Internationale AEW&C ontwikkelingen

[Harald]

E-7 Wedgetail Radar Jet The Pentagon Tried To Cancel Gets Over $1B In New Defense Bill
https://www.twz.com/air/e-7-wedgetail-radar-jet-the-pentagon-tried-to-cancel-gets-over-1b-in-new-defense-bill

[Huzaar1]

Saab timmert enorm aan de weg met de Global Eye je bent namelijk daarmee niet meer afhankelijk van de VS.

Jup

[Ace1]

Saab timmert enorm aan de weg met de Global Eye je bent namelijk daarmee niet meer afhankelijk van de VS.

[Harald]

Egypt considers Saab GlobalEye early warning aircraft to replace US-made E-2C Hawkeye.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/egypt-considers-saab-globaleye-early-warning-aircraft-to-replace-us-made-e-2c-hawkeye

Egypt is continuing negotiations with Saab over a potential acquisition of the GlobalEye airborne early warning and control aircraft to replace its aging E-2C Hawkeye fleet.

On January 8, 2026, Tactical Report noted that Egypt is continuing negotiations with Saab over a potential acquisition of the GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft to replace its aging E-2C Hawkeye fleet, following exploratory talks that began in mid-2025. The assessment reflects broader efforts to sustain airborne early warning coverage amid aging platforms and expanding air and maritime surveillance requirements.

Egypt continues the negotiations with Saab regarding a possible acquisition of the GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, as part of an effort to replace the Egyptian Air Force's aging U.S.-made E-2C Hawkeye. The talks originated during contacts at the Paris Air Show in late June 2025, where an Egyptian military delegation examined Saab's airborne surveillance systems and subsequently pursued follow-on exchanges. These contacts evolved into a government-to-government scoping phase overseen by the Egyptian Armed Forces Armament Authority in coordination with the Egyptian Air Force command. As of early January 2026, no contract signature, aircraft quantity, delivery schedule, or finalized financial arrangement had been announced, although some regional reporting has referred to a potential interest in a limited number of aircraft.

The Egyptian Air Force currently relies on the U.S. E-2C Hawkeye as its primary airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform, and this fleet forms the benchmark against which any successor system is being evaluated. Egypt acquired its initial E-2C aircraft between 1986 and 1993, with six aircraft forming the core of the fleet, later expanded to seven or eight airframes. These aircraft are based at the Cairo West Air Base and used by the 601 Air Wing, also referred to as the 601 AEW Brigade, to support national air defense by extending radar coverage and enabling airborne battle management. In 1999, Egypt upgraded five of its Hawkeyes to the Hawkeye 2000 configuration and also obtained at least one additional aircraft already modernized to that standard, with deliveries spanning the 2003–2008 period. Egypt further requested two excess E-2C airframes from the United States in October 2007, with deliveries beginning in 2010, and Egypt is said to have used its E-Cs during operations against ISIL targets in Libya in 2015.

The Hawkeye 2000 upgrade extended the operational life of Egypt's E-2C fleet and preserved its relevance well into the 2000s and 2010s, but it also underlined the structural limits of an aircraft that is several decades old. The Hawkeye 2000 configuration includes the APS-145 radar, newer mission computers, improved operator consoles, updated navigation systems, and better interfaces that support cooperative engagement and enhanced data exchange. This radar modernization allows the E-2C to track more than 2,000 airborne and surface targets at ranges exceeding 640 km, which remains useful for managing national airspace and coordinating fighter jets. However, the E-2C airframe design dates back to the 1960s, and Egypt's aircraft have been flying since the late 1980s, meaning higher maintenance demands and fewer options for further upgrades. At the same time, Egypt's surveillance needs have expanded to cover not only its airspace, but also maritime areas in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, as well as the Sinai Peninsula and southern approaches.

One of the main reasons why the Saab GlobalEye is being examined is the underlying carrier aircraft, which differs fundamentally from the E-2C. The GlobalEye is based on the Canadian Bombardier Global 6000 or 6500 long-range business jet, rather than a turboprop aircraft designed for carrier operations. This gives it a service ceiling of about 16,000 m, a top speed above 1,100 km/h, and an operational range close to 11,000 km. In simple terms, it can fly higher, faster, and farther than the E-2C, whose typical performance is limited to 10,600 m, 600 km/h, and about 2,700 km with mission endurance near 6 hours, respectively. With an endurance exceeding 11 hours, a single GlobalEye can reposition quickly, stay on station longer, and cover wider areas for extended periods, reducing the number of sorties needed to maintain continuous surveillance. For Egypt, this translates into more persistent coverage over wide areas such as the Red Sea approaches and eastern Mediterranean airspace.

Another distinction lies in how the GlobalEye collects information. While the E-2C focuses mainly on airborne target management, the Saab GlobalEye, also known as the S 106 in Sweden, is designed from the start to watch activities in the air, the sea, and on the ground at the same time. The Swedish system is centered on Saab's Erieye Extended Range radar mounted above the fuselage, an active system with detection ranges of up to 450 km against fighter-sized targets, depending on altitude and conditions. In addition to this main AEW radar, the GlobalEye integrates a Leonardo SeaSpray 7500E maritime surveillance radar, an electro-optical and infrared sensor, and modes that allow it to track moving targets on the ground. This configuration means the aircraft can concurrently monitor air, maritime, and surface activity in a single mission. For Egypt, this broader view supports stated objectives to expand airborne surveillance beyond air defense warning toward better maritime awareness, improved monitoring of sea lanes, and earlier detection of smaller threats like UAVs and cruise missiles.

How information is shared represents another area where the GlobalEye differs from Egypt's existing E-2C fleet. Saab's GlobalEye is designed to function as part of a wider network, incorporating multiple data links, voice communications, and satellite connectivity. It includes five onboard operator stations but can also fly missions where sensor data are sent directly to ground command centers without operators onboard. This architecture better fits with modern air defense concepts that rely on distributed command and control across air, naval, and ground forces rather than a single airborne decision point. By comparison, the E-2C has long served as Egypt's airborne command platform, but its older architecture limits how much data it can share and how easily it can integrate with newer systems. In contrast, in the GlobalEye concept, the aircraft acts as a data node that contributes to a broader integrated air and missile defense architecture.

Despite these capability differences, the talks between Egypt and Saab remain shaped by practical constraints. Integrating a new AEW&C aircraft into Egypt's existing defense structure is complex, because the country operates a heterogeneous mix of U.S., Russian, Chinese, and European air defense and command systems that must securely exchange data. Cost is another major factor, as a GlobalEye package including aircraft, training, support, and long-term sustainment would likely amount to several hundred million dollars, leading Egypt to consider flexible payment arrangements. Like many of its new defense procurement talks (such as the F110 frigate and the Barracuda submarine), Cairo is potentially interested in local maintenance and sustainment, which could raise questions about how much technical access and industrial involvement can be agreed under Sweden's export rules. Finally, the GlobalEye is not the only option available, with alternatives such as the E-7A Wedgetail and the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye also part of the broader comparison as Egypt weighs how best to shape its future airborne surveillance capability.

[Ace1]

Canadian NORAD Commander Explains Urgent Need For Better Sensing

Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna offers exclusive insights on the need for new satellites, airborne radar jets, and the drone threat.

he ability to sense and understand activities in the air and on the sea is one of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna's main responsibilities as operational commander for the Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Region (CANR). However, he faces a number of hurdles to accomplish that mission. Canada has no organic airborne early warning and control aircraft and is relying on an aging satellite system with many users competing for its products.

In the third installment from our exclusive interview last month, McKenna gives us a candid view of what Canada needs to do to modernize its sensing capabilities to get a better handle on the myriad threats NORAD is facing. He also talks about Canadian deliberations over the Trump administration's Golden Dome missile defense system and how to defend against the threat to military installations from drones. You can catch up with the previous installments here and here.

Some of the questions have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: Are there any updates to the Trump administration's Golden Dome missile defense initiative from Canada's point of view? And does Canada back the placement of kinetic interceptors in space?

A: I think that's a political decision. So I'm not going to speak to the space-based interceptor piece. That's up to my politicians to answer that. But certainly, the advocacy that I do is all about integrated missile defense. And how does Canada become a bigger player, a more reliable player, in how we sense things in the Arctic?

From an integrated missile defense point of view, I think we need to be looking at what ground-based effectors look like. And how do we protect ourselves from an integrated missile defense point of view? How do we be more additive in the NORAD partnership with more capability?

Q: How do you do that?

A: Well, I think one is the recapitalization and modernizing our command and control and modernizing the way that we sense. I think there's a lot of opportunity in the space domain as well. Canada signed a partnership between two Canadian companies, MDA and Telesat, that I think will bear fruit, from a polar communications point of view, in the next number of months. We have a project ongoing for space-based ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], which is likely to progress in the next month or two, and there'll be some news on that. So there's, there's a lot of money moving, finally, on defense spending.

Q: Are you able to provide any details about the space-based ISR?

A: We currently operate a government-of-Canada-owned constellation of four satellites called RADARSAT Constellation Mission. All the orbital axes are based on [the] Arctic, [but] obviously, it's global. It's a Low Earth Orbit constellation and it's radar.

It's all about looking through clouds. And for us, it's about looking at dark ships [with the AIS transponders turned off] with an actual picture of what ships are out there, and figuring out what ships are being non-compliant, and then queuing either ISR assets or the Coast Guard to go and have a look at those ships.

That was launched in 2019, and its service life is expected to last until about 2026. It's still giving us good data, and likely will give us good data until the 2030s. So DESSP, or the Defense Enhanced Surveillance of Space Project, is anchored on having a defense-only constellation of satellites, because you can imagine those satellites are being looked at for, 'hey, where are the whales?' 'Where's the ice?' Environmental pollution control. There's a lot of demand on it. We do get sort of primacy over it, but we do need more ISR in the Arctic, and I think we need our defense-only constellation. So part of the NORAD modernization project was funded very significantly.

Q: Back to Golden Dome. Are there any updates from the Canadian point of view?

A: So we look at it as Continental Shield. Golden Dome is the U.S. brand on it. From our point of view, it's great air missile defense and what we will put on the table to defend the continent with. And so I think there are ongoing negotiations between our governments with respect to what the specific investments will be. We've got a good head start, though, with our NORAD [modernization], and I think there's more to come.

Q: Let's switch topics for a minute. Has Canada experienced drone incursions over critical facilities like the U.S. and Europe have?

A: Not to the same extent. I'm obviously very attuned to what is going on in Europe and what has been going on in the States, and I talked about it with my commander quite a bit. We're taking counter-UAS very seriously. As we onboard exquisite things like the F-35, we need to have a better system. We've purchased a system called the Leonardo Falcon Shield system. That's the same one that the RAF uses, and we can place it at two of our wings right now, and I'm rolling it at all my wings as the deliveries roll in. And it's an RF [radio frequency] sensing, RF interception capability. It's not kinetic as of yet, but that can be added pretty easily. And I think we need to be thinking about this as a baseline capability. Every one of our air bases to be able to deny airspace for hobbyists and state actors who may wish to fly drones over top.

Q: Why do you think that Canada hasn't experienced drone incursions to the extent that the U.S. and Europe are experiencing them?

A: I honestly don't have an opinion on that. We do have drone issues. We do detect drones once in a while, but I have not had massive incursions in any of my NORAD bases as of yet. That doesn't mean it's not coming, though. And I think we can't be naive about this. The U.S. talks about Golden Dome, and [NORAD/NORTHCOM commander] Gen. [Gregory] Guillot, in front of Congress, has talked about the three domes, with the last, the smallest dome, being counter-UAS domes around the U.S. infrastructure. We see it the same way, in the sense that I need limited air defence around my key infrastructure to protect the assets that I wish to protect.

Q: You talked about your counter-UAS equipment having radio frequency detection and intercept capabilities. What's Canada's policy on kinetic counter-drone systems?

A: I think there's other optionality, right? And I think this becomes a policy and a legal discussion. What are the boundaries for our authorities? And if we need more authorities, we have to go back to the government to get them. We do have some exemptions from [Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada] that manages our spectrum. It's like the FCC in the States, so we've got a bunch of dispensations from them to conduct the interceptions we need for defense installations, which is good news. But I do think there's probably more to come. I do think kinetic, directed energy, drone-on-drone type [of defenses] would be very useful. I think it'll depend on the legal framework we're allowed to use to protect our facilities.

Q: What are the limitations on your counter-UAS actions?

A: It's an emerging space now in terms of we're just getting the installs done, and we're scratching at the authorities, and having the analysis is fine, but right now, in terms of what we're going to be able to do, I can do some things. I'm not going to get into the details on that – but I can do some things to deny access to my airspace right now. I do think there's going to have to be a discussion about the aggregation of additional authorities.

Q: Can you tell me more about the domestic counter-UAS strategy to help mitigate the threats, particularly posed by smaller, lower-end drones?

A: Well, one of the keys is domain awareness to begin with, like understand the problem you're facing and then pair your defensive design against that. And that really is the basis of integrated air and missile defense. But zoom down into the sub-tactical, force protection lens around each of our bases, and we're going through that process right now to get that laid down. The good news is I've got some systems installed. We're learning with them, and we're pushing the policy space to make sure we're having the right authorities.

Q: Have you had to use any of these defensive systems against drones yet?

A: Not yet.

Q: What space-based capabilities are needed for the mission that you don't have right now?

A: The one that's in development is the space-based air moving target indicator. The U.S. is going quite heavily on that. I'm really interested in what that could bring. It would be a nice layer on top of the Over the Horizon radar picture.

The key question is, how small a thing can it see? That's the overriding discussion we have now. And you know, could it ever supplant a thing like an airborne early warning aircraft? I think at the current time, no. Maybe 15 or 20 years from now, very much potentially. We'll see. I think we still need AWACS-like aircraft. So that third basket of policy authorities was received in 2024, they [provided] a bunch of money to us to go and conduct an options analysis, and we are in the middle of that right now, looking at airborne early warning aircraft that would be contributive to the NORAD mission set.

Q: What kind of airborne early warning aircraft are you considering in your review?

A: There are really three options. You could say four with an E-2D as well. But I think that may not fit for the purpose of the Arctic mission set. We are looking at the Boeing advanced E-7 Wedgetail. We're looking at the Phoenix [L3Harris airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft]. And we're looking at the GlobalEye, or variants that Saab has built. Two of them, L3Harris and the Saab offering, are both based on a Canadian biz jet. They're based on the Global 6500 aircraft that Bombardier produces.

Q: When will you make a decision?

A: That's a good question for my government. We owe them the results of our options analysis. We're near the end of options analysis (OA). The way that Canada appropriates money is by buying years, almost like your mortgage. It's very boring, but that's how you get money apportioned to you. And I believe it was sort of in the early 2030s. I'll be honest, I have a need almost immediately for it. To think about the state of the E-3  fleet around the world, both in NATO and the U.S., there's a need.

Q: Has the need for look-down radar capability pushed your airborne early warning aircraft program forward?

A: Because of the austerity of the radar landscape in Canada, I do need a movable, high-power radar in which to be able to cue my fighters and to take electronic custody of anything that was coming close to the approaches to North America, so I have a need for it, absolutely.

Q: So that's what's driving your options for the airborne early warning aircraft?

A: I feel quite strongly that we need that. We advocated to the government that we needed it. We made a good case. There are obviously lots of questions, but they bought our analysis, and they obviously provided us with policy coverage and funding to get after that.


https://www.twz.com/air/canadian-norad-commander-explains-urgent-need-for-better-sensing?utm_source=pushly

[Harald]

Frankrijk koopt twee radarvliegtuigen van Saab voor 1,1 miljard euro
https://share.google/3lVrQEu9bI0xbOFGn

Frankrijk bestelt twee GlobalEye-radarvliegtuigen en bijbehorende uitrusting voor 12,3 miljard Zweedse kroon (1,1 miljard euro) bij de Zweedse producent Saab. De leveringen zullen plaatsvinden tussen 2029 en 2032, meldt Saab dinsdag.

De GlobalEye is een zogeheten 'Airborne Early Warning and Control'-vliegtuig (AEW&C) met actieve en passieve sensoren, die het toestel moeten toelaten op lange afstand objecten in de lucht, op zee en op de grond te detecteren en identificeren. De GlobalEye-vliegtuigen moeten de vier Franse AWACS-toestellen van Amerikaanse makelij vervangen, meldt het Franse nieuwsagentschap AFP.

Het Franse directoraat voor bewapening (DGA) plaatste de bestelling. Naast de twee vliegtuigen gaat het ook om bijbehorende gronduitrusting, training en ondersteuning. Het contract bevat ook een optie op twee bijkomende toestellen.

[Ace1]

Beterschap

Dank je wel.

[Master Mack]

Nee was afgelopen zondagavond aan het wandelen en liep een donkere steeg waar een zwarte fiets in een heg lag, waarover ik gestruikeld ben.

Beterschap

[Ace1]

Contact links met een konijnenhol ?

Nee was afgelopen zondagavond aan het wandelen en liep een donkere steeg waar een zwarte fiets in een heg lag, waarover ik gestruikeld ben.

[Ace1]

Beterschap kerel.

Dank je wel.

[Benji87]

Zit met een gebroken linker voet thuis.

Contact links met een konijnenhol ?

[bergd]

Zit met een gebroken linker voet thuis.

Beterschap kerel.

[Ace1]

Had je niks te doen Ace    ik kan die informatie niet allemaal zo snel bewerken die jij stuurt

Zit met een gebroken linker voet thuis.

[bergd]

Had je niks te doen Ace    ik kan die informatie niet allemaal zo snel bewerken die jij stuurt

[Ace1]

Nieuw Amerikaans radarvliegtuig voorlopig gered?

Eerder dit jaar annuleerde het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie de geplande aankoop van de Boeing E-7 Wedgetail. Dit nieuwe radarvliegtuig zou de vloot van verouderde E-3 Sentry "AWACS"-radartoestellen moeten vervangen. Het Amerikaanse Congres heeft hier nu een stokje voor gestoken.

Amerikaans minister van Defensie Pete Hegseth wil vol inzetten op het gebruik van satellieten in plaats van radarvliegtuigen. Totdat er voldoende satellieten in de ruimte zijn om dit volledig te dekken, zijn er nog wel radartoestellen nodig. Als tussenoplossing werd de E-7 Wedgetail als te duur en te laat beschouwd, waardoor er een streep door de order ging. In plaats daarvan zou de US Navy een aantal E-2D Hawkeye radarvliegtuigen beschikbaar moeten stellen.

The Wall Street Journal schreef eerder deze week dat het Amerikaanse parlement deze plannen heeft geblokkeerd. Tijdens de budgetbesprekingen heeft het Amerikaanse Congres de financiering voor de E-7 Wedgetail gegarandeerd. Hiermee kan het project voorlopig doorgaan. De Congresleden voerden als reden aan dat met de huidige bedreigingen in de veiligheid, bemande radarvliegtuigen essentieel zijn. Een gat laten vallen tussen de E-3 Sentry en toekomstige observatiesatellieten, zou onverantwoord zijn.

Wat dit betekent voor de vervanging van de NAVO AWACS radarvliegtuigen is nog onduidelijk. De NAVO heeft een gezamenlijke vloot van veertien E-3 Sentry radartoestellen, gestationeerd op de Duitse vliegbasis Geilenkirchen. Deze zouden vanaf 2031 vervangen worden door zes Boeing Wedgetails. Nadat Amerika zich terugtrok uit het Wedgetail project, stond de gezamenlijke aankoop door NAVO al op losse schroeven. Vorige maand werd bekend dat Nederland zich samen met zes andere landen oriënteert op een alternatief voor de Wedgetail.

https://www.upinthesky.nl/2025/12/30/nieuw-amerikaans-radarvliegtuig-voorlopig-gered/