining stability in Europe's southern periphery over the next few years – not least the partial take-over of Mali by Islamist militants, where French forces have already felt compelled to intervene, the civil war in Syria and a possible standoff with Iran. And Washington, struggling with its own budgetary constraints, wants its allies across the world to take more responsibility for their regional security.

President Hollande's government can allay some of the French concerns about the lack of European industrial participation within NATO cost-saving initiatives. To do so, Paris could suggest projects to the alliance which involve equipment made in Europe. Berlin, London, Paris or Rome could sell some of their old fighter jets to countries in Central Europe which want to strengthen their arsenals cheaply. Europeans should buy cutting edge military capabilities only when it is necessary. Over the last few decades, the cost of defence equipment has grown exponentially. Even when their economies are stronger, governments will increasingly struggle to arm their militaries. In some cases, national security will require governments to continue acquiring the most technologically sophisticated capabilities. But for less sensitive tasks, governments should explore cheaper equipment options and a greater use of civilian suppliers, for example in communications.

Finally, European governments must ensure that they do not duplicate their efforts to build the next generation of drones. European governments have long argued that it has been very inefficient for Europe to have three manned fighter jets programmes - Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen. The duplication has prevented the various programmes from benefiting from economies of scale, it has curtailed interoperability amongst European armed forces and it has led Europeans to compete against each other in export markets.

Over the next few years, Europeans will decide how to develop unmanned combat aircraft and other sophisticated drones. It is still unclear how governments will proceed. France and Britain have announced plans to develop next generation drones bilaterally. Lately, EADS and Finmeccanica -Italy's largest defence company - have floated intentions to do the same. And France has agreed to work on unmanned aircraft with Germany, too. Under current spending trends, there is insufficient demand in Europe to support several competitive next generation large unmanned aircraft programmes. So Europeans must avoid several uncoordinated efforts taking place simultaneously. European countries could barely afford duplicating expensive aerospace programmes prior to the economic crisis. They definitely cannot afford it now.

Read more: http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/3033/european-nations-cannot-afford-separate-defence-programmes#ixzz2Jea0Ei8P

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Nato chief: EU must spend more on military

31.01.13

BRUSSELS - Nato chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen has urged EU countries to spend more on defence despite the economic crisis or risk losing US solidarity.

He said in a foreword to the alliance's report on 2012, out on Thursday (31 January), that: "If current defence spending trends were to continue, that would limit the practical ability of Nato's European nations to work together with their North American allies. But it would also risk weakening the political support for our alliance in the United States."

He added Nato is still "the most important military power in the world."

But he warned: "The security challenges of the 21st century - terrorism, proliferation, piracy, cyber warfare, unstable states - will not go away as we focus on fixing our economies."

He also said "the rise of emerging powers could create a growing gap between their capacity to act and exert influence on the international stage and our ability to do so."

The Nato report says the US accounted for 72 percent of Nato countries' defence spending in 2012 compared to 68 percent in 2007. France, Germany, Italy and the UK made up the bulk of the rest, but the French contribution fell steeply.

"This has the potential to undermine alliance solidarity and puts at risk the ability of the European allies to act without the involvement of the United States," the report notes.

It adds that Nato spending as a proportion of world military expenditure fell to 60 percent in 2011 from 69 percent in 2003 and is to hit 56 percent in 2014.

'EU like Vatican'

The angst over EU defence capabilities is not new.

Former US defence chief Robert Gates in a speech in Brussels in 2011 also voiced alarm.

"The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress - and in the American body politic writ large - to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence," he said at the time.

Gates and Fogh Rasmussen's anxiety is not confined to Nato.

Speaking in Brussels also on Thursday on the margins of an EU foreign ministers' meeting, Poland's Radek Sikorski said the Union needs a real defence force of its own.

"I think the Mali crisis shows this is necessary because the next crisis could unfold even more quickly and we need to be able to react instantly," he told press.

"Let's recall that events in Mali unfolded very fast. The terrorists crossed the line of contact and France reacted from one day to the next. But we know that in the EU, as in the Vatican, the wheels of state turn very slowly," he added.

EU arms licences

The latest EU figures appear to show that some of the worst crisis-hit EU countries are still ploughing money into new weapons despite Nato's concerns.

The report says that fellow EU countries in 2011 granted significant amounts of export licences to Greece (€783mn), Portugal (€397mn) and Spain (€1.6bn).

The numbers do not tell the whole story, however.

France, which makes up most of the Greek figure, granted licences to negotiate future arms sales rather than export licences as such.

A large chunk of the Spanish number relates to cross-border movements of spare parts in defence projects, such as Eurofighter or Typhoon, managed by the European defence consortium Eads.

Most of the Portuguese figure relates to deliveries from a 2005 deal to buy armoured vehicles from Austrian firm Steyr.

Lisbon cancelled the contract last November because Steyr delivered just 166 out of 260 units, invoking a €55 million penalty against the supplier.

"Portugal, in the last two years, reduced its budget for the purchase of military equipment by over 60 percent ... Also for budgetary reasons, though not only for that, Portugal, in 2011, decided to withdraw from several military programs, such as NH90 helicopters," its ministry of defence told EUobserver.

http://euobserver.com/defence/118914

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

UK unveils £159 billion defence equipment plan, but doubts remain

By Mohammed Abbas

LONDON | Thu Jan 31, 2013 1:46am GMT

(Reuters) - Britain published on Thursday a 159-billion-pound long-term defence equipment spending plan, a move aimed at reversing decades of mismanagement but which drew only qualified praise from experts.

The plan covers spending from 2012 to 2022, the first time the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has outlined defence equipment spending over such a long period, reflecting the gestation time of major military projects.

Equipment covered in the plan contained no surprises, having been outlined in the MoD's last major planning exercise, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which charted a course for British security needs by 2020.

British arms firm BAE Systems, Europe's largest defence contractor, is behind most of the large projects outlined in the plan, including submarines, ships, aircraft carriers and the Typhoon fighter jet.

The MoD has for years been criticised by spending watchdogs for over-optimistic cost and time forecasts for equipment projects, a matter that has grown in importance as Britain slashes spending to fix a budget deficit.

The spending plan includes a 4.8 billion pound contingency allowance to manage unexpected cost increases, as well as an unallocated 8 billion pounds for future equipment needs.

"Step by step, we are clearing up years of mismanagement under the last government by ending the culture of over-promising and under-delivering," Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, a Conservative, said in a statement, referring to the opposition Labour party.

Labour labelled Hammond "hubristic" and said his claims to have balanced the defence budget were "wild".

The MoD said the spending plan addresses what had been estimated to have been a 74 billion pound equipment funding gap, and that it had received the backing of the National Audit Office (NAO), parliament's spending watchdog.

OVER-OPTIMISM

However, the NAO said in a report reviewing the MoD's spending plan that while the ministry was approaching defence spending on a "more prudent basis" and had "taken significant positive steps", uncertainty remained.

"There is systemic over-optimism inherent in the department's assumptions around the costing of risk and uncertainty .... which may not be sufficiently mitigated by the contingency provision," the NAO said.

It stressed that its assessment of the spending forecast only took into account equipment procurement and not equipment support costs, which at 86 billion pounds makes up more than half of the spending plan.

The NAO also said the plan was "unlikely to be realistic" without a comprehensive analysis of risks and uncertainties.

John Louth, director for defence, industries and society at the Royal United Services Institute defence thinktank in London, said the MoD's plan lacked detail and was vulnerable to shocks.

"Whilst they should be applauded for publishing a 10-year plan, the information we have is very thin. It doesn't really talk about any accounting assumptions or anything that gives an understanding of how the numbers were generated," he said.

"If you have a 10-year forecast, you're making an awful lot of assumptions over how the world will be over that 10-year period .... We haven't been able to forecast any of the operations we've been involved with," he added.

An MoD spokesman said future "wider economic conditions" could have an impact on the plan, as well as another SDSR planned for 2015.

PROJECTS COVERED

The major defence equipment projects covered in the MoD spending plan are:

* 35.8 billion pounds on seven BAE-built Astute-class submarines and developing a replacement for the four Vanguard-class submarines used for Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent.

* 18.5 billion pounds on fighter jets, and UAVs, or drones, including the Joint Strike Fighter built by U.S. firm Lockheed Martin Corp, of which Britain has so far committed to buy 48, and the Typhoon, built by a consortium of BAE, Italy's Finmeccanica and European aerospace group EADS, of which Britain has ordered 160.

* 17.4 billion pounds on two aircraft carriers, six new Type 45 destroyers and the development of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, all built by BAE.

* 13.9 billion pounds on air-to-air refuelling, passenger and heavy lift capability by leasing Airbus aircraft through the EADS-led AirTanker consortium.

* 12.3 billion pounds on armoured fighting vehicles, including the Scout - built by General Dynamics - and the Warrior, built by GKN.

* 12.1 billion pounds on helicopters, including the Boeing-built Chinook and Apache, and the AgustaWestland-built Wildcat.

* 11.4 billion pounds on assorted missiles, torpedoes and bombs.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/uk-britain-defence-spending-idUKBRE90U00J20130131

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Lessons From Mali

By Robert Farley / January 31, 2013

The French-led intervention in Mali appears to be accomplishing some of its short-term objectives.  However, just as with Libya, the inability of France to conduct a medium-sized operation in a nearby country without U.S. assistance is raising eyebrows . France is experiencing shortfalls in several areas, but most notably in air logistics, including in-flight refueling and air transport.  The Obama administration has thus far lent measured assistance, recently backing away from a requirement that the French pay the Pentagon for services rendered. As Michael O'Hanlon has argued, the key to U.S. military supremacy lies in its system of global logistics, rather than in its most sophisticated weaponry .

To be sure, France's problems may be temporary.  The long awaited arrival of the A400M should resolve many of these logistical difficulties, and the aerial refueling situation may also improve. Nevertheless, the French experience has some important lessons for Asia-Pacific players. Military capabilities mean little without the ability to transport forces across distance, and a major logistical commitment requires sealift, airlift, and aerial refueling.

The development of the Y-20, assuming it goes into full production, demonstrates that the PLA is beginning to take airlift seriously. The Y-20 is expected to replace older Russian aircraft, and give the PLAAF a capability similar to that of the C-17 Globemaster. Indeed, the Y-20 may someday capture some of the emerging ASEAN market for large, advanced transport aircraft.

The transport fleets of most ASEAN states are dominated by C-130s and a variety of lighter aircraft, such as the An-26 and the C-212 Aviocar.  Japan and South Korea have similar, if somewhat more modern, transport squadrons. With increasingly dense littoral populations living in a disaster-prone region, the ability of ASEAN militaries to conduct airlift may become their critical operational capability. Of all Indo-Pac states, India has made the most serious investment with an order of 10 C-17s.

"Air diplomacy" may have a role to play. The pre-eminence of the United States in air transport continues to give it an advantage in crisis situations, as the U.S. military can deliver people and material faster and in greater quantities than any regional player. A Y-20 equipped PLAAF may someday be able to cut into this advantage. In the medium term, we could perhaps imagine an Asian alternative to the Heavy Airlift Wing, a organization serving the airlift needs of a consortium of European states.  The HAW owns 3 C-17 Globemasters (operating with Hungarian markings), giving member states a limited heavy airlift capacity.  Of course, any kind of multilateral military organization requires substantial agreement across parties, a requirement that does not necessarily hold even in ASEAN, much less across the panoply of East Asia states. Nevertheless, some sort of shared airlift capacity might make sense in context of the operations-other-than-war that so often occupy Asian military organizations.

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/01/31/lessons-from-mali/