Defensiebegrotingen en -problematiek, niet NL

[Elzenga]

Je hebt het over minder inzetbaar, daar kan je natuurlijk vele kanten mee heen. Het is ook mogelijk dat men het toen wist en ervan uitgegaan is, dat de benodigde modificaties zouden worden doorgevoerd. Maar dat hoort niet thuis in dit topic.

Zou ook kunnen ja. En de NH90s zijn wel inzetbaar dus tja....Er is de laatste jaren veel veranderd...in het nadeel van de krijgsmacht. En ik vrees dat we er nog niet zijn...als ik de prognoses zie en de financiele "problemen".

[Lex]

ik denk niet dat men toen al wist dat de tanks afgeschaft zouden worden en chinooks minder inzetbaar (al denk ik bij dat laatste dat men primair uitging van gunstige omstandigheden). Mogelijk had de JSS er heel anders uitgezien als die kennis er toen wel was geweest. Ik vind de JSS nog steeds een nuttig schip...mag best een LPD voor geofferd worden om een tweede mogelijk te maken...maar dan moet de tanks wel terugkeren en de Chinooks aangepast. Ik vind de JSS een nuttig schip voor de missies die ik in de toekomst verwacht.

Je hebt het over minder inzetbaar, daar kan je natuurlijk vele kanten mee heen. Het is ook mogelijk dat men het toen wist en ervan uitgegaan is, dat de benodigde modificaties zouden worden doorgevoerd. Maar dat hoort niet thuis in dit topic.

[Elzenga]

113 miljoen pond per stuk. Wij bestellen een JSS voor grofweg 3x zo duur. Want dan kunnen we naast bevoorraden ook tanks vervoeren (welke tanks?), met Chinooks opereren (niet de Nederlandse versies) en seabased opereren (wat ook met LPD's kan, zo niet beter).

Goed gedaan, die JSS-marinestudie.....

ik denk niet dat men toen al wist dat de tanks afgeschaft zouden worden en chinooks minder inzetbaar (al denk ik bij dat laatste dat men primair uitging van gunstige omstandigheden). Mogelijk had de JSS er heel anders uitgezien als die kennis er toen wel was geweest. Ik vind de JSS nog steeds een nuttig schip...mag best een LPD voor geofferd worden om een tweede mogelijk te maken...maar dan moet de tanks wel terugkeren en de Chinooks aangepast. Ik vind de JSS een nuttig schip voor de missies die ik in de toekomst verwacht.

[Lex]

Navy Struggles to Fill At-Sea Billets

SASEBO NAVAL BASE, Japan -- The Navy will ship hundreds of sailors to sea before their projected rotation date to fill undermanned billets, the Navy has announced.

Over the past six months, the service has instituted measures to address gaps in critical positions, offering cash and other perks to compel sailors to head back out to sea. While those measures are still taking hold, Navy officials said last week that more must be done to address the at-sea manning issue -- including involuntary measures -- as nearly one-third of its total enlisted ratings are currently unfilled.

As a result, existing programs are being expanded and new measures implemented to ensure these billets are staffed properly, according to a Navy news release.

"As our Navy is in ever-increasing demand around the world, filling these gap billets at sea has become more critical," Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk said in the release. "These actions should reduce the short-notice actions to man high-priority billets, such as cross-decking and diverts."

The Navy is separating nearly 3,000 midcareer sailors this year in 31 other fields that are overmanned.

The new initiatives include targeting between 200 and 400 sailors with critical skills over the next few months under Limited Directed Detailing and sending them back to sea before their projected rotation date, the release said. This initiative will target sailors who have completed a minimum of 24 months on shore duty.

Also, the Chief Petty Officer Early Return to Sea program is being updated and will now curtail shore duty for enlisted sailors between E-7 to E-9 and send them back to sea to fill billets that aren't being filled by rotating sailors.

There will also be changes to Career Management System Interactive Detailing beginning in the August 2012 cycle, the news release said. A single set of the highest priority sea and shore billets will be identified, advertised and filled with priority by detailers each cycle.

In addition, the Voluntary Sea Duty Program is being extended for an additional year and expanded to include high-tenure waivers so sailors are not compelled to retire if they choose the sea, according to officials from Personnel Support Activity Detachment Sasebo and the news release.

Stars and Stripes
Jul 30, 2012

[KapiteinRob]

113 miljoen pond per stuk. Wij bestellen een JSS voor grofweg 3x zo duur. Want dan kunnen we naast bevoorraden ook tanks vervoeren (welke tanks?), met Chinooks opereren (niet de Nederlandse versies) en seabased opereren (wat ook met LPD's kan, zo niet beter).

Goed gedaan, die JSS-marinestudie.....

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

En hier zullen ze in de UK (terecht) teleurgesteld in zijn:

DSME Announced as Winning Bid for the MARS Tanker Competition

Tuesday, July 31, 2012 by BMT Defence Services

Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) is pleased to announce that it is the preferred bidder for the Royal Navy's MARS (military afloat reach and sustainability) tanker. DSME and partners will provide the specialised design and build of four new logistic support vessels, to be operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).

The contract will be worth an approximate £452m, with a significant proportion going to sub-contractors and partners. As part of the RFA's fleet, the MARS tankers will offer logistical support to the Royal Navy by providing fuel, food and fresh water to naval vessels at sea. The vessels will each be just over 200m in length, 28m in beam, and have a displacement of over 37,000t. Each will be able to carry the equivalent volume of more than seven Olympic-sized swimming pools of fuel cargo. This new addition to the fleet is due to be in service with the RFA from 2016 onwards.

The winning bid combines outstanding shipbuilding quality and superior technology from DSME with naval design expertise from Bath-based BMT Defence Services with their AEGIR® vessel design. These naval auxiliaries will exploit the economic efficiencies of the world's premier shipbuilder, whilst retaining UK capability, knowledge and skills in naval ship design and engineering.

DSME is the world's pre-eminent specialised shipbuilder with a proven record of delivery spanning both complex commercial and military ships. From commercial tankers and offshore platforms, to destroyers and submarines, DSME is recognised as a world leader in the construction of technically demanding vessels. The commercial build and outfitting practices adopted for the MARS tanker, will deliver an efficient, high quality build process.

With the RFA Flotilla providing ever greater support to Royal Navy operations as well as providing a visible UK military presence across the globe, the BMT-AEGIR® platform design has been specially optimised for the requirements of the Royal Navy and RFA. It utilises a hull design that meets the latest marine pollution regulations and adopts design principles that are common with the latest Royal Navy platforms. DSME and its partners have refined this design in conjunction with many equipment suppliers.

Sang-Tae Nam, president and CEO of DSME commented, "DSME is especially proud to have won this important contract from the UK MOD, it shows a level of confidence in our ability to build ships to time, cost and performance. This significant win in the UK, coupled with our recent Indonesian submarine order, helps to further broaden our international business credentials. Exporting these MARS Tankers to the UK adds to our already strong and competitive portfolio, and we have no doubt that the great and longstanding relationship between DSME and BMT will be strengthened by this success."

Muir Macdonald, managing director of BMT Defence Services said, "We, and our partners DSME, are delighted with this result against such strong international competition and are looking forward to reinforcing our partnership with this joint success. I know we shall very much enjoy working closely with the MOD to now deliver these ships that are such an important addition to the RFA fleet. It will be a privilege to work with a shipbuilder with the reputation and capabilities of DSME, it gives BMT a massive boost in further proving our design and engineering expertise.

"The global market for auxiliary vessels will remain strong over the next couple of decades and the selection of our AEGIR® design puts Britain in pole-position for championing our design and know-how around the world."

Bernard gray, chief defence materiel, defence equipment and support, commented, "After an open, fair and rigorous competition involving bidders from around the world, DSME emerged as the preferred bidder. The DSME solution offers the best operational capability for the Royal Navy at the lowest whole life cost. A foreign build offers best value for money for defence, whilst the UK SME Company BMT Defence Services' AEGIR® design ensures our ability to meet international maritime obligations and provides the means for the Royal Navy to operate worldwide."

http://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/warship/bmt-defence/pressdsme-winning-bid-mars-tanker.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Factbox: Japan's Military: Well-armed But Untested In Battle

By Kiyoshi Takenaka/Reuters

July 31, 2012

Japan flagged as a potential risk a possible rise in China's military's role in shaping Beijing's foreign policy in its latest defense white paper on Tuesday, and said North Korea remained a serious regional threat under its new leader.

Following are some facts about Japan's military.

SIZE AND CAPABILITIES

Japan has a standing military of about 225,000 personnel, about one-tenth of China's and one-fifth of North Korea's, but bigger than that of Britain.

Japan's military is equipped with advanced and costly combat gear such as destroyers fitted with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, which were deployed earlier this year in response to North Korea's rocket launch.

Its latest procurement includes Lockheed Martin's F-35 stealth fighter jets, which cost 10.2 billion yen ($123 million) apiece.

But Japan's military, known as Self-Defence Forces (SDF), is untested in battle, as the country has not engaged in armed conflict since its defeat in World War Two.

Japan, the only nation to have suffered nuclear attacks, has a self-imposed ban against owning nuclear weapons and relies on the nuclear umbrella of the United States, its close security ally. Operating under a pacifist constitution, the SDF does not own attack-oriented aircraft carriers or long-range bombers.

BUDGETARY LIMITS

Japan's defence budget fell for the 10th straight year to 4.65 trillion yen ($59 billion) for the current fiscal year ending in March 2013, reflecting the constraints of Japan's huge public debt, which is the worst among industrialized nations at twice the size of its annual economic output.

In contrast, the defence budget of China nearly doubled to 650 billion yuan ($102 billion) over the past five years.

STRETCHING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution renounces the right to wage war to resolve international disputes and bans the maintenance of a military.

But the article has been stretched not only to permit the maintenance of armed forces for self-defence, but to allow overseas military activities -- including deployment in 2004 of troops on a non-combat mission to Iraq.

Conservative politicians want to change Japan's gun-shy policies, a desire that has intensified due to concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and China's emergence as a regional power.

Washington has also pressed Tokyo to take a bigger role in ensuring global security.

Japan last year eased its self-imposed ban on arms exports, in a step to create new markets for its defence contractors and facilitate cross-border cooperation in development of military equipment and technology.

CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Following a sweeping update of its national defence policy in 2010, Japan is bolstering its defence posture to its southwest, where it shares a maritime border with China.

China is rapidly building up its military might and increasing naval activities in Asian waters including the East China Sea, where Beijing and Tokyo have conflicting claims over uninhabited islets called Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.

Tensions have heightened since Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said this month the government was considering buying the disputed islands from their private owners to prevent Tokyo's conservative governor and a harsh critic of China proceed with a similar plan.

Japan is also wary of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, with its archipelago sitting within the range of Pyongyang's medium-range Nodong missiles.

In April Japan and the United States agreed to shift 9,000 U.S. Marines from the Japanese island of Okinawa to Guam and other Asia-Pacific sites as part of Washington's strategic rebalancing, or "pivot", toward the region.

But in recent months the planned deployment by the Pentagon of the Osprey helicopter-plane hybrid on Okinawa stirred up strong local protests, in the latest snag in U.S.-Japan security ties.

The Osprey can fly faster and further than conventional helicopters, making it easier for U.S. forces to respond to contingencies in areas away from Okinawa, such as Senkaku, but crashes in Morocco and Florida this year fanned safety concerns. ($1 = 78.6300 Japanese yen) ($1 = 6.3807 Chinese yuan)

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_31_2012_p0-481773.xml&p=4

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

More Subs, Bombers, And Missiles Could Be On Their Way To The Pacific

Robert Johnson|Jul. 30, 2012

With the Pentagon's increased focus on the Pacific region, and deployment of 60 percent of its naval fleet to the area, the locations now being considered for bases could shape U.S. military policy for decades.

Guam has been a prime contender for years, but a new report out by the Center of Strategic and International Studies could bring that plan into reality.

Brett Kelman at Pacific Daily News reports 109 unclassified pages of the document were released yesterday and outline a plan to move as many as 5,000 marines to the U.S. territory.

While this is a few thousand troops less than originally planned, the report also recommends bringing more weapons systems than originally called for.

If the White House agrees to the plan, which was drafted to reignite stalled efforts at a 2007 buildup agenda, the island could see three new submarines, a rotation of 12 B-52 bombers, and an extensive missile defense system to protect it all.

Already hosting B-52 rotations, Submarine Squadron 15 which includes three Los Angeles class nuclear submarines, and Naval Special Warfare Unit One which includes three SEAL teams — and a specialized group to deliver the SEALs into hostile territories — the additional buildup would make Guam a sizeable outpost in the Philippine Sea.

Guam is about 2,200 miles closer to Taiwan than Hawaii, already home to U.S. forces and the port facilities necessary to host and maintain fleet operations.

Given these considerations there seems little doubt that the island will see an increased U.S. military presence and we'll follow this up when additional information becomes available.

In the meantime we'll start taking a look at other proposed bases in the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore in the coming days.

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/new-report-calls-for-more-bombers-submarines-and-missiles-on-guam-2012-7#ixzz22EHEpkb9

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

If the Kremlin stays with its current naval development plans, the Russian navy will have a potent force of dedicated nuclear powered "carrier-killers" by the year 2020. In the foreseeable future this kind of weapon systems will continue to be the most important element of Russian deterrence in relation to economically and militarily growing Asian neighbors with limited natural resources but reviving empire ambitions.

Ruim voldoende redenen om de KM, ook na 2020, voldoende capaciteit te geven voor zowel blue als brown water ops, voorzien van bewapening welke geschikt is voor elk spectrum van maritieme oorlogvoering.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Carrier Killers for the Russian Navy: The Strategic Environment

(deel II)


The Red Sormovo yard in Nizhny Novgorod built a number of unique submarines, including the titanium-hulled Project 945, which are still in service. Under the Kremlin's orders, this enterprise was restructured in the 1990s and no longer works for the military.

The Amur Shipbuilding Plant (ASP) is located in Komsomolsk. The Amur river runs through the city and into Pacific Ocean. ASP has suffered during the transition of Russia's economy from command to market driven principles. If not for the Indian deal for Project 971 fast attack submarines, this enterprise would have closed down. In 2008 ASP completed the K-152 Nerpa. After sea trials and Indian crew training, the vessel was handed over to the Indian navy on 23 January 2012. But even with the Indian customer in existence, ASP is unlikely to go further than completion of one or two more Project 971 ships.

This leaves Russia with only one fully-fledged enterprise capable of nuclear shipbuilding in the longer term. This is Sevmash Dockyards (SMP) in Severodvinsk, located near the far northern border with Finland. The company had difficult times in the period 1998-2003 when orders ran low. However the company's management refused massive laid-offs, instead trying to keep workers in place by serving free dinners during working hours to all staff and distributing food to their families. This helped save a core of the enterprise's competent staff until the financial situation improved.

Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin have been frequent visitors to Severodvinsk, helping the city and local businesses ease their financial, technological and social problems. Today, Sevmash directly employs 27,000 people, with average monthly salary slightly above US$ 1,000. The management considers this figure as "sufficient" to keep the employees' families above the poverty line. With recently won orders for Project 955 and Project 885 submarines, the share of domestic military orders in the company's portfolio has risen above 70%.

Visiting Severodvinsk in February, deputy premier of the Russian Government in charge of defense industry Dmitry Rogozin said the local shipbuilders are contracted to build eight fourth-generation nuclear submarines by 2020, and that more orders are coming. He further said the earlier program for scrapping third-generation submarines is being revised so that "these vessels will get newer missiles and be subjected to a series of repair efforts ... enabling them to serve for another seven years".

Pricing
In November 2011, the Russian defense ministry awarded Sevmash orders for construction of four Project 955A Borey-A strategic underwater cruisers armed with the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles. This order comes after construction of three Project 955 Boreys (Yuri Dolgorukiy, Aleksander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh) now undergoing acceptance trials.

The customer also ordered five Project 885M Yasen-M fast attack submarines, in addition to the head vessel, the K-329 Severodvinsk, now undergoing sea trials. The exact sum of these contracts has not been made public. It is only known that the Alexander Nevsky was built under contract worth Rouble 23 billion, which equates to US$ 0.75 billion.

In 2012 Sevmash expects additional orders for the completion of certain third-generation submarine hulls laid in the mid-1990s, as well as for the refit and modernization of earlier commissioned submarines and large surface combatants. Why did the MoD place so many orders with Sevmash and its key industrial partners only recently? Why did the ministry not act in a similar way during a few preceding years? We can suggest an answer to these questions.

The big orders of late 2011 – early 2012 were preceded by a long process of MoD and industry working out a completely new pricing calculation system. When current defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov took his position in 2007, he called for a new approach to contracts with industry that would prioritize the price-efficient series production of modern weapons. As he put it, that approach had to be worked out and needs to remain in place until 2020.

Local shipbuilders were not ready for this change in the government's procurement policy. Only in 2011 - after a series of structural changes - was the industry was able to resume talks with the customer. In the middle of 2011 the sides formulated mutually agreeable principles and proceeded with the calculation of contract values for a selected range of naval products.

The Project 955 served as a guinea pig on which the new price calculation methods were tried. This product had already been mastered by industry, while the MoD wanted to procure more such ships. In September – October the calculations were made and submitted to the defense minister for approval. This enabled the November 2011 contract signing.

The gist of the new system is to encourage industry to continually reduce manufacturing expenses and improve resource management. Manufacturer profits are made directly dependant on savings it achieves during the series production of modern weapons. This requires more effective resource management, cutting manufacturing costs and making production more economically efficient.

Figuratively speaking, Serdyukov's role in the transformation of the Russian military defense complex is similar to that of Robert McNamara in the US. But pricing considerations are only one part in the answer to the above questions. Also, there is the Factor 2012: the presidential elections in March, which Putin won. On the eve of the elections, the Kremlin increased military spending in the hope of getting more support from voters employed by large defense enterprises and citizens of the cities where these enterprises situate.

Aviation threat evaporated
In February the Russian air force spokesman said the service intends to upgrade about 30 Tu-22M3 swing-wing supersonic bombers during the next eight years. Reportedly, between 50 and 60 such big jets are airworthy. Today, the Tu-22M3 is the only effective aviation asset available to combat carrier groups and naval task forces formed around modern cruisers and destroyers.

The aircraft inventory of Russia's Naval Aviation suffered 78% numerical reduction during the period 1992-1997. It further dwindled until mid-2011, when most of the Naval Aviation's large airplanes were transferred to the Air Force. Effectively, the navy has lost its aviation anti-carrier component. The move was controversial, and yet there was a good reason behind it. The most powerful and complex aircraft types in service with the Air Force and Naval Aviation became so small in numbers that their separate operations and maintenance lost combat worthiness and economic sense. This particularly applies to the Tupolev bombers and reconnaissance planes.

Surface warships of little account
With the Tu-22M3 no longer in its possession, the Russian Navy has to completely rely on its warships when it comes to countering enemy carriers. The Navy does have some surface combatants, but these can do little in the face of the potential enemy's air superiority and larger ship counts. The most they can do is to assist submariners during joint operations.

The 2005 shipbuilding program calls for construction of 30 corvettes, 20 frigates and six destroyers. By displacement, ability to operate in rough seas and duration of autonomous operations these ships are no match for in-service cruisers.

The Russian MoD has scheduled the Admiral Nakhimov for refit and modernization in 2013. Her builder Severnoye PKB was asked to prepare an appropriate documentation package by April 2012. The third Project 1144 nuclear-powered cruiser was commissioned in 1988. She stands in Severodvinsk harbor awaiting repairs. The destiny of her sister ship completed in 1984, the Admiral Lazarev, will be decided later, while the earlier Admiral Ushakov was decommissioned long ago and is due for scrapping.

The MoD is seeking a cost effective way for the Project 1144 upgrade. This involves keeping their machinery and replacing older missiles by more modern ones. The P-700 Granit anti-ship system employing the 3M45 cruise missiles is no longer in production and considered outdated.

The KR-93 turbojet engine accelerates the 7-tonne, 10-meter-long missile with a 750kg warhead (cumulative, vacuum or nuclear charge) up to Mach 2.5. For effective employment at maximum advertized ranges of 500-600km, the Granit's missiles need target designation either from aircraft or spacecraft. The Russian Navy no longer operates the dedicated designator airplane Tu-95RTs (all of 53 such aircraft have been grounded). The Legend-M satellite constellation was in full strength in 1983, but has degraded since then. In theory, vulnerable Kamov deck helicopters can provide targeting at longer ranges than the ship's own radar. This particularly applies to the most recent Ka-31 with its long-range Oko radar.

The Russian Navy operates three Project 1166 cruisers with gas-turbine propulsion - the Moscow, Varyag and Ustinov. These are armed with the Bazalt or Vulcan anti-ship systems in service since 1975 and 1982 respectively. Their 3M70 missile with maximum firing range of 700km shares Granit's targeting problems.

Cruise-missile submarines
Along with upgraded cruisers, the nuclear-powered submarines will remain the most powerful assets in the Russian inventory. Today, the navy operates dedicated carrier-killers of the third generation in the form of the Project 949A submarines armed with the P-700 Granit systems. It also operates nearly twenty third-generation fast attack submarines of the Project 971, Project 945 and Project 671RTMK able to fire Tomahawk-alike missiles from torpedo tubes.

In late 2012 the navy expects the commissioning of the K-329 Severodvinsk. This lead vessel of the Project 885 is considered to be of the fourth generation. The K-329 is outfitted with eight vertical SM-346 silos (10m-long, diameter 2m) each capable of housing either four Onix or five Caliber missile containers.

The P-800 Onix (the export version is called Yakhont) employs 3M55 ramjet-powered missiles. These weapons are nearly 9 meters long and weigh 3 tons without booster [air launched version, also known as the Alfa] or 4 tons with it. The missile accelerates to 750m/sec and has a firing range of 150-300km depending on altitude profile. It has a radar homing head able to detect a cruiser at a distance of 75km. The Onix provided the platform for the development of Indo-Russian BrahMos PJ-10.

The Caliber is non-exportable version of the Club-N/S that already equips the Indian navy Project 1135.6 Talwar-class frigates and Project 877EKM submarines. Both are able to employ three baseline missile types: the 91R antisubmarine (carries a torpedo, either APR-3M or MPT-1UM), 3M54 anti-ship and 3M14 land-strike. In addition, the non-exportable system can also fire longer-range RK-55 Granat missiles (Russia's Tomahawk) and their derivatives, the Biruza. Compared to the exportable 3M14, the non-exportable Granat has much longer firing ranges.

The Granat became operational in 1984 with 3M10 missiles fired from torpedo tubes of fast attack submarines. The 1.7-tonne turbojet weapon had a range of 3,000km. The 3M54 differs in having a third stage (in addition to booster and cruise turbojet) running on solid-fuel and accelerating to 1,000 m/sec. This version can be fired from either surface ship or submarine if her torpedo tubes can house this 8.2m-long weapon. Without the third stage, the 3M54 weighs 1.8 tons instead of 2.3 and has length of 6.2 meters.

The K-329 went to sea for trails on two occasions in 2011, and successfully performed tests using dummy Caliber missiles. Throughout 2012 the submarine shall continue testing Caliber and Onix systems. To complete customer acceptance trials, the K-329 is required to spend a total of 180 days at sea. The next in the series, the Kazan, is being built to the improved design [Project 885M] and is due for completion later in the year.

The design documentation for the refit and modernization of the Project 949A has been prepared. It calls for replacement of the Granit by the Onix and Caliber. No changes to the submarine's original load bearing structures are required. Three Onix or four Caliber missile containers can be squeezed into one Granit launch site – the latter will be reworked accordingly. The submarine will receive an improved combat system able to employ the newer missiles.

With a standard displacement of 15,000t, the Project 949A is one of the most complex and difficult-to-maintain n-subs in the world. So far, extensive repairs were successfully conducted only in Severodvinsk, while such attempts in the Far East proved ineffective.

According to open sources, the Northern fleet operates the K-119 Voronezh and the K-266 Orel. The Voronezh completed a major overhaul in November 2011, which made numerous but unspecified improvements to missilery and onboard equipment. This enabled the Northern Fleet to send the K-410 Smolensk for repairs in late 2011. The K-525 and K-206 have been scrapped. The K-148 Krasnodar and K-173 Krasnoyask have been decommissioned and await their turn for disassembly.

The Pacific Fleet keeps the K-456 Tver, K-186 Omsk and K-150 Tomsk on duty, while the K-132 Irkutsk has been undergoing overhaul since 2005. The status of the K-442 Chelaybinsk is unclear. The K-139 Belgorod is at a high degree of completion (over 70%) at Sevmash, but the customer has continued to change its views about whether to complete her. In February the Russian Navy commander Admiral Vysotsky said the Belgorod will be commissioned as a submarine for special operations.

If the Kremlin stays with its current naval development plans, the Russian navy will have a potent force of dedicated nuclear powered "carrier-killers" by the year 2020. In the foreseeable future this kind of weapon systems will continue to be the most important element of Russian deterrence in relation to economically and militarily growing Asian neighbors with limited natural resources but reviving empire ambitions.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=150713

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

30 Jul 2012

Carrier Killers for the Russian Navy: The Strategic Environment

(deel I)

Russia is redoubling its efforts to boost its naval nuclear deterrence and blue water capabilities. Such moves reflect Moscow's growing interest in safeguarding its natural resource interests in the Arctic and the growing military power of the Asia-Pacific region, argues Vladimir Karnazov.

By Vladimir Karnazov for Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter

The growing military potential of Japan and China - and continuing territorial disputes over the Kuril island chain and Arctic Shelf - is causing Russia to increase spending on her naval nuclear deterrent and blue-water forces.

In November 2011 the Russian Ministry of Defence firmed up orders for four Project 955A Borey-A strategic missile underwater cruisers (submarines) and five Project 885M Yasen-M cruise-missile submarines. In early 2012 decisions were made to refit and modernization the Project 1144 nuclear powered cruisers and Project 949A cruise-missile submarines. By rough estimates, these commitments combined amount to US$ 10 billion.

In January 2012 Russia handed over the K-152 Nerpa fast attack submarine to the Indian navy on a ten-year lease, the deal reportedly worth US$ 0.9 billion. These and other recent moves may lead to changes in the current balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Where will the enemy be?
The period between late 2011 and early 2012 brought news of the highest-ever level of orders for naval equipment placed by the Kremlin since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also during this period Moscow started to deliver on obligations to New Delhi on helping the long-standing ally and customer build national nuclear-deterrent and atomic-propulsion forces. In addition, this period was marked by the Kremlin leaders expressing their dissatisfaction with the deployment of US antimissile systems in Europe and promising an "asymmetric reply".

This "reply" calls for keeping Russian nuclear deterrent forces intact and able to meet new challenges. In late 2011 Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin made it clear who are these forces are: the US and NATO. In the Kremlin's eyes, the missile interceptor shield being created in Western Europe destroys the exisiting strategic balance between US and Russia. So, the nuclear deterrent forces shall be upgraded according to these new realities. Construction of strategic submarines, along with refit and modernization of in-service nuclear assets is a move in this direction.

Whatever great ideas on a new arms-race might be in minds of Kremlin strategists, the current indifferent state of the national economy and the run down military-industrial complex will not allow Russia to immediately restore the lost strategic balance of naval forces with the US and its NATO allies. Besides this, the Kremlin leaders have made certain promises to the West. These include arrangements in return for financial help from Western countries on scrapping decommissioned nuclear submarines in the frame of CTR ("common threat reduction") and other such programs. CTR has been important for both Russia and NATO. In the course of "Perestroika", the Russian navy halved its personnel numbers and decommissioned more than 50% of its warships in the five year period between 1992 and1997. In two years alone, 1990 and 1991, 91 and 33 submarines respectively went out of commission. In 1996 Russia had over 150 decommissioned submarines tied up in harbors with their nuclear fuel rods and used fuel still inside their reactors.

With Western help, Russia built additional facilities for warship disassembly and, as of October 2006, had scrapped 137 nuclear submarines. That time the number of decommissioned n-subs reached 197, of which 25 were being processed and another 32 waiting their turn. By now, the warship disassembly facilities in Severodvinsk have reached the annual capacity of six n-subs. The capacity of another plant, Zvezda in the Far East, is probably half of that.

While the issue of decommissioned submarines has largely been solved, Russia may still need Western financial help and technical assistance for used nuclear fuel. According to the recently published book "Soviet navy submarines 1945-1991" by Yuri Apalkov, in 2007 the Russian navy kept in its bases 21,000 boxes of used nuclear fuel. The issue of their processing is still far from being completely solved.

For these and other reasons, the Kremlin has been trying not to run into a direct confrontation with US and NATO. At the same time, it has been trying to defend long-term national interests and widen access to western technologies and financial resources - both much needed for renovation of Russia's struggling economy. The US, too, has been interested in Moscow as a supporter of the War on Terror.

Washington and Moscow share views on Afghanistan and other hot spots. The two have common interests, including those in the global economy and Asia. Obviously, the White House and Kremlin are in agreement on the oil-and-natural-gas issue: increasing Russian export of fossil fuels shall help decrease the impact on the economies of the US and allied countries following EU ban on Iranian oil purchases.

With above considerations taken into account, it seems more likely that the recent naval equipment orders are aimed primarily at maintaining the Russian navy's power above those of the growing "Asian tigers".

Both China and Japan have made great progress recently in strengthening their navies. Shipbuilders at Dalian have now finished work on PLAN's first aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang. She had sea trials for the first time in the second half of 2011. China has declared plans for the eventual construction of several carriers. Beijing continues the development and manufacture of nuclear submarines. Without Russian permission, China has launched into production of the J-11, a clone of the Sukhoi Su-27 land-based fighter, and the J-15, a clone of the Su-33 deck fighter. Local shipbuilders produced copies of Project 636 diesel-electric submarines. Japan has been even more disturbing and challenging in its expansion of capabilities. Her "self-defense" forces have commissioned a number of very advanced blue-water assets of previously unknown classes. Japan has built a series of AIP-equipped large conventional submarines and is working on more advanced ones featuring extended sea autonomy and stealthiness through use of high-power Stirling closed-cycle engines.

The DDG177 Atago and DDG178 Asigara destroyers with full displacement of 10,000 tons entered service in 2007-2008. The DDH181 Hyuga and DDH182 Ise "helicopter destroyers" with full displacement of 18,000 tons went into commission in 2009 and 2011 respectively. The JMSDF is soon be adding the even larger Shirane class to the growing arsenal. The latter three ships carry helicopters, but suggestions have been made that their size and systems allow for deck operations of the F-35 Lightning II fighter.

India, too, has been investing heavily in blue-water forces. This year the INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier shall be inducted and become the largest combat vessel of all time in the national inventory. In addition, India is building "home grown" Arihant-class nuclear powered submarines. Moscow has been helping these and other programs on a commercial basis. Participation in these activities has helped Russian shipbuilders and naval missile makers survive the difficult period of transition from a command to a market-driven economy, and keep skills needed for the development of advanced combat systems.

Territorial disputes
Modern submarines with nuclear propulsion can reach almost any given oceanic point. When launching atomic submarines into mass production in the 1950s, the Soviet Union wanted its underwater cruisers to always follow USN carrier groups and destroy them in case of war.

Today's plans are different. Moscow wants its underwater atomic warships to serve in protection of Russia's vast possessions in the North and the East against would-be aggressors. These possessions contain huge natural resources, which, as the Kremlin strategists think, may one day be challenged by economically strong, but resource-limited neighbors. In their view, the Chinese and Japanese forces must be countered for that reason.

In 2007 and 2008 the Kremlin had to make steps towards Beijing and ease the long-standing territorial dispute over lines of the Sino-Russian land border. The two countries signed agreements under which the Russian border guards withdrew from some of the disputed lands, leaving them with their Chinese counterparts. This allowed both parties to claim that the issue has been finally removed from the agenda. However, not everyone is happy about the deal, and so some sort of tension remains.

The situation is similar with Japan, which does have strong claims to the Kuril island chain and the island of Sakhalin. In the course of World War II and shortly after the Japanese unconditional surrender to the Allies in 1945, the Red Army took Sakhalin and the Kuril chain in a rapid and overwhelming military operation. The dispute between Russia and Japan regarding sovereignty over the South Kuril islands came on the agenda in the 1950s, when Tokyo tried to revise peace agreements signed under extreme pressure. The disputed area goes from the Kamchatka peninsula all the way down south to Kunashir near Hokkaido. The islands in question are washed by the Sea of Okhotsk on the west and North Pacific Ocean on the east.

Among other considerations, a good reason for keeping the Kurils is that this island chain effectively blocks entry to the Sea of Okhotsk for USN anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and thus provides relative safety for Russian underwater missile cruisers on deterrent patrols in this large area. In Gorbachev's time the Kremlin hinted it could give up claims to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai in return for Japan's promises on the non-military status of those. This did not help the situation and since then everything remained as it was.

In February 2010 Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev ordered substantial improvements to Kuril defenses, including refurbishing of two airfields and the deployment of S-400 long-range SAM systems. The move was made after Japan had protested against visits to the islands of high ranking Russian leaders including Medvedev himself and Minister for Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, calling them "provocative". Meantime, during these visits the [Russian and native] population of the islands strongly rejected the idea of Japanese sovereignty and asked the Kremlin for protection.

According to the Moscow-based Kommersant newspaper, the Russian army units on the disputed [South Kuril] islands include the 18th Machine-gun/Artillery Division made up of two regiments. The 46th Regiment is stationed on Kunashir, and the 49th Regiment on Iturup. In addition, there is an independent tank regiment on Kunashir (during 2010 its 92 outdated T-55 main battle tanks were replaced by a non-specified number of more modern T-80s) and an independent motorized infantry battalion on Iturup. The newspaper gives the following [incomplete] list of weapons in the possession of the above-mentioned units: 18 BM-21 Grad multiply rocket launchers, 36 Giatsint-B towed cannons and 18 D-30 towed howitzers, 12 Buk and 12 Strela-10 SAM launchers, 12 ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled and 8 ZSU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft gun systems. The 39th motorized infantry brigade on Sakhalin Island supplements these forces. Interestingly, the newspaper does not mention the 451 Missile Brigade. Reportedly, the brigade was formed in the early 1990s to unite under a single command separate units stationed on Sakhalin and Kuril islands, including four missile regimens which at that time were armed with the Rubezh (P-15M) and Redut (3M44 Progress) anti-ship missile systems. Last year the Russian defense ministry spoke of plans to further strengthen Kuril defenses with the Bastion system (3M55).

The Arctic Shelf is one more part of the Earth whose sovereignty is currently being discussed. The Kremlin wants to have a greater part of it, while the US, Canada, Norway and other NATO members have different views.

Today, Russia is world's largest possessor of natural resources, whose value is estimated at US$ 140 trillion, roughly ten times US GDP and some 200 times greater than its own. Russian share in the world's known oil reserves is 23%, natural gas 33%, coal 50% and timber 23%. The annual income from oil exports alone is estimated at US$ 300 billion. Through exploration of the vast territories, the Kremlin wants to keep its world leadership in the development and exploitation of natural resources. A capable navy is essential to provide protection of these territories from would-be aggressors.

Nuclear shipbuilding: current state
According to official statistics, in 1955-1993 the Soviet Union [and then Russia] constructed 234 nuclear powered submarines falling into three generations. These included 123 n-subs made in Severodvinsk, 56 in Komsomolsk, 39 in St. Petersburg and 25 in Nizhny Novgorod. Russia now continues at a much slower rate. The lead vessel of the Project 955 class, the Yuri Dolgorukiy, became the 1001-th [armed] submarine constructed in Russia since October 1917.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's nuclear shipbuilding industry has been transformed into something much smaller. Key enterprises on the Black Sea coast appeared to be on the territory of now-independent Ukraine - which proclaimed non-nuclear status. Admittedly, these enterprises had little to do with nuclear propulsion technology, except for some ambitions in the late 1980s when the Soviet navy planned the construction of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

Nuclear activities in the city of St. Petersburg have been diminishing for a number of reasons. Under current international agreements, the Baltic Sea has a non-nuclear status. The Russian navy does not deploy atomic warheads on warships and does not place orders for the construction of nuclear-powered vessels in the area.

The Admiralty Shipyards completed their last Project 671RTMK fast attack submarine, the K-448 Tambov, in 1992. Since then the enterprise has been completely focused on diesel-electric submarines. The last nuclear powered surface combatant built in St. Petersburg was the Peter the Great of Project 1144.2. The 23,800-tonne cruiser, forth and the last in the Atlant series (after Ushakov, Lazarev and Nakhimov) was commissioned in 1998, and serves with the Northern Fleet.

Saint Petersburg shipbuilders continue working on civil projects. They have completed one floating nuclear electric power generation station known as Project 20870 with displacement of 21,500 tons. Six more such stations and five nuclear-powered ice-breakers are on order. However, this business is under heavy criticism as not suitable and potentially very dangerous for a city with a population of five a million.

[Elzenga]

How could the Navy begin to remake LCS?

hoe verhouden deze problemen zich tot die bij de OPV?

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Greek army chief resigns, says state TV

July 25, 2012

ATHENS: Greece's army chief resigned on Wednesday, state television reported, hours before a defence council meeting called by Prime Minister Antonis Samaras to evaluate the country's top military brass.

Lieutenant-general Constantinos Ziazias, 57, had been appointed by the previous socialist administration in November 2011.

The defence ministry and the army could not immediately comment on the report.

New military chiefs are appointed in Greece every two or three years, but it is customary for a new administration to promote its own nominees once in
power.

Samaras' three-party coalition took over in June, aiming to pull the country out of a recession tailspin and seek easier terms on EU-IMF loans.

It faces pressure from its creditors to make additional spending cuts including in the defence budget and armed forces pay.

Agence France-Presse

http://gulftoday.ae/portal/f26b65dc-c4e4-43f6-9c1e-15185a1dbd5e.aspx

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

How could the Navy begin to remake LCS?

By Philip Ewing Tuesday, July 24th, 2012 3:01 pm

The only thing that's clear anymore about the Navy's littoral combat ships is that they haven't turned out as hoped.

As Defense News' naval man Christopher P. Cavas has revealed in a series of extraordinary reports, the bottom has dropped out of the LCS stock inside the service, which quietly worries the ships can't do several of the key things for which they were designed: Deploy with small, highly expert crews; quickly and easily swap their mission equipment in foreign ports; or keep the ships in fighting shape on an extended voyage at sea.

Cavas' latest report references an internal Navy study that found it'll be more difficult than anyone thought for LCS crews to do maintenance on deployment. They rely on American contractors who must fly in to help. U.S. law prohibits foreign workers from doing the kind of work LCS needs — a fact that, incredibly, seems to have escaped Navy leaders despite the years and billions they've spent on the program. This means taxpayers must pay for a team to fly from the U.S. to meet an LCS in, say, Busan, South Korea, to help the crew with the ship's upkeep.

Wrote Cavas:

The limited ability of the LCS crew to perform onboard maintenance, and the need to return to port for even basic repairs, "negatively impacts" the ships' availability to operational commanders, according to sources familiar with the classified report.

Further, the contractor teams handling maintenance duties are not performing up to snuff or being held accountable for their work. Many contractors are doing the work twice — the second time to correct problems with their initial work — avoiding penalties and billing the Navy twice for the jobs.

According to some LCS crews, the reliance on contractors actually results in more work for the crew, which is too small to supervise the contractors. Navy sailors often have to fix the problems after the contractors have left.

Extensive contractor services also are required to maintain spare parts inventories for the ships, since each of the two ship designs features a number of non-standard systems and the vessels are too small to carry many spares. Ships will be based on either the Lockheed Martin Freedom-class design or Austal USA's Independence class.

But the reports note the parts and work requirements need to be identified and ordered well in advance, so they're available when needed — a situation that severely limits the flexibility of the LCS.

You don't get to see the actual report itself, of course, even though you've paid for the ships and the contractors — twice — who phoned in their work here. It's possible the congressional anger that LCS stirred up earlier this year could result in more disclosures about what the Navy has learned, but do not hold your breath for that.

As for now, the Navy has already conceded it's adding 20 more racks to its LCS the USS Freedom, and in another Cavas report, that LCS can't take many of the missions the Navy needs and can't do the relatively quick toe-touch port swap of mission modules that was to have been its ace in the hole. In that story, Cavas wrote this:

The shortcomings are well known in the fleet, prompting a perception that service leaders are looking for missions to fit LCS, rather than the other way around.

And in Monday's story, he wrote this:

The OPNAV report, according to sources, concluded that, in light of what the ships can and can't do, the entire LCS concept of operations needs to be reviewed, along with the minimal-manning requirements and the contractor-based maintenance schemes.

The studies make plain the Navy's concern with exhaustion and fatigue among LCS crews and the need to improve their quality of life, and cite "the reality of the workload" to bolster those positions.

The review efforts also highlight the extreme complexity of the LCS program — the multiple crews, additional mission module packages and aviation detachments, and two distinct ship classes — as major factors in developing solutions.

So: The Navy has boxed itself into a program that it apparently cannot execute as it once planned. Despite years of criticism and skepticism from the outside, the service is at last reaching this conclusion for itself. Its leaders are acknowledging the need to take another look. Which makes the next question: Where could LCS go now?

Maybe Norman Polmar will win his dollar bill and the Navy will not order any more ships. Ending the current run at 22 vessels, instead of 55, could let the fleet field more sailors per ship and get more good out of each — "wholeness" being a favorite goal of Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the chief of naval operations. Building fewer ships also could theoretically free up money to better equip them, since it appears the Navy may be forced to rely more than it first wanted on built-in weapons and equipment, as opposed to the interchangeable gear.

(Cavas wrote that Navy leaders have acknowledged they're looking at installing Harpoon anti-ship missiles and a 76 mm gun, to upgrade from today's 57 mm — though the larger gun may not fit onto the Independence-class ships' narrow bow.)

It's not difficult to imagine the Navy dividing up its smaller but fully manned LCS fleet into dedicated squadrons with permanent missions. Some ships could be rigged for surface patrols, others for mine countermeasures and others for anti-submarine warfare. The Navy would get some of the ships it says it needs, though sacrificing each individual ship's ability to be a wild card.

The Navy brass, under its LCS-Is-A-Phish-Concert Doctrine — nobody knows where the groove will take us, bro! — would probably say the beauty of the program is its ability to accept these changes. The challenge is that LCS can only change so much; the ships are what they are, and altering them too much, to improve their endurance or increase their size, would spoil the progress of the Navy and its vendors in reducing their costs as they have. Whatever the heirs of the Freedom and Independence become, they probably cannot be true frigates or destroyers. Wrote Cavas:


Range is still another concern, because of capacity for both fuel and crew provisions. Although the original [concept of operations] called for ships to operate at sea for at least 21 days, the ships have storage capacity to only carry enough food for 14 days, according to sources familiar with the classified report.

So LCS could become something other than LCS we thought we'd get, but the ships that today's Navy is inheriting may only be able to do so much.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/07/24/how-could-the-navy-begin-to-remake-lcs/

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Adapted Astute subs a successor option

Published at 16:36, Friday, 20 July 2012

A REVIEW into alternatives to a Trident successor is likely to include the option of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear missiles putting it on "standby" and sending it out to sea at short notice.

The Ministry of Defence is reviewing the multi-billion replacement programme to appease Lib Dem coalition partners who oppose the like for like replacement, favoured by the Tories and Labour.

The plan preferred by the Lib Dems would see nuclear warheads fired from existing Astute submarines, eliminating the need to replace the Vanguard-class nuclear boats.

However, changing the submarines which carry the Trident missiles would require a new form of warhead, which could be judged to be an act of proliferation and therefore illegal
under treaty obligations.

The study is likely to suggest a list of options and while some parts will not be published, a summary is expected early next year.

Supporters think an Astute submarines with nuclear weapons could be deployed within a week if there was a build-up of international tension, therefore negating the need for a new fleet of submarines.

But sceptics warn keeping the deterrent in harbour could mean the act of launching could heighten tensions at the worst possible time.

Barrow MP John Woodcock said: "Everyone will study any new evidence that emerges, but it is no surprise to see the Liberal Democrats peddling the same old idea which previous studies have suggested would actually be less cost effective and less likely to deter a future nuclear war.

"A government which continues to face both ways on the deterrent will be accused of putting politics ahead of national security."

The idea of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on adapted Astute-class submarines has been floated in the past but is thought to be more expensive and less effective.

The Astute submarines would need to be re-engineered and new war heads built, and less effective as cruise missiles are more likely to miss their target and are easier to shoot down.

Terry Spurling, of the Barrow Submariners Association, said: "One of the things that I would say is that this is not a new idea.

"It is certainly an option, but I am not sure what strategically the Americans would think of it.

"The successor would certainly give you more options though."

A final decision on Trident replacement is not expected until after the next general election, but the initial gate stages of preparatory work have already been signed off.

Published by http://www.nwemail.co.uk