Spanning(en) rond Iran

[Lex]

Lex, Amerika wil de nieuwe wereldorde leiden en leider zijn, dat is niets bijzonders. Ooit was Rome zo en niet zo heel lang geleden wilde Duitsland het ook zijn. Niets bijzonders.

Dank voor deze wijze woorden.

[Marc66]

Lex, Amerika wil de nieuwe wereldorde leiden en leider zijn, dat is niets bijzonders. Ooit was Rome zo en niet zo heel lang geleden wilde Duitsland het ook zijn. Niets bijzonders.

[Lex]

US plans for a possible military strike on Iran are ready and the option is "fully available", the US ambassador to Israel said,.....

In hoeverre dit klopt, zal de toekomst uitwijzen, maar het is wel opvallend dat het aantal vluchten met als roepnaam Dragon of Havoc de afgelopen weken is toegenomen. De roepnamen zijn regelmatig te horen als zij zich melden bij de verkeersleiding van o.a. Malta, Spanje etc.
Voor de niet-ingewijden: Dragon = U2 en Havoc = B52. Het refuellen gebeurt boven de Med, met US kisten die vertrekken vanaf Kreta of Spanje.

[Marc66]

Wil Obama niet stoppen met sheriff spelen? 

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

VS: Iran, test ons niet

Als het moet zal Amerika de wapens oppakken om Iran te weerhouden verder te gaan met het ontwikkelen van nucleaire wapens. Ondanks dat er nog geen keiharde bewijzen zijn dat de Iraanse president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad bezig is met de productie van de 'weapons of mass destruction', heeft de ambassadeur van de Verenigde Staten in Israël een duidelijk signaal afgegeven.

Ambassadeur Dan Shapiro zei in zijn speech onder meer dat Iran niet moet proberen de hoge piefen in Washington te testen in hun vastberadenheid om het omstreden nucleaire programma op te geven.

Shapiro hoopt niet dat Amerika daadwerkelijk zal moeten gaan vechten, "maar dat betekent niet dat oorlog geen optie is. Alle plannen zijn al gemaakt."

De VS en Israël verdenken Iran al enige tijd van het produceren van nucleaire wapens. Door middel van waarschuwingen en boycotten proberen de landen Iran op de knieën te krijgen.

http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/buitenland/2012/05/vs-iran-test-ons-niet

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

De retoriek in de regio wordt in aanloop naar de besprekingen van 23 mei weer danig opgevoerd. Enigs sinds verontrustend (maar zal ook wel bij de retoriek horen) is de "lock down" in Israel. (voor zover daar werkelijk sprake  van is)

[Elzenga]

Russia says action on Syria, Iran may go nuclear

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (R) speaks at the second St. Petersburg International Legal Forum May 17, 2012. REUTERS/Dmitry Astakhov/RIA Novosti/Pool

By Gleb Bryanski

MOSCOW | Thu May 17, 2012 3:35pm EDT

(Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned on Thursday that military action against sovereign states could lead to a regional nuclear war, starkly voicing Moscow's opposition to Western intervention ahead of a G8 summit at which Syria and Iran will be discussed.

"Hasty military operations in foreign states usually bring radicals to power," Medvedev, president for four years until Vladimir Putin's inauguration on May 7, told a conference in St. Petersburg in remarks posted on the government's website.

"At some point such actions which undermine state sovereignty may lead to a full-scale regional war, even, although I do not want to frighten anyone, with the use of nuclear weapons," Medvedev said. "Everyone should bear this in mind."

Medvedev gave no further explanation. Nuclear-armed Russia has said publicly that it is under no obligation to protect Syria if it is attacked, and analysts and diplomats say Russia would not get involved in military action if Iran were attacked.

Russia has adamantly urged Western nations not to attack Iran to neutralize its nuclear program or intervene against the Syrian government over bloodshed in which the United Nations says its forces have killed more than 9,000 people.

Medvedev will represent Russia at the Group of Eight summit in place of Putin, whose decision to stay away from the meeting in the United States was seen as muscle-flexing in the face of the West.

Putin said previously that threats will only encourage Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Analysts have said that Medvedev also meant that regional nuclear powers such as Israel, Pakistan and India could get involved into a conflict.

As president, Medvedev instructed Russia to abstain in a U.N. Security Council vote on a resolution that authorized NATO intervention in Libya, a decision Putin implicitly criticized when he likened the resolution to "medieval calls for crusades".

Medvedev rebuked Putin for the remark, and some Kremlin insiders have said the confrontation over Libya was a factor in Putin's decision to return to the presidency this year instead of letting his junior partner seek a second term.

Russia has since accused NATO of overstepping its mandate under the resolution to help rebels oust long-time leader Muammar Gaddafi, and has warned it will not let anything similar happen in Syria.

Since Putin announced plans last September to seek a third presidential term and make Medvedev prime minister, Russia has vetoed two Security Council resolutions condemning Assad's government, one of which would have called on him to cede power.

Russia's G8 liaison Arkady Dvorkovich said Russia will try to influence the final version of the G8 statement at a summit in Camp David this weekend to avoid a "one-sided" approach that would favor the Syrian opposition.

"In the G8 final statement we would like to avoid the recommendations similar to those which were forced upon during the preparations of the U.N. Security Council resolutions," Dvorkovich said. "A one-sided signal is not acceptable for us."

Russia successfully managed to water down the part of the statement on Syria at a G8 summit in France in May 2011, removing the calls for action against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

"We believe that the United Nations is the main venue to discussing such issues," Dvorkovich said.

LAST APPEARANCE

The G8 summit is likely to be the last appearance among all the leaders of industrialized nations for Medvedev, who embraced U.S. President Barack Obama's "reset", improving strained ties between the nations.

Dvorkovich said Putin's absence from the summit, the first time a Russian president has skipped one, would not affect the outcome: "All the leaders, I saw their reaction, are ready to comprehensively work with the chairman of the government (Medvedev)."

Dvorkovich said that at a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama, Medvedev will raise opposition to attempts by some U.S. lawmakers to introduce legislation which will address human rights violations in Russia.

Such legislation could take a form of the so-called Sergei Magnitsky bill, named after the Russian lawyer who died in prison in 2009. The Kremlin human rights council says he was probably beaten to death.

The bill would require the United States to deny visas and freeze the assets of Russians or others with links to his detention and death as well as those who commit other human rights violations.

"New legislation which will address new political issues as imagined by some U.S. congressmen or senators is unacceptable," Dvorkovich said, promising a retaliation.

(Editing by Michael Roddy)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/17/us-g8-russia-idUSBRE84G18M20120517

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Iran attack decision nears, Israeli elite locks down


In in-depth overview Reuters tries to explain Israeli officials' silence on possible Iran strike. 'They've gone into lockdown mode now,' senior Western diplomat says. 'Whatever happens next, we won't find out until it happens'

Reuters Published:  05.18.12, 08:23 / Israel News


De rest van het verhaal via de link:

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4230878,00.html

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Weinig nieuws...natuurlijk zijn alle voorbereidingen gemaakt en is het scenario/draaiboek klaar. Dat gebeurd zo vaak. Ook ten aanzien van Noord-Korea liggen allerlei scenario's en draaiboeken klaar voor het geval...Dat het wederom wordt gemeld is onderdeel van de psychologische oorlogsvoering die nu plaats vindt.

Om de a.s. besprekingen idd wat "kleur" mee te geven en de druk op de ketel te houden.

[Elzenga]

Weinig nieuws...natuurlijk zijn alle voorbereidingen gemaakt en is het scenario/draaiboek klaar. Dat gebeurd zo vaak. Ook ten aanzien van Noord-Korea liggen allerlei scenario's en draaiboeken klaar voor het geval...Dat het wederom wordt gemeld is onderdeel van de psychologische oorlogsvoering die nu plaats vindt.

[jurrien visser (JuVi op Twitter)]

Plans to strike Iran 'ready', says US Israel envoy

By Reuters

Published: May 17, 2012

JERUSALEM: US plans for a possible military strike on Iran are ready and the option is "fully available", the US ambassador to Israel said, days before Tehran resumes talks with world powers which suspect it of seeking to develop nuclear arms.         

Like Israel, the United States has said it considers military force a last resort to prevent Iran using its uranium enrichment to make a bomb. Iran insists its nuclear programme is for purely civilian purposes.

"It would be preferable to resolve this diplomatically and through the use of pressure than to use military force," Ambassador Dan Shapiro said in remarks about Iran aired by Israel's Army Radio on Thursday.

"But that doesn't mean that option is not fully available – not just available, but it's ready. The necessary planning has been done to ensure that it's ready," said Shapiro, who the radio station said had spoken on Tuesday.

The United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany have been using sanctions and negotiations to try to persuade Iran to curb its uranium enrichment, which can produce fuel for reactors, medical isotopes, and, at higher levels of purification, fissile material for warheads.

New talks opened in Istanbul last month and resume on May 23 in Baghdad.

Israel, which is widely assumed to have the Middle East's only atomic arsenal, feels threatened by the prospect of its arch-foe Iran going nuclear and has hinted it could launch preemptive war.

But many analysts believe the United States alone has the military clout to do lasting damage to Iran's nuclear programme.

In January, Shapiro told an Israeli newspaper the United States was "guaranteeing that the military option is ready and available to the president at the moment he decides to use it".

US lawmakers are considering additional legislation that would increase pressure on Iran, with further measures to punish foreign companies for dealing with Iran in any capacity.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/380197/plans-to-strike-iran-ready-says-us-israel-envoy/

[Elzenga]

New US battle strategy against Iran in US movements and Israeli drill

DEBKAfile Special Report May 15, 2012, 11:57 AM (GMT+02:00)

A series of apparently unconnected military movements observed in Middle East seas and skies in the last tendays  have a common factor: introduction of the new US Air Sea Battle (ASB) doctrine, which is designed to make the most of tightly coordinated operations by air, land, sea, undersea, space and cyberspace capabilities for defeating those of the enemy.

Monday, May 14, the day that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal warned Iran not to meddle in the evolving Saudi-Bahraini union, large US Navy and Marine forces put into Jeddah port for first time in 11 years.
Last week, Israel's Navy and Air Force and their special operations units - Shaldag, Shayetet 13 and 960 Task Force - carried out their largest combined exercise ever in the Mediterranean. It ended with Israeli surface ships and submarines arrayed in a dense defensive line against enemy vessels armed with unconventional weapons approaching the Israeli coast.
The Israeli exercise, which ended May 13, practiced the new American ABS doctrine of simultaneously massing large-scale sea and air strength against Iran on two seas, in this case, the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. It also drilled operating in unison with their American counterparts under the same doctrine.
debkafile's military sources report that Washington timed the unveiling of the new battle strategy for May 10, two weeks before the Six Power nuclear talks with Iran resume in Baghdad.

US Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert explained that the ASB concept was developed  "to defeat A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategies such as the closure of the (Hormuz) strait, cyber attack, mines, cruise and ballistic missiles and air defense systems, threats enhanced by technological advancements."

Our military sources add: The concept is also closely applicable to American tactics for defending the Persian Gulf nations against possible Iranian aggression as the GCC takes its first unification steps to shore up its defenses against that threat.
Adm. Greenert wrote:  "There's been attention recently about closing an international strait using, among other means, mines, fast boats, cruise missiles and mini-subs."
debkafile: Those are precisely the systems Iran's Revolutionary Guards hold ready for a decision to block the strategic Strait of Hormuz to international oil traffic.

ABS concepts include "submarines hitting air defense and cruise missiles in support of Air Force bombers: F-22 Air Force stealth fighters taking out enemy cruise missile threats to Navy ships."
Adm. Greenert was the first senior American commander to put on public record the measures for repelling Iranian cruise missile attacks on US aircraft carriers deployed in the Persian Gulf. He also spelled out the mission for which a squadron of F-22 jets was stationed at the Al Dhafra air base in late April.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly 539 revealed on May 4 that a second squadron was due to land soon in the Gulf region.

On May 16, Adm. Greenert and US Air Force chief Gen. Norton Schwartz are to discuss the ABS in a public event at the Brookings Institute in Washington.
US and Israeli air, sea and special forces have meanwhile begun operating under the new doctrine in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.  Monday, the US Amphibious Ready Group, 24th MEU, led by the USS Iwo Jima put into Jeddah, the Saudi Navy's Red Sea command port, with 2,200 Marines aboard.
It was the first time since the 2001 Gulf War that the Saudis had permitted US naval and air units of this size to anchor in one of their ports and, moreover, allowed American military personnel to show themselves in its streets.
The GCC summit which began in Riyadh on the same day had three key items on its agenda: Iran's military, political and covert threat to the region's stability; the Syrian crisis; and unification steps between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to ward off Iranian interference in the Shiite-led unrest.

http://www.debka.com/article/22003/

[Jah]

Een diepere geopolitieke analyse over de strategie die Iran hanteert:

By George Friedman

For centuries, the dilemma facing Iran (and before it, Persia) has been guaranteeing national survival and autonomy in the face of stronger regional powers like Ottoman Turkey and the Russian Empire. Though always weaker than these larger empires, Iran survived for three reasons: geography, resources and diplomacy. Iran's size and mountainous terrain made military forays into the country difficult and dangerous. Iran also was able to field sufficient force to deter attacks while permitting occasional assertions of power. At the same time, Tehran engaged in clever diplomatic efforts, playing threatening powers off each other.

The intrusion of European imperial powers into the region compounded Iran's difficulties in the 19th century, along with the lodging of British power to Iran's west in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula following the end of World War I. This coincided with a transformation of the global economy to an oil-based system. Then as now, the region was a major source of global oil. Where the British once had interests in the region, the emergence of oil as the foundation of industrial and military power made these interests urgent. Following World War II, the Americans and the Soviets became the outside powers with the ability and desire to influence the region, but Tehran's basic strategic reality persisted. Iran faced both regional and global threats that it had to deflect or align with. And because of oil, the global power could not lose interest while the regional powers did not have the option of losing interest.

Whether ruled by shah or ayatollah, Iran's strategy remained the same: deter by geography, protect with defensive forces, and engage in complex diplomatic maneuvers. But underneath this reality, another vision of Iran's role always lurked.

Iran as Regional Power

A vision of Iran -- a country with an essentially defensive posture -- as a regional power remained. The shah competed with Saudi Arabia over Oman and dreamed of nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad duels with Saudi Arabia over Bahrain, and also dreams of nuclear weapons. When we look beyond the rhetoric -- something we always should do when studying foreign policy, since the rhetoric is intended to intimidate, seduce and confuse foreign powers and the public -- we see substantial continuity in Iran's strategy since World War II. Iran dreams of achieving regional dominance by breaking free from its constraints and the threats posed by nearby powers.

Since World War II, Iran has had to deal with regional dangers like Iraq, with which it fought a brutal war lasting nearly a decade and costing Iran about 1 million casualties. It also has had to deal with the United States, whose power ultimately defined patterns in the region. So long as the United States had an overriding interest in the region, Iran had no choice but to define its policies in terms of the United States. For the shah, that meant submitting to the United States while subtly trying to control American actions. For the Islamic republic, it meant opposing the United States while trying to manipulate it into taking actions in the interests of Iran. Both acted within the traditions of Iranian strategic subtlety.

The Islamic republic proved more successful than the shah. It conducted a sophisticated disinformation campaign prior to the 2003 Iraq war to convince the United States that invading Iraq would be militarily easy and that Iraqis would welcome the Americans with open arms. This fed the existing U.S. desire to invade Iraq, becoming one factor among many that made the invasion seem doable. In a second phase, the Iranians helped many factions in Iraq resist the Americans, turning the occupation -- and plans for reconstructing Iraq according to American blueprints -- into a nightmare. In a third and final phase, Iran used its influence in Iraq to divide and paralyze the country after the Americans withdrew.

As a result of this maneuvering, Iran achieved two goals. First, the Americans disposed of Iran's archenemy, Saddam Hussein, turning Iraq into a strategic cripple. Second, Iran helped force the United States out of Iraq, creating a vacuum in Iraq and undermining U.S. credibility in the region -- and sapping any U.S. appetite for further military adventures in the Middle East. I want to emphasize that all of this was not an Iranian plot: Many other factors contributed to this sequence of events. At the same time, Iranian maneuvering was no minor factor in the process; Iran skillfully exploited events that it helped shape.

There was a defensive point to this. Iran had seen the United States invade the countries surrounding it, Iraq to its west and Afghanistan to its east. It viewed the United States as extremely powerful and unpredictable to the point of irrationality, though also able to be manipulated. Tehran therefore could not dismiss the possibility that the United States would choose war with Iran. Expelling the United States from Iraq, however, limited American military options in the region.

This strategy also had an offensive dimension. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq positioned Iran to fill the vacuum. Critically, the geopolitics of the region had created an opening for Iran probably for the first time in centuries. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union released pressure from the north. Coming on top of the Ottoman collapse after World War I, Iran now no longer faced a regional power that could challenge it. Second, with the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, the global power had limited military options and even more limited political options for acting against Iran.

Iran's Opportunity

Iran now had the opportunity to consider emerging as a regional power rather than solely pursuing complex maneuvers to protect Iranian autonomy and the regime. The Iranians understood that the moods of global powers shifted unpredictably, the United States more than most. Therefore it knew that the more aggressive it became, the more the United States may militarily commit itself to containing Iran. At the same time, the United States might do so even without Iranian action. Accordingly, Iran searched for a strategy that might solidify its regional influence while not triggering U.S. retaliation.

Anyone studying the United States understands its concern with nuclear weapons. Throughout the Cold War it lived in the shadow of a Soviet first strike. The Bush administration used the possibility of an Iraqi nuclear program to rally domestic support for the invasion. When the Soviets and the Chinese attained nuclear weapons, the American response bordered on panic. The United States simultaneously became more cautious in its approach to those countries.

In looking at North Korea, the Iranians recognized a pattern they could use to their advantage. Regime survival in North Korea, a country of little consequence, was uncertain in the 1990s. When it undertook a nuclear program, however, the United States focused heavily on North Korea, simultaneously becoming more cautious in its approach to the North. Tremendous diplomatic activity and periodic aid was brought to bear to limit North Korea's program. From the North Korean point of view, actually acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons was not the point; North Korea was not a major power like China and Russia, and a miscalculation on Pyongyang's part could lead to more U.S. aggression. Rather, the process of developing nuclear weapons itself inflated North Korea's importance while inducing the United States to offer incentives or impose relatively ineffective economic sanctions (and thereby avoiding more dangerous military action). North Korea became a centerpiece of U.S. concern while the United States avoided actions that might destabilize North Korea and shake loose the weapons the North might have.

The North Koreans knew that having a deliverable weapon would prove dangerous, but that having a weapons program gave them leverage -- a lesson the Iranians learned well. From the Iranians' point of view, a nuclear program causes the United States simultaneously to take them more seriously and to increase its caution while dealing with them. At present, the United States leads a group of countries with varying degrees of enthusiasm for imposing sanctions that might cause some economic pain to Iran, but give the United States a pretext not to undertake the military action Iran really fears and that the United States does not want to take.

Israel, however, must take a different view of Iran's weapons program. While not a threat to the United States, the program may threaten Israel. The Israelis' problem is that they must trust their intelligence on the level of development of Iran's weapons. The United States can afford a miscalculation; Israel might not be able to afford it. This lack of certainty makes Israel unpredictable. From the Iranian point of view, however, an Israeli attack might be welcome.

Iran does not have nuclear weapons and may be following the North Korean strategy of never developing deliverable weapons. If they did, however, and the Israelis attacked and destroyed them, the Iranians would be as they were before acquiring nuclear weapons. But if the Israelis attacked and failed to destroy them, the Iranians would emerge stronger. The Iranians could retaliate by taking action in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States, which ultimately is the guarantor of the global maritime flow of oil, might engage Iran militarily. Or it might enter into negotiations with Iran to guarantee the flow. An Israeli attack, whether successful or unsuccessful, would set the stage for Iranian actions that would threaten the global economy, paint Israel as the villain, and result in the United States being forced by European and Asian powers to guarantee the flow of oil with diplomatic concessions rather than military action. An attack by Israel, successful or unsuccessful, would cost Iran little and create substantial opportunities. In my view, the Iranians want a program, not a weapon, but having the Israelis attack the program would suit Iran's interests quite nicely.

The nuclear option falls into the category of Iranian manipulation of regional and global powers, long a historical necessity for the Iranians. But another, and more significant event is under way in Syria.

Syria's Importance to Iran

As we have written, if the Syrian regime survives, this in part would be due to Iranian support. Isolated from the rest of the world, Syria would become dependent on Iran. If that were to happen, an Iranian sphere of influence would stretch from western Afghanistan to Beirut. This in turn would fundamentally shift the balance of power in the Middle East, fulfilling Iran's dream of becoming a dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf and beyond. This was the shah's and the ayatollah's dream. And this is why the United States is currently obsessing over Syria.

What would such a sphere of influence give the Iranians? Three things. First, it would force the global power, the United States, to abandon ideas of destroying Iran, as the breadth of its influence would produce dangerously unpredictable results. Second, it would legitimize the regime inside Iran and in the region beyond any legitimacy it currently has. Third, with proxies along Saudi Arabia's northern border in Iraq and Shia along the western coast of the Persian Gulf, Iran could force shifts in the financial distribution of revenues from oil. Faced with regime preservation, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states would have to be flexible on Iranian demands, to say the least. Diverting that money to Iran would strengthen it greatly.

Iran has applied its strategy under regimes of various ideologies. The shah, whom many considered psychologically unstable and megalomaniacal, pursued this strategy with restraint and care. The current regime, also considered ideologically and psychologically unstable, has been equally restrained in its actions. Rhetoric and ideology can mislead, and usually are intended to do just that.

This long-term strategy, pursued since the 16th century with the resurgence of Persian nationalism in the form of the Safavid Empire, now sees a window of opportunity opening, engineered in some measure by Iran itself. Tehran's goal is to extend the American paralysis while it exploits the opportunities that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has created. Simultaneously, it wants to create a coherent sphere of influence that the United States will have to accommodate itself to in order to satisfy the demand of its coalition for a stable supply of oil and limited conflict in the region.

Iran is pursuing a two-pronged strategy toward this end. The first is to avoid any sudden moves, to allow processes to run their course. The second is to create a diversion through its nuclear program, causing the United States to replicate its North Korea policy in Iran. If its program causes an Israeli airstrike, Iran can turn that to its advantage as well. The Iranians understand that having nuclear weapons is dangerous but that having a weapons program is advantageous. But the key is not the nuclear program. That is merely a tool to divert attention from what is actually happening -- a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/irans-strategy

[Elzenga]

Wie is er nu eigenlijk aan het provoceren? 

Neem posting 363 door waaruitje kan opmaken dat onderhavige F-22's helemaal geen belangrijke rol zouden hebben bij een aanval op het Iraanse atoomprogramma. De Amerikanen zitten sowieso verspreid over de halve wereld, dus om te gaan roepen dat ze provoceren? Dan doen ze dat die redenatie volgend continu en overal.....  :crazy:

feit is wel dat bewuste F-22s in bewuste rol een beschermende paraplu kunnen aanbrengen boven een reeks aanvallende toestellen. Dat kan natuurlijk ook met "gewone" Amerikaanse gevechtsvliegtuigen in de regio...maar de stealth kwaliteiten van de F-22 maken het bijzonder...want zij kunnen die beschermende taak minder zichtbaar dan wel voor de Iraanse luchtverdediging onzichtbaar uitvoeren. In dat kader snap ik de Iraanse reactie wel.

[KapiteinRob]

Wie is er nu eigenlijk aan het provoceren? 

Neem posting 363 door waaruitje kan opmaken dat onderhavige F-22's helemaal geen belangrijke rol zouden hebben bij een aanval op het Iraanse atoomprogramma. De Amerikanen zitten sowieso verspreid over de halve wereld, dus om te gaan roepen dat ze provoceren? Dan doen ze dat die redenatie volgend continu en overal.....  :crazy: