Internationale ontwikkelingen op onderzeebootgebied.

[Sparkplug]

The future of Royal Navy attack submarines

https://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/the-future-of-royal-navy-attack-submarines/

[Harald]

The compounding risk in Australia's transition to new submarines

Two questions are frequently raised about the process that selected Australia's preferred partner for the design and build of the future submarine.

The first is why the Defence Department didn't pursue a 'son of Collins', that is, an evolution of the successful Collins design, with the questioner's underlying assumption being that evolving an existing design should be cheaper and faster than starting an entirely new design. The second is why the Swedish shipbuilder Saab, which had acquired Kockums—the company that designed the Collins—wasn't invited to participate in the competitive evaluation process (CEP), given that it (other than the Japanese) was the only entity with demonstrated experience in designing and building large conventional submarines.

It's worth revisiting these questions because they're relevant to the Collins life-of-type extension (LOTE) program, which is the key to Defence maintaining an effective submarine capability throughout the long transition to the Attack-class submarine.

The two questions are distinct but related. The Australian National Audit Office's 2017 report on the CEP is silent on why Saab wasn't offered the opportunity to participate in the competition. The report simply says that Defence determined that the three entities that were invited to participate (TKMS of Germany, the Japanese government, and the ultimately successful DCNS of France) were the only ones that met Defence's requirement that the future submarine be 'designed and built by a proven submarine designer with recent experience in designing and building diesel-electric submarines'. The report doesn't assess whether that was an appropriate requirement or explain why Saab didn't meet it.

But there was a more fulsome discussion at Senate estimates in February 2015, only two weeks after then Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the CEP, followed by Defence's written response to the Senate's questions on notice. On the first issue, Defence testified that a study into the possibility of evolving the Collins 'demonstrated that the design effort involved would be similar to a new design'. Ultimately Defence concluded that an evolved Collins 'would not provide a beneficial, nor a low cost and low risk solution for the Future Submarine'.

On the second question, Defence officials repeatedly argued (pages 109 and 129, for example) that while the French and Germans had not designed or built a large conventional submarine, they along with the Japanese had demonstrated continuous submarine design and build activity.

In contrast, the Swedes, despite previously designing and building submarines both large and small, hadn't completed a full design and build program since 1996–97. Even though they were well into the design of their own A26 class, had been involved in the build of the Collins into the 2000s, had an extensive record of major upgrade activities (including inserting entirely new 'plug' sections into submarines), and employed over 3,000 naval and submarine engineers, that hiatus was judged to be an unacceptable risk.

Whether or not you're convinced by Defence's reasoning to exclude the Swedes (for me, it is one of Defence's most bizarre capability decisions), its argument is clear—submarine design, even modifications to an existing design, is difficult, and deep expertise is needed to undertake it successfully. There are no easy wins in submarine design, and mistakes create major cost, schedule and capability risks.

.../....

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-compounding-risk-in-australias-transition-to-new-submarines/

[Harald]

Germany-Norway talks on Naval Submarine Code use for new submarines still unresolved

Germany and Norway's different use cases and operating environments for their jointly developed submarine programme remain obstacles as the two countries continue to debate how to apply the Naval Submarine Code, which is designed to ensure safety and best practices for industry and operators.

https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/german-norway-talks-naval-submarine-code-use-ne/

[Parera]

De Australiers zijn behoorlijk in de Franse zooi gestapt.

[Ace1]

Industry fears rise for Aussie submarine work

Defence says contracts for a French language school, a ­Barossa Valley resort and the management consultancy that employs former defence minister Christopher Pyne are evidence of Australian industry involvement in the nation's $80bn Future Submarines program.

Defence released a list of 137 "subcontractors" to the submarine project last week to placate local firms after French company Naval Group warned that Australian suppliers might not get 50 per cent of the subs' contracts.

But the list includes just six defenc­e equipment suppliers and 28 engineering or technical services firms, while only about 50 are Australian-owned and operated.

The list is dominated by general­ services businesses, including­ accountants, travel agents, lawyers, recruiters, hotels, and fleet managers.

French language and cultural organisation Alliance Francaise is on the list, to support local staff wanting to better communicate with Naval Group's French management. Six hotels are named as "subcontractors", including the Novotel Barossa Valley Resort, while Consultancy EY, which Mr Pyne now works for as a defence adviser, is also on the list. The former­ defence minister, who backed Naval Group to build the subs, told The Australian he was not involved in the subcontract.

An industry source said Defence­ released the list "without thinking" about the message it sent to already furious defence industr­y firms, after The Aust­ralian revealed Naval Group's concerns about local suppliers.

"Defence and the minister's office needed to take a deep breath and assess the pros and cons of releasing that list, but they had a knee-jerk reaction and they have made it worse," the source said. "The government and Defence­ keep talking about creat­ing a sovereign submarine-­building capability, but there is nothing sovereign about law firms or hotels or accounting firms getting this work."

Naval Group will need to engage­ thousands of engineering and manufacturing companies to build the Attack-class submar­ines from 2023, but there is no mandated level that Naval Group must meet for Australian content.

Centre Alliance senator Rex Patrick said Defence had sought to create the impression that Australian companies were already winning key contracts, but "the number of companies on the list with true submarine-related capabilities is disturbingly low".

"You don't design a submarine and then insert Australian equipment; you have to design Aust­ralian equipment into the submarine from the start. The submarine design task is already under way and that means we are clearly in 'Australian industry participation' strife," he said.

Labor defence spokesman Richard Marles said the government was trying to hide the fact that it had failed to secure minimum Australian content requirements for the submarine project.

"Who are they trying to kid here?" he said. "How are security guards and hotel rooms key parts of the Future Submarine program? Meanwhile, the Morrison government secretly sent hull fabrication work off to France – that is the real measure of Scott Morrison's commitment to Australian industry."

Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price stood by the list, saying the benefits of the Defence mega-project would flow through to the broader economy.

"Let's be absolutely clear — the economic footprint of our $50bn Future Submarine program is much wider than just Australia's defence industry," she said. "The economic benefits from a project this size cannot be understated."

She had "absolute faith" in the Australian defence industry to "exceed our expectations in terms of local industry involvement in the Future Submarine program".

Ms Price recently launched an audit of Defence contracts to ensure maximum Australian industry involvement, and a plan to build the nation's skilled defence industry workforce.

Naval Group Australia chief executive John Davis said last week he was unable to predict whether Australian ­industry content would reach 50 per cent.

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/industry-fears-rise-for-aussie-submarine-work/news-story/5ca04c472f2a4ad33c03aa6abf686c53?fbclid=IwAR2zvCn7NXRko1PMmPl3QZR0Q2zeWFWR4i4KJU9JdL9DINw56uROZPiqNdo

[Sparkplug]

Dan de 'blauwe ogen'.  Ik kom zat mensen tegen, waarvan ik denk hoe is het in hemelsnaam mogelijk dat er iemand bij jouw intrapte en je man /vrouw werd, of hoe je die functie hebt verkregen.
Daar draait het (grotendeels) om verleiden, je goed verkopen.   En dat hebben de Fransen uitmuntend gedaan.  Australie tuint er niet voor de eerste keer in.  Het ARH Tiger en MRH-90 heli werden ook verkocht als zijnde Militairy Off The Shelf, dus geen ontwikkeling risico's meer en zou goedkoper zijn dan de concurrentie.  En 'Down Under' werd ook in deze 2 gevallen vette industriële participatie worsten voorgehouden.    Inspelen op emoties, gevoelens, die dan letterlijk en figuurlijk bij de ontvanger naar het hoofd stijgen.
Ondertussen ... loopt de ratio als water uit de hersenpan weg.   

En de Fransen hebben nog eerder met success de Mirage IIIO (afgeleide van de Mirage IIIE) aan Australië weten te slijten. Eens in de zoveel tijd lukt het ze.

Weer terug naar de onderzeeboten.

[Huzaar1]

Toch zijn de Aussie's ook deels zelf schuldig, vraag Kockums maar over hun ervaringen met de RAN/Australische DoD. Idiote eisen, weinig marktkennis, overschatting van eigen industriële capaciteit, etc. Dit ging nogmaals (maar in mindere mate) fout bij de bouw van de Hobart-klasse en zal ongetwijfeld ook weer gaan spelen bij de bouw van de toekomstige Hunter-klasse.

Dit lijkt me inmiddels ook wel bewezen .

[Parera]

Toch zijn de Aussie's ook deels zelf schuldig, vraag Kockums maar over hun ervaringen met de RAN/Australische DoD. Idiote eisen, weinig marktkennis, overschatting van eigen industriële capaciteit, etc. Dit ging nogmaals (maar in mindere mate) fout bij de bouw van de Hobart-klasse en zal ongetwijfeld ook weer gaan spelen bij de bouw van de toekomstige Hunter-klasse.

De bouw Collins klasse was inderdaad ook niet wat je kunt noemen een succesvolle samenwerking, om die reden hebben ze ook Saab uitgesloten in het begin van de aanbesteding van de vervanging van de huidige onderzeeboten.

Australië heeft zich voor een groot deel van hun vloot vastgebonden aan Spanje / Navantia door 7 van hun belangrijkste schepen te laten ontwikkelen (en deels bouwen) door deze werf.
Bij de 2 LHD's is de bouw uitgevoerd in Spanje en de afbouw in Australië waardoor de industrie een relatief klein deel van het werk kreeg.

De Hobart klasse destroyers zijn opgebouwd uit 31 modules, 9 stuks zijn gebouwd bij  ASC shipyards en de overige 22 zijn verdeeld over de overige werven in Australië, daar is het werk wel redelijk verdeeld maar het project heeft wel last gehad van veel vertraging en is het project ook duurder uitgevallen dan voorzien. Binnen de samenwerking tussen Navantia en de onderlinge lokale industrie zijn ook veel van de problemen op elkaar afgeschoven.

De 2 AOR's van de Supply klasse zijn volledig in Spanje gebouwd en in dit project is er nauwelijks ruimte voor de lokale industrie.

Het is nog maar afwachten hoe dit gaat aflopen voor de attack klasse onderzeeboten en de lokale industrie maar voor je het weet worden die boten gewoon in Cherbourg gebouwd.

[RTB]

Toch zijn de Aussie's ook deels zelf schuldig, vraag Kockums maar over hun ervaringen met de RAN/Australische DoD. Idiote eisen, weinig marktkennis, overschatting van eigen industriële capaciteit, etc. Dit ging nogmaals (maar in mindere mate) fout bij de bouw van de Hobart-klasse en zal ongetwijfeld ook weer gaan spelen bij de bouw van de toekomstige Hunter-klasse.

[Poleme]

Vraag me af of ze het volhouden, als de onderlinge relatie al zo verziekt is bij het begin van een project van tientallen jaren... In ieder geval wel een mooie testcase voor vervanging van de Walrus. Stap 1: geloof geen enkele aanbieder op hun blauwe ogen.
Dit klinkt vééls te bekend, zowel bij het OZB dossier als het MCMV dossier. Laten we het de Belgen over 10 jaar eens vragen of Naval Group haar beloftes nakwam 

Je T'aime.

Of de 'Aussies' het volhouden ?   Annuleren betekend binnenland's teveel politiek gezichtsverlies naar industrie en kiezers.  De Fransen verkochten de Shortfinned Barracuda met de belofte dat Australia het onderzeeboot ontwikkelingscentrum in hun regio zou worden.

Dan de 'blauwe ogen'.  Ik kom zat mensen tegen, waarvan ik denk hoe is het in hemelsnaam mogelijk dat er iemand bij jouw intrapte en je man /vrouw werd, of hoe je die functie hebt verkregen.
Daar draait het (grotendeels) om verleiden, je goed verkopen.   En dat hebben de Fransen uitmuntend gedaan.  Australie tuint er niet voor de eerste keer in.  Het ARH Tiger en MRH-90 heli werden ook verkocht als zijnde Militairy Off The Shelf, dus geen ontwikkeling risico's meer en zou goedkoper zijn dan de concurrentie.  En 'Down Under' werd ook in deze 2 gevallen vette industriële participatie worsten voorgehouden.    Inspelen op emoties, gevoelens, die dan letterlijk en figuurlijk bij de ontvanger naar het hoofd stijgen.
Ondertussen ... loopt de ratio als water uit de hersenpan weg.   

[Huzaar1]

Bizarre situatie is ontstaan, maar wat er nu bekend is geraakt is niets wat iemand nog niet wist.
Dat de Aussies erin getuind zijn is alleen maar bevestigd.

[RTB]

Vraag me af of ze het volhouden, als de onderlinge relatie al zo verziekt is bij het begin van een project van tientallen jaren... In ieder geval wel een mooie testcase voor vervanging van de Walrus. Stap 1: geloof geen enkele aanbieder op hun blauwe ogen.

While de Bailliencourt's bid was about twice the German's bid (later to be amended to at least three times the German bid), it was so much more exciting. Australia would be a regional submarine developer in partnership with the French and our industry would be deeply involved. The fact that Hervé Guillou's people might not have the capacity to fulfil the Australian industrial development part of the dream was a detail for the future.

Dit klinkt vééls te bekend, zowel bij het OZB dossier als het MCMV dossier. Laten we het de Belgen over 10 jaar eens vragen of Naval Group haar beloftes nakwam 

[Ace1]

Australia, France reaffirm commitment on Attack-class submarine project

Australia and France have reaffirmed their "full commitment" to the AUD80 billion (USD55.15 billion) project to build 12 Attack-class submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

The joint declaration - announced 15 February - follows comments attributed to John Davis, the chief executive of French-owned Naval Group's Australian subsidiary, in which he questioned the capability of Australian firms looking to participate in the construction project.

This participation is framed through Canberra's Australian Industry Capability (AIC) programme, which commits prime contractors to engage with local industry.

Australia's defence minister and her French counterpart Florence Parly said in a joint statement that they have reviewed the implementation of the 'Strategic Partnering Agreement' (SPA) that underpins the Attack-class programme.

https://www.janes.com/article/94341/australia-france-reaffirm-commitment-on-attack-class-submarine-project?fbclid=IwAR3XKBJcz-9qcWjKdp-941xqcoD0gA-9nfzKFW0MK__1KgqRCSYfLdI5PVY

[Ace1]

French negotiators misled Australia on submarines contract

French sub contract negotiators had their Australian counterparts for breakfast. Step by step, this is how they did it.

The French have developed their negotiating skills for centuries. They used every skill they learned to get what they wanted in the Australian submarine contract. Now retired defence minister Christopher Pyne can see yet another French negotiating victory over Australia. In frustration last week he cried out to his successors to be tough with the French and "hold their feet to the fire". My advice to Christopher is to forget it: the French are too clever.

Today's commentary is not about the virtues or hazards of the submarine technology, the deal with the US or the future directions of submarine warfare. It's about what Australians in both the private and government sector can learn from the brilliance the French showed in the submarine deal negotiation.

French lesson 1: Find out what your customer wants and offer it to them

Jean-Yves Le Drian is now France's foreign minister but in 2014 he was minister for defence. He came to Brisbane in November 2014 with the then French President, Francois Hollande, for the G20 meeting and a head of state visit. Le Drian believed that the best submarine for Australia's needs was nuclear and he planned to offer France's Barracuda nuclear submarine and to offer a link with the French nuclear industry, including fuel rod production, a nuclear energy reactor, and a desalinisation plant in Australia.

Le Drian was probably right and a nuclear submarine was the correct solution for Australia, but we wanted a diesel electric submarine. We also wanted substantial industry around the submarine development and close involvement in whole process. Le Drian vowed that the French tender would meet what the Australians thought they wanted even though that was not what the French submarine people wanted to deliver.

French lesson 2: Appoint a brilliant negotiator to mould the offer to what the customer wants and sell it

Le Drian realised that the legendary head of the French Naval industrial operation Hervé Guillou was the wrong person to push the deal through the Australian defence decision-making system and in any event he did not want to build the early submarines in Australia and set up an industrial network. In a brilliant move Le Drian appointed Marie-Pierre de Bailliencourt as effectively Guillou's second in command. She brought a team together, including highly skilled Australians, for the bid. Hervé Guillou was sidelined while the negotiations took place.

French lesson 3: Take advantage of lucky breaks

The brilliant Mme de Bailliencourt was well aware that the tender process came out of a "nodding deal" between Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with the backing of Americans. But in September 2015 Abbott was overthrown by Malcolm Turnbull.

There was a mutual dislike between the two Australian Prime Ministers so the Japanese no longer had the inside running. And then the French found out that the middle managers drafting the Japanese tender did not want to win so were likely to submit a bad tender. de Bailliencourt took full advantage of this luck and concentrated on beating the Germans who thought they were the logical winners.

French lesson 4: Go to the top

There was an elaborate tender decision-making process, but de Bailliencourt made sure our PM was well aware of the excitement and potential of her French bid. She made sure the Australian PM did not get wind of the agenda of Francois Hollande and Hervé Guillou.

French lesson 5: Price is not everything

The German tender was for a project a valued between $US20bn and $25bn and included a detailed plan to involve Australian industry. While de Bailliencourt's bid was about twice the German's bid (later to be amended to at least three times the German bid), it was so much more exciting. Australia would be a regional submarine developer in partnership with the French and our industry would be deeply involved. The fact that Hervé Guillou's people might not have the capacity to fulfil the Australian industrial development part of the dream was a detail for the future.

French lesson 6: Get the truth out quickly

When the winning French tender was announced the then defence minister Marise Payne was part of the announcement, but Malcolm Turnbull put his stamp on what he genuinely believed would be a great deal for Australia.

But as Turnbull was an announcing that all the submarines would be built in Australia (the de Bailliencourt proposal) Francois Hollande's office declared in the newspaper Le Monde that €8bn, would be spent in France and some 3000 to 4000 people would be mobilised to build the first two in France, in keeping with Guillou's plan. I alerted the nation to the difference, but it was swamped by press statements.

French lesson 7: Quickly remove your negotiator from the implementation

Guillou wasted no time in dumping de Bailliencourt as his deputy.

Fast forward and in 2018-19 and new defence minister Christopher Pyne had the task of trying to put together a Strategic Partnering Agreement that got somewhere near matching the proposals the Australians had agreed to. He ignored the warnings the of his Naval Board .

Then last week came the shocker statement from France's Naval Group Australia chief executive John Davis conceding that his company was still working to bridge cultural problems that had set back its ­relationship with Defence, predicting "difficult and hard ­conversations" as the project ramped up.

To which my response would be: you conned us, that's why it's hard.

Davis said the 12 attack-class boats would be the world's most expensive conventionally powered submarines, but they would also be the world's most capable diesel-electric subs and would deliver on Defence's "very specific and unique requirements". Remember, those "requirements" were what the French offered.

Mr Davis was unable to say whether the boats' Australian industry content would reach French promise of 50 per cent. He said the company, which is set to begin construction in 2022, was encountering "specific challenges" regarding Australian industry that were "new to Naval Group".

I'd say it's more a case that the French don't have and never did have the talent to perform what de Bailliencourt promised. And they want to develop that talent in France not Australia. Pyne should have recognised this and listened to his Naval Board.

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/french-negotiators-misled-australia-on-submarines-contract/news-story/9f390f7256b7b4f9e7a6f299fd5b7b3d?fbclid=IwAR1WgIKRbtNScWxh7R7X61QatRdgB5mOQOwpXqfGtBvxaWeTObeiBVty3lo

[Ace1]

Naval Group Australia responds to ANAO report

https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/naval-group-australia-responds-to-anao-report?fbclid=IwAR2KgumKy_id4fJxLF1a_GaMoX25mWJbCfh0HTsSpLK_I556ixFuOJfscH8