Internationale Helicopter ontwikkelingen

Gestart door Harald, 01/03/2017 | 13:48 uur

Huzaar1

Citaat van: Benji87 op 16/12/2025 | 11:08 uurIk denk dat daar juist de verbazing inzit. De duitsers gebruiken de H145M als overbrugging voor hun vervroegde pensioen van de Tiger. Het moet dus wel degelijk anti-tank capaciteiten overnemen totdat er een andere oplossing. Ik weet ook niet wat de Duitsers op lange termijn willen.

Ze gebruiken het om piloten te laten kunnen oefenen en werken met materiaal. Niemand in de bundeswehr of luftwaffe dicht de h145 een hoofdrol in een hoofdtaak 1 scenario om aan het front opzoek te gaan naar tanks.

Dit zijn ondersteunende systemen, wellicht SOF enablers. Geen gevechtshelikopters.
"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

Benji87


[/quote]
Citaat van: Huzaar1 op 16/12/2025 | 10:05 uurAaargh, dat is ook helemaal niet de bedoeling van de duitsers.

Doctrines mensen, echt. Komaan. Dit is geen anti tank helikopter noch bedoelt voor kinetisch staal op staal hoofdtaak 1 voorhoede.  Dat overleef je niet.

Ik denk dat daar juist de verbazing inzit. De duitsers gebruiken de H145M als overbrugging voor hun vervroegde pensioen van de Tiger. Het moet dus wel degelijk anti-tank capaciteiten overnemen totdat er een andere oplossing. Ik weet ook niet wat de Duitsers op lange termijn willen.

Huzaar1

#1269
Citaat van: Ace1 op 15/12/2025 | 20:21 uurZie ik dat goed dat de Duitse H145M helicopters alleen voorzien zijn van een .50 er en 70mm raketten? Daarmee ga je geen tanks mee te houden, wel als je een H145M helicopter kan voorzien van Hellfire of Brimstone raketten.



Aaargh, dat is ook helemaal niet de bedoeling van de duitsers.

Doctrines mensen, echt. Komaan. Dit is geen anti tank helikopter noch bedoelt voor kinetisch staal op staal hoofdtaak 1 voorhoede.  Dat overleef je niet.
"Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without your accordion" US secmindef - Jed Babbin"

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Ace1 op 15/12/2025 | 20:21 uurZie ik dat goed dat de Duitse H145M helicopters alleen voorzien zijn van een .50 er en 70mm raketten? Daarmee ga je geen tanks mee te houden, wel als je een H145M helicopter kan voorzien van Hellfire of Brimstone raketten.

Dat is het nadeel van slechts twee ophangpunten. De getoonde load-out van een gun pod en en rocket pod is voor escorte of voor light attack.
A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Ace1

Zie ik dat goed dat de Duitse H145M helicopters alleen voorzien zijn van een .50 er en 70mm raketten? Daarmee ga je geen tanks mee te houden, wel als je een H145M helicopter kan voorzien van Hellfire of Brimstone raketten.



Harald



Germany orders 20 additional Airbus H145M helicopters

Donauwörth, Germany, 15 December 2025 – Germany has decided to exercise the option for 20 more H145M light combat helicopters (Leichter Kampfhubschrauber or LKH for short) that were part of a contract signed in December 2023, bringing the total number to 82 helicopters.

"We are honoured and proud that Germany has decided to order 20 additional H145M LKH helicopters. This further commitment by one of our home countries is a powerful sign of trust in the H145M's exceptional performance and multi-role capabilities," said Stefan Thomé, Managing Director of Airbus Helicopters in Germany. 

The first H145M LKH helicopter was delivered to Germany, less than a year after the contract signature, in November 2024 and additional helicopters have since been delivered. The helicopter's missions include training, reconnaissance, special forces operations and light attack. The German Army will receive 72 helicopters, while the Luftwaffe's special forces will receive ten.

The H145M is a multi-role military helicopter that provides a broad range of mission capabilities. Within minutes, the helicopter can be reconfigured from a light attack role with axial ballistic and guided weapons and a state-of-the-art self-protection system into a special operations version with fast rappelling equipment. The comprehensive mission packages include hoisting and external cargo capabilities.

The H145M is the military version of the tried-and-tested, light twin-engine H145 helicopter. The global fleet of the H145 family has accumulated more than eight million flight hours. It is used by armed and law enforcement forces around the world for the most demanding missions. The Bundeswehr already operates H145 helicopters for special forces operations and search and rescue missions. The US Army employs almost 500 helicopters from the H145 family under the name of UH-72 Lakota, which have clocked more than 1.5 million flight hours. Other military operators of the H145 family are Hungary, Serbia, Luxembourg, Thailand, Ecuador, Honduras and Cyprus. Recent orders include Belgium signing for 17, Brunei for six and Ireland for four H145Ms.

Powered by two Safran Arriel 2E engines, the H145M is fitted with a full authority digital engine control (FADEC). In addition, the helicopter is equipped with the Helionix digital avionics suite which, alongside innovative flight data management, includes a high-performance 4-axis autopilot, reducing pilot workload during missions. Its particularly low acoustic footprint makes the H145M the quietest helicopter in its class.

https://www.edrmagazine.eu/germany-orders-20-additional-airbus-h145m-helicopters

https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2025-12-germany-orders-20-additional-airbus-h145m-helicopters

Ace1

How the Ukraine war has (and has not) changed the role of helicopters in combat

Russia's heavy rotorcraft casualties in the early part of the Ukraine war stem from outdated tactics and poor planning, argues Bell executive and former US Army general Jeffrey Schloesser, and do not mark the end of rotary-wing aviation as a viable military tool.

One of the most iconic images of the highly documented Russia-Ukraine War came from the conflict's opening hours.

Lines of Russian attack helicopters flying low over the grey winter forests and fields of northern Ukraine, discharging countermeasure flares as they absorb incoming fire. Arrow-straight plumes of smoke trailing both incoming Ukrainian anti-air missiles and rockets shot from the Russian rotorcraft.

Behind the Mil Mi-24 and Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopters come waves of Mil Mi-8 troop-carriers headed toward one of Moscow's earliest objectives of the war: Antonov airport in the city of Hostomel.

Moscow's plan was to quickly seize the airfield, owned by the Antonov aircraft corporation, and use it to land fixed-wing transports laden with combat troops, providing an airhead from which to seize the capital Kyiv less than 19 miles (30km) to the southeast.

The helicopter-borne air assault portion of the mission was carried out by the Russian army's elite VDV paratroopers. A small force of several hundred troops ferried and supported by a few dozen aircraft was meant to land at the Antonov airport. That small assault force would be reinforced by a larger contingent set to land in Ilyushin Il-76 transports and by mechanised troops advancing overland from Russia.

Very little of the plan came fruition.

The Russian assault force was engaged by Ukrainian air defences around Hostomel, taking fire from anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired guided missiles.

Losses of multiple Russian helicopter types have since been documented during or after the Hostomel assault, including Ka-52s, Mi-24s and Mi-8s. Total rotorcraft losses from the operation have been estimated between three and 10 on the Russian side.

While a portion of Russia's assault force did land and briefly hold the Antonov airport, a Ukrainian counter-attack allowed Kyiv's forces to thoroughly crater the 3,500m (11,480ft)-long runway and prevent the crucial Russian reinforcements from landing.

Although Russian armoured forces eventually reached Hostomel by ground, the delay fended off Moscow's attempt at a lightning decapitation strike on the Ukrainian capital.

The high-profile failure of a crucial helicopter strike mission in the war's opening hours became an enduring scene of the war, which now approaching the close of its fourth year is frozen in a bloody stalemate.

Russia's helicopter woes were not limited to Hostomel, however.

Data provided by the Ukrainian defence ministry suggests Russia has lost 347 rotorcraft during the war. The Russian Losses in Ukraine project says the vast majority of those losses – 82%, or 288 helicopters – came in the first 12 months of fighting.

"There's the absolute reality of Russian aircraft being shot down," says Jeffrey Schloesser, a retired two-star general with the US Army and now senior vice-president of strategic pursuits at rotorcraft manufacturer Bell.

Widely available battlefield footage of Russian aircraft being engaged and wrecked has led armchair generals to declare the end of the helicopter as an effective battlefield tool.

That conclusion has been further reinforced by the emergence of drone warfare in the more recent years of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, now defined by skies saturated with lethally armed quadcopters precisely guided by remote operators.

However, Schloesser believes this conclusion is overly simplistic and fails to account for obvious failings in Russian planning and tactical execution.

"You see their aircraft flying in formation, in the middle of the day, at an altitude that is a perfect box for both surface-to-air missiles as well as small arms fire," he tells FlightGlobal.

"The Russians, using really outdated tactics and techniques and procedures during the initial parts of the war, suffered huge amounts of rotary-wing casualties and I think that became the perception throughout much of the world," Schloesser adds.

While the Bell executive certainly has incentives to downplay suggestions of the helicopter's irrelevance, Schloesser draws on frontline experience that spans combat tours in Iraq, Afghanistan and the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo.

As a uniformed officer, he commanded a battalion of the US Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment that provides rotary-wing aviation support to commando forces across the US military. Schloesser later commanded the army's 101st Airborne Division, which specialises in helicopter air assault operations much like the ill-fated airfield seizure attempted by the Russian VDV in Hostomel.

Rather than indicting the entire concept of rotary-wing air support and troop movement, the retired major general says Russia's struggle to effectively employ its helicopter force should be regarded as an internal failing of Moscow's generals and war plan.

"The Ukrainians destroyed much of that Russian capability right off the bat because of the errors they made," Schloesser says. "They tried to do an air assault without suppressing enemy air defences."

An equivalent US operation in contested airspace would likely have involved a massive deployment of fighters, bombers, ground-attack aircraft and electronic warfare platforms to open a temporarily safe corridor for the assault force – something the Russians only loosely attempted, seemingly based on the expectation of minimal resistance.

The main assault on Hostomel also occurred in daylight, with the helicopters flying directly toward their target. By contrast, the US Army prefers to fly at night and use indirect avenues of approaches to avoid defenders or mask their destination, Schloesser notes.

Defeat at Hostomel, and the failure of several less-publicised helicopter operations over the subsequent weeks of combat, has substantially blunted Russian enthusiasm for rotary-wing aviation, in Schloesser's opinion.

"I have seen very limited intent to use air assault in this conflict ever since the first two months or so," he says. "They lost a large amount of aircraft and the troops that were specially trained. In many cases, the defeat of those forces occurred very quickly on, and in many cases they were utterly destroyed."

The true cause of Russia's bloody rotary-wing fiasco was a failure to adapt tactics to the reality on the ground, rather than an inherent inadequacy of the medium, he insists. "They did not learn while they were trying to execute."

Instead of evolving, the Russians appear to have sidelined much of their remaining helicopter fleet, with losses mostly levelling off since mid-2023, according to the Russian Losses in Ukraine project.

On the Ukrainian side, Schloesser says there have been one or two notable instances of successfully employing helicopters, such as the evacuation of army forces from the besieged port city of Mariupol in 2022.

And in October, a small team of Ukrainian special forces were deployed via a Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk to the city of Pokrovsk, which the army was in the process of withdrawing from. That news was reported by Reuters.

However, Kyiv's options for helicopter-borne operations have largely been limited by its small inventory of outdated Soviet-origin rotorcraft.

Fleet data from aviation analytics firm Cirium counts the Ukrainian army as having 61 Mi-8 utility and 39 Mi-24 attack helicopters.

Even after wartime losses, the Russian fleet still includes more than 770 aircraft from the Mi-8 family, more than 320 Mi-24/35 attack helicopters and 135 of the distinctive Ka-52 coaxial ground-attack rotorcraft.

By way of compassion, the US Army's world-leading helicopter inventory boasts nearly 2,300 UH-60 troop-carrying assault rotorcraft, along with more than 830 Boeing AH-64 attack types and over 500 Boeing CH-47F heavy-lift transports.

The service has also contracted with Bell to design and deliver the next-generation MV-75 tiltrotor, with an eye toward providing significantly more speed and range – qualities US Army leaders say they need to make air assaults viable in an era of long-range precision weaponry.

But the Russia-Ukraine war has forced tweaks to the Pentagon's long-term helicopter strategy.

Most notably, the US Army in 2024 cancelled the Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft scout platform over concerns about survivability – just as Bell and Sikorsky were set to launch flight testing on two prototype designs.

The army is now developing a new class of uncrewed vehicles it calls "launched effects", which the service plans to integrate with existing rotorcraft like UH-60s and AH-64s.

Air-launched effects will act as scouts, operating ahead of manned rotorcraft to identify threats and strike targets, keeping helicopters and crews away from the most-hazardous areas.

Still, despite dangers confronting rotary-wing aviation, the US Army does not appear to be backing away from its use of helicopters.

"Apache, Black Hawk and Chinook platforms remain indispensable to the force," the service said in 19 November feature highlighting its work to incorporate more quadcopter drones and other small UAVs into army aviation.

"[The army] is not discarding helicopters, it is augmenting them," the report notes, adding that small drones will supplement existing rotary-wing missions such as medical evacuation, logistics support and deep-penetration strikes, rather than taking them over entirely.

"The difference now lies in employment," the report says.

According to Schloesser, that is the right approach.

Rather than consign helicopter forces to the ash heap of history, he argues rotary-wing forces will return to their historic place as a battlefield enabler deployed strategically in closely coordinated operations alongside fixed-wing jets, electronic warfare assets, ground-based air defences and other combat forces.

That concept, known as "manoeuvre warfare", has been a doctrinal pillar of combat operations in Western armies for decades.

The very earliest example of the idea emerged in 1918 at the end of the First World War, when Australian General John Monash combined tanks, infantry, artillery and early military aircraft to seize the French town of Le Hamel in a meticulously choreographed operation.

Schloesser says helicopters can still survive and be effective in modern combat when used in this fashion – specifically with the goal of quickly moving troops or disrupting enemy forces in ways enabling larger ground offensives.

"I never operated them separately," Schloesser notes of his time commanding the 101st Airborne Division, which includes thousands of infantry and artillery soldiers in addition to its sizeable contingent of helicopters. "I always combine the efforts on the battlefield for maximum effect, and that's what's going to be required to change the calculus."

Part of that change will be shifting toward using what Schloesser calls "disaggregated forces".

Rather than relying on large staging areas to support dozens or hundreds of helicopters, armies will need to spread aircraft across many smaller refuelling and rearming sites, further removed from front lines.

The proven ability of both Russia and Ukraine to hit specific targets hundreds of kilometres away with relatively simple munitions indicates this will prove challenging, requiring layered air defences and counter-UAS protections. Ukraine's successful strike against three strategic bomber bases deep inside Russia in May revealed the vulnerability of parked aircraft, even those far from the battlefield.

Multiple Tupolev Tu-22M3, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers, and at least one Il-76-based A-50 airborne early warning and control platform, were damaged or destroyed in the unconventional attack that used more than 110 explosively armed quadcopters smuggled into Russia via truck.


Even considering that threat, Schloesser says Russia's ongoing performance in Ukraine suggests either risk aversion or a lack of expertise necessary to develop and execute complex, multi-layered operations to which helicopters can safely and effectively contribute.

"There just doesn't seem to be an ability at the higher levels to fight in this type of combined arms manoeuvre warfare," he says. "I just don't see that."

One possible explanation is the heavy losses suffered by Russia's helicopter forces in the first year of the war – which may have killed many personnel experienced in developing such operations.

While Moscow appears to have settled into an attrition-based strategy of long-range bombardment and infantry attacks, Kyiv is now looking to expand its rotary-wing capabilities.

In October, the Ukrainian government signed a letter of intent with Bell to pursue an acquisition of an unspecified number UH-1Y utility and AH-1Z attack helicopters.

While details around financing and US government approval still need to be addressed, Schloesser says the Bell rotorcraft offer significant potential benefits to Ukraine.

The aircraft have 85% commonality, offering simplified sustainment across a wide portfolio of rotary-wing missions. The two H-1 aircraft are primarily operated by the US Marine Corps (USMC), which practises an expeditionary fighting style Schloesser says fits well with the wartime demands and abilities of the Ukrainian army.

Schloesser says the UH-1Y and AH-1Z feature sophisticated countermeasures that would help them survive modern threats, though he declines to elaborate, citing security classification.

From an operational perspective, the USMC has already demonstrated the ability of the AH-1Z to perform air-to-air and counter-UAS missions in test environments.

A cost-effective means for both those functions is in high demand by the Ukrainians, as Russia overpowers conventional air defences with massed wave bombardments of low-cost, one-way drones.

Perhaps most importantly, Bell's H-1 production line in Amarillo, Texas has availability. After the final new delivery for the USMC in 2022, and more recently completing orders for Bahrain and the Czech Republic, Bell is working through a 12-aircraft order from Nigeria for the AH-1Z – the company's last confirmed H-1 customer.

That gives Ukraine a rare opportunity to relatively quickly secure new-build aircraft, wait times for which typically run several years out.

With peace talks between Ukraine, Russia and the USA currently underway, it may be that new H-1s fail to reach Ukraine in time to impact the war.

However, Schloesser, who was part of the Bell team negotiating with Kyiv on the potential H-1 deal, says a new helicopter fleet can still bring significant benefits to Ukraine.

"They have a vision of the future where their country is able to rebuild its defence capabilities and its defence industries," he notes. "In our discussions with them, one of the things that they've constantly talked about is how can this play in a way that allows the Ukrainians a role in the future of the aircraft as well."

Kyiv has made commitments for large numbers of military aircraft in recent weeks, including Dassault Aviation Rafale F4 fighters from France and Swedish-made Saab Gripen E/F fighters.

While a means to pay for the new jets and helicopters remains elusive, all indicators are that Kyiv is preparing for the current war to end with some form of uneasy truce – one requiring a strong Ukrainian military to deter subsequent Russian adventurism.

Whether that force includes significant numbers of modern rotorcraft remains to be seen. However, recent sales indicate helicopters will likely remain fixtures of modern militaries for decades.

For instance, in addition to plans to field Bell's MV-75, the US Army is upgrading its existing UH-60s, AH-64s and CH-47Fs. Meanwhile, allies in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region are moving ahead with significant fleet expansion plans. Most recently, Poland signed a multi-billion dollar order for 96 Apache attack helicopters.

China is also fielding new rotorcraft, including its domestically produced Harbin Z-21 attack helicopter and Z-20T troop-carrying assault type.

https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/how-the-ukraine-war-has-and-has-not-changed-the-helicopters-role-in-combat/165492.article

Sparkplug

Citaat van: Lynxian op 01/12/2025 | 12:47 uurDie mooie software update zit hopelijk ook in ons onderhoudpakket?

Net als de VS en VK heeft ook Nederland de AH-64E v6 en er wordt ook meer aangestuurd op de uniformiteit qua software.

Het zou vreemd zijn als DHC en British Army AAC hier niet van zouden kunnen leren.
A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Lynxian

Die mooie software update zit hopelijk ook in ons onderhoudpakket?

Sparkplug

U.S. Army AH-64E Apache's Counter-Drone Capability Rapidly Matures

Apaches scored 13 drone kills out of 14 engagements during Operation Flyswatter, reflecting the AH-64's evolving counter-UAS capabilities.

Thomas Newdick Published Nov 30, 2025 2:59 PM EST

The U.S. Army's AH-64 Apache attack helicopter is continuing to develop its ability to detect and destroy enemy aerial drones. In a recent live-fire test, AH-64E versions of the helicopter used the latest Version 6 (V6) software package that further enhances the Apache's qualifications as a drone-hunter, something that has previously been proven in exercises in the Middle East, as you can read about here.

The recent live-fire maneuvers, Operation Flyswatter, were carried out at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, and involved AH-64Es in the current-production V6 configuration deployed from the South Carolina Army National Guard (SCARNG). Other Army, National Guard, Marine Corps, Navy, and industry partners participated under an effort that was managed by the Apache Project Management Office (PM Apache).


A head-on view of a U.S. Army AH-64E Apache attack helicopter during Operation Flyswatter, at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina. Photo courtesy from S.C. Army National Guard/Matthew Ryan

During Operation Flyswatter, the AH-64Es were tasked with detecting and tracking uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), before defeating them with a combination of laser-guided missiles, laser-guided rockets, and the Apache's 30mm cannon.

In the process, the drills demonstrated the utility of the V6 software and the weapons package against drone threats. Missions were flown exclusively by SCARNG aircrews, with various different detection and engagement scenarios being played out.

.../...

https://www.twz.com/air/u-s-army-ah-64e-apaches-counter-drone-capability-rapidly-matures
A fighter without a gun . . . is like an airplane without a wing.

-- Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF.

Harald



U.S. Special Operations Command orders more MH-47G helicopters from Boeing

U.S. Special Operations Command issued a $877 million delivery order to Boeing on November 20, 2025, for additional MH-47G Block II helicopters, extending production activities through late 2030.

On November 20, 2025, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) awarded a delivery order valued at $877,742,891 to Boeing for the procurement of more MH-47G special operation helicopters, with most manufacturing activity scheduled to continue until November 2030 under contracting activity at MacDill Air Force Base. This new order follows a sustained sequence of procurements that already include new-build and remanufactured MH-47G Block II, which remains the Night Stalkers' principal heavy assault helicopter.

This new contract is part of a wider sequence of modernization actions that began with a July 2018 indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract valued at $26.9 million for the production of MH-47G Block IIs. In June 2019, another contract valued at $194 million directed the delivery of several MH-47G Block IIs, and the first Block II helicopter reached the U.S. Special Operations Command in September 2020. In June 2021, the U.S. Department of State approved a foreign military sale of fourteen Block II Chinooks to the United Kingdom valued at 578 million dollars. The U.S. Army subsequently ordered two additional CH-47F Block IIs in October 2022, while, in December 2023, the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC) awarded Boeing a $271 million contract to produce six remanufactured MH-47G Block IIs. In March 2025, the USASOAC issued a new contract for five remanufactured MH-47G Block II helicopters valued at $240 million with deliveries beginning in 2027. These awards brought the total number of MH-47G Block II aircraft under contract to fifty-one and remain aligned with plans to complete the full USASOAC Chinook fleet by early 2030.

The MH-47G is the current special operations variant of the CH-47 Chinook, derived from earlier MH-47D and MH-47Es but incorporating updated electrical and hydraulic lines, monolithic-framed fuselage structures, and long-range fuel tanks integrated into enlarged sponsons sometimes described as fat tanks. Earlier MH-47D helicopters were CH-47D airframes with added engine control improvements and refueling probes, while MH-47E helicopters introduced more powerful T55-L-714 engines, enhanced fuel capacity, integral tanks, and additional avionics. With nicknamed the Night Stalkers, the MH-47G performs heavy assault tasks such as insertion and extraction of special operations forces, resupply missions, static ground refueling points known as fat cow operations, and serving as an airborne command and control node during complex missions. To date, the MH-47G is the only U.S. Army helicopter able to sustain special operations in the higher mountainous regions of Afghanistan and therefore supported tasks at altitudes that restricted other aircraft. Like other Chinook variants, the MH-47 additionally supports vehicle loading through a rear ramp.

Powered by two Honeywell T55-GA-714A turboshaft engines, each delivering 3,529 kilowatts (≈ 4,734 hp) and fitted with IES-47 infrared exhaust suppressors designed to lower the infrared signature during low-level and night operations, the MH-47G can reach a top speed ranging between 259 and 315 km/h, depending on the configuration. With a maximum gross weight of 24,494 kilograms, the helicopter can carry 7,828 liters of fuel, yielding a mission radius of 630 kilometers under typical profiles, while additional provisions for in-flight refueling extend, of course, mission duration. In terms of dimensions, the MH-47G's fuselage measures 15.9 meters in length, with an overall length of roughly 30.18 meters when rotors are unfolded; its rotor diameter of approximately 18.8 meters further helps the MH-47G for heavy internal and external loads. Speaking of which, cargo handling is supported by a rear ramp, a belly hatch, and side openings with bubble windows, while a starboard side forward door is fitted with a rescue hoist for personnel recovery, to manage fast loading and unloading.

The cockpit of the MH-47G uses a night vision goggle-compatible glass digital layout with five multi-function displays and two control display units, all integrated through the Common Avionics Architecture System shared with the MH-60M and other U.S. Army fleets. The avionics suite includes a digital moving map display, dual MIL-STD-1553 digital data buses, the AN/ASN-137 inertial doppler navigation system, the CP-1516/ASQ automatic target handoff system, the AN/ASN-149(V)2 GPS receiver, and a Rockwell Collins AN/ARN-149(V) direction finder. The sensor package contains the AN/ZSQ-2 electro-optical system with forward-looking infrared and day cameras mounted in a chin turret to support low-altitude operations in adverse visibility. Additional capability is provided by the AN/APQ-174B multimode radar and the more current AN/APQ-187 Silent Knight radar, both offering terrain following, terrain avoidance, and weather detection modes, all displayed on cockpit screens. Communications equipment includes an AN/ARC-220 high-frequency radio, an AN/ARC-201D single-channel ground and airborne radio, four AN/ARC-231 radios with two satcom-capable units, several jam-resistant AN/ASN-145 AHRS radios, the MTX Blue Force Tracker, and the AN/APX-123 identification transponder, while a digital intercommunication system links all crew positions.

Defensive equipment of the MH-47G includes the Common Missile Warning System, the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures, the AN/AVR-2B laser warning receiver, and XM216 dark flares that remain invisible to the unaided eye during deployment. Armament consists of two M134 7.62 mm electrically operated miniguns mounted at the forward port and starboard cabin openings and two M240D 7.62 mm belt-fed machine guns mounted in rear cabin windows, forming four operational gun stations. The MH-47G is equipped with multiple insertion and extraction systems, including the Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System for rapid deployment, the Special Patrol Insertion and Extraction System allowing up to eight personnel to clip onto a single rope, rope ladders deployed from the belly hatch, and an electrically powered rescue hoist above the forward door. A personnel location system is also integrated to locate downed aircrew using compatible emergency beacons.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/u-s-special-operations-command-orders-more-mh-47g-helicopters-from-boeing

Harald

Fabrikant NH90 schikt voor 305 miljoen met Noorwegen
Luchtvaartnieuws https://share.google/MEsI3wzXZ8cqmNyZ9

De deels Nederlandse helikopterfabrikant NHIndustries betaalt Noorwegen 305 miljoen euro om een conflict over gebrekkige marinehelikopters op te lossen. Noorwegen wilde van zijn contract voor NH90-helikopters af, omdat die met jarenlange vertraging werden geleverd en ondermaats zouden presteren.

NHIndustries is een samenwerkingsverband van het Frans-Duitse Airbus, het Italiaanse Leonardo en het Nederlandse GKN Fokker. De kleine Nederlandse partner maakt onder meer het landingsgestel van de helikopters.

Veel Europese landen en ook een aantal niet-Europese bondgenoten vliegen met de multifunctionele NH90. Die kan op zee en boven land transport en andere opdrachten uitvoeren. De productie verliep vanaf het begin echter moeizaam, mede doordat elke klant de helikopter naar eigen wens wilde aanpassen.

Noorwegen zegde in 2022 de bestelling van zijn veertien NH90's af. De rechtszaak over de schade is nu geschikt.


Harald



Thailand expands Super Puma fleet with Airbus H225 buy for rescue and medevac.

The Royal Thai Air Force signed a contract for two additional Airbus H225 helicopters dedicated to search-and-rescue and emergency medical missions. The purchase expands a fleet in service since 2015 and strengthens Thailand's capacity for disaster response and national security.

Airbus Helicopters, on September 26, 2025, announced that the Royal Thai Air Force has signed a contract for two additional H225 helicopters earmarked for search and rescue and emergency medical missions. The follow-on buy grows Thailand's Super Puma family, already in service since 2015, and will be completed locally by Thai Aviation Industries under its partnership with Airbus Helicopters. The announcement underscores a decade of operational use by the RTAF across CSAR, SAR, and troop transport, and signals continued reliance on heavy twin-engine lift for both national security and humanitarian response.

The H225, known in its military configuration as the H225M Caracal, is a heavy-lift, long-range helicopter powered by two Safran Makila 2A1 turboshafts and a five-blade Spheriflex main rotor, a combination that favors range, payload, and low vibration over prolonged maritime and overland sorties. The type offers a roughly 600 nautical mile class range with seating for up to 28 troops and an external sling capacity of about 4,750 kilograms. In its military profile, the airframe typically cruises near 262 km/h and can reach up to 324 km/h, sustaining endurance of more than four hours on standard internal fuel. These figures place the Caracal at the upper end of the medium-heavy segment for endurance SAR and tactical transport.

For Thailand's crews, the cockpit and automatic flight control system are the operational centerpiece. The H225 family carries a proven four-axis autopilot with SAR-dedicated upper modes such as search patterns, precise low-level automatic level-off, transition down to hover, and fly-away protection. The avionics suite supports RNP approaches down to LPV minima and provides real-time power margin awareness, reducing workload as missions shift from fast transit to high-precision hoist operations over water or mountainous terrain in poor visibility. In the cabin, quick role-change rails accommodate litters, medical kits, or troop seating, and the platform is cleared for multiple stretchers, belly or side hoists, and heavy underslung loads for disaster relief.

The Caracal's military fit adds range, survivability, and flexibility for CSAR and special operations. Operators can equip the aircraft with self-protection suites, armor kits, door guns, and an optional in-flight refueling probe for extended legs from ship or shore. In Southeast Asia's mixed maritime and jungle environment, the H225M's de-icing certification and shipboard compatibility expand the weather and basing envelope, supporting rapid launches for cyclone response, flood rescues, and medevac from remote provinces to urban trauma centers. For the RTAF, the new pair dedicated to SAR and EMS aligns with a fleet concept where existing H225Ms continue to handle CSAR and tactical lift, allowing maintenance and training synergies across aircrews and ground personnel.

This procurement fits a broader Thai modernization arc and a maturing industrial link with Airbus. Completion work in Thailand through Thai Aviation Industries embeds sustainment know-how and accelerates fleet availability. Thailand has also been assessing long-range air mobility and refueling options, including next-generation tanker-transports, signaling interest in a balanced force structure that pairs fixed-wing reach with rotary-wing responsiveness. Regionally, the move keeps Thailand aligned with other Asia-Pacific H225M users and diversifies heavy-lift capacity while avoiding the lifecycle and interoperability risks of a one-type fleet. Airbus notes that more than 360 H225 and H225M helicopters are in service worldwide with close to a million accumulated flight hours, a data point that matters in procurement cultures where reliability and fleet commonality outweigh brochure speed.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/thailand-expands-super-puma-fleet-with-airbus-h225-buy-for-rescue-and-medevac

silvester herc

Citaat van: Parera op 28/08/2025 | 14:11 uurU.S. Army tests spike missile from AH-64 in Poland



Ustka, Poland -- The United States Army, in close cooperation with the Polish Air Force Inspectorate, successfully completed a joint live fire campaign of the Spike NLOS missile system from a U.S. Army 12th Combat Aviation Brigade AH-64Ev6 Apache Guardian helicopter.

The campaign, held on the northern coast of Poland, marked an important milestone for allied long-range precision strike capabilities. During the campaign, two Spike NLOS missiles engaged sea-based targets at distances of up to 25 kilometers, demonstrating precision strike accuracy and flexible target engagement from a rotary-wing platform.

Observers from several countries, including senior military representatives and defense officials, witnessed the successful operational integration firsthand. This marked the first time that the U.S. Army employed the Spike NLOS missile in the European theater. The Spike NLOS missile's successful integration on the AH-64E Apache emphasizes the system's capability to meet evolving mission needs, particularly in maritime and beyond-line-of-sight scenarios.

The event underscored the growing strategic cooperation between the United States and Poland, further enhancing collective deterrence capabilities along NATO's eastern flank. This joint campaign not only demonstrates current operational effectiveness but also highlights the potential future direction for integration of Spike NLOS missiles onto Poland's own AH-64E Apache fleet, enhancing national and regional defense capabilities.

https://www.army.mil/article/288130